Stacey Pynn Complaint Against Matthew Pynn

Stacey Pynn Complaint Against Matthew Pynn is an extremely well-written complaint that I believe covers all the essential issues.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

(BUFFALO DIVISION)

 

Petitioner:  STACEY PYNN                                      )           Case : 24-cv-508 filed May 23, 2024

)

-vs-                                                                              )           COMPLAINT

)

Defendants:  MATTHEW PYNN,                             )

NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM )           DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF COURT              )

ADMINISTRATION, NIAGARA COUNTY,          )

NIAGARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF              )

SOCIAL SERVICES, NIAGARA COUNTY           )

CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES, NIAGARA     )

COUNTY CLERK’S OFFICE, NORMAN              )

  1. GEORGE, LAWRENCE MARKS, )

KEVIN M. CARTER, ANDREW ISENBERG        )

DEAN PULEO, KEITH D. KIBBLER, DANIEL    )

  1. FURLONG, RICHARD KLOCH             )

FRANK SEDITA III, SARA SHELDON,                )

CATHERINE NUGENT-PANEPINTO,                   )

JOSEPH JASTRZEMSKI, LISA KESSLER             )

DAVID HAYLET JR., CLAUDE JOERG,               )

MEGHAN LUTZ, NIAGARA COUNTY CPS         )

SUPERVISOR “JANE DOE”, RHONDA PLATT   )

CHARLES P. BEN, NICHOLAS D’ANGELO        )

BIANCA GATTO, DAVID NATHANSON,            )

STANLEY EDWARDS, RONALD WILSON,        )

JOHN SPERO, OTHER “JANE DOES” and            )

“JOHN DOES”                                                           )

__________________________________________)

 

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

  1. Plaintiff, Stacey Pynn, brings this action against Defendant/s Matthew Pynn et al., and alleges, upon information, the record of previous proceedings, and belief and hereby submits the following for consideration by this honorable Court.

 

APPLICATION OF LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION

  1. Plaintiff Stacey Pynn appears here in her pro se status. As such, this Plaintiff respectfully requests that her pleadings herein will be liberally construed by this honorable Court, pursuant to the standards established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (Holding that: “ a pro se litigant’s pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” are held to the most liberal of standards because pro se litigants may be less capable of formulating legally-competent initial pleadings.)

 

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

  1. This Court has jurisdiction over these matters pursuant to 42 U.S. Code § 1983. A suit brought under 42 U.S. Code § 1983 is a civil action for deprivation of rights. (“ anyone who deprives a United States citizen of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws is liable to the injured party. The injured party can take action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”) (See:42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statue, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction on thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party.)

 

4.           Jurisdiction and venue is proper here pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 1391 which provides in relevant part that “28 USC §1391.  Except as otherwise provided by law—(1)this section shall govern the venue of all civil actions brought in district courts of the United States; and (2) the proper venue for a civil action shall be determined without regard to whether the action is local or transitory in nature.” (See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that officials acting in abuse of their authority who deprive an individual of a constitutional right may be liable under § 1983.)(See also, Brown v. State of New York, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 52 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1996). 2 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.) In Brown, the New York Court of Appeals held that individuals may assert claims for compensatory damages for violations of their rights protected by the equal protection guarantees of the New York State Constitution.

5.           Additionally, Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 28 USC §§ 1331 and 1343, supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §1367;

6.          Venue is properly laid in the Western District of New York Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated.

 

  1. Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides Federal Courts can hear all cases in law and

equity arising under this Constitution, [and] the laws of the United States.  The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause broadly, finding that it allows federal courts to hear any case in which there is a federal ingredient, see Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 (1824)

 

  1. Plaintiff asserts that this court is appropriate as this complaint falls within this district’s subject matter jurisdiction and seek damages from Defendants for injuries suffered from an alleged fraud involving a state court judgment, the adjudication of and Plaintiff does not require the federal court to sit in review of any state court judgments.  Furthermore, Plaintiff seeks permissible injunctive remedy against state courts and state court judges, (see Motion #1 for TRO or Federal Receivership).

 

  1.  This court also has jurisdiction over these matters pursuant to18 U.S. Code § 3509 – Child victims’ and child witnesses’ rights[1] and 42 U.S.C. § 13031[2], and 18 U.S.C. § 2241– Aggravated sexual abuse 18 U.S.C. § 2242– Sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 2243– Sexual abuse of a minor or ward and 18 U.S.C. § 2244– Abusive sexual contact, and 18 U.S. Code § 3231 – District courts; and whatsoever rules, laws, regulations and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may apply. The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.

 

  1. Jurisdiction and venue are proper here pursuant to activity pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See 18 U.S.C. § 1964.

 

 

NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACTION

  1. The criminal activities, cover ups, and corruption involving all of the Defendants, either jointly and/or severally in both their personal and/or administrative, and/or illegal judicial  capacities constitute criminal activity pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See 18 U.S.C. § 1964.

 

  1. The Petitioner also brings this lawsuit pursuant to pursuant to 42 U.S. Code § 1983.

 

  1. The Plaintiff brings this private civil action for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

 

  1. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conduct involves statutorily  prohibited activities: (1) investing in, (2) acquiring, and/or (3) conducting or participating in an enterprise with income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, and (4) conspiring to commit the first three types of activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(d).

 

  1.   As to the element of causation, this plaintiff alleges that the unlawful conduct of all of the Defendants was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Harmoni International Spice, Inc. v. Hume, 914 F.3d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 2019)
  2. The Plaintiff brings this Complaint RICO 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d), the conduct and conspiracy prongs of the statute.

 

  1.  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), the Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against all Defendants’  (1) conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity (known as “predicate acts”), (5) causing injury to the Plaintiff and her minor children by the conduct constituting the violations and criminal activities set forth herein.. See Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005).

 

  1.   The Defendants each committed criminal acts and conduct and had some part in directing the affairs of their criminal enterprise. [3]

 

  1. The Defendants conducted a pattern of racketeering activity, which resulted in irreparable harm to the Plaintiff and her minor children, from on or about February 4, 2013.[4]

 

  1. The Defendants each conspired and schemed and conducted a criminal enterprise involving the exploitation and abuse of minors and conspired and conducted cover ups to conceal their ongoing criminal activity in the same.[5]
  2.  The Defendants criminal conduct was interrelated in purpose and scope and embraced criminal acts that had the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and were not isolated events.[6]

 

  1.   The criminal conduct of the Defendants was “long term” as defined under the RICO Act, beginning at least on or before February 4, 2013, and continuing until present day.[7]

 

  1.  The Plaintiff alleges that the misconduct and criminal activity constitutes racketeering activity because the relevant conduct consists of at least one of the indictable predicate acts listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) (“‘[R]acketeering activity’ consists of no more and no less than commission of a predicate act.”).

 

  1. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants’ conduct involved violations and criminal conduct through predicate offenses pursuant to: §§ 1461–1465 (relating to obscene matter); §1503 (relating to obstruction of justice); §1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations);  1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement); §1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant); §1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant); §§ 1581–1592 (relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons); §1952 (relating to racketeering); §§2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2260 (relating to sexual exploitation of children); §§2421–24 (relating to white slave traffic); and title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery).

 

  1. The RICO Act required predicate acts alleged by the Plaintiff and committed by the Defendants are proven upon the record as it exists and by a preponderance of the evidence. See Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1987).

 

  1. This case is brought by the Plaintiff, Stacey Pynn, and it is based upon the reckless and harmful endangerment and neglect and abuse of minor children involving, but not limited to, violent physical and sexual abuse, molestation, and sex trafficking of children and the cover up of these crimes, being conducted in the state of New York involving each of the Defendants.

 

  1. The Defendants all conducted, and continue to conduct knowingly and willfully, at various and sundry times, violent, abusive, neglectful, predatory, criminal and harmful acts against children. All Defendants listed above were, or still are, directly or indirectly involved in the perpetration and conspiracy to abuse children and the cover up of these crimes, as proven upon the record of proceedings and the testimony of the victims. The Defendants perpetrate, promote and cover up these crimes in a continuing criminal enterprise.

 

  1. The Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages based upon the ongoing pain and suffering resulting from the abuses committed, tolerated, and allowed to continue unchecked, by all Defendants, who all at some time and in some way participated directly or indirectly in this criminal abuse of the Plaintiff’s children, and other children, in violation of the laws of the State of New York and the United States.

 

  1.      The scheme of child sex trafficking, sexual abuse, molestation and kidnapping of minor children, and the cover up of these crimes, under the guise of child protection, involves each of the Defendants. These abuses constitute violation of the criminal codes of both the State of New York and the United States as set forth more specifically herein.

 

  1. Over the course of many years the Defendants directly or indirectly, through means jointly and severally, at various and sundry times, sexually exploited and abused minor children through a scheme involving the child protective services administrations of the state of New York, and the New York Court systems.

 

  1. These abuses were conducted at various places and involved various institutions enacted and organized under the guise of protecting the rights of these abused children. These abuses involved the abduction of children from their individual and jointly married parents under the guise of child protection. The system, and status quo, of the administrative and judicial institutions set forth herein conducted the crimes willfully and knowingly to the exploitation of numerous minor children throughout the state of New York in violation of the laws of the United States, as set furthermore specifically herein below.

 

  1. Defendant Matthew Pynn, in conjunction with and through conspiracy and direct involvement in these crimes, with the aiding and abetting of the other Defendants conspired and actively jointly and severally permitted, allowed, corroborated, authorized, participated in, sanctioned, endorsed and covered up, criminal activity in conjunction with Defendant Matthew Pynn were, and continue to be involved in a scheme of child sex trafficking and cover-ups and continued sexual abuse and molestation and sex-trafficking of minors.

 

  1. To wit, from at least on or about May 10, 2013, up to and including today, Matthew Pynn  and his codefendants were involved in the sanctioned illegal abduction, through court ordered removal of custody from custodial parents, through false premises, and other means set forth more specifically herein, caused to be enticed and actually removed and “kidnapped” minor children for the purposes of engaging said minor children in abusive sex acts and molestation and abuse.

 

  1. Furthermore, Matthew Pynn and the codefendants did conspire and involve themselves in order to ensure and maintain the supply of children, and to increase the supply of victims.

 

  1. Matthew Pynn and his codefendants used and implemented the Court system and protective services established and used the confidentiality afforded by these forums for the purposes of child protection to discretely supply these victims under the guise child protection.

 

  1. Defendant Matthew Pynn’s sexually abused his own children. Plaintiff’s own and other children, some as young as six years of age, were also either directly or indirectly abused by the codefendants and coconspirators through coercion, grooming and provision of further victims.

 

  1.     In creating and maintaining this network of minor victims throughout the State of New York designed to sexually abuse and exploit minor children, Matthew Pynn and his associates and codefendants worked and conspired together to provide victims through the New York Child Protective Services system, which were established and obligated to the protection of children.

 

  1. With the sanctioning, endorsement, involvement and protection of the Defendants Defendant Matthew Pynn has been allowed to continue to sexually abuse, repeatedly strangulate and neglect Plaintiffs four minor children. All Defendants neglected and participated either directly or indirectly in this criminal conduct.

 

  1. All Defendants, including Matthew Pynn and his codefendants as accomplices, aid and abettors, and coconspirators have knowingly and willfully refused and neglected to perform their legal duties of office owed and demanded from their positions and employment owed to people in the state of New York.

 

  1. All Defendants have knowingly and willfully refused to follow, neglected, and violated the Rules of Civil Procedure governing our courts, and the rules and requirements applicable to child protection services required to ensure the safety of mine and other children in the state of New York, and denied constitutionally guaranteed due process to the victims and parents of the abused and neglected children.

 

To wit,

  • The state of New York knowingly and willfully circumvented, neglected, violated, and/or refused to implement policies and procedures in place, or that should have been implemented and put into place, designed to prevent fraud and abuse and standards and procedures concerning conflicts of interests among persons.
  • The state of New York refused to maintain diligent hiring practices and employee oversight, as required.
  • The state of New York knowingly and willfully refused to investigate reports, tips, and evidence of child abuse, sexual abuse, strangulation and physical abuse of minor children, and in incidents where these abuses were known to the State of New York, the State of New York knowingly, willfully and criminally covered them up.
  • The state of New York knowingly and willfully refused to perform its obligation to prevent the abuse of children in any and all ways, by any and all means, and to prevent further abuse from occurring.

 

PARTIES

  1. Plaintiff, Stacey Pynn, is a resident of the State of New York and resides at

7217Woodmore Court, Lockport, New York 14094. She is mother to the four children abused by Defendant Matthew Pynn and the other Defendants.  She is a licensed physician assistant, notary public and a certified paralegal.  She is court watcher and founder of The Lock Keeper Court Watchers, LLC.

 

  1. Defendant New York State Unified Court System (“NYS UCS”) is a department of

government of New York State that includes all courts in New York State and provides a broad range of services to promote the rule of law and strives to deliver Justice for all.  It consists of twelve (12) State and Federal-funded courts.  They include three appellate courts – the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court and the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court – and nine trial courts – the Supreme Cout, the Court of Claims, County Court, Family Court, Surrogate’s Court and Criminal Courts of New York City, the District Courts on Long Island, and the City Courts outside New York City.  Defendant NYS UCS is located at 25 Beaver Street, 8th Floor Room 830, New York, New York 10004.

 

  1. Defendant New York State Office of Court Administration (“NYS OCA”) is an

administrative arm of NYS UCS that is responsible for financing and management of all courts in the NYS UCS, including Family Court; Defendant NYS OCA is located at Office of Court Administration, Rm. 852 25 Beaver Street New York, NY 10004.

 

  1. Defendant Niagara County Department of Social Services (herein after “Niagara

DSS”) is a New York State Local Department of Social Services located in Niagara County, New York, This Defendant is located at 301 10th street, Niagara Falls, NY 14302.

 

  1. Defendant Niagara County Child Protective Services (“Niagara CPS”) is a subdivision of Niagara DSS, charged with investigating reports of child abuse or neglect, whose purpose is to ensure that children are safe to prevent any future abuse or neglect through the provision of supportive services. This Defendant is located at 301 Tenth Street, Niagara Falls, NY, 14302.

 

  1. Defendant Niagara County Clerk’s Office is a department of the government of

Niagara County maintains official governmental records, including official court records and documents. This Defendant is located at Niagara County Courthouse, PO Box 461, 175 Hawley Street, 1st Floor, Lockport, NY 14095-0461

 

  1. Defendant Lawrence Marks NYS OCA Registration # 1871508 is an Attorney in the State of New York and is the former Chief Administrative Judge of the NYS UCS.  He was responsible as “chief executive officer” in the exercise of the functions, powers, and duties of a “public employer” under the provisions of article fourteen of the civil service law.  He was responsible for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the New York Statewide court system pursuant to N.Y. Jud. Law §212.  He was responsible for holding hearings on conduct investigations and promulgating rules of conduct for judges in New York State. He  is responsible for the appointment of Defendants Kevin Carter as Administrative Judge of the New York State Eighth (8th) Judicial District and Keith D. Kibler as the New York State Family Court Supervising Judge of the Eighth (8th) Judicial District. This Defendant is located at 25 Beaver Street Room 852 New York, NY 10004.

 

  1. Defendant Norman St. George NYS OCA Registration # 2249522 is an attorney

registered in New York State and is the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge in New York State.  He is responsible for overseeing all trial-level courts throughout New York State, along with the departments and operations within the Office of Court Administration.  He is responsible for receiving, reviewing and investigating complaints about the conduct of the courts within New York State. This Defendant is located at 100 Supreme Court Drive Mineola, NY 11501.

 

  1. Defendant Kevin M. Carter NYS OCA Registration #2420016 is an attorney in the state

of New York.  He is currently the purported Administrative Judge of the New York State Eighth (8th) Judicial District.  His responsibilities include ensuring due process in court, holding hearings on conduct investigations in accordance with the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge and authorizing the transfer of court proceedings from one judge to another. This Defendant is located at Erie County Hall 92 Franklin Street, 3rd floor. Buffalo, NY 14202

 

  1. Defendant Andrew Isenberg, NYS OCA Registration #2534113 is an attorney in

the state of New York.  At all times during this complaint, he was the executive assistant to Defendant Kevin M. Carter. This Defendant is located at Erie County Hall 92 Franklin Street, 3rd floor. Buffalo, NY 14202.

 

  1. Defendant Dean Puleo, NYS OCA Registration #4105045 is an attorney in the state

of New York.  At all times during this complaint, he was the assistant to Defendant Kevin M. Carter for Town and Village Courts in the State of New York 8th Judicial District. This Defendant is located at 92 Franklin Street Fl 3rd Buffalo, New York 14202.

 

  1. Defendant Keith D. Kibler, He is a supervising judge of the Eighth (8th) Judicial District This Defendant is located at 189 N Main St., Warsaw, NY 14569.

 

  1. Defendant Daniel J. Furlong is a Justice of the New York State Supreme Court, Eighth (8th) Judicial District.  This Defendant is located at Erie County Court Building 25 Delaware Avenue, Ground floor, Buffalo, NY 14202.

 

  1. Defendant Frank Sedita III Registration # 2134468 is a New York Supreme Court Judge in the Eighth Judicial District. This Defendant is located at Niagara County Courthouse 175 Hawley Street Lockport, NY 14094. 

 

  1. Defendant Catherine Nugent-Panepinto is a justice of the Supreme Court, 8th Judicial District. Her term expires December 31, 2024. This Defendant is located at 92 Franklin St, Buffalo, NY 14202.

 

 

  1. Defendant Claude Joerg, Registration# 1936525 is the Niagara County Attorney.  This Defendant is located at 175 Hawley St., Lockport, NY 14094.

 

  1. Defendant Joseph Jastrzemski is the Niagara County Clerk

This Defendant is located at 175 Hawley St., Lockport, NY 14094.

 

  1. Defendant Lisa Kessler is an employee of the Niagara County Clerk’s Office.

This Defendant is located at 175 Hawley St., Lockport, NY 14094.

 

  1. Defendant David Haylett Jr. Registration #5187356 is an1 attorney for Defendant Niagara County Department of Social Services.  He is a partner at Seaman Norris LLP. *This Defendant is located at 175 Hawley Street19, Lockport NY 14095.

 

  1. Defendant Nicholas D’Angelo is a disbarred attorney formerly employed by the Defendant Niagara County Department of Social Services. He is a convicted sex offender.  D’Angelo is a violent eight-time-convicted felony serial rapist. Defendant is located at 4217 Ridge Road Lockport, New York 14094.

 

  1. Defendant Meghan Lutz is a Niagara County Department of Social Services Commissioner.  As a Social Services Commissioner she oversees the overall operations, including training and hiring of Niagara County Child Protective Services employees.  This Defendant is located at 301 10th street, Niagara Falls, NY 14302.

 

  1. Defendant Bianca Gatto at all times during this Complaint is a supervisor for Niagara

County Child Protective Services.  She is responsible for overseeing the conduct and training of caseworkers.  This Defendant is located at 301 10th St, Niagara Falls, NY 14303.

 

  1. Defendant Rhonda Platt is a caseworker for Niagara County Child Protective Services.   She is charged with conducting investigations concerned with child welfare.    This Defendant is located at 301 10th St, Niagara Falls, NY 14303.

 

  1. Defendant Charles P. Ben NYS OCA Registration #1790443 was at all times during this

Complaint an attorney in the State of New York.  He is the attorney for children in the state of  New York Supreme Court, county of  Niagara This Defendant is located at 193 East Ave. Lockport, NY 14094.

 

  1. Defendant David Nathanson at all times during this complaint is a purported forensic

psychologist licensed in New York State license #013295. This Defendant is located at 1275 Delaware Ave. Buffalo, NY 14209.

 

  1. Defendant Ronald Wilson is a New York State Trooper Investigator, Troop A in Batavia New York.  This Defendant is located at 4525 W Saile Dr, Batavia, NY 14020.

 

  1. Stanley Edwards III is a New York State Trooper Major and Commander of Troop A.  He is also on the New York State Police Internal Affairs Bureau Western Region for Professional Standards.  This Defendant is located at 4525 W Saile Dr, Batavia, NY 14020.

 

  1. Defendant John Spero is a New York State Trooper Investigator, shield #953This Defendant is located at 6566 Dysinger Road, Lockport, New York 14094.

 

  1. Defendant, Matthew Pynn, is an attorney licensed to practice in New York Registration NYS OCA #2603744 and was a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Debtor in the year 2015He is a former attorney for Defendant Niagara County CPS and current employee of Defendant Niagara County as a Public Defender frequently appearing regularly in all courts located around Niagara County.  He stands accused of sexual abuse and the strangulation of his own children. This Defendant is located at 112 LeVan Avenue Lockport, New York 14094.

 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 

  1. From February 27, 2002, to the present Defendant Matthew Pynn has been employed as

an attorney by Niagara County, initially as an Assistant Social Services Attorney for the Niagara County Department of Social Services, and for the past twenty (20) years a Niagara County Public Defender.  Due to the nature of his job as a Niagara County Public Defender, he works regularly within the courts located in Niagara County and as a result is well acquainted with judges, court officials and court staffers.  He is also well acquainted with local police and other investigative officers, especially child welfare investigators for Defendant Niagara County CPS since at one time he was also employed there.

 

  1. Plaintiff Stacey Pynn and Defendant Matthew Pynn were married June 15, 2002, and four children resulted from their marriage, female HP born April 10, 2006, male LP born December 22, 2006, and twin females MP and AP born December 16, 2009.  On or around May 10, 2013, Defendant Stacey Pynn filed for divorce in the New York State Supreme Court, County of Niagara case e150065/2013.

 

  1. Plaintiff Stacey Pynn was unaware at the time that the courts and child welfare agencies located in and around Niagara County had conspired to criminally cover up the severe child abuse and maltreatment committed by her then spouse Defendant Matthew Pynn.

 

  1. The Reprehensible Hiring Practice of the New York State Courts and Child Welfare Agencies in Niagara County is Well Known yet the State Courts and Niagara County Do Little or Nothing or Attempts to Conceal the Issues from the Public.

 

  1. The reprehensible hiring practices and inhumane treatment in the New York State courts detailed herein involve failures to prevent fraud, abuse, and conflict of interest among persons are in violation of 42 United States Code §602(6) and illegally violate New York State’s contract with the Federal Government to received Title IV Federal Funding under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”). These deliberate and knowingly made fraudulent violations of the False Claims Act mandate that the state must pay back threefold the multi-millions it has fraudulently received to the United States government and the federal taxpayers that the state of New York has bilked out of these fraudulently obtained proceeds. Indeed,  New York State should be denied future Federal Funding immediately, or else, through association and allowing this fraud to continue the United States government itself is complicit in not only the fraud but also the horrific crimes against children and families which are being committed by the State of New York through its agents.

 

  1. The Defendants have all conspired and actually committed and covered up the hiring of multiple disgraced criminal public officials. Defendant Matthew Pynn’s child sexual abuse, strangulation and other multiple forms of child abuse, all of which have been proven and exist as a matter of public record, constitute criminal conduct under to18 U.S. Code § 3509 – Child victims’ and child witnesses’ rights[8] and 42 U.S.C. § 13031[9], and 18 U.S.C. § 2241– Aggravated sexual abuse 18 U.S.C. § 2242– Sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 2243– Sexual abuse of a minor or ward and 18 U.S.C. § 2244– Abusive sexual contact, and 18 U.S. Code § 3231.

 

  1. Endorsement of these criminal acts by administrators of the courts and child welfare protective services and the judges violate New York state’s Title IV Federal Funding income requirements.  See 45 CFR §302 State Plan Requirements, See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) “Congress authorized the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) to audit and cut off funds to States whose programs do not substantially comply with Title IVs (contract) requirements.”

 

  1. Considering the extensive monetary income obtained through the New York state’s defrauding of the Title IV federal funding program, the fraudsters should and must be prosecuted under the law.

 

  1. Plaintiff’s children are victims of child sex trafficking by the Defendants, including the government officials involved as alleged herein.

 

  1.  Many of these predatory and corrupt government officials have failed or neglected to take and file their lawfully obligated public officer’s oath of office in violation of New York State Public Officer’s Law §10.  Many have defective oaths.  They have failed to establish a trust they will uphold the U.S. and New York State Constitution in their elected or appointed role.  See Cooper v Aaron 358 U.S. 1, 78 C. Ct. 1401 (1925), “any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the Unites States wars against the Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the supreme law of the land.  The Judge has engaged in acts of treason.  The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “no state legislator or executive or judicial officer can wage war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.”  No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can wage war against the Constitution without violating his solemn oath to support it.  358 U.S. 18.

 

 

The New York Senate held a hearing on November 1, 2023, calling the New York state Family Court System “dehumanizing” and involving a “demeaning cattle-call culture.”  

 

  1. The Defendants’ reprehensible conduct and inhumane treatment of people is public knowledge and described herein:

 

  1. Defendant Lawrence Marks stepped down from his position as Chief Administrative Judge amidst an investigation by the New York State Civil Liberties Union and his role in a confidential memorandum advising judges to ignore certain evidence in Temporary Orders of Protection.  Defendant Lawrence Marks’s oath for his position as Chief Administrative Judge of the NYS UCS is defective and therefore not valid thus failing his lawful obligation as a public officer to establish a trust that he will uphold the U.S. Constitution.  This also complicates any assigns by Defendant Lawrence Marks that they are void given the vacatur of his position as Chief Administrative Judge ab initio due to the self-executing effects of New York State Public Officer’s Law §30 (h). His last reported pay for this position by his employer New York State was $227,800 in the year 2022.

 

  1. Defendant Norman St. George has failed to file his public officer oath with the New York State Department of State for his position of the First Deputy Administrative Judge in New York State.  As such his position is vacant pursuant to New York State Public Officer’s Law §30(h) and he is not afforded the statutory protections of his position as a public official.  His publicly reported New York State pay for this position in the year 2022 was $222,200.

 

  1. Defendant Niagara County has been under public fire for reprehensible hiring practices, See the Investigative Post Scheer, Mark “Niagara County Keeps Hiring Disgraced GOPers… Not Even Felonies Disqualify Job Candidates” Jan. 30, 2021, Niagara County keeps hiring disgraced GOPers – Investigative Post : Investigative Post last visited May 13, 2024, noting among other troubling county employees, the Niagara County employment trainer Glenn Aronow is a disgraced former senate staffer, who lost his post due to sexual harassment.

 

 

  1. Defendant Niagara County Department of Social Services has been under public fire for the blunder in hiring Defendant Nicholas D’Angelo as a Child Protective Services Attorney who at the time of his hiring to work for the Department was a known sex offender who offended on a fourteen year old girl in a school hallway, see the Niagara Gazette, Pfifer, Rick, “Judge to monitor Falls student | Local News | niagara-gazette.com” August 15, 2010, last visited May 14, 2024.

 

  1. A social media group on Facebook exists solely dedicated to Defendant Kevin M. Carter, “Wrecking Families” as a Family Court Judge and Eighth Judicial District Administrator.  Defendant Kevin M. Carter failed to file his public officer oath for his position as Administrator to the 8th Judicial District with New York State in violation of New York State Public Officer’s Law §10. As such his position is vacant pursuant to New York State Public Officer’s Law §30 (h) and he is not afforded the statutory protections of his position as a public official.  His last publicly reported income for this position is $218,500 in the year 2023.

 

  1. Defendant Andrew Isenberg, legal assistant to the Defendant Kevin M. Carter in the Eighth Administrative Judicial Office was arrested for inappropriate conduct in a boy’s locker room on March 25, 2023, see Spectrum News, Skoog, Katie “Two people, including state court official, arrested in Alumni Arena men’s locker room – The Spectrum (ubspectrum.com)”, March 25, 2023, last visited May 14, 2024.  His last publicly reported pay for this position in the year 2022 was $170,884.

 

  1. Defendant Dean Puleo, another legal assistant to the Defendant Kevin M. Carter in the Eighth Administrative Judicial Office was arrested in his past for strangulating his much younger girlfriend on July 17, 2010, see The East Aurora Advertiser, “Puleo Pleads Not Guilty to Harassment Charge – East Aurora Advertiser (eastaurorany.com)” July 22, 2010, last visited May 14, 2024.  His last publicly reported income for this position was $124,099 in 2023.

 

  1. Defendant Richard Kloch has a history of judicial misconduct  as a Court of Claims Judge in New York State, County of Niagara for his failure to recuse in cases involving his own family, see Niagara Gazette, Scheer, Mark, “Claim asks for Kloch’s recusal | Local News | niagara-gazette.com” October 29, 2010, last visited May 14, 2024.  His last publicly reported income for this position was $210,322 in the year 2021.

 

 

  1. Defendant Daniel J. Furlong has made international news including Fox and the Tucker Carlson Show for his egregious adjudication as a Supreme Court Judge in the state of New York, county of Niagara, with Tucker Carlson stating, “I would rather have cancer than go through this.”  See The Tucker Carlson Show, Carlson, Tucker, “Uncensored: The Battle for Parental Rights (tuckercarlson.com)” April 19, 2024.  Last visited May 14, 2024.  His last publicly reported income for this position was $210,900 in the year 2023.

 

  1. Defendant Frank Sedita III now a Supreme Court Judge in the state of New York, county of Niagara has received public scrutiny for an apparent bribery scheme, “pay to play”.  See the Buffalo News, “Sedita strong arms his staff to pry big donations (buffalonews.com)” August 7, 2013.  Last visited May 14, 2024.  He ran unopposed and was elected as a Justice of the New York State Supreme Court, Eighth (8th) Judicial District in November 2015.  His last publicly reported income for this position was $210,900 in the year 2023.

 

  1. Defendant Sara Sheldon received public scrutiny when she presided on a case as Supreme Court Judge in the state of New York, county of Niagara that her adjudication was favorable to rapists.  See The Buffalo News, “Editorial: Judge’s sentences diminished, disrespected victims of rape (buffalonews.com)”, Updated June 22, 2021, last visited May 14, 2024.  Her last publicly reported income for this position was $190,875 in the year 2016.

 

  1. Defendant Catherine Nugent-Panepinto is a disgraced Supreme Court Judge in the state of New York, county of Niagara who was censored December 9, 2020, for violations of a host of Rules Governing Judicial Conduct Sections 100.1, 100.2(A), 100.2(C), 100.3(B)(8), 100.4(A)(1) and (2) and 100.4(G) in another matter.  Her spouse is Marc C. Panepinto, a former 60th District senate member, is also a censored attorney for sexually inappropriate conduct whose license was temporarily suspended at two different times, and he spent time in prison for “bid to cover up sexual advances.”  Newspapers also reported complaints that Catherine Nugent-Panepinto was serving alcohol to minors at her residence, see The Buffalo News, McCarthy, Robert “City Honors parents complained about Panepinto underate drinking parties”, https://buffalonews.com/news/local/city-honors-parents-complained-about-underage-drinking-parties/article_c0f873b6-04b6-536b-abd2-df31365fd12b.html.  Last visited May 22, 2024.  She has failed to properly file her lawfully obligated public officer oath pursuant to New York State Public Officer’s Law §10 and therefore her position of judge is vacant ab initio pursuant to the self-executing effects of New York State Public Officer’s Law §30(h).  Her last publicly reported income for this position was $210,900 in the year 2023.
  2. Defendant Joseph Jastrezemski has had allegations of harassment levied against him in his official capacity as the Niagara County Clerk that he racially discriminated and sexually harassed a former courier of Defendant Niagara County Clerk’s Office.  See The Buffalo News, Prohaska, Thomas, “State agency holds hearing on harassment charges against Niagara County clerk (buffalonews.com)”, March 7, 2022.  Last visited May 14, 2024.  His publicly reported pay was $102,981 in the year 2022 for this position.

 

  1. Defendant Claude Joerg has received complaints that he abuses his position as the Niagara County Attorney to secure legal cases for his attorney family.  See the Niagara Gazette, Sheer, Mark, “Firm employing county attorney’s son hired to defend migrant case | Local News | niagara-gazette.com” July 27, 2023.  Last visited May 14, 2024.  He is also the chair of the Niagara County Ethics Committee.  His last reported income for the position as a Niagara County Attorney in the year 2022 was $144,231.

 

  1. Defendant Charles P. Ben was formally advised by the Attorney Grievance Committee for violation of confidentiality pursuant to New York State Judiciary Law §90 on December 13, 2019, and has been subject to a legal malpractice case that settled outside of court in the State of New York Supreme Court, County of Niagara by Ricky Longfritz in August 2016 case e159324/2016. His attorney father was also grieved in the past for maintaining conflict-of-interest cases, and Defendant Charles P. Ben was involved in that matter.

 

  1. Defendant Nicholas D’Angelo, now disbarred, was a registered attorney in the State of New York.  He was an attorney who formerly worked for Defendant Niagara County CPS.  He was hired despite it being publicly known that he was a child sex offender and is now deemed a level three (3) serial violent sex offender after a plea for eight (8) felony rape charges including a sixteen-year-old child who was a ward of the state.  See WKBW local news, “Attorney pleads guilty to multiple charges for sexually assaulting victims. (wkbw.com)” April 25, 2023.  Last visited May 14, 202.  Defendant Nicholas D’Angelo only got a suspicious deal of four months in jail and an agreement not to prosecute him for any other remaining crimes despite the violation of 18 U.S.C. §2243, (child sex trafficking via his position with Defendant Niagara County Child Protective Services), for which local media and the courts horrifically defamed the child victim an “under-age prostitute.”

 

 

  1. Defendant Bianca Gatto is a product Niagara County’s nepotism in hiring practices. She is employed by Defendant Niagara County as a Child Protective Services supervisor.  Her aunt is Pamela Gatto, her mother is Christine Gatto, and her father is Anthony Gatto.  Her aunt, mother and father all employees of Niagara with Child Protective Services/DSS.  Each has worked with Defendant Matthew Pynn during his employment in Niagara County Child Protection.  Complaints circulated the internet upon her hiring to work for Niagara County Child Protective Services alleging nepotism in favor of her over more suitable candidates who scored much higher on their civil service exams.  She ranked 30th on her civil service exam June 29, 2012, yet was hired above all these candidates who scored better. For her position, and for her involvement in the sexual abuse of children, in the year 2022 she was paid $62,244.

 

  1. Defendant David Nathanson has received nearly a dozen or more complaints submitted to his oversight the Office of Professional Discipline for his license through the New York State Department of Education.  One mom complained that he constructed a report that recommended she lose custody because at one time she cried in front of her son during a custody battle.  Another couple complained that David Nathanson called them delusional when they complained to him their child was not safe, and that child was later murdered.  He is a very controversial forensic psychologist within the courts and the concern is he is recommending custody to child abusers over the safe parent.

 

  1. Defendant Ronald Wilson is a corrupt New York State Police Officer that has been disciplined for multiple preventable auto and drunk driving collisions.  The most recent auto collision on April 24, 2021, on Southwestern Boulevard in Orchard Park New York involved Defendant Ronald Wilson driving while intoxicated after drinking at least 5 scotch and sodas “in pint sized containers”, one shot of unknown liquor, and one Manhattan, was witnessed to be speeding and hit the vehicle of a developmentally disabled person.  Ronald Wilson, as a matter of record lied to police initially when asked if he was the driver of the vehicle.  He received 35 days suspension without pay and is still a New York State Police Officer today.  This criminally corrupts police officer is paid  $161,391, and is allowed to conduct himself unchecked while violating the laws of the state of New York which would land civilians in prison.

 

  1. Defendant Stanely Edwards III has failed to file his public officer’s oath to the New York State Department of State pursuant to New York State Public Officer’s Law §10, therefore his position is vacant pursuant to the self-executing effects of New York State Public Officer’s Law §30.  His last publicly reported income for this position in 2023 was $185, 973.

 

  1. Defendant Matthew Pynn is an attorney for Defendant Niagara County formerly for Child Protection Services and current Public Defender.  He is currently still licensed and allowed to practice law in the state of New York.  His children disclosed sexual abuse and strangulation by him.  He has been substantiated for child abuse / maltreatment four times by Erie County Child Protective Services in New York for medical neglect, inadequate guardianship and educational neglect.  He filed Chapter 7 Bankruptcy on December 31, 2015.  He has been fined by the New York State Worker’s Compensation Board for $3000.00 and closed his law practice.

 

 

  1. The United States is Among the Top Three Countries in the World For Child Sex Trafficking According to Our Own Government and a Main Way Children Are Sought is Through The Child Welfare System.

 

 

  1. The United States Department of State on Human Trafficking that have consistently reported the United States is among the top three countries in the world for human trafficking.  The report explained and confirmed that children are provided to pedophiles through the foster care system.  New York State is among the top four states, (among California, Texas, and Florida) in the U.S. for child sex trafficking according to those reports.

 

  1. For over a decade, Plaintiff, her four children and multiple other concerned reporters reported to the Courts and Defendant Niagara County CPS that the child abuse ring now in place in the child protective services system and is always swept under the rug by the Defendants.

 

  1. Despite the plethora of evidence that the Plaintiff’s children were sexually abused, strangulated, and harshly neglected, by Defendant Matthew Pynn, in lieu of protecting the children and Plaintiff, the Defendants, for over a decade, committed, conspired to commit and covered up the child sexual abuse, strangulation and multiple forms of woeful neglect of the Defendant Matthew Pynn by denial of a fair forum for court and Child Protection investigations. Defendants also knowingly and willfully created biased reports and or obstructed documents from official court records to affect adjudication and protect themselves from their personal involvement being revealed.

 

  1. Plaintiff was denied her right to access the courts by the Defendants.

 

  1.    Defendants tampered with witnesses including threatening, intimidating, harassing, falsely arresting Plaintiff Stacey Pynn.

 

  1. Defendants directed counselors to ignore past and ongoing medical evidence of sexual abuse by the Defendant Matthew Pynn.

 

  1. Defendants knowingly and willfully ignored evidence and the children’s protected own abuse allegations.
  2. Defendants harshly restricted Plaintiff from any meaningful access to her children and from participating in medical care (despite Stacey Pynn being a current licensed physician assistant and the Defendant being substantiated for medical neglect by another outside CPS agency).
  3. Defendants failed and refused to properly investigate and arrest Defendant Matthew Pynn for his role in the ongoing sexual abuse and molestation of his own minor children, and covered up the same. Defendants knowing and willful refusal and failure to protect Plaintiff and her children resulted in irreparable harm.

 

  1. Defendants have knowingly and willfully maintained the minor children in the custody of their abuser, despite the children failing to thrive emotionally, educationally and physically, to their own detriment and peril.

 

  1. On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn publicly interviewed “Tiffany”, who is also one of Matthew Pynn’s victims, (on the podcast How to Fight CPS and Win the New York Edition). This Victim provided public witness testimony that Matthew Pynn was involved in her four children being trafficked to their pedophile father. Tiffany stated that she was sixteen when the pedophile captured her. The pedophile’s age was forty-four. She stated  that Matthew Pynn sexually trafficked children via adoption to a former Niagara County New York foster parent “Sherri” whom he knew to be a pedophile. This is not surprising since attorney Matthew Pynn is himself a pedophile as a matter of record.

 

  1. Tiffany detailed that this Sherri was the lesbian girlfriend of another Niagara County Child Protection Services attorney Susan Sussman. Sussman used her position to “kidnap” children for their homosexual relationship involving the grooming and sexual abuse of children.  When it became known that Sherri was sexually abusing the foster children in her care, Defendant Matthew Pynn represented her and knowingly and willfully continued to do adoptions for her after being made aware that she was abusing children.

 

  1. Among the issues in the interview, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn and Tiffany discuss how Stacey Pynn was able to participate in righting the wrongdoing of the Defendants and Matthew Pynn involving Niagara County CPS.

 

  1. Tiffany has since been granted sole custody of her children after escaping her captor, and the perpetrator is now free, but supervised due to his illegal-drug addiction and historic pattern of violence conducted in front of the minor children when in his care.

 

  1. Defendant Matthew Pynn’s proclivity for children, molestation, and his involvement in child sex trafficking is public knowledge, and a matter of record, and confirmed by mental evaluation, yet law enforcement, the courts and Child Protection Services refuse to do anything about it.

 

 

  1. Case-Fixing Activities by Maintaining Confidential Investigations Contaminated by Conflict-of-Interest and Denial of a Fair and Impartial Forum

 

  1. Between 2013 and 2024 the Defendant/s New York State Unified Court System and

Niagara County CPS received dozens of reports of child sexual abuse, strangulation and other forms of child abuse / maltreatment and human rights violation committed by Defendant Matthew Pynn.

 

  1. Despite their public officer oaths to uphold the U.S. and New York State Constitution to afford Due Process, the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 602(6) to avoid conflicts, and the New York State Municipal Laws under Article 18 due process that requires, the courts and child welfare agencies located in and around Niagara County maintained court cases, misrepresented material facts, and omitted critical information related to known abuse of children in investigation reports of child abuse / maltreatment when Defendant Matthew Pynn was involved.

 

  1. The court related Defendants and the social service Defendants named in this complaint all maintained cases and failed their lawful obligations to disclose their conflicts with Defendant Matthew Pynn and recuse, thus depriving Plaintiff Stacey Pynn of her Fifth Amendment Right to a fair and impartial forum for court and Child Protection investigations.

 

  1. The court related Defendants and the social service Defendants named in this complaint conspired to do this to maintain control of court and investigation narratives and outcomes as a means to protect Defendant Matthew Pynn from public exposure of his child abuse / maltreatment and give him custody of his children whom he victimized, and to conceal the trafficking of children under the guise of child protection.

 

  1. Denial of a Fair Forum in the Courts Located in and Around Niagara County New York and the Conspiracy to Commit and Cover Up Child Sexual Assault and a Host of other Crimes from the Bench.

 

  1. Defendant Joseph Jastrzemski is the Niagara County Clerk.  In addition to overseeing the entire Niagara County Clerk’s Office and filing and maintaining of official government records, the Clerk of the Court is also responsible for the assignment of Judges pursuant to N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 22 §205.3(b).

 

  1. The electronic filing system used in the state of New York, county of Niagara Supremecourt is called “NYSCEF”.  The Niagara County Clerk’s Office and the Defendants Joseph Jastrzemski and Lisa Kessler are charged with filing and maintaining official court records “docketing” in NYSCEF.  Within NYSCEF is the docket referred to herein as “NYSCEF Doc”, (Exhibit A the NYSCEF Doc for the New York State Supreme Court case of Pynn v Pynn e150065/2013).

 

  1. Despite it being a Judge’s obligation above the duty of others to follow the law and ensure due process in their courtroom, the court Defendants in this action in lieu of immediately disclosing their conflicts and affording a swift change of venue expansively violated Plaintiff’s due process for over a decade by shifting the burden onto Plaintiff to prove why each and every single judge and lawyer must recuse or be disqualified.  This is despite the fact that the condition of knowing defendant Matthew Pynn personally and professionally existed from onset of the case.  A delay in justice is denial of justice.

 

  1.     Over a dozen judges have recused or been disqualified for cause in Niagara County Family Court. Soon to be disqualified judge Defendant Kevin M. Carter has consistently denied all of Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s Motions for a change in venue, and this continues to the present time refusing to right his wrongdoings.

 

  1. Throughout Plaintiff’s courtroom experience litigating against Defendant Matthew Pynn in Niagara County New York, she discovered that court records were massively corrupted, as described herein this Complaint.  This constitutes criminal conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 1512, 2071, 3002 and New York State Penal Law§§§ 175.25 (tampering with government records), 195.00 (official misconduct), and 215.40 (tampering with evidence).  This is further in violation of Plaintiff’s First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights on her right of public access to the courts including her right of access to complete and accurate court records, her due process rights of complete and accurate court records with timely access, a fair forum, and her substantial civil and human rights to protect her children and raise them as their parent with meaningful unfettered access, and is in violation of the New York State Constitution.

 

  1. Each judicial defendant has created orders in conflict of interest despite a lawful obligation to recuse.  This is fraud on the court such that the “impartiality of the court has been corrupted so significantly that it cannot perform its tasks without bias or prejudice”.  According to the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, when a state official violates the U.S. Constitution, they have officially shed their jurisdiction and are acting in their personal capacity.

 

  1. On February 4, 2013, one month prior to the filing of divorce, Defendant Matthew Pynn made a $500.00 off cycle campaign donation, (No:  5449 dated February 4, 2013, M&T Bank acct #022000046) to the Niagara County Republican Committee, which later became infamously known in the public sector as Senator George Maziarz’s “personal slush fund” and resulted in Senator George Maziarz’s stepping down from office and his arrest for use of campaign funds for personal expenses. Amidst the flurry of news being reported on George Maziarz’s arrest, commenters from the public referred to the Niagara County Public Defenders, (where Defendant Matthew Pynn was working at the time) as the “Maziarz boys.”

 

  1. Plaintiff found a correspondence in Defendant Matthew Pynn’s email

thepynnacle@yahoo.com dated November 15, 2006, at 5:40:55 AM EST whereas Defendant Matthew Pynn corresponded with attorney Michael Benedict that Maziarz “called me (Defendant Matthew Pynn) personally” and offered to do “anything he could to help” fix his cases.

 

  1. An article was published in the Niagara Reporter with assistance from Carl Paladino on August 20, 2012 “Introducing the “George Maziarz Friends and Family Unemployment Reduction Plan”, https://niagarapostdotcom.wordpress.com/2012/08/20/introducing-the-george-maziarz-friends-and-family-unemployment-reduction-plan. The article went on to describe jobs doled out by Maziarz to all his friends and family.  The infamous names included many Defendants named in this herein Complaint but are not limited to:
  • Beverly Maziarz “wife” secretary to Honorable Richard C. Kloch Sr, Acting Supreme Court Justice, Niagara County, appointed with the help of George Maziarz to whom Kloch publicly gave his thanks.
  • Friend Judge Richard C. Kloch Sr. A Buffalo News article from June 14, 2001 quote by Kloch: “George Maziarz has worked unendingly, tirelessly, to get a Court of Claims judgeship appointment for his district… my family and I will be eternally grateful”. Kloch is also the godfather of a son of Caroline Wojtaszek DA’s son.

 

  1. The first Judge assigned to the case of Pynn v. Pynn in the state of New York Supreme Court, county of Niagara case #e150065/2013 was Defendant Catherine Nugent-Panepinto who is a publicly censured judge who did not recuse upon her own self initiative and whose public officer oath is not filed with the New York State Department of State.  It was not until Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s then attorney discovered that Defendant Catherine Nugent-Panepinto’s law clerk at the time was a client of Defendant Matthew Pynn’s counsel and asked Defendant Catherine Nugent-Panepinto to disqualify herself.  Catherine Nugent-Panepinto did she do so silently disqualify herself from the case.  This was after Defendant Catherine Nugent-Panepinto created orders, to benefit Defendant Matthew Pynn.  In regard to silent disqualifications, See United States v. Tweel, 550 F. 2d 297, 5th “Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or where an injury left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.”

 

  1. Given the $500 off-cycle donation to George Maziarz’s “personal slush fund” and given the names from the 2012 article assisted by Carl Paladino, it is then no surprise that the next judge assigned to the matter of Pynn v Pynn in the New York State Supreme Court, County of Niagara County case e150065/2013 was none other than Richard Kloch, Sr., whom George Maziarz’s wife Beverly Maziarz was the secretary to, and who publicly stated in the Buffalo News on June 14, 2001 he is eternally grateful to George Maziarz for helping him secure his judicial position.

 

  1. Defendant Richard Kloch created several orders in Pynn v Pynn before he silently disqualified himself as detailed herein:

 

  1. Defendant Richard Kloch sua sponte assigned Defendant Charles P. Ben as attorney for the children.

 

  1. Despite a Judge’s duty to ensure due process in his courtroom, Defendant Richard Kloch, failed to appropriately explore the circumstances of an apparent conflict as Defendant Charles P. Ben previously hired the Defendant Matthew Pynn to work for him for over a decade prior to his appointment to represent the Pynn’s children.  They also share clients in common.

 

  1. Defendant Charles P. Ben also failed his requirement to disclose to Defendant Richard Kloch the full extent of his conflict to represent the children of Matthew and Stacey Pynn.

 

  1. Richard Kloch relied upon Defendant Charles P. Ben’s testimony in court on of “I don’t believe there’s a conflict”.

 

  1. This relationship between Defendant Matthew Pynn and Defendant Charles P. Ben is especially concerning when as a matter of record on August 24, 2017, Charles P. Ben admitted that the Plaintiff’s children disclosed sexual abuse by their father to him, yet Charles P. Ben substituted judgment and conspired to commit child sexual abuse by arguing custody to the children’s sexually and physically abusive and woefully neglectful father in violation of his client’s substantial human rights.

 

  1. Despite Plaintiff’s children complaining Charles P. Ben was lying about their wishes, it was not until after ten (10) years of apparent attorney misconduct that March 7, 2023, Charles P. Ben finally admitted in court that his clients “indicated they would no longer want me as their counsel.”

 

  1. On September 20, 2013, the children’s pediatrician testified that he reported to Child Protective Services that Defendant Matthew Pynn neglected and sexually abused the Plaintiff’s children.  Despite this alarming testimony, with reckless disregard of child welfare and safety, Defendant Richard Kloch recklessly and inhumanely awarded equal and unsupervised access to Defendant Matthew Pynn.

 

  1. Defendant Richard Kloch ordered a forensic custodial evaluation and sua sponte

appointed, “cherry picked”, the very controversial Defendant David Nathanson to conduct the report.

 

  1. The court order read that David Nathanson was only to evaluate the role alcohol played in the marriage.  Despite this very narrow circumscribed order, David Nathanson conspired to conceal the child sexual abuse of Defendant Matthew Pynn.

 

  1. Defendant David Nathanson took it upon his own self-direction, acting outside his court order, to obstruct justice and called Defendant Niagara CPS and the New York State Police “requesting” they do not talk to the Plaintiff’s children about their sexual abuse allegations.

 

  1. Defendant David Nathanson took this action despite the very alarming personality disorders elicited by Defendant David Nathanson’s own testing that Defendant Matthew Pynn has a hysteropsychopathic deviate personality disorder (34/43 Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory “MMPI” pattern and problems detected in the Parenting Stress Index “PSI”) with severe implications as a parent.

 

  1. David Nathanson obstructed these very pertinent MMPI 34/43 parenting implications from his report to further conceal the dysfunction of Matthew Pynn as a parent.  This medical misconduct and is a crime of obstruction of justice and witness tampering, as well as a crime of aiding and abetting child sexual abuse 18 U.S.C. §§§ 2, 3,4, 241, 242,1512, and 2071.  It is also a crime in New York State Penal Law §§§ 260.10 (child endangerment) and 195.00 (official misconduct), and 120.25 (reckless indifference to life).

 

  1. Since these heinous crimes of David Nathanson, his reports from the years 2013 and 2015 have been completely discredited by updated reports from other psychiatrists and psychologists.

 

  1. The disreputable Defendant Ronald Wilson, a New York State Trooper Investigator after being contacted by Defendant David Nathanson, failed his lawful obligation to properly investigate Defendant Matthew Pynn despite the evidence before him that indeed Defendant Matthw Pynn did sexually abuse and strangulate the Plaintiff’s child(ren) and failed to protect the Plaintiff’s children from harm thereby causing Plaintiff emotional harm and loss of time and enjoyment with her children.

 

  1. Defendant John Spero assisted the conspiracy among the codefendants when he created an unsworn letter on police letterhead dated March 28, 2019 containing knowing and willful false statements that he did an investigation and there was no indication “that Mr. Pynn ever acted in a manner that would be considered harmful to the welfare of his child.”

 

  1. Defendant Stanley Edwards III as a New York State Police Officer in the Internal Affairs Bureau was made aware of the evidence of violent child abuse perpetrated by the Defendant Matthew Pynn and made aware of the conduct of Ronald Wilson and John Spero yet failed to right any wrongdoings.

 

  1. Defendant Richard Kloch told Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s then counsel that he knew Defendant “Matthew Pynn personally” and prejudged the matter stating, “and I don’t think he did the things as alleged.”

 

  1. Influenced by his preconceived bias in favor of Defendant Matthew Pynn, Defendant Richard Kloch ordered Plaintiff Stacey Pynn to pay $25,000.00 of the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn’s attorney fees, even though Defendant Matthew Pynn is an attorney himself and his counsel only ever requested less than $1000 from him at the time, thereby exaggerating the unequal footing, a due process violation, of the litigants even more in favor of Matthew Pynn.

 

  1. Following a Motion for his disqualification filed February 22, 2017, Defendant Richard Kloch silently disqualified himself, therefore conceding to the alleged judicial fraud on the court.

 

  1. Unfortunately, the attorney affidavit and exhibits in support of this motion still appear to be obstructed from the official court record.  (See Exhibit A NYSCEF Doc #90.)

 

  1. As such, any and all orders created by Richard Kloch are a result of judicial fraud on the court.

 

  1. Defendant Sara Sheldon was the subsequent judge assigned to the matter of Pynn v

Pynn in the state of New York Supreme Court, County of Niagara case# e150065/2013.

 

  1. Defendant Sara Sheldon fraudulently ordered Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s house to be listed for sale even though there was no judgment of divorce permitting equitable distribution of marital property.  See Khan v Khan (43 N.Y. 2d 203), which held that “unless a court alters the legal relationship of a husband and wife by granting a divorce… It has no authority to order the sale of the marital home owned by the parties as tenants by the entirety.”

 

  1. After Defendant Sara Sheldon ordered the sale of the marital property absent a judgment of divorce, it was discovered that her law clerk, Michael Benedict was a former Niagara County Public Defender and co-worker with Defendant Matthew Pynn.  It was further discovered that they were texting each other divorce and custody particulars regarding the Pynn v Pynn

 

  1. On December 14, 2017, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s then counsel filed a motion seeking Sara Sheldon’s disqualification and she did so silently disqualify herself, therefore conceding to the alleged judicial fraud on the court and therefore her conduct was acting outside her judicial capacity.

 

  1. The Supporting Affidavits and Exhibits of the Sheldon disqualification motion were obstructed from the official court record until February 8, 2023, which is six (6) years later (NYSCEF Doc #413), and after Plaintiff Stacey Pynn perfected appeals on the matter.

 

  1. This obstructed document was material to her requests in the appellate courts for custody and a change of venue, and thus Plaintiff Stacey Pynn was denied due process in her appeals before the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division Fourth Department cases CA 22-00200, and CA 21-00160.  See York Daily Record, et al. v Byrnes (1:22-cv-00361-SHR) U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania that determined a First Amendment right of public access to the courts includes a right of timely access to complete and accurate court records.

 

  1. As such, all orders resulting from Defendant Sara Sheldon are a result of judicial fraud on the court.

 

  1. Upon the disqualification of Sara Sheldon, the next judge assigned in the New York

State Supreme Court, County of Niagara was Defendant Daniel J. Furlong.

 

  1. Defendant Daniel J. Furlong created several court orders before he silently disqualified himself from Pynn v Pynn.  Plaintiff suffered severe injury and emotional harm while Defendant Daniel J. Furlong, presided on her case.

 

  1. Defendant Daniel J. Furlong carried out Defendant Sara Sheldon’s unlawful order and directed Plaintiff Stacey Pynn to give Defendant Matthew Pynn $65,000 to buy “his share” of the marital residence prior to their divorce and prior to equitable distribution.

 

  1. This was an unlawful ruling outside Daniel J Furlong’s judicial jurisdiction as set forth by the ruling in Khan and is and was a theft of assets from Plaintiff Stacey Pynn intended to financially batter her and pay for the Defendant’s kidnapping and trafficking of her children to their perpetrator of violent child physical and sexual abuse.

 

  1. The $65,000.00 Plaintiff was ordered to give to Matthew Pynn for “his” portion of the homestead even though he didn’t pay any mortgage, taxes or upkeep on the house for five years and is in addition to the $25,000.00 Richard Kloch ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant Matthew Pynn for attorney fees even though Defendant is an attorney himself and he never paid more than $1000.00 in attorney fees for his divorce at that time.  This created an even greater unequal footing, fifth Amendment due process violation, in favor of the Defendant Matthew Pynn and funded the conspiracy to kidnap and traffic Plaintiff’s children from her under the guise of the justice system.

 

  1. On June 7, 2018, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Motion to Disqualify Defendant Charles P. Ben as Attorney for Children citing his failure to fully disclose the nature of his relationship with Defendant Matthew Pynn and failure to obtain a signed waiver in writing for conflict-of-interest, and failure to properly communicate with his clients.  Daniel J. Furlong furnished a ruling on papers, but then obstructed the filed papers from the official court record.  This Motion to Disqualify Defendant Charles P. Ben was obstructed from the official court record until February 8, 2023, which is nearly five (5) years later (see NYSCEF Doc #415).  This document was material in Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s appeals in the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division Fourth Department cases CA 21-00160 and CA 22-00200.

 

  1. Defendant Daniel J. Furlong ignored / obstructed all of the children’s protected hearsay statements of abuse from trial and willfully, knowingly and deliberately ignored any and all other evidence of child abuse during trial in the State of New York Supreme Court County of Niagara Pynn v Pynn

 

  1. Plaintiff Stacey Pynn filed a Motion to admit the children’s statements of abuse into evidence on February 18, 2020, however the Notice of Motion was obstructed from the official court record until February 8, 2023, which is three (3) years later, (NYSCEF Docs #147 and 421.)  This document was a material document for Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s appeals in the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division Fourth Department case CA 22-00200 and CA 21-00160.

 

  1. At one time, on January 29, 2021, while Plaintiff Stacey Pynn was appearing in court

to protect her children from the abuse / maltreatment of Defendant Matthew Pynn, Defendant Daniel J. Furlong, told her to “Shut your mouth!”.  When Plaintiff replied, “that is Unconstitutional… I have important things to state to the record”, Defendant Daniel J. Furlong, abused his powers of contempt and fined Plaintiff Stacey Pynn $1000.00.

 

  1. Plaintiff Stacey Pynn appealed this order in the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division Fourth Department case # CA 21-00356 and Defendant Daniel J. Furlong’s order was unanimously vacated, citing this was a violation of due process, see P. v M.P. 2022 NY Slip Op. 6377 Decided November 10, 2022.

 

  1. Another instance of Defendant Daniel J. Furlong’s reign of treasonous terror,

that also occurred on January 29, 2021, when he told the parties in court that he called the children’s counselors (ex parte) without permission and told them to ignore any medical evidence of past or ongoing sexual abuse against the Defendant Matthew Pynn.

 

  1. Defendant Daniel J. Furlong further threatened witness Plaintiff Stacey Pynn that if she disclosed any more concerns of abuse by the Defendant Matthew Pynn to counselors, he (Defendant Daniel J. Furlong), would throw Plaintiff Stacey Pynn in jail.  Plaintiff Stacey Pynn contends that this was evidence / witness tampering, case-fixing activity and aiding and abetting in felony child abuse, 18 U.S.C §§§ 2, 3, 241, 242, 1512, 2071 and in violation New York State Penal Laws §§§ 260.10 (child endangerment), 120.25 (reckless indifference to life) and 215.40 (tampering with evidence) intended to affect adjudication.

 

  1. On February 26, 2020, during trial Defendant Daniel J. Furlong, JSC excused away

Defendant Matthew Pynn’s repeated strangulation, choking, squishing, and pushing Plaintiff’s child against a wall, “that’s in 2015 this is 2020.  Anything else?”.

 

  1. Daniel J. Furlong left the children victims in the custody of the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn ordering Plaintiff to pay $2600/mo. in child support plus additional expenses despite this knowledge and evidence offered at trial.

 

  1. To date, all evidence documents admitted during this trial is still obstructed from the official court records and Plaintiff Stacey Pynn witnessed Defendant Matthew Pynn’s counsel Michele Bergevin leave the courtroom with it in violation of New York Penal Laws §215.40 (evidence tampering).  When Plaintiff Stacey Pynn reported this to Defendants Daniel J. Furlong, and Kevin M. Carter the purported New York State Eighth District Administrative Judge, nothing was done, (NYSCEF Doc #152 Clerk’s minutes w Exhibit List.)

 

  1. On June 19, 2019 Daniel J. Furlong ordered Plaintiff Stacey Pynn under threat of contempt to sign an Affidavit in Lieu of Testimony to her divorce that she did not agree with.  A judge lacks authority to force anyone to sign an affidavit she does not agree with. Defendant Daniel J. Furlong also denied Plaintiff Stacey Pynn an evidentiary hearing on the Custody and Access Agreement that was incorporated with the Judgment of Divorce despite her application to the court to Vacate the Custody Agreement based on fraud filed on June 13, 2019.

 

  1. Defendant Daniel J. Furlong also denied Plaintiff Stacey Pynn an evidentiary hearing on the Custody and Access Agreement that was incorporated with the Judgment of Divorce despite her application to the court to Vacate the Custody Agreement based on fraud filed on June 13, 2019.

 

  1.  Unfortunately, this Motion to Vacate the Custody Agreement based on fraud was obstructed from the official court record until February 8, 2023, which is nearly four (4) years after its filing.  This was a material document obstructed from Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s court record (certified as a complete and accurate record by Defendant Niagara County Clerk’s Office) for Appeals in the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division Fourth Department case # CA 21-00160 and CA 22-00200, (NYSCEF Docs #117, 420 and 421.)
  2.   On September 2, 2020, Daniel J. Furlong intentionally created false orders for child access with an incorrect index number (155065 instead of 150065) and did not ender said orders into Pynn v Pynn e 150065/2013.  Upon Plaintiff’s request for Daniel J. Furlong to correct and fil these orders, he refused thereby blocking Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s access to the Appellate Court to an appeal.  Said false orders that were never filed or properly served conferred Defendant Daniel J. Furong’s judicial authority to subject children to agree and arrange access with Plaintiff Stacey Pynn when they want to see her.  The courts have

held absent a certain access order, this is a denial of access to the children and the means in which Defendant Daniel J. Furlong sex trafficked the parties’ children to the alleged violent physical and sexual perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn and away from their safe parent Plaintiff Stacey Pynn, (see Merkle v Henry, 133 A.D. 3d 1266, 20 N.Y.S. 774, 15 N.Y. Slip Op. 8317 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)).

 

  1. On September 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider Custody and Access.  A hearing was held on this application, however, this document too was obstructed from the official court record until July 12, 2022 (Exhibit A NYSCEF Doc #’s 333-346), nearly two years after it was filed despite Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s Motion to the Appellate Court for Daniel J. Furlong to Produce this document on December 16, 2021.  This document was material for Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s Appeals takin in the New York State Appellate Division Fourth Department case CA 21-00160 and CA 22-00200.

 

 

  1. As such, Plaintiff appeared in person to the Defendant Niagara County Clerk’s

Office on or around December 15, 2021, and asked Defendant Lisa Kessler how she can obtain this document for the appellate record.  Defendant Lisa Kessler told her that she did not have access to the document because Defendant Daniel J. Furlong still had possession of the document and it was his (Defendant Daniel J. Furlong’s) fault it was not returned to the Defendant Niagara County Clerk’s Office.

 

  1. As such, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn filed for the disqualification of Defendant Daniel J. Furlong on or around November 8, 2011.

 

  1. Defendant Daniel J. Furlong, did so silently disqualify himself upon the basis and merits of Plaintiff’s verified statements, thereby conceding to all the criminal activity and judicial fraud alleged.

 

  1. After being reminded he was in violation of New York State Judiciary Law §9, he did file a Reason for Recusal form that stated the reason that Plaintiff Stacey Pynn accused him of bias.

 

  1. As such any and all orders of Defendant Daniel J. Furlong were created out of judicial fraud on the court.

 

  1. Upon the recusal of Defendant Daniel J. Furlong, Hon. Frank Caruso was assigned as a judge. Hon. Frank Caruso filed his reason for recusal pursuant to New York State Judiciary Law §9 stating that “Mr. Pynn is a local attorney who has appeared in our court numerous times creating a level of familiarity.” (See Exhibit A NYSCEF Doc #269).

 

  1.    The recusal statement of Hon. Frank Caruso proves that every single judge in this matter was a conflict of interest, whether they self-disclosed and recused or were disqualified, due to Defendant Matthew Pynn’s familiarity in the courts in Niagara County, not just with the judiciary, but also court officers and staff within the courts.  Furthermore, the condition that all these judges knew Defendant Matthew Pynn personally and professionally was present at onset of the case on May 10, 2013.  It should not have taken over a decade for these judges to admit their conflicts and recuse or disqualify themselves.

 

  1. This decade long disqualification of all these judges was a tremendously unreasonable delay and denial of due process in the divorce custody action of Pynn v Pynn in the state of New York Supreme Court, county of Niagara.

 

  1. After the recusal of Hon. Frank Caruso JSC, Defendant Frank Sedita, III was assigned as judge.

 

  1. Defendant Frank Sedita III created multiple orders despite his obvious bias and disregard for the law.  To date, he refuses to disqualify himself despite several motions filed by the Plaintiff Stacey Pynn, including one heard as recent as May 15, 2024.

 

  1. Plaintiff Stacey Pynn filed a Motion to Vacate all disqualified judges’ orders on December 21, 2021 to the New York State Supreme Court, County of Niagara with Defendant Frank Sedita III presiding, (See Exhibit A NYSCEF Doc #s 258-266), and requested a change of venue to also be reviewed by Defendant Kevin M. Carter purported Eighth Judicial District Administrative Judge.  These requests went ignored by Kevin M. Carter.

 

  1. In response to this motion, Defendant Frank Sedita III, held a “conference” on the record, which was really not a conference.  It was a hearing as it resulted in orders absent due process.

 

 

 

  1. Defendant Frank Sedita III did not allow anyone to speak other than to announce our appearances despite judicial ethics and the Fifth Amendment Due Process rights to be heard in court.

 

  1. Defendant Frank Sedita III, then maliciously ordered without a hearing, which is a requirement before disenfranchising the Constitutional right of access to the courts, that Plaintiff Stacey Pynn is precluded from filing any applications in the court without prior approval or an attorney.

 

  1. In this “conference”, Defendant Frank Sedita III further violated Plaintiff’s right to be heard in court on the December 3, 2021, and denied a hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate recused judges’ orders.  When Plaintiff Stacey Pynn attempted to defend herself during this conference on Teams, Defendant Frank Sedita III, hung up on her and ended the “conference” in violation of due process.

 

  1. Plaintiff Stacey Pynn immediately appealed this order dated January 5, 2022, to the New York State Appellate Division Fourth Department case CA 22-00200.  Plaintiff Stacey Pynn was retaliated upon in the decision and order of the New York State Appellate Division Fourth Department in their decision and order stating that she was being punished for serving “strangers” in her appeal.  These “strangers” are Legislators and other government oversight officials. The New York State Appellate Court Fourth Department upheld the lower court’s disenfranchisement of Plaintiff’s Constitutional right of public access to the courts absent due process.  This is an unconstitutional state ruling as a constitutional right cannot be disenfranchised absent due process, and this ruling is a First Amendment retaliation for seeking redress from Legislators and other government officials.

 

  1. On May 5, 2022, Defendant Frank Sedita III, signed a judgment in favor of Defendant

Charles P. Ben, attorney for Plaintiff’s children, in the amount of $17,766.86, (See   NYSCEF Doc# 318) absent any due process from the Motion of Charles Ben filed April 13, 2022 and having no return date and never afforded a hearing (Defendant Charles P Ben falsely stated in his proposed judgment the motion was heard before Defendant Daniel Furlong, which was not possible since Defendant Daniel Furlong, was disqualified six months prior to the Notice of Motion), (See NYSCEF Doc# 304).  Despite being an attorney and knowing better, Defendant Charles P. Ben continues to try to enforce this fraudulently obtained judgement in violation of due process that he knows or should know to be fraudulent.

 

  1. On July 6, 2022, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn requested permission to file an Emergency

OSC in court before Defendant Frank Sedita III, due to concerns of child neglect and since on March 31, 2022, the parties’ daughter revived her past sexual abuse disclosures in a conversation with her mother overheard by a non-party witness.

 

  1.   By letter from the court on July 7, 2022, Defendant Frank Sedita III refused to entertain the OSC, willfully, deliberately and in reckless disregard, leaving the Plaintiff’s children in harm’s way and in the custody of their perpetrator of severe, violent child abuse / maltreatment.  Defendant Frank Sedita III then deleted the witness affidavit describing the Plaintiff’s daughters disclosures of her sexual abuse as a younger child.

 

 

  1. On September 18, 2022, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn received a letter from Erie County

Child Protective Services dated September 6, 2022, that Defendant Matthew Pynn was substantiated for child abuse / maltreatment.

 

  1. Again, on September 18, 2022, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn asked Defendant Frank Sedita III, to allow her access to the courts and entertain her July 6, 2022, Emergency OSC.  Defendant Frank Sedita III, scheduled a conference, but then kept permitting opposition to adjourn and delay adjudication on the multiple substantiated findings of child abuse / maltreatment perpetrated by Defendant Matthew Pynn.

 

  1. Given the substantiated child abuse / maltreatment findings, and Defendant Frank Sedita III’s delays granting of several adjournments, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn went to the New York State Family Court, County of Niagara to file a Petition for an Emergency New York State Family Court Act Article 8 Temporary Order of Protection for her and her children on September 23, 2022.

 

  1. All New York State Family Court Judges in the County of Niagara recused, (Hon.

Restaino JFC, Hon. Delabio JFC and Defendant Kathleen Wojtaszek-Gariano), citing familiarity with Defendant Matthew Pynn.

 

  1. Defendant Keith Kibler, the New York State Family Court Superior Judge,

was assigned as a visiting judge from Wyoming County.  He declined to sign the emergent temporary order of protection, even despite Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s Motion to Reconsider that included evidence that the kids were sexually and physically abused as well as the evidence that a neighboring county substantiated Defendant Matthew Pynn several times for child abuse / maltreatment, thus denying Plaintiff Stacey Pynn equal protection under the law.

 

  1. On October 4, 2022, a conference was held in front of Defendant Frank Sedita III.  Frank Sedita III, JSC yelled at Plaintiff Stacey Pynn much of the time for her social media content, (in retaliation of her First Amendment right to post on social media), that is opposed to adjudication from the bench in favor of sex offenders over the welfare of children in our community.  It is difficult to understand why a judge would be upset over people complaining about adjudication that is too soft on child perpetrators in our community.

 

  1. Defendant Frank Sedita III, ultimately agreed that the issue of the indicated child abuse findings against Defendant Matthew Pynn should be litigated in the New York State Family Court County of Niagara where the Family Offense Petition was already pending.

 

  1. On October 21, 2022, Defendant Matthew Pynn’s counsel Michele Bergevin filed a

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s application for a Temporary Order of Protection to the New York State Family Court, County of Niagara (Defendant Keith Kibler).

 

  1. On November 10, 2022, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn filed a Motion for Keith Kibler to disqualify himself for failure to afford due process upon his refusal to hold a hearing on Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s application for attorney fees from the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn, and by failing to disqualify Defendant Charles P. Ben as Attorney for Children, who previously filed a motion in another case of same parties that he cannot provide effective assistance to his clients.  On November 22, 2022, Defendant Keith Kibler refused to disqualify himself despite his obvious obligations to do so.

 

  1. On November 10, 2022, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn filed a Motion for Frank Sedita III to be

disqualified and for a change in venue.  Defendant Frank Sedita III, JSC refused to entertain this Motion and instead took it upon himself to delete the Motion seeking his own disqualification from the official court record and all Plaintiff’s associated Notices of Appeal (See Exhibit A NYSCEF Docs 377-379, 380-383).

 

  1. On November 15, 2022, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn filed to the New York State Supreme

Court, County of Niagara (Defendant Frank Sedita III) a Motion to Vacate Frank Sedita IIIs order precluding Plaintiff Stacey Pynn from filing applications to the court.  Plaintiff Stacey Pynn contended among other things that the change of circumstances since her order of contempt was vacated by an appeal, see S.P. v M.P. 2022 NY Slip Op. 6377 Decided November 10, 2022, and since the Defendant Matthew Pynn was now substantiated several times for child abuse / maltreatment, this exonerated her from a maliciously, defamatory wrongly applied label of “meritless / frivolous” litigant.

 

  1. Instead of holding a hearing on the motion, Defendant Frank Sedita III deleted the

application from the official court record and refused to right his wrongs, (See NYSCEF Docs 384-385) and knowingly and willfully continued to obstruct Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s access to court under his manufactured false pretenses as a means of obstructing justice, “case-fixing.”

 

  1. In another attempt to obtain a fair forum, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn filed once again for an Emergency Temporary Order of Protection for her and her children against Defendant Matthew Pynn in a neighboring venue, with the State of New York Family Court, County of Erie (judge Mary Carney).  On or around March 7, 2023, the application was before judge Mary Carney who immediately dismissed the petition and remanded the case back to the conflict-of-interest county of Niagara.   Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s Motions to Reconsider and prevent the transfer back to Niagara County courts are obstructed from both the Erie County and Niagara County court records to the present time.

 

  1. Despite Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s refusal to consent to appearing in The State of New York Family Court, County of Niagara Defendant Keith Kibler proceeded with court anyway over Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s objections and request for assigned counsel.  Without a hearing, Defendant Keith Kibler, denied Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s requests to have an attorney present, and created shocking defamatory orders that Plaintiff Stacey Pynn is not allowed to file in any New York State Family Court within the entire 8th Judicial District despite his obvious lack of jurisdiction to create such an order.

 

  1. Defendant Keith Kibler disparaged Plaintiff Stacey Pynn by disseminating this order to every single-family law clerk within the New York State 8th Judicial District.
  2. Denial of Due Process by Massive Corruption of Official Court Records

Obstruction of Justice, Tampering with Official Government Records and Tampering with Evidence

 

  1. One of the means the Defendants used to sexually traffic Plaintiff’s children to the

perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn was to massively corrupt the government official court records in the case of Pynn v Pynn e150065/2013 by obstructing material documents that were contrary to the intended goal of the conspiracy thereby obstructing justice or “case-fixing” as described throughout this complaint, see Potts v Brown US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division Aug 26, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15911: “Due process requires that the handling of important court records be free from arbitrary interference and unreasonable delay.” Delays of justice, in this case over a decade whereas Plaintiff was made to disqualify each judge over their obligation at onset to disclose conflicts and recuse, is a denial of justice.

 

  1.  On or around November 19, 2022, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn emailed the New York

State Supreme Court Eighth Judicial District Administrative Judge Defendant Kevin M. Carter, “URGENT!! Criminal Tampering Official Court Record e150065/2013 Niagara Co Supreme Pynn v Pynn”.

 

  1.  Without explanation from Defendant Kevin M. Carter, Documents filed as

old as ten (10) years ago were suddenly added to the official court record for the first time as of December 6, 2022, through and including February 8, 2023, (See Exhibit A NYSCEF Docs 394-397, 400-403, 405-421).

 

  1. On December 6, 2022, at 4:34pm, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn sent an email to Defendant/s

Lisa Kellser, Kevin M. Carter, and Defendant Lawrence Marks’s law clerk Janet Fink that some documents were added to the official court record, but there were still more obstructed documents from the official court record of Pynn v Pynn Niagara County Supreme Court e150065/2013.

 

  1.  On December 8, 2022, at 7:19 am, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn notified Defendant Kevin M.

Carter among others that Defendant Frank Sedita III omitted a material witness affidavit, (NYSCEF Doc #329) that detailed an event on March 31, 2022, when Plaintiff’s daughter recalled being sexually abused by her father as a child in a conversation overheard by the witness.

 

  1. On December 13, 2022, at 10:01pm Plaintiff Stacey Pynn notified various New York

State court officials including Defendant Kevin M. Carter that documents admitted into evidence were still missing from the official court record to include the Pediatrician medical records admitted on September 20, 2013, (at a time the Pediatrician testified in court that he believed the children were sexually abused and mistreated by Defendant Matthew Pynn); and all documents admitted into evidence during trial in the year 2020-2021, (see NYSCEF Doc. #152 the list of exhibits which are missing), and that copies of Judicial subpoenas were also missing.

 

  1. On January 2, 2023, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn emailed Defendant Kevin M. Carter,

dcaj-alb@nycourts.gov, dcaj-oji@nycourts.gov and others requesting a status update on the evidence documents that are still missing and the status on her request for a change in venue since Defendant Frank Sedita III, was clearly ignoring evidence of severe child abuse / maltreatment and has been discourteous and intemperate with Plaintiff Stacey Pynn, a Domestic Violence victim.

 

  1. Plaintiff Stacey Pynn was told that investigations referred to the email of

dcaj-alb@nycourts.gov goes to the New York State Supreme Court Deputy Administrative Judge Defendant Norman St. George.

 

  1. Despite these complaints and despite Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s notice of claim to the state, the court Defendants in this case refused to right their wrongdoings by affording Plaintiff a change in venue or vacate orders due to judicial fraud on the court from disqualified judges, or vacate orders created from judicial bias, or holding the Defendants accountable for obstruction of justice, case-fixing, tampering with official government records, or tampering with evidence.

 

  1. This massive corruption of Plaintiff’s official court record in the State of New York

Supreme Court, County of Niagara case e150065/2013 described herein is not likely to be accidental mistake or honest error.  Upon information and belief, the defendants conspired through their corrupt conduct to deprive Plaintiff Stacey Pynn, to conceal the conduct of Defendant Matthew Pynn, and conceal the reprehensible hiring practices of our courts and Defendant Niagara County, and Niagara County CPS.  the New York State Unified Court System, and the New York State Office of Court Administration acting in their official capacity as Administrators, are implicated nearly equally in the apparent criminal conspiracy to commit and cover up child sexual abuse, child sex trafficking, and criminal obstruction of justice in Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s official court record 18 U.S.C §§1512, 2071 and New York State Penal Laws §§§ 175.25 25 (tampering with government records), 195.00 (official misconduct), 215.40 (tampering with evidence), 260.10 (child endangerment) and 120.25 (reckless disregard for human life) and are therefore liable for conspiring to deprive Plaintiff of her God given civil rights and meaningful time with her children upon their failures to ensure a fair forum and a complete and accurate court record.

 

  1. Defendant Kevin M. Carter, Andrew Isenberg, and Dean Puleo Criminally Obstructed Justice and Hindered the Prosecution of Defendant Matthew Pynn for the crimes of Repeated Child Strangulation and Child Endangerment

 

  1. Due to local law enforcement and the District Attorney’s refusal to commence a criminal action against Defendant Matthew Pynn, Plaintiff commenced her own civilian criminal complaints and Matthew Pynn on or around January 19, 2023, (see People v Clymer 2010 N.Y. Slip Op20239 [28 Misc 3d 856] that permits citizens to commence misdemeanor criminal complaints) and filed the complaints with the Lockport City Court.

 

  1. The criminal complaint was forwarded to Defendant Kevin M. Carter in his administrative capacity for the Eighth Judicial District. Despite his awareness of Plaintiff’s right to commence this complaint, Defendant Kevin M. Carter and his associates Andrew Isenberg and Dean Puleo directly, willfully and knowingly shielded the complaint from proceeding thereby conspiring with others to commit and coverup strangulation and other forms of child endangerment perpetrated by Defendant Matthew Pynn.

 

 

  1. To the Extent that Defendants Niagara County, Niagara CPS, Bianca Gatto, Nicholas D’Angelo, Claude Joerg, David Haylett, Rhonda Platt and “Jane Doe” are Complicit in Criminally Conspiring to Commit and Cover up the Sexual and Physical Abuse and Maltreat Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s Children and Deny Plaintiff Stacey Pynn and her Children a Fair Forum for Child Welfare Investigations

 

 

  1. Previously, on July 5, 2017, Plaintiff commenced an action in this Honorable Court case 16 CV-548-LJV against Niagara County CPS which was dismissed without prejudice.  Since the time of that action, the Defendants have never taken any meaningful action to correct their wrongdoing and continue to corruptly conspire to commit and cover up the severe child abuse and maltreatment of Defendant Matthew Pynn, a former employee of Niagara CPS and current Niagara County Public Defender.

 

  1. Some incidents of child abuse and maltreatment discovered in that litigation, which

are necessary to review to show the pattern of continued and ongoing conduct, were that

on May 8, 2015, the Plaintiff’s children disclosed that Matthew Pynn choked her daughter in the backpack room because she lied and because she crumbled her homework.

 

  1. Plaintiff’s daughter was repeatedly running away from Defendant Matthew Pynn contemporaneous to her disclosures of repeated strangulation thus is a behavior resulting from fear that corroborates her disclosures of strangulation.  Police were required to find her and return her.  Unfortunately Police and Niagara County CPS always returned her to the custody of her abuser.  Niagara County Child Protection deemed the disclosures of strangulation, stopping breathing and choking, and repeatedly running away “appropriate caregiver… no safety concerns”.  This was even though child strangulation is a criminal felony in violation of New York State Penal Law §120.11 (obstruction of breathing).

 

  1. Plaintiff’s daughter created a written testimonial statement of her father’s sexual abuse of her in November 2014 while at her father’s house.  This statement was provided to Defendant Bianca Gatto, a Niagara County Child Protection caseworker, who failed to report the additional allegation of sexual abuse to the current report and failed to investigate the sexual abuse allegations whatsoever despite her mandated reporter law obligations, see New York State Penal Law §265.25 on mandated reporting.  When Plaintiff Stacey Pynn called Bianca Gatto on February 5, 2015, Bianca Gatto refused to refer the children, as required by law, to a Child Advocacy Center for multiphasic forensic interview.  Safety reports filed to the state by Bianca Gatto at this time falsely stated “No safety concerns”, which are criminal false instruments sent to the state in addition to her criminal failure to report as a mandated reporter the written sexual abuse testimony of Plaintiff’s daughter. This was done in a manner to conspire to commit and cover up child sexual abuse and strangulation by caseworker Defendant Bianca Gatto, her supervisor Carol Henderson and other officials with Niagara CPS.

 

  1. Niagara County CPS had a non-discretionary policy to investigate all claims of sexual

abuse and refer them to the Child Advocacy Center for a timely multidisciplinary forensic interview (“MDI”) contemporaneous to their disclosures of abuse as per their policies and procedures, see Social Services Law §424 and Chapter 6 page L2 top paragraph of the 2023 Child Protective Services Manual.

 

  1. Any forensic evaluation of the children was either never performed to date or performed seven (7) years late, on May 9, 2020, the children’s disclosures of sexual abuse and strangulation.

 

  1.      On May 9, 2020, the perpetrator Matthew Pynn was permitted to escort the subject child to the interview which is contrary to normal practices where alleged perpetrators are not permitted to escort victims to forensic interviews.   This was five years after the children were forced to live in the custody of their perpetrator.

 

 

  1. During trial on February 26, 2020, the disgraced Defendant Nicholas D’Angelo, now

deemed a level three violent sex offender, represented caseworker Bianca Gatto, in his role as a Niagara County DSS Attorney, due to Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s subpoena of her at trial.  Defendant Nicholas D’Angelo, (now a felony violent level III convicted child sexual perpetrator himself) knew or had to have known Plaintiff’s children were sexually abused and strangulated by Defendant Matthew Pynn upon reading the Motion to Niagara County to subpoena the caseworker, yet Nicholas D’Angelo in his capacity as a Niagara County Child Protection Services attorney did not take any actions to ensure a full and proper investigation of their disclosures thereby conspiring among the other Defendants to commit

 

 

and cover up child sexual assault of Plaintiff’s minor children, rather he aided and abetted their perpetrator father Defendant Matthew Pynn to abuse and maltreat them ever after.

 

  1. For a time after the lawsuit, reports of suspected child abuse / maltreatment were investigated by Erie County Child Protection Services due to the conflict of interest of persons.  The transfer to another venue is the only time Defendant Matthew Pynn was ever indicated by Child Protection for child abuse / maltreatment.  Not only was he indicated for child abuse / maltreatment, but they substantiated four (4) findings against him.  At no time has Niagara County ever indicated / substantiated child abuse or neglect against him.

 

  1. Since at least December 31, 2015 and to the present time, Matthew Pynn has been represented for his Chapter 7 Bankruptcy by Patrick Balkin who is an Assistant Attorney for Defendant Niagara County Child Protective Services.

 

  1. On September 6, 2022, by letter Plaintiff Stacey Pynn was notified that upon the change of venue for investigations of child abuse / maltreatment reports to Erie County that Defendant Matthew Pynn was substantiated multiple times for two findings of inadequate guardianship, lack of medical care and educational neglect.

 

  1. The New York State Child Protection Services Manual policy is that upon a finding

of child abuse / maltreatment, the case is referred back to the district in which the subject resides.  If the neighboring LDSS (in this case Erie County), finds that it is necessary to initiate a court proceeding, the actions based on those findings must be undertaken by the “home” LDSS in its own jurisdiction [FCA §1015] and in this case the home LDSS is Defendant Niagara County where Defendant Matthew Pynn is a former Child Protection Attorney and current Public Defender.

 

  1. This policy, page E-2 Chapter 4 Section E affords the conflict-of-interest persons in

the “home” district the ultimate decision-making authority to decide if they want to commence an action such as an article 10 Petition to remove the children from their perpetrator.

 

  1. Niagara County CPS took no action against Niagara County employee Defendant Matthew Pynn to correct the wrongdoing. After the multiple indications of child abuse / maltreatment substantiated by Erie County, despite the admitted conflict of interest,  Niagara County CPS once again began maintaining investigations of reports of abuse naming Defendant Matthew Pynn where he had incriminating evidence ignored, removed, altered and destroyed.

 

  1. On or around late December 2022, a report was made to the statewide Child Abuse Statewide Register reporting a concern of child abuse directly involving Defendant Matthew Pynn.  Defendant Niagara County CPS continued maintaining the investigations thereby aiding and abetting Defendant Matthew Pynn in the cover ups of his sexual abuse and other allegations.

 

  1. Plaintiff refused to consent to Defendant Niagara County CPS maintaining investigations, and duly informed caseworker Defendant Rhonda Platt on January 12, 2023 that this was against the ethical requirements of public officials per 18 U.S.C 602(6) and New York State Municipal Laws under Article 18 and a violation of due process depriving Platintiff Stacey Pynn and her children a fair and impartial investigation.

 

  1. Plaintiff contacted Defendants David Haylett and Claude Joerg regarding the conflict of interest of Defendant Niagara County CPS conducting investigations and maintaining altered records evidence regarding Defendant Matthew Pynn.  Defendant Claude Joerg stated he has “no problem with” maintaining and continuing conflict of interest investigations.  Defendant Joerg refused to transfer the investigations to another county.

 

  1. On January 7th and January 13, 2023, Plaintiff sent detailed emails to Defendants Claude Joerg, David Haylett, Rhonda Platt, and others detailing severe child abuse evidence and a cease and desist to Defendant Niagara County CPS from maintaining investigations on Defendant Matthew Pynn. Nonetheless, Defendant Niagara County CPS maintained the investigations and inexplicably unfounded them.

 

  1. The decision to maintain these investigations despite the conflict of interest of persons and the financial motive to conceal the child abuse / maltreatment of former Niagara County CPS employee Defendant Matthew Pynn and to conceal their reprehensible hiring practices was made by Defendants Niagara County attorney Claude Joerg, Niagara County CPS attorney David Haylett Jr and Commissioner Meghan Lutz. They are aware of the sexual abuse and strangulation facts and evidence combined with multiple other forms of child abuse / maltreatment committed by Defendant Matthew Pynn, yet they refuse and continue to refuse to correct their wrongdoings.

 

  1. All Defendants Conspire Deliberatly and Knowingly and Illegally Harshly Restrict Plaintiff’s Right of Intimate Association with Her Children
  2.   The 14th Amendment of the Constitution affords parents the unfettered right to raise our children, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390, 262 US 399 (1923) which held the

rights to conceive and raise one’s child is “essential”, Prince v Massachusetts, 321

US 158, 321 US 166 (1944): “It is cardinal with us that the custody and care and

nurture of the child resides first with parents, whose primary function and freedom

include preparation for obligations that state can neither supply or hinder.”,

Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 397 US 263 (1970) which held that the right to parent

in the companionship and care, custody and management of his or her children

warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection, Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57 (2000):  “the liberty interest at issue in this case – the interest of

parents in the care, custody and control of their children – is perhaps the oldest

fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”

 

  1. The New York State Constitution Article 1§11 provides that “[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof…”  The Court of Appeals elaborated up on Article 1§11 in Bower Assocs. V. Town of Pleasant

     Valley, 2 N.Y. 3d 617, 630 (2004) holding that: “[t]he essence of a violation of the

constitutional guarantee of equal protection is, of court, that all persons similarly situated must be treated alike.”

 

  1. The New York State Courts have held for a noncustodial parent to develop a meaningful nurturing relationship with his or her child, “visitation must be frequent and

regular, (Daghir v Daghir, 82 AD2d at 194, affd 56 NY 2d 938, see Matter of Graves v Smith, 264 AD 2d 844, Matter of Gerald D. v Lucille S., 188 AD2d at 650). “Absent EXTRAORDINARY circumstances, where visitation would be detrimental to the

child’s well-being, a noncustodial parent has a right to reasonable visitation

privileges” (Twersky v Twersky, 103 AD2d at 775-776; see Matter of Brian M. v. Nancy M., 227 AD2d 404; Matter of Schack v. Schack, 98 AD2d 802).”

 

  1. Despite the absence of any showing of imminent danger by a preponderance of the evidence, see Stanley v Illinois, 405 U.S. at 405 U.S. 651, the legal requirement to infringe on parental rights, the Defendants illegally, knowingly and deliberately conspired to

alienate the affection of Plaintiff’s children from her as a means of cruel and inhumane

treatment causing her excruciating emotional distress and continue to this day.

 

  1. Plaintiff was socially and professionally humiliated by the loss of custody of her children and people gossiping “she must have done something wrong”, and the Defendant Matthew Pynn going to the children’s doctor’s appointments and making false defamatory statements to Plaintiff’s professional colleagues that Plaintiff’ has mental illness.  Plaintiff, who was extroverted prior to this crisis, was severed from social interactions as she had to fight for her children for over a decade.

 

  1. Plaintiff had to learn the law and become a certified paralegal which took thousands of hours from her social life.  Plaintiff had to work inhumane hours like a slave to cover attorney costs for herself and money ordered to the perpetrator of her children’s abuse / maltreatment, Defendant Matthew Pynn.

 

  1. Plaintiff has endured excessive attorney fees, court costs, and money ordered to the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn totaling $1 million dollars. She has lost time with her children that cannot be made up.

 

 

 

  1. All Defendants Refuse to Right Their Wrongdoings as a Result, the Children are Failing to Thrive Emotionally, Physically and Educationally in the Custody of the Perpetrator of Child Abuse / Maltreatment Defendant Matthew Pynn

 

 

  1. Despite the plethora of evidence that the children were sexually abused, strangulated,

and harshly neglected, in lieu of protecting the children and Plaintiff, the Defendant/s for over a decade corruptly conspired to commit and cover up the child sexual abuse, strangulation and multiple forms of woeful neglect of the Defendant Matthew Pynn by

knowingly hiring another perpetrator Defendant Nicholas D’Angelo as a

Niagara County CPS attorney with intent knowing he would be willing to conspire in the cover up of Matthew Pynn, denial of a fair forum for court and Child Protection investigations, obstructed documents from official court records to affect

adjudication, financially battered Plaintiff by theft of her assets and money, denied Plaintiff her right of access to the courts, tampered with witnesses including threatening, intimidating, harassing, and directing counselors to ignore past and ongoing medical evidence of sexual abuse by the Defendant Matthew Pynn, willfully ignored evidence and the children’s protected hearsay abuse allegations, harshly restricted Plaintiff’s from any meaningful access to her children and from participating in medical care (despite Stacey Pynn being a current licensed physician assistant and the Defendant being substantiated for medical neglect by another outside CPS agency), failed and continue to fail to properly investigate and arrest Defendant Matthew Pynn and failed to protect Plaintiff and her children from further harm.  In fact, the children are currently captive in the custody of their perpetrator to this day despite the children failing to thrive emotionally, educationally and physically.

 

  1. Just for example, the current state of the children in the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn’s custody, out of the past one hundred forty days of school this 2024 year, one child of the Plaintiff has been absent / tardy seventy-two days and another child absent / sixty eight days, which is affecting their grades.  The parties’ son developed sexualized behaviors as the result of his victimization since the age of six and this was never therapeutically mitigated by Defendant Matthew Pynn, (the impetus of the medical neglect and inadequate guardian substantiated findings against Defendant Matthew Pynn by an outside CPS agency), and now the Plaintiff’s son was arrested for sending sexually explicit images to another child.  Another child is a school dropout and is socially isolated essentially almost never leaving her father’s residence except for transient errands like grocery shopping and her GED classes.

 

  1. Despite another county’s child protection (Erie County on September 18, 2022) substantiating multiple findings of child abuse / maltreatment against Defendant Matthew

 

Pynn, the Defendants Unified Court System and Niagara County Child Protective Services et al., refuse to right their wrong.

 

  1. To this day despite their knowledge that Defendant Matthew Pynn sexually abused

and repeatedly strangulated the children and continued to sleep with Plaintiff’s daughter almost always well into her teen years, and despite their knowledge the children are failing to thrive in Defendant Matthew Pynn’s custody, Niagara County CPS and Niagara County CPS Defendant employees herein named, continue to refuse to right their wrongdoing and the Plaintiff’s children are still in their perpetrator’s custody when Plaintiff has no history of abusing or neglecting children and is a licensed physician assistant in the state of New York with no history of mental illness and is fully capable of providing good care to her children.

 

  1. Despite the Eighth Amendment in the United States Constitution states that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, it is reprehensible and dehumanizing, the treatment that Plaintiff Stacey Pynn has endured by both the courts and child welfare in the state of New York, county of Niagara consistent with the hiring practices and court treatment complained of by the public and New York Senate.

 

  1. The safe parent attempting to spare her children from the substantiated child abuse / maltreatment of the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn is enduring harsh deprivations of her civil liberties and financially battered; however, the child abuser Defendant Matthew Pynn, whose children disclosed sexual abuse and strangulation by him and who is substantiated by Erie County CPS for several indications of child abuse / maltreatment walks free with impunity and custody of the parties’ children and is permitted to continue to practice as an attorney for Defendant Niagara County as a Public Defender.

 

  1. Despite Plaintiff’s Constitutional Right to have meaningful access and parent her children, she has been harshly restricted by the state courts absent any showing of imminent danger by a preponderance of evidence.

 

  1. As a result of this reprehensible hiring and dehumanizing treatment, the damages onto Plaintiff Stacey Pynn are severe, (see Stacey Pynn’s oral argument to the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division Forth Judicial Department on September 11, 2023, starting at 1:42.11 https://www.youtube.com/live/VPMJBPY_t5E?si=aNHgVViPMb_AuhYF.)

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS, CORRUPT “CASE-FIXING” CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C 1983 TO DEPRIVE PLAINTIFF OF FIFTH and FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS, AND EQUAL PROTECTIONS UNDER THE LAW

 

  1. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as though fully

set forth herein;

 

  1. Defendant Matthew Pynn and Defendants Niagara County and Niagara County

CPS repeatedly and persistently conspired to obstruct justice, “case-fixing”, with the other Defendants named in this cause of action to influence and impede adjudication,  Namely The NYS UCS, The NYS OCA, various New York State Supreme and Family Court Judges, (Kevin Carter, Keith Kibler, Lawrence Marks, Norman St. George, Daniel Furlong, Frank Sedia III and other public officers and staffers in the courts located within and around New York State) conspired to deprive Plaintiff Stacey Pynn of a right to a fair trial and equal protection under the law.  At all times some Defendants impersonated positions as public officers, (thus their positions are vacant and absent the protections of their office pursuant to New York State Public Officer’s Law §30), others presided on cases despite financial and political conflicts of interest in violation of their public oath of office to afford due process, (see New York State Public Officer’s Law §70, thus acting outside of their jurisdiction and such actions are absent the statutory protections of their office), and repeatedly and persistently violated state and criminal laws and massively obstructed documents from official court / government records in violation 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 2071, 3002 and New York State Penal Law §§§175.25, 195.00 and 215.40 to influence / impeded adjudication, (see United States v. Caldwell_581 F. Supp.3d1); repeatedly and persistently promulgated deliberate malicious manufactured known to be manufactured false narratives and created false probable cause for the intended purpose theft of millions of dollars of money and assets from Plaintiff Stacey Pynn and silence her to “Shut your mouth!” about the sexual trafficking and physical abuse and neglect of her children perpetrated by crony Defendant Matthew.  This was with the additional intended, deliberate and willful purpose of sparing the Defendants Niagara County, Niagara County CPS, Niagara County DSS, and the Niagara County Public Defender’s Office from accountability and shame for their reprehensible hiring practices for sensitive positions involving vulnerable children, and conceal the inhumane treatment in the state courts, and to fraudulently monetize tremendous sums (multi-millions) of money in False Claims from Title IV Federal Funding to New York State in violation of CAPTA contract requirements for hiring practices.  In furtherance of that conspiracy, Defendants and their co-conspirators.

  1. Acted absent jurisdiction and or impersonated public officers under color of law in New York State.
  2. Refused to order Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s requests for a change in venue for a fair and impartial forum in a manner to control a false narrative and influence adjudication in violation of Due Process and Equal Protection rights under color of law;
  3. Maintained cases, and failed obligations to recuse / disqualify despite a clear fiduciary conflict of interest and also having familiarity with Defendant Matthew Pynn, (who is an attorney who practices frequently in the courts around Erie and Niagara County and worked formerly for Defendant Niagara County CPS and is currently and attorney for Defendant Niagara County as a Public Defender) in a manner to control a false narrative and influence adjudication in violation of Due Process and Equal Protection rights under color of law;
  4. Pervasively obstructed / tampered with numerous material documents (approximately fifty (50) or more) from the official government court records of Pynn v Pynn in the State of New York Supreme Court, County of Niagara case e150065/2013 and in the case in the State of New York Family Court file 80114 in a manner to impede / influence adjudication in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1512, 2071, 3002 and Plaintiff’s 5th Amendment Right of Due Process to have a complete and accurate record, (see United States v. Caldwell_581 F. Supp.3d1);
  5. Financially battered and financially exploited Plaintiff for millions of dollars intended to impede / impair her ability to defend herself and denied her applications for attorney fees which created an unequal footing in state litigation matters against her ex-spouse Defendant Matthew Pynn who is an attorney himself and well known in the courts and has had nearly free attorney services throughout. This is in violation of 5th Amendment rights of due process by creating a disadvantaged party / unequal footing among the litigants;
  6. Hindered Plaintiff’s time barred active Criminal Complaints against Defendant Matthew Pynn, (a perpetrator of multiple substantiated child abuse / maltreatment findings), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 2071, 3002, New York State Penal Law §205.65 but conspired to falsely arrest, assault, batter and illegally detain Plaintiff Stacey Pynn in violation of Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s substantial civil liberties and in violation of New York State Penal Law §§§ 120.11, 135.10 and 190.26 and in a manner to influence / impede adjudication ;
  7. Obstructed justice, “case-fixed”, “precluded” by judicial order absent jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Right of Access to the Courts and equal protections under color of law throughout the entire 8th Judicial District in the State of New York in a manner to influence / impede adjudication and in Violation of Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s 1st Amendment Rights and 18 U.S.C.§ 3002;
  8. Denied full and fair evidentiary hearings on Plaintiff’s applications in violation of Plaintiff’s First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights in a manner to influence / impede adjudication;
  9. Were discourteous to Plaintiff Stacey Pynn in state courtroom proceedings and told Plaintiff Stacey Pynn to “Shut Your Mouth!” and threw her out of the court room during court proceedings while attempting to defend herself on the record from the false narratives the courts were attempting to create, while she was appearing to protect her children from perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn’s multiple substantiated findings of child abuse / maltreatment (and are still being ignored to this day), which was found by the New York State Appellate Division Fourth Department to be in violation of Due Process, see S.P. v M.P. 2022 NY Slip Op. 6377 Decided November 10, 2022;
  10. Abused Judicial powers of contempt and abused Peace Officers powers of arrest in violation of their required Constitutional oaths in a manner to retaliate against Plaintiff Stacey Pynn and influence / impede adjudication;
  11. Tampered with witnesses including substantial procedural irregularities, (such as Defendant Daniel Furlong, making ex-parte calls to children’s counselors directing them to ignore medical evidence of sexual abuse, and threatening Plaintiff Stacey Pynn with jail if she reported concerns of child abuse or brought medical evidence of abuse to her children’s counselors), in a manner in violation of 18 U.S.C§§1512 and New York State Penal Laws§§§ 195.00, 175.25, and 215.10(a), intended to influence adjudication “case-fixing” activities;
  12. Obstructed and interfered with government investigations of felony child physical and sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C.§1512 in a manner to influence / impede adjudication;
  13. Improperly closed or failed duty to investigate reports of child abuse;
  14. Held hearings off the record from which no transcripts exist and made ex parte phone calls to witnesses despite Plaintiff Stacey Pynn expressly objecting to do so in violation of due process rights afforded by the 5th Amendment in a manner to influence / impede adjudication;
  15. Ignored, suppressed and obstructed evidence of child abuse committed by Defendant Matthew Pynn from the court records in violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection under color of law and right to an unbiased courtroom in a manner to influence / impede adjudication;
  16. Refused to fairly investigate matters and refused to prosecute in violation of 14th Amendment rights of equal protection under color of law in a manner to influence / impede adjudication;

Causation: As a result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff would have had custody of her children for the past 11 years and her children would be spared from severe abuse.

Damages:  Plaintiff Stacey Pynn has endured excessive attorney fees totaling approximately $1 million in fees and court costs and money ordered to the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn and their co-conspirators, deprivation of substantial civil rights, loss of income, loss of time to intimately associate with her children, damage to her professional reputation, emotional pain and suffering for over ten (10) years and seeks damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

 

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS:  CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C §1983 TO DEFAME PLAINTIFF

 

Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as though fully set forth

 

herein;

 

  1. All Defendants except for Defendant Matthew Pynn at all times relevant to this

 

action either acted without jurisdiction or impersonated public officers;

 

Defendant Matthew Pynn conspired with Defendants to defame Plaintiff Stacey Pynn by:

 

  1. Defendants shared among themselves and promulgated that Plaintiff is a “meritless” “frivolous” litigator when they knew she was not as evidenced by four substantiated findings of child abuse / maltreatment levied against child perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn;
  2. Abusing powers of contempt and falsely labeling her as contumacious in the courts, (which was later vacated upon Appeal in the New York State Appellate Division Fourth Department by unanimous order, see S.P. v M.P. 2022 NY Slip Op. 6377 Decided November 10, 2022);
  3. Abused authority and created orders absent jurisdiction and disseminated them to disparage Plaintiff and obstruct her right to access and equal protection among all Family Courts located within the 8th Judicial District in New York State;
  4. Defendants shared among themselves and promulgated that Plaintiff is a “false alleger” when in fact, Defendants knew or had to have known Plaintiff is not falsely alleging either by his own conduct or the fact that Defendant Matthew Pynn has four substantiated findings of child abuse / maltreatment;

Causation:  As a result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff Stacey Pynn has endured people at work and her employment talking about her “she must have done something wrong”

Damages:  Plaintiff Stacey Pynn has endured excessive attorney fees totaling approximately $1 million in fees and court costs, loss of ability to attain a fair trial in any family court within the entire 8th Judicial District of New York, deprivation of substantial civil rights, loss of income, loss of time to intimately associate with her children, damage to her professional reputation, emotional pain and suffering for over ten (10) years and seeks damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

 

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS, CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C §1983 TO DEPRIVE PLAINTIFF OF HER 1st AMENDMENT PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS

 

 

Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as though fully set forth herein;

All Defendants except for Defendant Matthew Pynn at all times relevant to this action either acted outside of their jurisdiction or impersonated as public officers absent their oath;

  • Defendant Matthew Pynn and Defendant Niagara County corruptly

conspired with the NYS OCA, NYS OCS, Norman St. George in his Personal and purported Administrative capacity as Deputy Chief Administrative Judge, Kevin Carter in his personal and Administrative capacity as Administrative Judge to the 8th Judicial District in New York State, Keith Kibler in his Personal and Administrative Capacity as Superior Judge of the 8th Judicial District Family Court, Daniel Furlong, Frank Sedita III and Charles P. Ben to deprive / harshly restrict Plaintiff Stacey Pynn of her First Amendment Right of Public Access to the Courts by:

  1. Defendants shared among themselves and promulgated the manufactured false pretenses intended to obstruct her right of access to the courts in a manner to influence / impede adjudication;
  2. Abused authority and created orders absent jurisdiction and disseminated them to disparage Plaintiff and obstruct her right to access all Family Courts located within the 8th Judicial District in New York State in a manner to influence / impede adjudication;
  3. Defendants shared among themselves and promulgated false “orders” with an incorrect case index so that they are not filed and cannot be appealed in a manner to influence / impede adjudication;
  4. Defendants massively corrupted the official court record that is neither incidental nor minor for an appeal to be taken in violation of Due Process;
  5. Defendants Refused to vacate orders to correct their wrongdoing restricting Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s access when there was a change of circumstances exonerating the falsely applied labels held unfairly against her;
  6. Defendants made false statements in court about the children’s wishes in order to dismiss Plaintiff’s applications;

Causation:  Defendants have hindered Plaintiff’s ability to seek modification of the current custody and access order causing additional harm to her and her children who are knowingly severely abused and maltreated.

Damages:  Plaintiff Stacey Pynn has endured excessive attorney fees totaling approximately $1 million in fees and court costs, deprivation of substantial civil rights absent due process, loss of income, loss of time to intimately associate with her children, emotional pain and suffering for over ten (10) years and seeks damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

 

 

FORTH CAUSE OF ACTION IN VIOLATION OF THE FIRST NINTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO CARE AND CUSTODY OF CHILDREN AND RIGHTS TO INTIMATE ASSOCIATION UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983

 

Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as though full

set forth herein All Defendants except for Defendant Matthew Pynn at all times relevant to this action acted under color of state law.

  1. Plaintiff Mother Stacey Pynn has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the

care, custody, and management of her children, the right to intimate association, and a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference from the State.  Defendants corruptly conspired to deprive / harshly restrict Plaintiff Stacey Pynn of her Fourteenth Amendment Right of Intimate Association with her children by:

  1. Plaintiff Mother Stacey Pynn has been deprived of said liberty interest without due process of law and was denied a fair and impartial forum;
  2. Tragically returning the runaway child to the custody of her father every time she ran and failed to place her in the custody of the Plaintiff every time.
  3. Manufactured false pretenses to prevent Plaintiff from attaining custody such as claiming she was a “false alleger”;
  4. Omitting, willfully ignoring child abuse of the Defendant Matthew Pynn and recklessly failing to examine the best interests and God given human rights of the children to be safe from child abuse and neglect;
  5. Massively obstructed documents from court records;
  6. Circulated the uncrossed discredited report of controversial David Nathanson and omitting that the report contains adverse data against Defendant Matthew Pynn indicating he has severe personality disorder with adverse parenting implications.
  7. Failing to investigate reports of severe child abuse;
  8. Failing to provide a fair forum for investigations;
  9. Negligently delaying for seven years a multiphasic forensic evaluation for the children’s reports of sexual abuse and strangulation and negligently permitting the perpetrator to drive her to the interview and threatening her safe parent mother witness from participating in the investigation;
  10. Advancing false instruments to the state on the safety reports during CPS investigations saying no safety concerns despite the children’s disclosures of severe sexual abuse and strangulation;
  11. Hindering prosecution against Defendant Matthew Pynn;
  12. Failing to protect, failure to afford a restraining order;
  13. Adjudicating false defamatory labels against Plaintiff calling her meritless and frivolous litigator;
  14. Dismissing corroborating evidence that the children’s abuse disclosures are bona fide such behaviors ignored include but are not limited to: age-inappropriate sexual knowledge at the age of eight, Plaintiff’s son wrote “You naked, me naked we put or winners in or butts, we suc or weners, we do it for secs”, sexualized and violent behavior changes, temper tantrums and runaway behavior nearly exclusive to the perpetrator, school truancy, nightmares, children’s disclosures of sexual abuse to several witnesses including Defendant Charles P. Ben, agoraphobia, the children’s disclosures of sexual abuse and strangulation that corroborate each other, and the father’s several indications for neglect, his own journal that describes himself forcing a child onto her bed and hitting her, and his own journal that states “porn made other sins cloud my thinking”;

Causation:  As a result of the Defendants unconstitutional conduct, Plaintiff Mother Stacey Pynn was deprived of regular, physical custody of her four children, which she is entitled to under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Damages:  As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff Mother Stacey Pynn was damaged and injured in an amount to be determined at trial.

 

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION ABUSE OF PROCESS IN VIOLATION OF NEW YORK STATE LAW RELATED TO JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS

 

Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as though full

set forth herein All Defendants except for Defendant Matthew Pynn at all times relevant to this action acted under color of state law.

  1. The Judicial Defendants named in this action also abused processes.
    1. Defendant Richard Kloch failed his obligations to recuse at onset of the case in The State of New York Supreme Court, County of Niagara, Pynn v Pynn e150065/2013 and created orders despite his knowing of Defendant personally and professionally and having a predetermined bias on the case.
    2. Defendant Catherine Nugent-Panepinto failed her obligations to recuse in The State of New York Supreme Court, County of Niagara, Pynn v Pynn e150065/2013 when her law clerk is a client of oppositions counsel and ignored emergency applications filed by Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s counsel to protect her children from the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn. Defendant Catherine Nugent-Panepinto, signed ex parte orders that the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn shall be the only parent to take the children to school despite the fact that perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn at the time was incapable of transporting the parties’ daughter to school because whenever he attempted to take her, he emotionally tormented her and she would arrive to school late and emotionally distraught.  Now said child has failed out of school and has no education and the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn is indicated for educational neglect.  Defendant Catherine Nugent-Panepinto did this to give perpetrator Defendant leverage over the safe parent Plaintiff Stacey Pynn in court.  Defendant Hon. Catherine Nugent-Panepinto, has failed to file her public officer oath with the State and is therefore not afforded the statutory protections of her office having done this to Plaintiff Stacey Pynn.
    3. Defendant Sara Sheldon, JSC failed her obligations to recuse in The State of New York Supreme Court, County of Niagara, Pynn v Pynn e150065/2013 when her law clerk is a former coworker of perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn. Defendant Sara Sheldon ordered the marital residence be sold or threatened Plaintiff Mother Stacey Pynn she will go to jail.  This was an illegal order by Defendant Sara Sheldon as there was no divorce to permit equitable distribution.  This was to launder money to co-conspirators and financially batter and silence Plaintiff Mother Stacey Pynn.  It was also to give a residential advantage to perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn and an attempt to render Plaintiff Mother Stacey Pynn homeless or in an apartment too small to accommodate four children.
    4. Defendant Daniel Furlong, failed his obligations to recuse in the State of New York Supreme Court, County of Niagara, Pynn v Pynn e150065/2013 due to his bias against mothers who report child abuse. Defendant Daniel Furlong, signed Defendant Sara Sheldon’s illegal order to sell the residence or for Plaintiff Stacey Pynn to sign her $65,000.00 over to perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn.  This was to launder money to co-conspirators and financially batter Plaintiff Mother and silence her.  Defendant Daniel Furlong obstructed numerous documents from the official court record.  Defendant Daniel Furlong abused his judicial powers of contempt against Plaintiff Stacey Pynn and ordered her to pay $1000.00.  This order of contempt was vacated by Appellate review citing a violation of due process.  This finding in violation of due process by The New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division Fourth Department in S.P. v M.P. 2022 NY Slip Op. 6377 Decided November 10, 2022 is a violation of Defendant Hon. Daniel Furlong’s oath pursuant to New York State Public Officer’s Law §30(e) and he is not afforded the statutory protections of his office pursuant to New York State Public Officer’s Law §15.
    5. Defendant Frank Sedita, III abused processes in The State of New York

Supreme Court, County of Niagara, Pynn v Pynn e150065/2013 to falsely label Plaintiff as a “vexatious and meritless” litigator when no reasonable judge would have adjudicated this when the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn has four substantiated findings of child abuse/maltreatment.  Defendant Frank Sedita, III used these false pretenses to preclude Plaintiff Stacey Pynn from filing in court, absent an attorney, when he knew this was in effect a complete unlawful obstruction of Plaintiff Mother’s access to the courts being a Chapter 13 debtor and cannot afford an attorney.  Defendant Frank Sedita, III JSC used his false labels held against the Plaintiff Mother as a plausible cause to delete documents from the official court record, including Plaintiff’s Motion for him to recuse and notices of Appeal.  Defendant Frank Sedita III created judgments, and ignored state and federal laws absent due process ordering Plaintiff Mother Stacey Pynn to give large sums of money, (and is now attempting to launder money from the unlawful sale of her home), to co-conspirators including Charles P Ben, (who continues to pursue a $20,000.00 judgement even though no due process was afforded) to the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn and his co-conspirators;

 

  1. Defendant Keith Kibler abused processes in the State of New

York Family Court County of Niagara file 80114 when he refused a hearing on Plaintiff’s Application for a Restraining Order from perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn.  He further abused processes when he created orders outside of his jurisdiction and ordered that Plaintiff Stacey Pynn was not allowed to file anything in any Family Court throughout the entire Eighth Judicial District.

 

  1. Defendant Kevin Carter, abused processes when he obstructed Plaintiff

Stacey Pynn’s criminal complaint from proceeding and refused when repeatedly asked by the Plaintiff Stacey Pynn to afford a change in venue.

 

  1. When Plaintiff complained to Defendants Lawrence Marks and Norman St. George, about the above actions of Judges, no effective intervention occurred for Plaintiff Stacey Pynn.

Causation:  If Plaintiff was afforded a fair venue with reasonable judges, her custody litigation would have ended a decade ago and she and her children would be protected and Plaintiff not financially battered.

Damages:  As such, the Plaintiff has suffered loss of time and enjoyment with her children, has suffered tremendously while her children are in the custody of their perpetrator of abuse/maltreatment and has endured theft of millions of dollars in property, assets and money and enormous attorney fees in an amount to be determined in a trial by jury.

 

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION CONSPIRACY TO SEX TRAFFIC MINORS IN VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. §1591 UNDER COLOR OF LAW

 

Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as though full set forth herein All Defendants except for Defendant Matthew Pynn at all times relevant to this action acted under color of state law.

 

  1. The Defendants knew or had to have known that Plaintiff’s children were indeed sexually abused and strangulated by the disgraced Defendant Matthew Pynn who has several substantiated findings of child abuse / maltreatment by a neighboring county child protection agency.

 

  1. The Defendants knew or had to have known that the Plaintiff’s children’s sexual abuse allegations are corroborated by:
    1. The mental state of the accused Defendant Matthew Pynn having several findings of child abuse / maltreatment,
    2. The age-inappropriate knowledge of sex and sexualized behavior problems of Plaintiff’s son LP,
    3. The runaway behavior of HP from Defendant Matthew Pynn involving police to find her and secure her return,
    4. The disclosures of the children that corroborated each other’s statements including their sexual abuse “pinching privets” and “hurting my butt” and that HP was being repeatedly strangulated by the disgraced Defendant Matthew Pynn.
  2. Yet the Defendants conspired to criminally commit and cover up the sexual abuse, strangulation and other forms of child abuse and maltreatment of the perpetrator Defendant Matthew Pynn by doing the following:
  3. Keeping the matter “in house” refusing a change of venue for investigations and court cases;
  4.     Manufacturing false pretenses calling the Plaintiff a “false alleger” when they knew this was not the case;
  5. Defaming the Plaintiff as a “meritless and frivolous” litigant;
  6. Assigning Charles P. Ben who used to hire Defendant Matthew Pynn for a period of time spanning more than a decade and who substituted the children’s judgment arguing custody to their perpetrator father and lying to the court about the children’s wishes;
  7. Assigning a controversial court forensic, David Nathanson who is known to recommend to the custody of child abusers and his reports have been related to child death(s);
  8. Relying on the cloak of confidentiality of CPS documentation and failing to report apparent felony child abuse crimes to the police;
  9. Failing to investigate or properly investigate reports of child abuse permitting it to perpetuate;
  10. Failing to protect;

Causation:  No reasonable court or child protection agency or attorney for children would do what these Defendants did to cover up child abuse leaving the Plaintiff’s children unprotected.

Damages:  As such, the Plaintiff has suffered loss of her God given rights of time and enjoyment with her children, has suffered tremendously while her children are in the custody of their perpetrator of abuse/maltreatment and has endured theft of millions of dollars in property, assets and money and enormous attorney fees in an amount to be determined in a trial by jury.

 

 

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION ACTIVITY IN VIOLATION OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT PURSUANT TO

  • S.C. §§ 1962 AND 1964

 

  • The criminal activities, cover ups, and corruption involving all of the Defendants, either jointly and/or severally in both their personal and/or administrative, and/or illegal judicial capacities constitute criminal activity pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See 18 U.S.C. § 1964.

The Petitioner also brings this lawsuit pursuant to pursuant to 42 U.S. Code § 1983.

The Plaintiff brings this private civil action for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conduct involves statutorily  prohibited activities: (1) investing in, (2) acquiring, and/or (3) conducting or participating in an enterprise with income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, and (4) conspiring to commit the first three types of activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(d).

As to the element of causation, this plaintiff alleges that the unlawful conduct of all of the Defendants was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Harmoni International Spice, Inc. v. Hume, 914 F.3d 648, 651 (9th Cir. 2019)

The Plaintiff brings this Complaint RICO 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d), the conduct and conspiracy prongs of the statute.

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), the Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against all Defendants’  (1) conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity (known as “predicate acts”), (5) causing injury to the Plaintiff and her minor children by the conduct constituting the violations and criminal activities set forth herein.. See Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005).

 

The Defendants each committed criminal acts and conduct and had some part in directing the affairs of their criminal enterprise. [10]

 

The Defendants conducted a pattern of racketeering activity, which resulted in irreparable harm to the Plaintiff and her minor children, from on or about February 4, 2013.[11]

The Defendants each conspired and schemed and conducted a criminal enterprise involving the exploitation and abuse of minors and conspired and conducted cover ups to conceal their ongoing criminal activity in the same.[12]

The Defendants criminal conduct was interrelated in purpose and scope and embraced criminal acts that had the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and were not isolated events.[13]

The criminal conduct of the Defendants was “long term” as defined under the RICO Act, beginning at least on or before February 4, 2013, and continuing until present day.[14]

The Plaintiff alleges that the misconduct and criminal activity constitutes racketeering activity because the relevant conduct consists of at least one of the indictable predicate acts listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) (“‘[R]acketeering activity’ consists of no more and no less than commission of a predicate act.”).

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants’ conduct involved violations and criminal conduct through predicate offenses pursuant to: §§ 1461–1465 (relating to obscene matter); §1503 (relating to obstruction of justice); §1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations);  §1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement); §1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant); §1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant); §§ 1581–1592 (relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons); §1952 (relating to racketeering); §§2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2260 (relating to sexual exploitation of children); §§2421–24 (relating to white slave traffic); and title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery).

The RICO Act required predicate acts alleged by the Plaintiff and committed by the Defendants are proven upon the record as it exists and by a preponderance of the evidence. See Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1987).

This case is brought by the Plaintiff, Stacey Pynn, and it is based upon the reckless and harmful endangerment and neglect and abuse of minor children involving, but not limited to, violent physical and sexual abuse, molestation, and sex trafficking of children and the cover up of these crimes, being conducted in the state of New York involving each of the Defendants.

The Defendants all conducted, and continue to conduct knowingly and willfully, at various and sundry times, violent, abusive, neglectful, predatory, criminal and harmful acts against children. All Defendants listed above were, or still are, directly or indirectly involved in the perpetration and conspiracy to abuse children and the cover up of these crimes, as proven upon the record of proceedings and the testimony of the victims. The Defendants perpetrate, promote and cover up these crimes in a continuing criminal enterprise.

 

Causation:  No reasonable court or child protection agency or attorney for children would do what these Defendants did to cover up child abuse leaving the Plaintiff’s children unprotected.

Damages:  As such, the Plaintiff has suffered loss of her God given rights of time and enjoyment with her children, has suffered tremendously while her children are in the custody of their perpetrator of abuse/maltreatment and has endured theft of millions of dollars in property, assets and money and enormous attorney fees in an amount to be determined in a trial by jury.

 

 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Ms. Stacey Pynn

demands a trial by jury in this action of all issues so triable.

 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

That Plaintiff Stacey Pynn respectfully requests that she be rewarded:

  • compensatory damages against all defendants in an amount to be determined by the jury; and that Plaintiff Stacey Pynn be awarded punitive damages against all Defendants in an amount to be determined by the jury; and
  • that this Court provide the injunctive relief to afford a fair forum of a transfer to different venue outside of Niagara County with a restraining order against all courts and investigative authorities, (police and child welfare), located within and around Niagara County from hearing matters of Plaintiff Stacey Pynn and her immediate family;
  • that this Court to provide additional injunctive relief declaring that the actions of all the Defendants herein corruptly violated Plaintiff’s right of access to the courts and equal protection under the law, violated her right to due process and a fair forum, and violated due process rights by obstructing voluminous material documents from the official court records in New York State courts repeatedly and persistently over the course of ten (10) years since inception of her cases of Pynn v. Pynn in the New York State Supreme Court, County of Niagara index #e150065/2013 and the New York State Family Court, County of Niagara file 80114 and in the New York State Family Court, County of Erie in violation of the First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments in the Constitution of the United States and New York State Constitution Article I, VI, and XIII, and under the Common Law of New York, specifically deprivation of rights without due process of law; and
  • this court to rule the judicial Defendants created orders that are void and unenforceable due to judicial fraud on the court, and that the Defendants
  • committed theft of millions of dollars in assets and money without jurisdiction and while impersonating court officers; and
  • that the Defendants inflicted emotional distress including by negligent infliction; and
  • for this Court to order Defendants to cease and desist from obstructing official government records, including but not limited to documents from court and corresponding docket sheets and investigative records;
  • and that this Court provide the additional injunctive relief removing all state court orders that preclude Plaintiff Stacey Pynn’s right of public access to the courts;
  • and that this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, issue and order awarding Plaintiff Stacey Pynn reasonable attorney’s fees together with the costs of this action against all defendants;
  • and that this Court to order the Defendants without their required oath on file the ab initio vacatur of their elected or appointed offices, and for those Defendants in violation of their oath requirements pursuant to New York State Public Officer’s Law §10 are denied any statutory protections of their office including but not limited to immunity; and
  • that this Court enter the New York State Unified Court System into a federal receivership given the profuse Constitutional disregard herein described, and
  • that this court to enter the New York State CPS Program Manual is in violation of the U.S. Constitutional due process requirement upon the direction to refer substantiated reports from a neighboring county back to the conflict of interest preferred jurisdiction county to decide on any court intervention, and
  • that this Court award such other further relief, together with any other legal or equitable relief, or both, as the Court deems just and proper.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of May 2024, I Stacey Pynn, the Plaintiff in the above captioned case, appearing pro se do hereby affirm that the foregoing is truthful and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief under penalty of perjury.

 

 

Dated: May 22, 2024

Buffalo, New York                                                     ______________________________

Stacey Pynn, pro se

 

safetypynn@gmail.com

[1] 18 U.S. Code § 3509 – Child victims’ and child witnesses’ rights

[2] Under 42 U.S.C. § 13031—a provision of the Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990—all covered professionals who learn of suspected child abuse while engaged in enumerated activities and professions on federal land or in federal facilities must report that abuse, regardless of where the suspected victim is cared for or resides..

[3] The conduct element of § 1962(c) requires that the defendant have some part in directing the affairs of the enterprise. Liability is not limited to those with primary responsibility for the enterprise’s affairs, nor is a formal position within the enterprise required. However, the defendant is not liable under § 1962(c) unless the defendant has participated in the operation or management of the enterprise itself. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993) (holding that accountants hired to perform audit of cooperative’s records did not participate in “operation or management” of cooperative’s affairs by failing to inform cooperative’s board of directors that cooperative was arguably insolvent). In determining whether the conduct element has been satisfied, relevant questions include whether the defendant “occupies a position in the chain of command,” “knowingly implements [the enterprise’s] decisions,” or is “indispensable to achieving the enterprise’s goal.” Walter v. Drayson, 538 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that attorney’s performance of services for alleged associated-in-fact enterprise was not sufficient to satisfy § 1962(c)’s conduct element).

 

[4] A pattern is defined as “at least two acts of racketeering activity” within ten years of each other. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Proving two predicate acts is a necessary condition for finding a violation but may not be sufficient. See H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989). To establish a “pattern of racketeering activity,” the predicate acts must be both “related” and “continuous.” Id.; Sever, 978 F.2d at 1529.

 

[5] An “enterprise includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The “definition is not very demanding.” Odom, 486 F.3d at 548. RICO does not require that either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering be motivated by an economic purpose. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262 (1994).

[6] Related conduct “embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.” H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 240. Relatedness of the alleged or proven predicate acts is rarely an issue. See Medallion Television Enters., Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 833 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding alleged predicate acts to be related.)

 

[7] The continuity requirement reflects Congress’s concern in RICO with long-term criminal conduct. H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989). To establish a “pattern of racketeering activity,” the predicate acts must be both “related” and “continuous.”  Plaintiffs must prove either “open-ended” or “closed-ended” continuity—that is, a plaintiff must either prove a series of related predicate acts committed over a substantial period of time (known as closed-ended continuity) or show past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition (known as open-ended continuity). See  Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 749 (9th Cir. 2000)

[8] 18 U.S. Code § 3509 – Child victims’ and child witnesses’ rights

[9] Under 42 U.S.C. § 13031—a provision of the Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990—all covered professionals who learn of suspected child abuse while engaged in enumerated activities and professions on federal land or in federal facilities must report that abuse, regardless of where the suspected victim is cared for or resides..

[10] The conduct element of § 1962(c) requires that the defendant have some part in directing the affairs of the enterprise. Liability is not limited to those with primary responsibility for the enterprise’s affairs, nor is a formal position within the enterprise required. However, the defendant is not liable under § 1962(c) unless the defendant has participated in the operation or management of the enterprise itself. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993) (holding that accountants hired to perform audit of cooperative’s records did not participate in “operation or management” of cooperative’s affairs by failing to inform cooperative’s board of directors that cooperative was arguably insolvent). In determining whether the conduct element has been satisfied, relevant questions include whether the defendant “occupies a position in the chain of command,” “knowingly implements [the enterprise’s] decisions,” or is “indispensable to achieving the enterprise’s goal.” Walter v. Drayson, 538 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that attorney’s performance of services for alleged associated-in-fact enterprise was not sufficient to satisfy § 1962(c)’s conduct element).

 

[11] A pattern is defined as “at least two acts of racketeering activity” within ten years of each other. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Proving two predicate acts is a necessary condition for finding a violation but may not be sufficient. See H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989). To establish a “pattern of racketeering activity,” the predicate acts must be both “related” and “continuous.” Id.; Sever, 978 F.2d at 1529.

 

[12] An “enterprise includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The “definition is not very demanding.” Odom, 486 F.3d at 548. RICO does not require that either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering be motivated by an economic purpose. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262 (1994).

[13] Related conduct “embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.” H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 240. Relatedness of the alleged or proven predicate acts is rarely an issue. See Medallion Television Enters., Inc. v. SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 833 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding alleged predicate acts to be related.)

 

[14] The continuity requirement reflects Congress’s concern in RICO with long-term criminal conduct. H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989). To establish a “pattern of racketeering activity,” the predicate acts must be both “related” and “continuous.”  Plaintiffs must prove either “open-ended” or “closed-ended” continuity—that is, a plaintiff must either prove a series of related predicate acts committed over a substantial period of time (known as closed-ended continuity) or show past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition (known as open-ended continuity). See  Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 749 (9th Cir. 2000)

Bill Windsor files Motion Against Judge Thomas W Thrash

1-11-CV-01923-TWT – Motion for Reconsideration-2024-04-10

1-11-CV-01923-TWT-Letter-to-USDCNDGa-Clerk-filing-2024-04-10

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER

William M. Windsor (“Windsor” or “Plaintiff”) hereby files this MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING LEAVE.

Windsor shows the Court as follows:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

  1. On April 3, 2024, Judge Thomas W. Thrash entered this purported order [EXHIBIT A]:

“This is a pro se civil action filed against the former Clerk of Court, a number of his employees, judges of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and judges of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. It is before the Court on various motions filed by the pro se Plaintiff. After a hearing and on motion of the United States of America, on July 15, 2011 the Court issued an injunction prohibiting the Plaintiff from filing any additional Complaints against federal judges or employees of the federal judiciary without obtaining the consent of a federal judge in the district in which the action was to be filed. The injunction was issued because of the Plaintiff’s extraordinary abuse of the federal judicial system by repeatedly filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against the judges assigned to his many cases, because of the burden to clerical and judicial operations caused by his voluminous frivolous filings, and because his continuing course of conduct had become an impediment to the administration of justice. The administration of justice would suffer irreparable harm if the Plaintiff is allowed to continue filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against the judges and others involuntarily involved in his litigious campaigns. The balance of the harms and the public interest demanded that the Plaintiff be stopped.

“The Plaintiff’s most recent filings are more of the same. The Motion for Leave to Pursue Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights and Additional Causes of Action [Doc. 294] seeks permission to file a lawsuit against the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States and one of his employees because of the Plaintiff’s unhappiness with how a petition for a writ of mandamus was handled by the Court. The Motion for Leave to file a Bivens Action against Judge Thomas W. Thrash [Doc. 295], and Motion for Leave to File Purported Injunctions [Doc. 296] seek permission to file a lawsuit against this Court for limiting the Plaintiff’s ability to file frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against judges and other judicial officers. The Motion for Leave to Pursue Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights and Addition Causes of Action [Doc. 294] is DENIED. The Motion for Leave to file a Bivens Action against Judge Thomas W. Thrash [Doc. 295], and Motion for Leave to File Purported Injunctions [Doc. 296] are DENIED. The Court notes that the proposed Bivens action against it is clearly barred by the statute of limitations and absolute judicial immunity. Leave to file the proposed Complaints is DENIED.”

  1. On May 20, 2011, Windsor filed the Verified Complaint in the Superior Court of Fulton County. The Civil Action was assigned No.
  2. On June 14, 2011, Windsor filed a Motion to Deny Removal and a RESPONSE TO THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER. This was never addressed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, and he never addressed jurisdiction.  Therefore, this latest purported Order by Judge Thomas W. Thrash is a void order.
  3. Docket Numbers 294, 295, and 296 were not submitted to Judge Thomas W. Thrash. They were submitted to the Presiding Judge, Timothy Batten.
  1. THE ORDER IS DEFECTIVE AS JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH HAS NO JURISDICTION.
  2. On June 14, 2011, Windsor filed a Motion to Deny Removal and a RESPONSE TO THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER. This was never addressed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, and he never addressed jurisdiction.
  3. The ORDER must be vacated.
  1. THE ORDER CITES NO CASE LAW AND NO STATUTE IN SUPPORT.
  2. The ORDER is completely void of any authority. Judge Thomas W. cited no case law and no Rules or other authority.
  3. The ORDER must be vacated.

III. THE MOTIONS WERE SUBMITTED TO PRESIDING JUDGE TIMOTHY BATTEN, NOT JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH.

  1. Docket Numbers 294, 295, and 296 were not submitted to Judge Thomas W. Thrash. They were submitted to the Presiding Judge, Timothy Batten. [EXHIBIT B.]
  1. WINDSOR HAS NEVER ABUSED THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, AND JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH CAN CITE NO FACTS TO SHOW THAT HE DID.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash falsely and maliciously wrote in this ORDER: “The injunction was issued because of the Plaintiff’s extraordinary abuse of the federal judicial system by repeatedly filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against the judges assigned to his many cases.”
  3. Judge Thomas W. Thrash can cite no facts to support this outrageous claim.
  1. WINDSOR HAS NEVER FILED A FRIVOULOUS FILING. ALL OF HIS FILINGS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY RESEARCHED AND HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE FACTS AND THE LAW.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash false, maliciously, and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “…because of the burden to clerical and judicial operations caused by his voluminous frivolous filings, and because his continuing course of conduct had become an impediment to the administration of justice.”
  1. WINDSOR HAS NEVER FILED A malicious or vexatious lawsuit against anyone. ALL OF HIS FILINGS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY RESEARCHED AND HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE FACTS AND THE LAW.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash false, maliciously, and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The administration of justice would suffer irreparable harm if the Plaintiff is allowed to continue filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against the judges and others involuntarily involved in his litigious campaigns. The balance of the harms and the public interest demanded that the Plaintiff be stopped.”
  3. Judge Thomas W. Thrash is a corrupt judge who has committed one crime after another against Windsor. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET.]

VII.  WINDSOR HAS NEVER FILED A malicious or vexatious lawsuit against anyone.  ALL OF HIS FILINGS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY RESEARCHED AND HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE FACTS AND THE LAW.

  1. Judge Thomas W. Thrash maliciously and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The Plaintiff’s most recent filings are more of the same.”
  2. There are no facts to support this outrageous statement.

VIII.  WINDSOR HAS NOT SOUGHT TO PURSUE A LEGAL ACTION AGAINST the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States and one of his employees because of the Plaintiff’s unhappiness with how a petition for a writ of mandamus was handled by the Court. HE SOUGHT IT DUE TO GROSS VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW AND THE RULES.

  1. Judge Thomas W. Thrash maliciously and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The Motion for Leave to Pursue Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights and Additional Causes of Action [Doc. 294] seeks permission to file a lawsuit against the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States and one of his employees because of the Plaintiff’s unhappiness with how a petition for a writ of mandamus was handled by the Court.”
  2. They violated the Rules and the law.  They likely committed criminal violations as well.
  1. WINDSOR HAS NOT SOUGHT TO PURSUE A LEGAL ACTION AGAINST JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH FOR IMPROPER PURPOSES. HE SOUGHT IT DUE TO GROSS VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW AND THE RULES.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash maliciously and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The Motion for Leave to file a Bivens Action against Judge Thomas W. Thrash [Doc. 295], and Motion for Leave to File Purported Injunctions [Doc. 296] seek permission to file a lawsuit against this Court for limiting the Plaintiff’s ability to file frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against judges and other judicial officers.”
  3. The United States Constitution gives pro se parties the right to file lawsuits, and this right may not be taken away absent a Constitutional amendment.
  1. WINDSOR HAS NOT SOUGHT TO PURSUE A LEGAL ACTION BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR A CLAIM OF ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash maliciously and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The proposed Bivens action against it is clearly barred by the statute of limitations and absolute judicial immunity.”
  3. The proposed action is not barred by the statute of limitations. Judge Thomas W. Thrash again makes such a claim with no legal authority cited.  State law establishes the statute of limitations, and this ORDER is yet another violation that will be subject to a claim for denial of Constitutional rights.
  4. There is no such thing as “absolute judicial immunity.” Judge Thomas W. Thrash again makes such a claim with no legal authority cited.
  1. THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The NOTICE OF removal is procedurally defective, and thE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.
  2. The NOTICE OF REMOVAL had procedural defects that make it void on its face.
  3. There is a presumption against removal jurisdiction, and this Court must strictly construe the removal statute. (Fajen v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir.1982).) The party seeking removal has the burden of proving the jurisdictional and procedural requirements for removal. (Laughlin v. Prudential Ins. Co., 882 F.2d. 187 (5th Cir. 1989).)
  4. The NOTICE OF REMOVAL fails on all accounts, so the MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL must be granted, and the ORDER must be vacated.

XII.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is procedurally defective FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT DEFENDANTS MUST MAKE AN APPEARANCE, and thE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.

  1. None of the Defendants had made an appearance.
  2. None of the Defendants had filed a CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT as required by N.D.Ga Local Rule 3.3 and FRCP 7.1, which was due to be filed with the Clerk “at the time of first appearance. [1-11-CV-0192-TWT Docket].
  3. The U.S. Attorneys, Sally Quillian Yates and Christopher Huber, had no authority to appear for the Defendants.
  4. Christopher Huber was representing one of the Defendants in two legal actions before Defendant Judge Duffey. There are an assortment of other conflicts that made it impossible for Christopher Huber to represent many of the Defendants.
  5. Nothing had been filed with any court giving the U.S. Attorneys the authority to appear for any of the Defendants.
  6. None of the Defendants were identified in the signature block on the NOTICE OF REMOVAL, so the Petition was not filed on behalf of any of the Defendants
  7. There is no indication that any of the Defendants have signed a sworn affidavit in regard to representation or the NOTICE OF REMOVAL.
  8. The ORDER must be vacated.

XIII. THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is procedurally defective BECAUSE THE ACTION WAS NOT YET PENDING IN FULTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT AS 28 U.S.C. § 1442 REQUIRES, SO THE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.

  1. The removal statute requires service prior to removal in the state of Georgia. The removal statute states that an action must be “pending” in a state court before it may be removed.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (noting that civil action may be removed to the district court “embracing the place wherein it is pending”).
  2. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the word pending means “remaining undecided” or “awaiting decision.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 (7th ed. 1999).  An action must have “commenced” before it can be “pending.”  A determination of whether the action was pending in a Georgia court at the time of removal requires reference to Georgia law.  Under Georgia law, “there is a substantial difference between the commencement of an action and its being a suit pending between the parties.” (McClendon v. Hernando Phosphate Co., 28 S.E. 152, 153 (Ga. 1897).)   Georgia law preserves this distinction, as filing a suit “is still not the commencement of suit unless followed by service within a reasonable time.” (Franek v. Ray, 236 S.E.2d 629, 632 (Ga. 1977).)  Thus, under Georgia law, “an action is not a ‘pending’ suit until after service of process is perfected.” (Steve A. Martin Agency, Inc. v. PlantersFIRST Corp., 678 S.E.2d 186, 188 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); see also Jenkins v. Crea, 656 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“An action is not a pending suit until service is perfected.”)
  3. Defendants Judge Julie E. Carnes, Judge Joel F. Dubina, Judge Ed Carnes, Judge Rosemary Barkett, and B. Grutby have not been served with process. Windsor also filed a motion with the Fulton County Superior Court seeking to add six additional Defendants.
  4. Since the Civil Action was not yet “pending” in Fulton County Georgia Superior Court, the text of the removal statute prevents removal prior to service on Judge Julie E. Carnes, Judge Joel F. Dubina, Judge Ed Carnes, Judge Rosemary Barkett, and B. Grutby. (28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).)

XIV.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is procedurally defective FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE RULE OF UNANIMITY, and this MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED.

  1. Another defect in the NOTICE OF REMOVAL is its failure to comply with the rule of unanimity.
  2. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) states that “defendants desiring to remove any civil action . . . shall file in the district court of the United States . . . a notice of removal.” There are 16 Defendants in this Civil Action, and all 16 Defendants have not filed the NOTICE OF REMOVAL.
  3. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 requires the unanimous consent of all defendants to the removal. (Russell Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 09/06/2001); Loftis v. U.S. Parcel Serv., Inc., 342 F.3d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 2003).)  The NOTICE OF REMOVAL failed to claim the consent of ANY Defendant, and it clearly fails to explain the absence of consent to the removal by at least nine of the Defendants, so it is defective for violating the rule of unanimity.  Since some of the Defendants did not join in the notice of removal and the NOTICE OF REMOVAL failed to account or the lack of their consent, the NOTICE OF REMOVAL is procedurally defective and cannot withstand the MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL.

“… all of the defendants must consent to removal.” (Wisc. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 393 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).)

“The unanimity requirement mandates that in cases involving multiple defendants, all defendants must consent to removal.” Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1044 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247-48, 20 S.Ct. 854, 855, 44 L.Ed. 1055 (1900) (deriving from a removal statute the rule that all defendants must join in removal)).  (See also In re Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp., 837 F.2d 432 (11th Cir. 01/19/1988); In re Ocean Marine Mut. Protection and Indem. Ass’n, Ltd., 3 F.3d 353, 355-56 (11th Cir. 1993); Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 754 (8th Cir. 2001); Balazik v. County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Kerwood, 969 F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 1992); Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1986); N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 272-73 (7th Cir.1982); Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686 (10th Cir. 1981); 11C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3731 (3d. ed. 1998); Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 590 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 12/30/2009).)

  1. THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is defective BECAUSE THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION, SO thE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.
  2. This Court lacks federal-question jurisdiction because there is no dispute as to the validity, construction or effect of a federal statute with a cause of action “arising under” the laws of the United States.
  3. This Civil Action is pursuant to the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. No federal statute has been included in the causes of action.
  4. There is no federal question presented on the face of the Verified Complaint. Windsor intends this Civil Action to be solely based on Georgia law.  Windsor specifically excluded federal statutes that could have been raised so this action would remain in Georgia courts.

Federal courts use the “well-pleaded complaint” rule to determine “arising under” jurisdiction. Long, 201 F.3d at 758. That rule provides that “‘federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.’” Id. (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). “[T]he party who brings the suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon.” The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).

This court has held that for a paper to fall within the removal statutes, it must be unambiguous. Cf. Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (10th Cir. 1998)

XVI.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is defective PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C § 1442 (a)(1) BECAUSE FEDERAL OFFICERS HAVE NOT RAISED A FEDERAL DEFENSE, SO THE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.

  1. The U.S. Attorney erroneously cited 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) as a basis for the removal.

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) provides that “a civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress….”

  1. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) does not apply because the Verified Complaint is not about suing “in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office or… under any Act of Congress….”

The U.S. Supreme Court holds that the jurisdictional provision found in 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) required federal officers to raise a federal defense before removing to federal court.  Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 109 S. Ct. 959, 103 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1989).

  1. None of the other Defendants raised any defense whatsoever to the Civil Action. The ONLY statement made by the U.S. Attorney in the NOTICE OF REMOVAL is: “This action is one that may be removed to the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2679.”
  2. There is no citation of case law to support such a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) has nothing to do with defenses this Civil Action, so no defense has been raised.

The Supreme Court has held that “the right of removal [under § 1442(a)(1)] is absolute for conduct performed under color of federal office,” Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242, 101 S. Ct. 1657, 1664, 68 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1981), and that 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) “is broad enough to cover all cases where federal officers can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty to enforce federal law.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406-07, 89 S. Ct. 1813, 1816, 23 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1969). The Court agreed with the government that “the removal statute is an incident of federal supremacy, and that one of its purposes [is] to provide a federal forum for cases where federal officials must raise defenses arising from their official duties.” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405, 89 S. Ct. at 1815.

The purpose of section 1442(a)(1) is to “permit[ ] the removal of those actions commenced in state court that expose a federal official to potential civil liability or criminal penalty for an act performed … under color of office.” Murray v. Murray, 621 F.2d 103, 107 (5th Cir.1980). In Willingham, the Supreme Court noted that “the removal statute is an incident of federal supremacy, and that one of its purposes was to provide a federal forum for cases where federal officials must raise defenses arising from their official duties.” 395 U.S. at 405, 89 S. Ct. at 1815. “The test for removal should be broader, not narrower, than the test for official immunity.” Id.

  1. The U.S. Attorney has failed to meet the Supreme Court’s stated requirements for removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) that are binding precedents recognized by the Eleventh Circuit.

Proper removal of an action under section 1442(a)(1) has historically required the satisfaction of two separate requirements. First, the defendant must advance a “colorable defense arising out of [his] duty to enforce federal law.” Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 133, 109 S. Ct. 959, 966-67, 103 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1989) (quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406-07, 89 S. Ct. at 1816). That defense need only be plausible; its ultimate validity is not to be determined at the time of removal. Id. at 129, 109 S. Ct. at 964. However, absent the assertion of a federal defense, a state court action against a federal officer is not removable. Id. [emphasis added.]

Second, the defendant must establish that there is a “causal connection between what the officer has done under asserted official authority” and the action against him. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33, 46 S. Ct. 185, 190, 70 L. Ed. 449 (1926) (interpreting predecessor statute); see also Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409, 89 S. Ct. at 1817. However, the Supreme Court has held that, in a civil suit such as this, it is sufficient for the defendant to show that his relationship to the plaintiff “derived solely from [his] official duties.” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409, 89 S. Ct. at 1817. In such a case, the causal connection requirement “consists, simply enough, of the undisputed fact that [the defendant was] on duty, at [his] place of federal employment, at all the relevant times.” Id. If the question raised by the plaintiff is whether the defendant was engaged in “some kind of frolic,” or acting in contravention of his official duties, the parties will have the opportunity to present their versions of the facts to a federal court. Id. (Magnin v. Teledyne Continental Motors, 91 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 08/15/1996).)  [emphasis added.]

  1. It is impossible for a Defendant to raise a colorable defense to charges of racketeering as racketeering is not something that one may do under their federal employment.
  2. The federal interest in this matter is insubstantial, and the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction would disrupt the Congressionally-approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.

“[F]ederal jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. Those advantages are “the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.” Id. at 312.

More recently, in Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290 (C.A. 11, Dec. 19, 2008), plaintiffs brought, inter alia, a defamation claim based on the defendants’ statements that the plaintiffs had violated federal gun laws. See 552 F.3d at 1293-94. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that federal question jurisdiction was appropriate, concluding that the federal interest involved was insubstantial. See id. at 1301-03.

Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 234 F.3d 514, 518 (11th Cir. 2000) serves to illustrate this point.  In Ayres, the plaintiff brought suit under Georgia’s civil RICO statute, alleging that the defendant had violated the federal National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and, by so doing, had committed federal mail and wire fraud, which were predicate offenses constituting racketeering. See 234 F.3d at 516-17. The Eleventh Circuit found federal question jurisdiction was appropriate because “this case requires that we decide whether or not a breach of the disclosure duty under the [National Traffic and Motor Vehicle] Safety Act constitutes a federal mail and wire fraud crime.” Id. at 519. In other words, because the meaning of a federal statute was at issue, a substantial federal question was involved. See id.

(“[F]ederal question jurisdiction exists where a plaintiff’s cause of action has as an essential element the existence of a right under federal law which will be supported by a construction of the federal law concluding that the federal crime is established, but defeated by another construction concluding the opposite”). Where, however, “allegations of violations of federal law as predicate acts under a state RICO act” do not “require the court to interpret an independent federal statute,” federal question jurisdiction is inappropriate. See Austin v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1227-28 (N.D. Ga. 2007); accord, e.g., Neighborhood Mortgage, Inc. v. Fegans, No. 1:06-CV-1984-JOF, 2007 WL 2479205, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2007) (“Unlike Ayres where the court had to decide whether the federal mail and wire fraud statutes would also constitute a breach of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, where there is no other federal question, . . . the mere citation of federal mail and wire fraud as predicate acts to a state RICO action is not sufficiently substantial to confer federal jurisdiction”). [emphasis added.]

As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Adventure Outdoors: Ayres involved two levels of federal questions. The need to construe independent bodies of federal law and to determine the legal effect of the interaction of those two bodies of law made the federal question in Ayres far more substantial than the one presented by Adventure Outdoors’s defamation claim. 552 F.3d at 1302. The same is also true here because this matter has nothing to do with the construction of federal regulations. Consequently, this Court should decline to exercise federal-question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claim and remand this matter to the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia.

  1. This Court’s exercise of federal-question jurisdiction over this state-law claim would be inappropriate because there is no dispute as to any federal statute.

“‘A removing defendant bears the burden of proving proper federal

jurisdiction.’” Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11thCir. 2008) (quoting Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002)). “All doubts about the propriety of federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.” Id. (citing Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996)); accord Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[W]here a plaintiff and defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand”).

The test for whether federal jurisdiction should be exercised over embedded federal issues in state-law claims between non-diverse parties is whether “a state law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).

 

  1. In this matter, NO federal issue exists. There is no disputed question of federal law.

Federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims is confined to those claims that “‘really and substantially involv[e] a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.’” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)). (See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (Vinson, J., dissenting).)

  1. This Civil Action does not seek to hold an officer of the United States in violation of state law while simultaneously executing his duties as prescribed by federal law. In this Civil Action, federal employees ignored the limitations on their powers.  They intentionally committed acts that violate the Georgia RICO Act, and they knowingly participated in an enterprise designed to damage Windsor.  It is well established that a federal employee’s actions lie outside the scope of his or her authority when he or she fails to comply with the affirmative requirements of the law.

we look to (1) whether the officers were acting “within the outer perimeter of [their] line of duty” as defined by federal statutory and regulatory law, Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1434 (1959) (plurality opinion), and (2) whether “in doing [those acts, they] did no more than what was necessary and proper for [them] to do” as demarcated by the Constitution, see Neagle, 135 U.S. at 57, 10 S.Ct. at 666. As the Supreme Court explained, “a federal official may not with impunity ignore the limitations which the controlling law has placed on his powers.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 489, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2902, 57 L.Ed. 2d 895 (1978). Indeed, it is a tautology that a federal officer’s actions lie outside the scope of his authority when the officer fails to comply with the affirmative requirements of federal statutory or regulatory law, see id. at 489–91, 98 S.Ct. at 2902–03; Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 390–91 (5th Cir. 2009); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 837 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir.1988), and his actions fail to qualify as “necessary and proper” if committed in violation of the negative injunctions of the Constitution, see Butz, 438 U.S. at 489–91, 98 S.Ct. at 2902–03; Castro, 560 F.3d at 389; Medina, 259 F.3d at 225; Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 800 F.2d at 1196; see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–90, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1461, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170–71 (1803).

XVII.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is defective PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C §2679 BECAUSE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WERE NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES WHEN THEY PARTICIPATED IN THE VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTES TO DAMAGE WINDSOR, SO THE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.

  1. The Defendants were not acting within the scope of their official duties when they committed acts of racketeering against Windsor.
  2. The Verified Complaint specifies violation of the following Georgia statutes as the sole basis for the RICO claim: Obstruction of Justice and Tampering with Evidence pursuant to O.C.G.A. 16-10-94; Perjury – Violation of C.G.A. 16-10-70; Subornation of Perjury – Violation of O.C.G.A. 16-10-72, and O.C.G.A.16-10-93; Theft by Deception – O.C.G.A.16-8-3.

In Mesa v. California, the Supreme Court denied removal under the federal officer removal statute to two postal employees, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), because they failed to establish that they were acting within the scope of their official duties and therefore, had no colorable federal defense to the state law charges of reckless driving and related offenses. 489 U.S. 121, 127–28, 109 S.Ct. 959, 963–64, 103 L.Ed. 2d 99 (1989). Because the federal employees’ actions fell outside the scope of their federal duties, California’s interest in vindicating the rights of its citizens did not frustrate any valid federal interest. (Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 07/15/2009).)

The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction and doubt is resolved in favor of remand. Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979); Prize Frize Inc. v. Matrix Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999).

  1. The question of whether an employee’s conduct was within the scope of his employment “is governed by the law of the state where the incident occurred.” See S.J. & W. Ranch, 913 F.2d at 1542; Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 76 S. Ct. 100, 100 L. Ed. 761 (1955) (per curiam), vacating 215 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1954); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Georgia law does not permit anyone to violate the Georgia RICO Act.  Georgia law says the conduct must be within the general duties of employment for which the employee was hired, and none of the Defendants were hired with duties to violate criminal statutes and commit racketeering.
  2. The U.S. Attorney is not impartial; the U.S. Attorneys are “interested parties.” The U.S. Attorneys are representing some of the Defendants in related matters against Windsor.

Moreover, the statutory interpretation urged by defendant Lehtinen is particularly suspect because it leaves the determination of a dispositive issue in FTCA cases to an interested party. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c), the Attorney General is required to “defend any civil action or proceeding brought in any court against any employee of the Government . . . for any such damage or injury.” Id. We do not believe Congress intended to entrust the party responsible for providing the federal employee’s defense with the power to make a scope determination that will have the result of dismissing the plaintiff’s suit for lack of jurisdiction. Nasuti, 906 F.2d at 812-13; Petrousky, 728 F. Supp. at 894; see Gogek, 729 F. Supp. at 933. Our concern with the impartiality of the scope determination is especially acute in a situation like the one in this case where the authority to make scope certifications has been delegated to the federal employee defendant or his colleagues. (S.J. & W. Ranch Inc. v. Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 10/10/1990).)

  1. This Civil Action is about the corrupt practices of the Defendants, using the federal court system in Fulton County Georgia to commit criminal acts against Windsor and others. Windsor must argue that under these circumstances, this Civil Action could not be moved to the same federal court system that Windsor is suing.  The very clerks that Windsor has charged with racketeering are the clerks who will be handling the various filings in this matter.  The judges named as Defendants are friends of this Court.  Windsor can be treated fairly and impartially only if he is on the neutral turf of the Fulton County Superior Court.

XVIII.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The POSITION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE NOTICE OF REMOVAL IS SUBJECT TO LITIGATION, AND IF THIS COURT DOES NOT DENY REMOVAL AND DOES NOT VACATE THE ORDER FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED ABOVE, WINDSOR DEMANDS DISCOVERY AND AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

  1. Should this Court ignore and fail to deny removal on the grounds specified above, the district court must conduct a de novo hearing on whether the Defendants were not acting within the scope of their official duties when they committed acts that Windsor complains of in the Verified Complaint. This Court must permit Windsor full discovery on the scope question. (J. & W. Ranch Inc. v. Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 10/10/1990).)

 

XIX.  THIS COURT VIOLATED FRCP RULE 7.1 AND DENIED WINDSOR’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS BY GRANTING THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S MOTION.

  1. The U.S. Attorney’s Motion was not an emergency motion, and it was not expedited.
  2. D.Ga. Local Rule 7.1 gave Windsor 14 days to respond to the U.S. Attorney’s motion.
  3. This Court denied Windsor’s right to file a response before the Court considered the motion.

64.             When attorneys have motions filed against their clients by a pro se party, the attorneys are given the opportunity to present their arguments to the judge in a response.  Windsor is pro se, and he has been denied this right of due process.  He has been treated as a different class of litigant, and he has been denied equal protection.  Windsor has a Constitutional guarantee that he will not be denied protections under the law that are enjoyed by attorneys, but this Court has violated Windsor’s Constitutional rights.  This Court has also denied due process.If due process is to be secured, the laws must operate alike upon all and not subject the individual to the arbitrary exercise of governmental power unrestrained by established principles of private rights and distributive justice. (Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).) In 1934, the United States Supreme Court held that due process is violated “if a practice or rule offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).)   As construed by the courts, due process includes… the opportunity to be heard …  and that the person or panel making the final decision over the proceedings be impartial in regards to the matter before them.  (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).) (See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).) “…wherever it is necessary for the protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought.”  (Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701, 708.) “The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions.  The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual.  Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment. . . .”’  (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 -81 (1972).)

  1. WINDSOR HAD NO LEGAL OBLIGATION TO SEEK LEAVE TO FILE ANYTHING.

65.             There is no valid order requiring Windsor to seek leave.

 

CONCLUSION

  1. Judge Thomas W. Thrash has made statements in this ORDER that are false, malicious, and not supported by any facts in the case. The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests upon the party seeking removal, and Defendants failed to carry this burden and Judge Thomas W. Thrash intentionally violated the law and the Rules.  Absent a valid Notice of Removal, this Court had no jurisdiction to grant any motion by the Federal Defendants.
  2. This Court denied Windsor’s most basic fundamental rights to due process.

68.             There is no valid order requiring Windsor to seek leave.

  1. For all of the reasons expressed above, this Court must VACATE THE ORDER.

WHEREFORE, Windsor respectfully requests:

  1. grant this Motion;
  2. vacate the ORDER dated April 3, 2024; and

c.      grant any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of April, 2024.

_______________________________

William M. Windsor

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-661-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

VERIFICATION OF WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

I, William M. Windsor, swear that I am authorized to make this verification and that the facts alleged in the foregoing MOTION are true and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters I believe them to be true.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge.

This 10th day of April, 2024,

_______________________________

William M. Windsor

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-661-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

As required by Local Rule 7.1D, N.D. Ga., I hereby certify that this pleading has been prepared in Times New Roman 14-point font, one of the font and point selections approved by this Court in Local Rule 5.1B, N.D. Ga.

_______________________________

William M. Windsor

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-661-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing MOTION to each Defendant by mail with sufficient postage addressed with the addresses for service shown in the Verified Complaint and by mail and email to:

CHRISTOPHER J. HUBER

ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

Georgia Bar No. 545627

600 Richard B. Russell Federal Bldg.

75 Spring Street, S.W. — Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Telephone: 404-581-6292 — Facsimile: 404-581-6181

Email: chris.huber@usdoj.gov

This 10th day of April, 2024,

_______________________________

William M. Windsor

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-661-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Bill Windsor Charged with Crimes by Sage Dental

On April 10, 2024, Bill Windsor was charged with crimes by Sage Dental in The Villages Florida.

Sage Dental calls police to charge Bill Windsor with a crime
Sage Dental – Scene of the Crimes

On 4/10/2024, 75-year-old disabled veteran Bill Windsor hobbled into the offices of Sage Dental on Warm Springs Drive in The Villages Florida to deliver an envelope of medical records.

Bill Windsor had been emailing and calling Sage Dental for a month or so with every attempted contact ignored.  No response to emails.  No return calls to voicemail messages.  No response to regular mail.

William Michael Windsor had been charged $226 by Sage Dental when they used a bogus code with Humana so Humana wouldn’t pay.  All Bill Windsor wanted was a proper code so he would get a refund and so a cleaning was shown in 2023 as required by insurance companies.  If you don’t get a cleaning annually, medicare supplement insurance plans will never again pay.

Sage Dental Office Empty in The Villages Florida
Sage Dental Office Empty

When Bill Windsor arrived, Sage Dental was empty.

Sage Dental Envelope Delivered
Sage Dental Envelope Delivered

Bill Windsor placed his delivery on the desk at the entrance and sat down next to a woman wearing an Angel baseball cap.

Sage Dental employee refusing to accept envelope delivered by Bill Windsor
Sage Dental employee refusing to accept delivery

When a Sage Dental employee appeared all dressed in black, she ignored him and refused to accept the delivery.  She said he could wait until 2:00 p.m. when the manager would return.  She turned her back and walked away.

Sage Dental employee calling police
Bill Windsor Charged with Crimes by Sage Dental

An extremely antagonistic Sage Dental employee dressed in blue appeared and asked Bill Windsor to leave.  He explained that he is a patient and was there to deliver medical records.  She said she was not authorized to receive deliveries.  Next thing you know, she was calling the police. Bill Windsor Charged with Crimes by Sage Dental.

Robin Wakelin Sage Dental
Robin Wakelin Sage Dental

Bill Windsor believes the woman in blue is Office Manager Robin Wakelin.  The woman in blue is a liar and appears to be a member of a Criminal Racketeering Enterprise.

Police at Sage Dental in The Villages Florida
Police at Sage Dental in The Villages Florida

Two Wildwood Police Officers appeared.  They said they were there because of a complaint for trespassing and harassment.  Bill Windsor Charged with Crimes by Sage Dental.  The male officer asked the woman in blue what she wanted him to do.  This appeared to Bill Windsor to be the next step before arrest.

Bill Windsor didn’t have a computer, so he was unaable to check the law.  But, it is clear that he had not committed trespassing.  https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2020/810.09

The statute says it is a misdemeanor if a person defies an order to leave, personally communicated to the offender by the owner of the premises or by an authorized person.  Bill Windsor was not ordered to leave, and the woman in blue had told him she was not authorized.

It is also clear that he had not committed haraassment.

https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2019/784.048

“Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.  Bill Windsor did nothing to emotionally distress the woman in blue or anyone else.  His legitimate purpose was to deliver an envelope of records.

http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0800-0899/0877/Sections/0877.03.html

Bill Windsor did not disturb the peace.  A woman seated across from him in the lobby said so.

Sage Dental office in The Villages Florida

Sage Dental office in The Villages Florida – do not ever go there.  Bill Windsor will file a civil complaint against Sage Dental, the woman in black, the woman in blue, Dr. Angelica Mena, Kayla Tapper, Robin Wakelin, James Boardwine, and unnamed Doe Defendants.  Bill Windsor believes this is organized crime.

Bill Windsor seeks Injunction Amendment

thrash-thomas

Bill Windsor seeks Injunction Amendment for corrupt acts of Judge Thomas W. Thrash.

The Clerk of Court finally docketed this today — Bill Windsor seeks Injunction Amendment:

 

1-11-CV-01923-TWT-Request-for-Leave-to-Amend-Injunctionc-FILESTAMPED-2024-03-15

Bill Windsor seeks Injunction Amendment for corrupt acts of Judge Thomas W. Thrash.

 

 

Windsor Petition for Rehearing En Banc

The following is the Windsor Petition for Rehearing En Banc.  It was copied and pasted here from the Federal Court document.  This Petition for Rehearing En Banc shows how judges ignore the law to screw a self-represented litigant (pro se).  (It may be easier to read the Petition from the pdf scanned by the Eleventh Circuit.

Judges nationwide HATE Bill Windsor because he is committed to exposing their evildoings.  See https://AANL.net for his latest plan to save America from judicial corruption and denial of our Constitutional rights.  He has published thousands of articles on LawlessAmerica.com since 2008.  He is not a lawyer, and he cannot give legal advice, but he can and does help his friends with his experience.

Please forgive the spacing and numbering because Word and WordPress just don’t always cooperate.  Photos and links have been added that are not in the legal Petition.

APPEAL NO. 22-12038 and 22-12411

_______________________________________________________

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________________________________________

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

versus

James N. Hatten, et al,

Defendants

________________________________________________________

United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division

D.C. Docket No. 1:11-CV-01923-TWT

Judge Thomas Woodrow Thrash

thrash-thomas

_________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________

bill windsor

William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Avenue PMB 1134, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

Phone: 352-###-####, Email: windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com

PRO SE FOR PLAINTIFF/ APPELLANT, WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR REHEARING

and en banc determination

William M. Windsor (“WINDSOR”) hereby requests that the Court relieve WINDSOR from the Judgment and OPINION dated 1/25/2024 in USCA11 Case No. 22-12038 and USCA11 Case No. 22-12411, pursuant to Rules 35 and 40 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”).

  1. WINDSOR references and incorporates herein the entire dockets and their contents in 1-11-01923-TWT (”01923”) [APPENDIX 128], USCA11 Case 22-12038 (“22-12038”) [APPENDIX 129, and USCA11 Case 22-12411 (“22-12411”) [APPENDIX 130.]

FIRST PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED

BY THE SECOND PANEL

  1. The decisions of the “SECOND PANEL” of the Eleventh Circuit (Judges Robin Rosenbaum, Elizabeth Branch, and Britt Grant) conflict with decisions of every U.S. Court of Appeals, recent decisions in this case [APPENDIX 131 and APPENDIX 132], and Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (11th Cir. 1993); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 1986); Riccard v. Prudential,307 F.3d 1277, 1295 n.15 (11th Cir. 2002); Klay v. United, 376 F.3d 1092, 1099-1102 (11th Cir. 2004); Dinardo v. Palm Beach Judge, 199 Fed.Appx. 731 (11th Cir. 07/18/2006).  Consideration by the full Court is therefore necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the Court’s decisions.

Judge Britt Grant

  1. The one Appealed Order in 22-12411 is APPENDIX 135. It purports to place restrictions on state courts, so the Appeal must be granted.
  2. The four appealed orders in 22-12038 are APPENDIX 137, APPENDIX 4, APPENDIX 138, and APPENDIX 135. Each purports to place restrictions on state courts, so the Appeals must be granted.
  3. Article Three of the U.S. Constitution empowers the courts to handle cases or controversies arising under federal law. Article 3 grants no powers over state courts; a federal order for filing restrictions cannot apply to states.
  4. WINDSOR has researched “filing restrictions” referencing the three key federal precedents. The decisions in all eleven Circuits appear to be unanimous in providing that federal courts are unable to approve federal courts issuing orders that apply to state courts.
  5. BUT, there is one and only one circuit that has allowed a federal judge to approve federal courts issuing orders that apply to state courts. It’s the 11TH CIRCUIT, but only in appeals involving WINDSOR.
  6. WINDSOR could find NO OTHER CASE to support the actions of JUDGE Thomas W. THRASH. There has never been another appellate decision that disagrees with Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 191-92 (5th Cir. 2008); Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1344 (10th Cir. 2006); and Martin-Trigona v. Lavien, 737 F.2d 1254, 1263 (2d Cir. 1984).  See also Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 05/20/1985)APPENDIX 21 is a Memorandum of Law on 137 applicable federal cases as of 08/08/2020.

SECOND PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The SECOND PANEL violated the September 7, 2022 Order of this Court [APPENDIX 131] and ignored the Law of the Case Doctrine.
  2. The SECOND PANEL has outrageously dismissed WINDSOR’s appeals [APPENDIX 133] and [APPENDIX 134] falsely claiming he abandoned them.
  3. WINDSOR has been pursuing the corrupt acts of JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and the Eleventh Circuit, for 15 years. He has never abandoned anything.
  4. From the first sentence in the Opinions, the SECOND PANEL has shown they have a complete bias against WINDSOR.
  5. The STATEMENTS REGARDING APPEAL [APPENDIX 139] and [APPENDIX 140] were required to establish that the Appeals were not frivolous, and it was determined by Eleventh Circuit Judges Adalberto Jordan, Jill A. Pryor, and Andrew L. Brasher (“FIRST PANEL”) on 9/7/2022 that the appeals were not frivolous. [APPENDIX 133] and [APPENDIX 134]. They ruled:

“With respect to both the appeal statement associated with appeal no. 22-12038 and the appeal statement associated with appeal no. 22-12411, the Court finds that Appellant has raised a non-frivolous issue, specifically whether a pre-filing injunction may be extended to filings in state court. See, e.g., Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F .3d 181, 192 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, these appeals survive the frivolity screening required by this Court’s December 21, 2011 order.” [emphasis added.] [22-12038-Docket-13-ORDER-Not-Frivolous-Stay-Consolidated-2022-09-07.] [APPENDIX 131.]

  1. Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F .3d 181, 192 (5th Cir. 2008) was cited by the FIRST PANEL. It says:

“The district court abused its discretion in extending the pre-filing injunction to filings in state courts, state agencies, and this Court.

“Baum argues that even if the injunction is proper for federal courts, ‘[a]buse of state judicial process is not per se a threat to the jurisdiction of Article III courts and does not per se implicate other federal interests.’  Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d at 1263.

“In Martin-Trigona, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court ‘erred in its blanket extension of the [pre-filing] injunction to state courts….’ [737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984).]

Blue Moon does not cite to any authority that upholds a federal court’s pre-filing injunction against state court and state agency filings.

“The Tenth Circuit held that (2) a district court’s pre-filing injunction may not extend to filings in any federal appellate court, and (3) a district court’s pre-filing injunction may not extend to filings in any state court. Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1344 (10th Cir.2006).”

  1. Yet in the first sentence of the OPINIONS, the SECOND PANEL stated: “This appeal is the latest in a line of frivolous litigation pursued by William Windsor.” There is no evidence of this.  This violates Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) Rule 602.  This DIRECTLY contradicts the 9/7/2022 Order of the Eleventh Circuit [APPENDIX 131.]
  2. There is absolutely NO EVIDENCE that WINDSOR has ever filed anything in any court anywhere that was frivolous. This SECOND PANEL cannot show evidence to the contrary.
  3. The Eleventh Circuit decided that issue in these cases on 9/7/2022. The “law of the case doctrine” provides that an appellate court’s determination of a legal issue binds both the trial court and the court on appeal in any subsequent retrial or appeal involving the same case and substantially the same facts. The appellate court’s holdings on the questions presented to it on review become the “law of the case.” The purpose of the doctrine is to promote finality and judicial economy by minimizing unnecessary relitigation of legal issues once they have been resolved by the appellate court.  Instead, the SECOND PANEL thumbed its nose at judicial economy and created unnecessary litigation.
  4. WINDSOR will file Judicial Complaints against Robin Rosenbaum, Elizabeth Branch, and Britt Grant.

 

THIRD PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The Second Panel did not issue an Opinion on one of the Appealed Orders.
  2. On Page 6 of [APPENDIX 133 and APPENDIX 134] in the next to last paragraph of the “Background” section, each states: “… his appeals were allowed to proceed as to the district court’s May 21, 2022, and June 30, 2022, orders.”
  3. There is no May 21, 2022 Order as proven by the dockets. [APPENDIX 128, APPENDIX 129, APPENDIX 130.] Therefore, one of the orders appealed has not been addressed, and this PETITION must be granted.

 

FOURTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The SECOND PANEL’s Opinions cause significant confusion as to what in the world they are pretending to say.
  2. On January 25, 2024, an OPINION was docketed in USCA11 Case 22-12038 (“22-12038”) – DOCKET 50 [APPENDIX 133] and USCA11 Case 22-12411 (“22-12411”) [APPENDIX 134] by this SECOND PANEL
  3. A JUDGMENT was also docketed in both cases as shown on the Dockets. [APPENDIX 129 and APPENDIX 130.]
  4. The File Stamp at the top of each page docketed in 22-12038 on APPENDIX 129 says “USCA11 Case 22-12038.”
  5. The File Stamp at the top of each page docketed in 22-12411 on APPENDIX 130 says “USCA11 Case 22-12038.”
  6. The Case Numbers on both APPENDIX 132 and APPENDIX 133 show BOTH Case Numbers on Page 2 of USCA11 Document 51-1.

 

FIFTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. Only two cases were cited by the SECOND PANEL in the OPINIONS.  Neither is applicable to the instant case.
  2. One of the two cases was cited by the Appellees in the BRIEF OF APPELLEE. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 – DOCKET 39.] [APPENDIX 141] Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) appears on PP.6–7 of the OPINION [APPENDIX 133] and on P.12 of the BRIEF OF APPELLEE [APPENDIX 141]. The Sapuppo Order [APPENDIX 142] briefly references Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.2008) [APPENDIX 143,P.3.]
  3. None of WINDSOR’s authority was cited by the SECOND PANEL. WINDSOR cited 58 cases, eight statutes, and other authorities in his NOTICE OF APPEAL [APPENDIX 17 and APPENDIX 25]; 88 cases, 13 statutes, and nine other authorities in his APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146]; 36 cases, three statutes, and three other authorities in his APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF [APPENDIX 144.]
  4. Timson v. Sampson was cited by the SECOND PANEL [OPINION, PP.7-8] APPENDIX 143] as purported authority that WINDSOR abandoned his claims:

“Although “we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally,” we

nonetheless deem “issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant . . . abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). “Moreover, we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief.” Id.”

 

  1. But the SECOND PANEL misrepresented the facts and what Timson actually provides that is relevant to the instant case.
  2. Timson v. Sampson [APPENDIX 143] actually says:

“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, Lorisme v. I.N.S., 129 F.3d 1441, 1444 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1997), issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.  Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2002).

Moreover, we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief.  Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003).  Timson, thus, abandoned this issue.” [emphasis added.]

 

  1. Lovett v. Ray, says: “Because he raises that argument for the first time in his reply brief, it is not properly before us.” [emphasis added.] [APPENDIX 145.]
  2. WINDSOR raised this issue from Day 1. In WINDSOR’s 420-page APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF [APPENDIX 144], he begins by saying “This Court must base its analysis on the 2011 and 2018 orders, and he explains why.  The SECOND PANEL ignored all of this.
  3. WINDSOR PLAINLY AND PROMINENTLY RAISED ISSUES IN HIS REPLY BRIEF in all caps, bold type, and underlined:
  • THERE WAS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ORDERS EXHIBIT-1 1-026 AND EXHIBIT-11-048 (“APPEALED ORDERS” THE APPELLEE’S BRIEF MUST BE DISREGARDED AS TO ANYTHING THAT APPEARS TO BE CLAIMS OF FACT. But, Factual Basis was raised on P.8 of the NOTICE OF APPEAL [APPENDIX 25].  This violates FRE Rule 602.

 

  • AS THE BRIEF IS UNSWORN, AND THERE IS NO FACTUAL SUPPORT FOR ANY CLAIMS OF FACT. Factual Basis was raised on P.8 of the NOTICE OF APPEAL [APPENDIX 25].  This violates FRE Rule 602.
  • EXHIBITS TO THE APPELLEE’S BRIEF MUST BE DISREGARDED AS THEY ARE UNAUTHENTICATED. Factual Basis was raised on P.8 of the NOTICE OF APPEAL [APPENDIX 25].  This violates FRE Rule 901.
  • THIS COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT IT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER WINDSOR’S CHALLENGES TO DISTRICT COURT’S 2011 AND 2018 ORDERS. See STATEMENT REGARDING APPEAL PP.7-8; APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.
  • APPELLEE’S BRIEF ISSUE #1: THIS COURT DOES NOT LACK JURISDICTION OVER WINDSOR’S APPEAL OF THE 2022 ORDERS AS THE APPELLEES HAVE FALSELY CLAIMED.
  • APPELLEE’S BRIEF ISSUE #2: THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER WINDSOR’S APPEAL OF THE 2022 ORDERS. See APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.
  • APPELLEE’S BRIEF ISSUE #3: WINDSOR DID NOT ABANDON A CHALLENGE TO THE 2022 ORDERS BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY ANY LEGAL ERRORS SPECIFIC TO THOSE ORDERS AS THE APPELLEES HAVE FALSELY STATED. See APPENDIX 141, PP.1-12.

 

  1. WINDSOR identified all the legal errors that applied to the 2022 orders.
  2. The terms are very clear “…filing any complaint or initiating any proceeding, including any new lawsuit or administrative proceeding [APPELLANT’S BRIEF] [APPENDIX 146-P.13-¶99.]
  3. The APPEALED ORDERS have nothing to do with filing a complaint, filing a new lawsuit, or filing an administrative proceeding. A Texas application for guardianship in an existing probate court matter is not the filing of a lawsuit and is not an administrative proceeding. And it is a matter over which JUDGE THRASH has no jurisdiction.
  4. Contrary to the outlandish claim of the APPELLEES, this clearly explains why the 2022 Orders are void. WINDSOR explained that the so-called permanent injunctions do not restrict a Texas application for guardianship in an existing probate court matter as it is not the filing of a lawsuit and is not an administrative proceeding.
  5. See APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146], P.xxvii, P.l,¶¶25-26. See P.3,¶38: Neither the motion to deny removal nor jurisdiction were ever addressed by JUDGE THRASH in 01923.
  6. WINDSOR has never filed anything frivolous, and he has not abused the federal judicial system.
  7. The U.S. Attorney continues to violate the Constitution and the law by claiming a federal judge has jurisdiction over state court matters.

 

SIXTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDERS ARE VOID AND INVALID.

See STATEMENT REGARDING APPEAL P.7; APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.

 

SEVENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

WINDSOR AND HIS ACQUAINTANCES WERE DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 

See STATEMENT REGARDING APPEAL P.9; APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146],P.xvi.

 

EIGHTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF LAW

AND FACT

WINDSOR ABSOLUTELY, POSITIVELY, MORE THAN ADEQUATELY BRIEFED HIS CLAIM.  HE PLAINLY AND PROMINENTLY RAISED IT BY DEVOTING DISCRETE SECTIONS OF HIS ARGUMENT.

 

  1. This SECOND PANEL either didn’t review the filings or corruptly invented an issue that does not exist. [OPINION – APPENDIX 133 and APPENDIX 134, P.6, II. Discussion, ¶1.]
  2. The FRAP requires that an APPELLANT’S BRIEF be filed, and on 6/7/2023, WINDSOR filed 65 pages verified under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 USC 1746. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 APPENDIX 146], P.65.] It identifies and attaches a copy of the Order Appealed. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34] [APPENDIX 146, P.45,¶¶98,100.]  It is titled “APPEAL NO. 22-12038-J AND 22-12411-J.”
  3. The APPELLANT’S BRIEF TABLE OF CONTENTS [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34, P.xv] [APPENDIX 146] has a major heading “ARGUMENT” and five arguments PLAINLY AND PROMINENTLY identified:
  • A FEDERAL COURT JUDGE DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO PLACE RESTRICTIONS ON THE OPERATION OF STATE COURTS, SO ALL OF THE APPEALS MUST BE GRANTED. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.]
  • ALL ORDERS OF JUDGE THRASH MUST BE DECLARED VOID BECAUSE FEDERAL COURT ORDERS ARE VOID WHEN JURISDICTION IS NEVER DETERMINED. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.]
  • JUDGE THRASH’S FEDERAL COURT ORDERS PLACING RESTRICTIONS ON THE OPERATION OF STATE COURTS ARE VOID ORDERS. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146], PP.xv-xvi.]
  • IN GEORGIA, A PARTY APPLYING FOR IN FORMA PAUPERIS IS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES OF THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF A SPOUSE. SO DENIAL OF IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS TO WINDSOR WAS UNLAWFUL. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146], P.xvi.]
  • Windsor’s constitutional due process rights have been violated, so the appeals must be granted. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146, P.xvi.]
  1. WINDSOR has filed detailed information with this Court in the Statement of Appeal, Notice of Appeal, Responses to Questions from the Clerk, Appellant’s Brief, and Appellant’s Reply Brief. Virtually everything he has filed has been sworn under penalty of perjury.
  2. As to the June 30, 2022 Order of Judge Thomas W. Thrash [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17] is the “NOTICE OF APPEAL.” FRAP Rule 3 requires that such a Notice must be filed to initiate an appeal, and WINDSOR filed it on 7/18/2022.  It identifies and attaches a copy of the Order Appealed. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278, P.1.] [APPENDIX 17.]  It lists the Constitutional rights violated. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.1-2.]
  3. It raised the following:
    1. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER IS VOID AND INVALID. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.4-5.]
    2. WINDSOR AND HIS ACQUAINTANCES WERE DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.6-8.]
    3. THERE WAS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ORDER. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], P.8.]
    4. THE ORDER IS VAGUE, AND IT IS TOO BROAD. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.8-10.]
    5. JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO ISSUE ORDERS ON STATE COURT MATTERS. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.10-12.]
    6. JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO ISSUE ORDERS DENYING LEGAL RIGHTS TO ACQUAINTANCES OF WINDSOR [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.12-13.]
  4. The 7/26/2022 “STATEMENT REGARDING APPEAL” [APPENDIX 147] was required to establish that the Appeal was not frivolous, and it was so determined. It identified and attached a copy of the Order Appealed. [APPENDIX 147, P.13.]  APPENDIX 147 provided a concise summary of the issues.
  5. It raised the following:

 

NINTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The Judgment is VOID.
  2. A court must have jurisdiction to enter a valid, enforceable judgment on a claim. Where jurisdiction is lacking, litigants may retroactively challenge the validity of a judgment. [https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/subject_matter_jurisdiction.]
  3. WINDSOR has consistently denied jurisdiction for 12+ Years. [APPENDIX 128.]
  4. The requirement that a court have subject-matter jurisdiction means that the court can only assume power over a claim that it is authorized to hear under the laws of the jurisdiction. All Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. They only have the power to hear cases that arise under federal law, The instant case was brought in state court for violation of Georgia statutes and has no grant of subject matter jurisdiction.  [APPENDIX 19.]  See Const. Art. III, Sec. 2.
  5. A threshold concern for all federal courts is the presence, or absence, of Constitutional standing. The standing requirement does not exist in the instant case.  Subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist in the absence of constitutional standing. This restriction prevents courts—whose members are not elected and are therefore not politically accountable—from influencing the law in a legislative capacity. In this sense, the standing doctrine and subject-matter jurisdiction facilitate the separation of powers.
  6. Under federal question jurisdiction, a litigant—regardless of the value of the claim—may bring a claim in federal court if it arises under federal law, including the U.S. Constitution. See 28 USC 1331. Federal question jurisdiction requires that the federal element appears on the face of a well-plead complaint, and it does not
  7. The jurisdictional division between state and federal tribunals is an essential component of American federalism. Federalism is the Constitutional division of power between state governments and the federal government of the United States.
  8. Article Three of the U.S. Constitution establishes the judicial branch of the U.S. federal government. Article Three empowers the courts to handle cases or controversies arising under federal law. There is no federal law regarding guardianship of state citizens.
  9. Federal case law establishes that a federal judge has no jurisdiction over state courts, and a federal order for filing restrictions cannot apply to state courts. There are many 11TH CIRCUIT precedents.  See Paragraph 3 above.

 

TENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. Applying the Judgment prospectively is no longer equitable.
  2. In addition to the many other issues, WINDSOR is in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy and has no access to funds required by the purported Injunction.
  3. The JUDGMENT closes the courthouse doors to WINDSOR, which is a significant violation of Constitutional rights.

 

ELEVENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

Judge Elizabeth BranchJudge Robin RosenbaumJudge Britt Grant

  1. The SECOND PANEL appears to WINDSOR to be totally corrupt.
  2. The U.S. Constitution does not give federal judges jurisdiction over state courts. This SECOND PANEL has pretended this isn’t one of the most-notable Constitutional provisions.  Unless they didn’t bother to read the file, the FIRST PANEL did this work for them and ordered as they did in APPENDIX 133 and APPENDIX 134.
  3. Each justice or judge of the United Statesis required to take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his or her office:

“I, ___________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.” [28 USC 453.]

U.S. Constitution

  1. JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH and judges with the Eleventh Circuit have chosen to ignore the Constitution for 15 years when it comes to WINDSOR, and no one else. EVERY Federal Circuit has established precedents on this specific issue, including the Eleventh Circuit.  JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH and judges with the Eleventh Circuit have all violated their Oath of Office.

 

TWELFTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. When there is no legal basis for jurisdiction or an Injunction, the fact that a judge issues void orders does not make them lawful.
  2. The Appellate Courts have the power to correct such overwhelming violations of the Constitution and the law at any time.
  3. The SECOND PANEL is wrong in ignoring the VOID Injunctions that are the basis for the APPEALED ORDERS.

 

THIRTEENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. Judge Thomas W. Thrash’s basis for denying WINDSOR’s APPEALS is to falsely and maliciously claim that WINDSOR did something in the past, so he no longer has his Constitutional right to file anything in any legal matter.

 

FOURTEENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The SECOND PANEL falsely claimed on P.4. of the OPINIONS [APPENDIX 133 and APPENDIX 134] that the case was removed from state court.
  2. JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH never ruled on jurisdiction, and he never issued an order in response to WINDSOR’s reply and objection [APPENDIX 19 and APPENDIX 128.]

 

Wanda Dutschmann

FIFTEENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT:

MOM IS DEAD

  1. Wanda Dutschmann is dead. She was known as MOM, and WINDSOR is writing a book titled “KILLING MOM.”

Killing Mom

  1. WINDSOR believes JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH and the SECOND PANEL contributed to her death by denying WINDSOR the opportunity to save her and her Estate through Guardianship in Texas. This is one of the APPEALED ORDERS [01923 – Docket ] [APPENDIX 135].

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, WINDSOR requests that this PETITION is granted; relieve WINDSOR from the Judgments and OPINIONS dated 1/25/2024; grant WINDSOR’s APPEALS; and grant such other and further relief as is deemed just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 7th day of February, 2024,

_______________________________
William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Bill Windsor verifies

VERIFICATION OF WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

I, William M. Windsor, swear that I am authorized to make this verification and that the facts alleged in the foregoing PETITION are true and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

In accordance with 28 USC 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge.

This 7th day of February, 2024,

_______________________________
William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this pleading has been prepared in Times New Roman 14-point font, one of the font and point selections required by the Rules.  There are 3891 words.

This 7th day of February, 2024,

_______________________________
William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing to each Defendant by Federal Express to:

RYAN K. BUCHANAN – GABRIEL A. MENDEL

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY — ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

600 United States Courthouse

75 Ted Turner Drive, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Telephone: (404) 581-6000 — Facsimile: (404) 581-6181

Email: gabriel.mendel@usdoj.gov

This 7th day of February, 2024,

_______________________________
William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Complaint for VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Columbia

Complaint PDF  —  EXHIBITS PDF

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,                           )

Plaintiff                                                                     )

)           CIVIL ACTION NO.

Scott S. Harris and                                                 )           ________________________

Rashonda Garner,                                                  )

Defendants.                                                             )

                                                                               

 

Complaint for VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

AND ADDITIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION

The Parties to This Complaint

 The Plaintiff

William Michael Windsor (“WINDSOR”) is a citizen of the United States and is a resident of Lincoln County, South Dakota.

Name:                       William Michael Windsor

Address:                    5013 S. Louise Avenue #1134, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

County:                     Lincoln

Telephone:                352-###-####

Email:                        windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com

 

  1. The Defendants

Scott S. Harris (“HARRIS”) is a citizen of the United States, an employee of the federal government in Washington, DC, and a federal official.  HARRIS is sued as an individual.

Name:                        Scott S. Harris

Address:                    Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone:                202-479-3025

Email:                        pio@supremecourt.gov

 

Rashonda Garner (“GARNER”) is a citizen of the United States, an employee of the federal government in Washington, DC, and a federal official.  GARNER is sued as an individual.

Name:                       Rashonda Garner

Address:                    Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone:                202-479-3025

Email:                        PMcCabe@supremecourt.gov

 

  1. I Basis for Jurisdiction

[X]  Federal Officials (a Bivens Claim)

Constitutional rights the Plaintiff claims are being violated by federal officials (HARRIS and GARNER), including Denial of Due Process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) provides: “A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated….”

III.       Statement of Claim

   Where did the events giving rise to your claims occur?

The events took place at the Supreme Court building in Washington, DC and in Lincoln County South Dakota and Sumter County Florida.

  1. What date and approximate time did the events giving rise to your claims occur?

May 10, 2023; May 23, 2023; June 1, 2023; July 20, 2023; September 26, 2023; October 1, 2023; October 2, 2023; October 27, 2023; October 31, 2023; November 3, 2023; November 20, 2023; November 21, 2023; November 22, 2023; November 27, 2023; December 18, 2023, December 19, 2023; December 20, 2023, December 21, 2023.

What are the facts underlying your claims?

  1. On May 10, 2023, William M. Windsor (“Windsor”), an individual, filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition and Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (“PETITION”). [EXHIBIT A – May 10, 2023.] This Filing was made in compliance with the United States Supreme Court’s Rule 29 and in the manner required by the Rules, as shown on the Certificate of Service. [EXHIBIT B, Pages 51-52.]  The appropriate number of copies were mailed to the Clerk, and a copy was sent to the Solicitor General and the attorney involved in the case.
  2. On May 10, 2023, the Docket of the United States Supreme Court shows: “Application (22A1009) to file petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in excess of page limits, submitted to Justice Thomas.” [EXHIBIT A, May 10, 2023.]
  3. On May 23, 2023, Justice Clarence Thomas granted the Application (22A1009) “to file petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in excess of page limits. The petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition may not exceed 49 pages.” [EXHIBIT A, May 23, 2023.]  It was filed.
  4. On June 1, 2023, the Waiver of the Right of Respondent United States to respond was filed. [EXHIBIT A, June 1, 2023.]
  5. On July 20, 2023, the PETITION was “DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/26/2023.” [EXHIBIT A, July 20, 2023.]
  6. WINDSOR spoke by telephone with Jake in the United States Supreme Court Clerk’s Office. Jake explained that WINDSOR’s PETITION would be considered by the nine Justices in a “Conference.”
  7. The “Filing and Rules” section for the United States Supreme Court Clerk’s Office explains:

“The timing for placing petitions on a conference list and distributing them to the Justices is governed by Rule 15.5, which provides as follows: “The Clerk will distribute the petition to the Court for its consideration upon receiving an express waiver of the right to file a brief in opposition, or, if no waiver or brief in opposition is filed, upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing. If a brief in opposition is timely filed, the Clerk will distribute the petition, brief in opposition, and any reply brief to the Court for its consideration no less than 14 days after the brief in opposition is filed, unless the petitioner expressly waives the 14-day waiting period.” [https://www.supremecourt.gov/casedistribution/casedistributionschedule.aspx.]

  1. United States Supreme Court Clerk Scott S. Harris has explained Conference Scheduling in a memorandum. [https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/Guidance-on-Scheduling-2023.pdf.] [EXHIBIT K.]
  2. The Supreme Court Historical Society explains the Conference process. [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/.] [EXHIBIT C.]
  3. On September 26, 2023, the Docket of the United States Supreme Court indicates a Conference was held by the nine Justices in Case No. 22-7648. [EXHIBIT A, September 26, 2023.]
  4. On October 2, 2023, the United States Supreme Court’s Docket shows “Petition DENIED.” [EXHIBIT A, October 2, 2023.]
  5. On October 27, 2023, WINDSOR filed a Motion for Rehearing just to be safe. [EXHIBIT E.] It was sent by USPS. [EXHIBITS F and G.]   This was 25 days after the Docket claims the Petition was denied, so it would have been timely if an order had been issued.
  6. On October 31, 2023, WINDSOR received a letter from Scott S. Harris dated October 2, 2023. [EXHIBIT D.] The letter is not even signed; it’s a stamp.  It bears no seal, and it is not signed by a Justice.  The letter does not qualify as an Order required after a Conference.  And the time has not started to run on the filing of a motion for rehearing.
  7. On November 3, 2023, a letter was dated to WINDSOR by Rashonda Garner for Scott S. Harris. [EXHIBIT H.] The letter is not an order.  All copies of WINDSOR’s Filing were returned. [EXHIBIT I.]  The original copy is stamped “RECEIVED OCT 30 2023 Office of the Clerk Supreme Court U.S.” [EXHIBIT I.]
  8. On November 20, 2023, the letter dated November 3, 2023 was received by WINDSOR. [EXHIBIT J.] The letter is not an order.
  9. On November 21, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail.
  10. On November 21, 2023, Rashonda Garner left a voicemail saying she didn’t understand WINDSOR’s message. [EXHIBIT L.]
  11. On November 22, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail.
  12. On November 27, 2023, all of the mail dated November 3, 2023 regarding the Motion for Rehearing was sent certified mail return receipt to Rashonda Garner. [EXHIBIT H and EXHIBIT J.]
  13. On November 27, 2023, WINDSOR submitted 11 copies of a “MOTION” to the United States Supreme Court.
  14. On December 18, 2023, WINDSOR received a return of all of his November 27, 2023 mailing in a box. [EXHIBIT S.] This is all about WINDSOR’s Petition regarding violations of his Constitutional rights.  USSC Case #22-7648 —   https://lawlessamerica.com/motion-for-compliance-with-rules-of-u-s-supreme-court-was-filed-by-bill-windsor/?fbclid=IwAR14vsRgJBVkismog3TBwe88_GxfP98RcmMOmyLcHUwyt5hVBh3V8sLlENg.  This is the case chosen as one of the approximately 8,000 cases submitted in 2023 that the nine justices were actually to hear on September 26, 2023. https://lawlessamerica.com/74-year-old-disabled-man-with-use-of-only-one-finger-will-have-all-nine-u-s-supreme-court-justices-hear-his-pro-se-petition/?fbclid=IwAR1ExGhpVh0dTM8WRD_Bxr6cA_-NB2Hxg6I5adfB41Z7-FXc_zeQQl-MGQ4
  15. On December 19, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail. [EXHIBIT M.]
  16. On December 19, 2023, WINDSOR again called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail. [EXHIBIT N.] [EXHIBIT O.]
  17. On December 20, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner yet again and left a detailed voicemail. [EXHIBIT P.]  The call was not returned.
  18. On December 20, 2023, the Docket of the United States Supreme Court in Case #22-7648 shows no entries after October 2, 2023. [EXHIBIT Q.]
  19. As of December 26, 2023, Rashonda Garner still has not returned WINDSOR’s

 

PREVIOUS LAWSUITS AND ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF

The PLAINTIFF has not filed other lawsuits in state or federal court that deal with the same facts involved in this action.

Arguments – claims for relief

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #1 — Bivens Claim

  1. WINDSOR’s Constitutional rights are being violated by federal officials, Harris and Garner, including Denial of Due Process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. HARRIS and GARNER violated WINDSOR’s Constitutional rights, and those rights were so clearly established that a reasonable person would have known they were being violated.
  2. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.

 

  1. WINDSOR has been denied Constitutional Due Process Rights
  2. Due process requires that the government respect all of the legal rights that are owed to a person according to the law. Procedural due process guarantees protection to everyone so that statutes, regulations, and enforcement actions ensure that no one is deprived of “life, liberty, or property” without a fair opportunity to affect the judgment or result.  Judges have shown absolutely no respect for Windsor’s legal rights.  They have ignored the law and the facts.  Windsor has been denied the most fundamental right to not have his legal rights stolen by dishonest judges.
  3. This is not abuse of discretion; they violated the Constitution and laws intentionally. (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).)
  4. In Case No. 2018-CA-010270 in THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA (“010270”), the fundamental right to have the courts accept Windsor’s sworn affidavits as true has been violated. (Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).)
  5. Judges are required to be impartial. Judges have demonstrated pervasive bias against Windsor.  They haven’t shown an ounce of impartiality. (Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).)
  6. In “Some Kind of Hearing,” Judge Henry Friendly said that an important right of due process is “a decision based exclusively on the evidence presented.” Florida judges have not made decisions based upon the evidence presented.
  7. Due process is “an established course for judicial proceedings or other governmental activities designed to safeguard the legal rights of the individual.” Action denying the process that is “due” is unconstitutional.  In 010270, judges have denied the process that is due.  (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).)
  8. Litigants allegedly have the right to protections expressly created in statute and case law precedent. Statutes have been violated and overwhelming case law has been ignored by judges.
  9. Litigants have the right to equal protection of the law regardless of race, creed, color, religion, ethnic origin, age, handicaps, or sex. Windsor is 75, handicapped, and he has not received equal protection as a pro se party.
  10. Litigants have the right to a remedy, by recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs that they may receive in their person, property, or character. Windsor has been denied recourse.
  11. Litigants have the right to justice, without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without undue delay; in conformance with the laws. Florida judges have denied justice and have not conformed with the laws.
  12. The principle of due process of law is one of the most important protections against arbitrary rule.
  13. An inherent right is the honesty of the judge. Judges in Florida have committed perjury and obstruction of justice; they have violated many canons of the Code of Judicial Procedure as well as rules in the Florida Code of Professional Conduct.  Inherent in due process is the expectation that the judge will not violate criminal statutes, but they have.
  14. Judges in Florida have violated Windsor’s rights by using their power to inflict their bias.
  15. For due process, Windsor has the right to protections expressly created in statute and case law. Due process allegedly ensures that the government will respect all of a person’s legal rights and guarantee fundamental fairness and justice.  Due process holds the government subservient to the law of the land, protecting individual persons from the state.
  16. Due process requires an established course for judicial proceedings designed to safeguard the legal rights of the individual. Action denying the process that is “due” is unconstitutional.  Inherent in the expectation of due process is that the judge will abide by the rules.   Judges in Florida have violated rules for the purpose of damaging Windsor.
  17. An inherent Constitutional right is the honesty of the judge. Judges in Florida have not been honest.  They have violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
  18. The Constitution guarantees Windsor a fair and impartial judge. Florida judges denied Windsor’s guarantee to inflict their extra-judicial bias.

Every person “has a constitutional and statutory right to an impartial and fair judge at all stages of the proceeding.” (Liteky v U.S., 510 US 540 (1994).  (See Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037; Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971); accord Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pension, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (citation omitted).)

  1. Due process is supposed to guarantee basic fairness and to make people feel that they have been treated fairly.

“justice must give the appearance of justice” (Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1954).)  (Peters v. Kiff, 407, U.S. 493, 502 (1972).)

48.              At a basic level, procedural due process is essentially based on the concept of “fundamental fairness.”  For example, in 1934, the United States Supreme Court held that due process is violated “if a practice or rule offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”

49.              Where an individual is facing a (1) deprivation of (2) life, liberty, or property, (3) procedural due process mandates that he or she is entitled to adequate notice, a hearing, and a neutral judge.  Substantive due process refers to the rights granted in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.  Fifth Amendment due process means substantially the same as Fourteenth Amendment due process.

50.              Judges and Federal officers have a Constitutional duty to Windsor.  The DEFENDANTS breached their Constitutional duties through action and inaction.

  1. They have violated Windsor’s civil and Constitutional rights under color of law.

“[t]rial before an ‘unbiased judge’ is essential to due process.” Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971); accord Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pension, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (citation omitted). (Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972)

  1. The due process clauses of the Constitutions of Florida, South Dakota, and the United States guarantee a party an impartial and disinterested tribunal in civil cases. (Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 1613 (1980).)

Partiality in favor of the government may raise a defendant’s due process concerns. (In re United States of America, 441 F.3d at 66 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).)

  1. Judges in Florida have effectively denied Windsor’s rights of equal protection under the law in Article VI of the Constitution. Their actions prove that they have exercised their power in this and other actions for their own personal purposes rather than the will of the law.

Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412 (7th Cir. 1972), citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed 204 (1824); U.S. v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1990).

  1. The orders issued by judges in Florida suggest “the appearance of” animosity towards Windsor.
  2. These latest purported orders from JEFF ASHTON deny WINDSOR his fundamental Constitutional right of access to the courts, “unquestionably a right of considerable constitutional significance.” (Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2008).) Meaningful access to the courts is a constitutional right. (Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en banc).) [emphasis added.]

 

  1. AN ORDER was not ISSUED ON THE CONFERENCE DECISION OF SEPTEMBER 26, 2023.
  2. The Rules of the United States Supreme Court require valid evidence of the October 2, 2023 alleged denial by the Court of the Petition of William M. Windsor in Supreme Court Case #22-7648. An Order was not issued.  This is a violation of due process.
  3. The letters dated October 2, 2023 and November 3, 2023 are not orders and have no validity. [EXHIBITS D and H.] The U.S. Supreme Court Rules use the term “Letter” 13 times, and letters such as these are not authorized by the Rules.
  4. No valid evidence of the denials was attached to the letters.
  5. There is no order issued under seal, in violation of 28 U.S.C. 1691 – “All writs and process issuing from a court of the United States shall be under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk thereof.”

The word “process” at 28 U.S.C. 1691 means a court order.  See Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River Paper Co., 19 F. 252 (C.C. W.D. Wisconsin 1884);  Taylor v. U.S., 45 F. 531 (C.C. E.D. Tennessee 1891);  U.S. v. Murphy, 82 F. 893 (DCUS Delaware 1897);  Leas & McVitty v. Merriman, 132 F. 510 (C.C. W.D. Virginia 1904);  U.S. v. Sharrock, 276 F. 30 (DCUS Montana 1921);  In re Simon, 297 F. 942, 34 ALR 1404 (2nd Cir. 1924);  Scanbe Mfg. Co. v. Tryon, 400 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1968);  and Miles v. Gussin, 104 B.R. 553 (Bankruptcy D.C. 1989).

  1. There has never been an ORDER on WINDSOR’s case that was purportedly considered by the nine U.S. Supreme Court Justices on September 26, 2023. https://lawlessamerica.com/motion-for-compliance-with-rules-of-u-s-supreme-court-was-filed-by-bill-windsor/?fbclid=IwAR3ldAVwjfI4p7AZo4ILmjCRpshIx-4yAdr-nYAC_yvgz5jg_lIwN0Rfp8Q
  2. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “order” as a “mandate; precept; a command or direction authoritatively given….”
  3. gov defines “clerk of court” as “the court officer who oversees administrative functions, especially managing the flow of cases through the court.
  4. com defines “Administrative function” as that used in carrying out an administrative program and is to be broadly construed to include any aspect of agency organization, procedure, or management. In one state, for example, the term “administrative function” is defined as follows:

(1) “Administrative function” means the administration of:

(i) a law of the State;

(ii) a law of a political subdivision of the State; or

(iii) a rule, regulation, or bylaw of a public body.

(2) “Administrative function” does not include:

(i) an advisory function;

(ii) a judicial function;

(iii) a legislative function;

(iv) a quasi-judicial function; or

(v) a quasi-legislative function. [emphasis added.]

 

  1. Non-judicial court officers, such as clerks of court, will have specific tasks delegated to them by the court; they can make decisions on matters that the legal system does not consider to require judicial discretion and judgment. These are often described as “ministerial.”
  2. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “mandate:” “In practice, a judicial command or precept proceeding from a court or judicial officer, directing the proper officer to enforce a judgment, sentence, or decree. Seaman v. Clarke, 60 App. Div. 416, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1002; Horton v. State, 63 Neb. 34, 88 N. W. 146.
  3. “In the practice of the Supreme Court of the United States, the mandate is a precept or order issued upon the decision of an appeal or writ of error, directing the action to be taken, or disposition to be made of the case, by the inferior court … in some of the state jurisdictions….”
  4. WINDSOR has not received a judicial command. A letter purportedly written by the Clerk is not an order.
  5. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “precept” as “an order or direction, emanating from authority, to an officer or body of officers, commanding him or them to do some act within the scope of their powers.”
  6. A letter from the Clerk is not a Precept.
  7. The letter does not direct any proper officer to enforce a judgment, sentence, or decree.
  8. Failing to do what is required by the rules is a violation of due process, and this is a Constitutional violation.
  9. Windsor requires an order by the United States Supreme Court with a seal of the court and an actual signature of a Justice. This Due Process Notice and Service by Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, Scott S. Harris, was to be made on parties in 22-7648 of the valid record of denial of the Petition by the United States Supreme Court, if that actually happened.

 

  1. WINDSOR’S CONFERENCE DECISION WAS NOT PUBLISHED, AND IT MUST BE.
  2. United States Supreme Court’s Conference Decisions in Appeal No. 22-7648 must be published, and WINDSOR’s was not. This is a violation of due process.

“All conference decisions are published.” [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/ — EXHIBIT C, Paragraph 5.]

“When the vote has been taken on a case, the writing of an opinion is assigned—by the Chief if he voted with the majority, otherwise by the senior Justice of the majority.” [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/ — EXHIBIT C, Paragraph 6.]

 

  1. WINDSOR’S FILINGS WERE NOT DOCKETED AS THEY MUST BE.
  2. WINDSOR’S filing of a Motion for Rehearing [EXHIBIT E] has been unlawfully excluded from the Docket. [EXHIBIT A.] It was timely filed with the Clerk in paper form – an original and 10 copies.  There was no service by the United States Supreme Court.  This is a violation of due process.
  3. “Filing” is defined as:

“To place a paper in the official custody of the clerk of court to enter into the files or records of a case. [https://www.uscourts.gov/glossary#letter_f]

“the act of giving an official form or document to someone in authority in order to begin a legal process.” [Britannica Dictionary definition of FILING.]

“to deposit with the clerk of the court a written complaint or petition which is the opening step in a lawsuit and subsequent documents, including an answer, demurrer, motions, petitions, and orders. [Copyright © 1981 2005 by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill.].

 

  1. United States Supreme Court Rule 29 requires:

“1.   Any document required or permitted to be presented to the Court or to a Justice shall be filed with the Clerk in paper form.

“2.   A document is timely filed if it is received by the Clerk in paper form within the time specified for filing; or if it is sent to the Clerk through the United States Postal Service by first-class mail (including express or priority mail), postage prepaid, and bears a postmark, other than a commercial postage meter label, showing that the document was mailed on or before the last day for filing; or if it is delivered on or before the last day for filing to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery to the Clerk within 3 calendar days….”

  1. The Clerk of the United States Supreme Court seems to be routinely violating the due process requirements of many litigants. EXHIBIT R is an article written in 2012 about almost identical corruption by U.S. Supreme Court Clerk Thomas Suter.
  2. Notice and Service was not provided. Windsor demanded that it be executed immediately.
  3. Windsor asks that this Motion be docketed pursuant to Due Process and that a valid adjudication of the Motion be noticed and served on the parties.
  4. Windsor also requests all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under No. 22-7648, including all audit data. The audit data is the login name and login time of the individuals who entered any data in the records.
  5. WINDSOR believes these unlawful practices have taken place for at least 13 years. WINDSOR requests copies of all letters issued, rather than orders, in every case since 01/01/2008.

 

  1. ALL ORDERS AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH WINDSOR HAVE NOT BEEN SENT BY EMAIL AS REQUIRED.
  2. Documents attached as EXHIBITS hereto show that WINDSOR does not receive mail promptly. The American Association of Non-Lawyers requires that non-lawyers receive all communications by email.  This eliminates one of the many unfair advantages given to lawyers.  This is a violation of due process.
  3. WINDSOR must be served and communicated with at windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com.

 

  1. WINDSOR WAS NOT ISSUED AN ORDER ON HIS MOTION FOR REHEARING, AND HE MUST BE GIVEN THE PROPER TIME TO RESPOND TO ANY OBJECTION.
  2. Orders are required. This is a violation of due process.
  3. United States Supreme Court Rule 44 (2) provides: “Any petition for the rehearing of an order denying a petition for a writ of certiorari or extraordinary writ shall be filed within 25 days after the date of the order of denial….”
  4. There was no “order of denial,” so the time has not started to run on rehearing.

 

  1. THE CLERKS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, HARRIS AND GARNER, HAVE VIOLATED SUPREME COURT RULE 79 BY NOT KEEPING PROPER RECORDS.
  2. Records are required. This is a violation of due process.
  3. Rule 79 requires:

“(a) Civil Docket.

(1) In General. The clerk must keep a record known as the “civil docket” in the form and manner prescribed by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts with the approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The clerk must enter each civil action in the docket. Actions must be assigned consecutive file numbers, which must be noted in the docket where the first entry of the action is made.

(2) Items to be Entered. The following items must be marked with the file number and entered chronologically in the docket:

(A) papers filed with the clerk;

(B) process issued, and proofs of service or other returns showing execution; and

(C) appearances, orders, verdicts, and judgments.

(3) Contents of Entries; Jury Trial Demanded. Each entry must briefly show the nature of the paper filed or writ issued, the substance of each proof of service or other return, and the substance and date of entry of each order and judgment. When a jury trial has been properly demanded or ordered, the clerk must enter the word ‘jury’ in the docket.”

  1. HARRIS and GARNER have violated WINDSOR’s civil rights by failing to comply with this Rule.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #2 — CONSPIRACY

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. The Defendants, in some way or manner, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan. The mutual understanding was to break the law at some time in the future and/or to achieve a lawful aim by unlawful means.  The DEFENDANTS willfully became members of such conspiracy.  During the existence of the conspiracy, various DEFENDANTS knowingly committed at least one overt act in an effort to carry out or accomplish some object of the conspiracy.  The conspiracy was designed to deprive the PLAINTIFF of legal rights and deceive the courts to obtain an illegal objective.  Each of the DEFENDANTS is responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrongs. DEFENDANTS reached agreement to commit these overt acts.  They committed to support their efforts with a series of lies, to conceal documents, to falsify documents, to lie, and to undertake a variety of actions designed to damage the PLAINTIFF.  At least one of the DEFENDANTS knowingly committed at least two of the overt acts. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct). The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #3 — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. The DEFENDANTS have shown extreme and outrageous conduct. The PLAINTIFF has been under extreme emotional distress for 15 months.
  3. DEFENDANTS intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the PLAINTIFF through defamation, fraud, conspiracy, and violation of civil and Constitutional rights.
  4. DEFENDANTS inflicted emotional distress on the PLAINTIFF.  DEFENDANTS acted intentionally or recklessly.
  5. Some of the damaging words about the PLAINTIFF and actions against the Plaintiff are not defamatory, and it is these words and actions for which the PLAINTIFF seeks recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
  6. Conduct of DEFENDANTS was extreme and outrageous. These outrageously false and/or criminal claims and the wide variety of things that DEFENDANTS have done would prompt an average member of the community to exclaim “outrageous!”
  7. The activities of DEFENDANTS have been so extreme that it has gone well beyond all possible bounds of decency, and it must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. All of the acts of DEFENDANTS taken together amount to the type of extreme conduct that qualifies as intentional infliction of emotional distress.
  8. The conduct of Defendants caused the distress.
  9. The distress caused was severe emotional distress to the PLAINTIFF. The outrageous harassment, lies, libel, slander, and defamation are bad alone, but the effect on the PLAINTIFF’s mental health has been severe.
  10. There are no alternative causes of action that would provide a remedy for the severe emotional distress caused by DEFENDANTS’ conduct that does not meet whatever standard the Court decides is appropriate for defamation.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #4 — 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) – Violation of Federal Civil RICO Act

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. The conduct of DEFENDANTS violates the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (“Federal RICO”).
  3. DEFENDANTS, individually and in conspiracy with one another, are all RICO persons who violated RICO by engaging in (1) “racketeering activity,” (2) conducted through a “pattern,” (3) affecting an “enterprise,” (4) impacting interstate commerce. DEFENDANTS also violated 18 USC §1962(d) by conspiring as alleged herein to violate 18 USC §1962(c). All of DEFENDANTS’ predicate acts have a similar purpose – to damage the PLAINTIFF – all have similar victims, the PLAINTIFF, all have had similar results, and the methods of commission have been virtually identical.
  4. Racketeering Activity included violations of section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), and other sections.
  5. A number of crimes were committed by DEFENDANTS. Interstate crimes of wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and criminal conspiracy were committed between the District of Columbia, South Dakota, and Florida.
  6. DEFENDANTS knowingly devised or participated in a scheme to defraud the PLAINTIFF and did so willingly with an intent to defraud. The activity engaged in consists of two or more predicate acts of racketeering activity, the most recent of which occurred within hours after the commission of a prior act.
  7. The DEFENDANTS committed violations of Federal RICO and RICO Conspiracy – 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct: knowledge of, participation in, and benefit from a RICO enterprise). In addition to the substantive offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961, a criminal conspiracy to commit these offenses is a RICO predicate act.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #5 — Violation of Federal RICO Conspiracy Offense — 18 USC § 1962(d)

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. The DEFENDANTS, in some way or manner, came to mutual understandings to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan as described herein. The mutual understanding was to break the law. The DEFENDANTS willfully became members of such conspiracy.
  3. During the existence of the conspiracy, various DEFENDANTS knowingly violated the Federal RICO Act. These violations were knowingly committed in an effort to carry out or accomplish some object of the conspiracy.
  4. The conspiracy was designed to deprive the PLAINTIFF of Constitutional rights and legal rights and to deceive the courts to obtain an illegal objective. Each of the DEFENDANTS is responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrongs. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct: knowledge of, participation in, and benefit from a RICO enterprise).  The predicate acts are identified herein, and those paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #6 — Violation of Due Process and Deprivation of Rights — 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. HARRIS, GARNER, and UNIDENTIFIED DOES conspired for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, and/or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice with intent to deny PLAINTIFF due process and to injure him while attempting to enforce his right to self-representation, and this violated the equal protection of the laws.. HARRIS, GARNER, and UNIDENTIFIED DOES have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #5 — Violation of Constitutional Rights

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. DEFENDANTS had a Constitutional duty to the PLAINTIFF.  They breached their Constitutional duties to the PLAINTIFF through action and inaction.  This caused damage to the PLAINTIFF.
  3. The PLAINTIFF brings this action against HARRIS and GARNER, pursuant in part to 28 U.S. C. § 1331, in claims arising from violations of federal constitutional rights guaranteed in the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and redressable pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents 403 U.S. 388 (1971). HARRIS and GARNER subjected the PLAINTIFF to deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.
  4. HARRIS and GARNER’s actions are non-judicial, and there is no immunity. The PLAINTIFF has been damaged.  The PLAINTIFF prays for monetary damages against HARRIS and GARNER based upon violations of federal Constitutional rights pursuant to Bivens.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #6 — Fraud

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. Defendants intentionally misstated material facts, omitted material facts, and made false representations. Defendants knew they made false statements or omitted material facts, or they had a reckless disregard for the truth.  The PLAINTIFF and the courts relied upon the intentional misstatements and/or omission of material facts.  Defendants committed fraud.  The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct).

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #7 — Common Law Fraud

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. Defendants misrepresented material facts. These Defendants had knowledge of the falsity.  Their intent was that the representations would be acted upon by people ignorant of the falsity, relied on the truth of the representations, and had a right to rely upon it.
  3. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct). The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #8 — Violation of Pro Se Rights

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. Pro se parties are a minority class of people. The PLAINTIFF objects to the treatment of pro se parties in state and federal courts.  The PLAINTIFF, Pro Se, has been repeatedly denied rights and abused.  Judges and judicial officers have violated the Constitutional rights of the PLAINTIFF and other pro se parties.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #9 — Constitutional and Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1988 — Violation of First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint for purposes of this claim.
  2. The PLAINTIFF was denied due process and his rights were violated when filings were not filed or considered.
  3. The PLAINTIFF was denied access to a court to seek redress of grievances.
  4. Defendants directly participated in the infraction, after learning of it, failed to remedy the wrong, and created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred or allowed such policy or custom to continue.
  5. As a direct result of the actions, statements and / or policies of the Defendants, the PLAINTIFF suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
  6. Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s known statutory and Constitutional rights.
  7. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, the PLAINTIFF has suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe and substantial damages. These damages include lost income, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental and emotional anguish, and distress.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #10 — Violation of Fourth Amendment Failure to Train and Supervise — 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint for purposes of this claim.
  2. The Defendants’ immediate supervisors, had a duty to train and supervise them to ensure they were not engaging in conduct that violated the civil rights of citizens like the PLAINTIFF.
  3. Instead of carrying out this duty, Defendants chose to encourage the misconduct of needless escalation and aggression witnessed by the Defendants against the PLAINTIFF in this case.
  4. DefendantS’ use of excessive force and their illegal seizure and assault upon the PLAINTIFF was the direct result of their supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the civil rights of citizens and of disabled citizens in particular, and his repeated failure and refusal to intervene to supervise, train, or otherwise put a stop to such misconduct.
  5. All of the acts described herein were done by Defendants intentionally, knowingly, willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and recklessly in disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s federally protected rights, and they were done pursuant to the pre-existing and ongoing deliberately indifferent customs, policies and practices of the Clerk of Court, under color of law.
  6. Upon information and belief, the Clerk of Court’s customs and practices of unlawful conduct (and failures to train/supervise to prevent the same) proximately causing the harms described herein to the PLAINTIFF.
  7. Upon information and belief, it is the custom and practice at the Clerk of Court’s Office of the United States Supreme Court to regularly violate the civil rights of citizens like the PLAINTIFF and intentionally, knowingly, willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and recklessly operate in disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s federally protected rights;
  8. Upon information and belief, it is the custom and practice at the Clerk of Court’s Office to try and cover-up and justify such wrongdoing.
  9. Upon information and belief, it is the custom and practice by the Clerk of Court to refuse to discipline its employees for misconduct and to refuse to ever find its employees have engaged in wrongdoing, in the face of obvious and repeated constitutional violations, which resulted in a foreseeable culture of dishonesty and silence in the face of ongoing and repeated civil rights violations.
  10. The unlawful conduct of Defendants as set forth in detail herein, amounts to a custom and well-settled, widespread overall practice of fraud and corruption deliberately insulated from law enforcement accountability, throughout the Defendants, even if not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, and is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.
  11. Through the Defendants’ continuous ratification of unconstitutional actions and inactions, Defendants have condoned and become the driving force of the Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct.
  12. Defendants failed to properly train and supervise its employees to avoid their foreseeable use of unconstitutional conduct.
  13. Defendants’ policies, customs, and practices in failing to properly train and supervise its employees were the moving force and proximate cause of the violations to the PLAINTIFF’s constitutional rights.
  14. The custom, policy, and practice of Defendants of encouraging, condoning, tolerating, and ratifying the unconstitutional conduct, as described herein, were the moving force behind and the proximate cause of, the violations to the PLAINTIFF’s Constitutional rights.
  15. Upon information and belief, Defendants have been deliberately obfuscatory and in other litigation involving claims against its officers, has made concerted efforts to withhold, destroy, conceal and delay the release of documents and correspondence that relate to the unconstitutional policies, customs, and practices set forth above, and which also evidence Defendants’ unconstitutional practices, customs, failures to train, and supervise Defendant officers as set forth above.
  16. The acts or omissions of Defendants caused the PLAINTIFF to suffer physical and mental pain, among other injuries, damages, and losses.
  17. The actions and omissions of Defendants as described herein deprived the PLAINTIFF of the rights, privileges, liberties, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States of America and caused his other damages.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #11 — Constitutional and Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1988 — Violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
  2. The PLAINTIFF was denied due process and his rights were violated when Defendants gave false information to WINDSOR and judges.
  3. Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s known statutory and Constitutional rights.
  4. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, the PLAINTIFF has suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe and substantial damages. These damages include lost income, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental and emotional anguish, and distress.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #12 — Monell Claim

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
  2. At all relevant times herein, the Clerk of Court’s Office developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned de facto policies, practices, and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the PLAINTIFF’s Constitutional rights which caused the violation of such rights.
  3. Defendants ‘ unlawful actions were done willfully, knowingly, and with the specific intent to deprive the PLAINTIFF of his Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
  4. The Constitutional abuses and violations of the Clerk of Court’s Office, were and are directly and proximately caused by policies, practices and/or customs developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged and sanctioned by Defendants, including the failure: (a) to adequately supervise and train its officers and agents, including the Defendants, thereby failing to adequately discourage further Constitutional violations on the part of its Clerk of Court’s Office, and their employees; (b) to properly and adequately monitor and discipline its employees, including Defendants; and (c) to adequately and properly investigate citizen complaints of misconduct, and, instead, acts of misconduct were tolerated.
  5. Upon information and belief, Defendants acting through its Clerk of Court’s Office, developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned a de facto policy, practice, and/or custom of unlawfully interfering with and/or arresting, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, individuals who exercise their rights under the First Amendment by engaging in monitoring and documenting law enforcement and judicial misconduct.
  6. Defendants’ unlawful actions were done willfully, knowingly, and with the specific intent to deprive the PLAINTIFF of his Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
  7. The PLAINTIFF has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer serious and irreparable harm to his Constitutional rights unless Defendants are enjoined from continuing their unlawful policies, practices, and/or customs which have directly and proximately caused such Constitutional abuses.
  8. Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s known statutory and Constitutional rights.
  9. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, the PLAINTIFF has suffered, and will continue to suffer severe and substantial damages. These damages include lost income, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental and emotional anguish, and distress.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #13 — CIVIL CONSPIRACY

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
  2. Defendants conspired to damage the PLAINTIFF.
  3. Defendants formed and operated the conspiracy. The object to be accomplished was to defame, libel, slander, harass, cyberstalk, invade his privacy, falsely charge the PLAINTIFF with felonies, cause emotional distress, invade his privacy, and damage him. Evidence shows that Defendants had a meeting of the minds and actively worked together toward this objective.
  4. Multiple unlawful, overt acts were committed. There was specific intent to agree to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means.  The conspiracy occurred in the District of Columbia.  The act in, and effect on, the District of Columbia was a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy.
  5. There are underlying torts that support the conspiracy cause of action.
  6. Damage resulted to the PLAINTIFF from acts done in furtherance of the common design. The PLAINTIFF has been caused pain and suffering, emotional distress, lost enjoyment of life, loss of his marriage, damage to his relationship with his family, severe damage to his reputation, damage to his career, and more.  The PLAINTIFF’s business relationships have been severely damaged.
  7. The PLAINTIFF’s reputation is now sullied by false, defamatory information online. This defamation likely can never be erased because it is breeding in cyberspace.
  8. There was extreme risk by Defendants as there was not a remote possibility of injury or even a high probability of minor harm, but rather the likelihood of serious injury to the PLAINTIFF.
  9. Actual awareness existed because Defendants knew about the peril, but their acts demonstrated they did not care.
  10. Some Defendants aided and abetted the conspiracy and underlying torts.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #14 — EXEMPLARY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
  2. Defendants acted intentionally to damage the PLAINTIFF.
  3. Defendants committed fraud, malice, and gross negligence. This isn’t the case of someone slipping up and making one false statement.  The actions of Defendants were deliberate.
  4. Conduct of Defendants, as described above, is willful, wanton, wicked, intentional, and malicious resulting from fraud, insult, and malice, and it is associated with aggravating circumstances, including willfulness, wantonness, malice, oppression, outrageous conduct, insult, and fraud, thus warranting the PLAINTIFF’s recovery of punitive damages from each of the Defendants.
  5. The entire want of care by the Defendants shows that the acts complained of were the result of conscious indifference to the rights or welfare of the PLAINTIFF.
  6. The PLAINTIFF should receive an award of punitive/exemplary damages. Exemplary damages serve to provide the claimant with recovery above and beyond compensatory damages in order to punish the wrongdoers for egregious conduct and to deter the wrongdoers and others from similar conduct in the future.
  7. Since the PLAINTIFF’s damages can never be erased in this case; there is no amount of money that could compensate the PLAINTIFF for the loss of life as he knew it; there is no amount of money to compensate a decent, honest, law-abiding citizen for the destruction of his reputation.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #15 — INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

 

  1. If not enjoined by this Court, Defendants and their agents, representatives, and employees will continue to implement similar policies and practices that deny citizens their Constitutional rights without due process, violate their right to equal protection of the laws, and deprive people of the privileges or immunities of citizenship. This course of conduct will cause citizens to suffer irreparable injury, including but not limited to, loss of business opportunities and the deprivation of their livelihoods.  Citizens have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law for such an injury.  Accordingly, injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other authority is appropriate.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #16 — RICO RELIEF

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF asks that this Court liberally construe the RICO laws and thereby find that all Defendants, both jointly and severally, have acquired and maintained, both directly and indirectly, an interest in and/or control of a RICO enterprise of persons and of other individuals who were associated in fact, all of whom engaged in, and whose activities did affect, interstate and foreign commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); that all Defendants be required to account for all gains, profits, and advantages derived from their several acts of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s); that judgment be entered for the PLAINTIFF and against all Defendants for the PLAINTIFF’s actual damages, and for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF treble (triple) damages, under authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), according to the best available proof; that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF all damages sustained by the PLAINTIFF in consequence of Defendants’ several violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF his costs of the lawsuit incurred herein including, but not limited to, all necessary research, all non-judicial enforcement, and all reasonable counsel’s fees; that all damages caused by all Defendants, and all gains, profits, and advantages derived by all Defendants, from their several acts of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s), be deemed to be held in constructive trust for the benefit of the PLAINTIFF, his heirs and assigns; that the PLAINTIFF has such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper, under the circumstances of this action; that Defendants have conspired to acquire and maintain an interest in, and/or conspired to acquire and maintain control of, a RICO enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962(c) and (d); that Defendants have conspired to conduct and participate in said RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962(c) and (d); that all Defendants be required to account for all gains, profits, and advantages derived from their several acts of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s); that judgment be entered for the PLAINTIFF and against all Defendants for the PLAINTIFF’s actual damages, and for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF treble damages, under authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF all damages sustained by the PLAINTIFF in consequence of Defendants’ several violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF his costs of the lawsuit incurred herein including, but not limited to, all necessary research, all non-judicial enforcement, and all reasonable counsel’s fees; and that all damages caused by all Defendants, and all gains, profits, and advantages derived by all Defendants, from their several acts of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s), be deemed to be held in constructive trust for the benefit of the PLAINTIFF, his heirs and assigns.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #17 — Violations of Title II of Americans With Disabilities Act — 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213

 

  1. All preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated here for purposes of this Claim.
  2. Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from discrimination on the basis of a disability.
  3. The DEFENDANTS failed to provide modifications or reasonable accommodations to the PLAINTIFF in light of his disabilities, and the Clerk of Court HARRIS failed to adopt policies and procedures, or adequately train his staff to safely interact with people who suffer such disabilities.
  4. Some reasonable accommodations for a litigant functioning alone with Cognitive Decline and use of only one hand while traveling a thousand miles from home is to allow recording, provide all communications in writing, and communicate by email for the fastest possible delivery.
  5. Unlawful discrimination, pursuant to DOJ regulation, includes a failure to make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.” 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(7).
  6. As a proximate result of actions of the DEFENDANTS, the PLAINTIFF was injured, suffered physically and emotionally, has been unable to comply with requests of the Clerk of Court, and continues to experience fear, trauma, and anxiety.
  7. As a result of the DEFENDANTS’ violations of Title II of the ADA, the PLAINTIFF is entitled to compensatory damages.

 

  1. INJURIES

 

________________________________________________________________

 

  1. RELIEF

 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Windsor respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in his favor and against the Defendants:

  1. that this COMPLAINT be granted;
  1. Appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the unlawful and unconstitutional acts and practices of the Defendants;

 

  1. Compensatory and consequential damages, including damages for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of liberty, privacy, sense of security and individual dignity, and other pain and suffering on all claims allowed by law;

 

  1. Appropriate equitable relief against all Defendants as allowed by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including the enjoining and permanent restraining of these violations, and direction to Defendants to take such affirmative action as is necessary to ensure that the effects of the unconstitutional and unlawful practices are eliminated and do not continue to affect the PLAINTIFF or others;

 

  1. All economic losses and damages on all claims allowed by law to be established at trial;

 

  1. Punitive damages on all claims allowed by law and in an amount to be determined at trial;

 

  1. that an order be issued confirming if there was a Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648;

 

  1. that an order be issued reflecting the Due Process Notice and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. Harris, on parties in Case No. 22-7648 of the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court;

 

  1. that the Opinion of the Court in Case No. 22-7648 be provided;

 

  1. that the vote of each Justice be indicated in Case No. 22-7648;

 

  1. that the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process;

 

  1. that an order be issued that WINDSOR must be served and communicated with at windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com;

 

  1. that this Motion be granted – motion TO REQUIRE confirmation OF A Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648 and ISSUANCE OF AN Order SO CONFIRMING; order reflecting the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court in Case No. 22 7648, the Due Process Notice, and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. HARRIS, of OPINION in Case No. 22-7648 on EACH partY; RECORD OF VOTES BY EACH JUSTICE in Case No. 22-7648; ORDER THAT the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that this Motion DATED NOVEMBER 27, 2023 be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648 AT NO charge, including all audit data; AND if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. HARRIS be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648, at no charge, including all audit data; that Windsor be provided copies of letters and orders issued in every case considered in Conference since 02/01/2008; that if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. Harris;

 

  1. Issuance of an Order mandating appropriate equitable relief, including, but not limited to: (1) The imposition of policy changes designed to avoid future similar misconduct by Defendants; (2) Mandatory training designed to prevent future similar misconduct by Defendants;

 

  1. Pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate; and

 

  1. Any further relief to which PLAINTIFF may show himself justly entitled.

 

Submitted this 26th day of December 2023,

 

 

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

VERIFICATION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C.§1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NOT.

This 26th day of December 2023,

 

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this COMPLAINT has been prepared in Times New Roman 12-point font, one of the font and point selections approved by this Court and meets the requirements of this Court.

This 26th day of December 2023,

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

WINDSOR is a private individual.  He is not a nongovernmental corporation so a corporate disclosure statement is not appropriate or required by Rule 7.1.

This 26th day of December 2023,

 

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, William Michael Windsor, do swear that on this date, December 26, 2023, I have served the enclosed COMPLAINT on the DEFENDANTS in the above proceeding or their counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with first-class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days.

The names and addresses of those served are as follows:

Name:                       Scott S. Harris

Address:                    Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone:                202-479-3025

Email:                        pio@supremecourt.gov

 

Name:                       Rashonda Garner

Address:                    Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone:                202-479-3025

Email:                        PMcCabe@supremecourt.gov

 

This 26th day of December 2023,

 

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY

 

THE PLAINTIFF REQUESTS TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE.

 

This 26th day of December 2023,

 

_______________________________
WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR
,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Bill Windsor reportedly slandered by Marcie Schreck and Letty Lanzaro

Marcie Schreck

Marcie Schreck (not Shrek) is a woman in Amarillo, Texas who asked Bill Windsor for help with her family’s legal problems 12 years ago.  She was a no-show for Lawless America filming, but she contacted Bill for help again in 2021.

Bill spent virtually full-time for a year helping.  Bill stopped helping when Marcie said and did things that he considered to be scary.

Now she’s back accusing Bill Windsor of all types of things that are complete fabrications.

Today, Bill Windsor reportedly slandered by Marcie Schreck and Letty Lanzaro.  Bill received an email from long-time friend, David Schied.  He reported the following:

“Marcie Schreck and her associate, Letty Lanzaro, are two women who have been recently calling to me.  At first, Bill Windsor’s name was never mentioned to me by Marcie Schreck.  Her request was for me to tell her about SEPSIS in my person experience; and then to ask what I might recommend in her having to deal with court corruption pertaining to some case in WACO, TX related to her deceased mother’s estate and problems with her disabled son.  I did the best I could well over 1/2 hour on the first call.
“Then, after a week to 10 days, I got the call from Letty Lanzaro who called with heavy allegations about Bill Windsor being charged with “barratry” in the very same case.  A 3-way conference call was attempted but failed with Marcie.  Soon afterwards, Marcie and I spoke and she reiterated the allegations against Bill with more details.  Both women were insisting that Bill Windsor needed to take down information from the Internet about Marcie’s son’s case or it would be the end of everything for her son as well as her mother’s estate.
“Both women are saying Bill had acted selfishly and ‘lawlessly’ to enter records into the court(s) as Marcie’s “representative.”  Marcie ended up insisting that Bill had done so to get access to her mother’s estate by giving her false promises, including moving to a different state.”
Bill never did anything but help this family.  He doesn’t know Letty.  He doesn’t take well to demands and false accusations.  He will not take anything down, and he will be delighted to sue them for slander and harassment.
Here are a few of the articles that Bill Windsor has published:
Barratry (/ˈbærətri/ BARR-ə-tree) is a legal term that, at common law, described a criminal offense committed by people who are overly officious in instigating or encouraging prosecution of groundless litigation, or who bring repeated or persistent acts of litigation for the purposes of profit or harassment.

Crazy Judge Dan L. Schaap – Hunter Tyler Schreck Legal Update – 11-29-2021

 

crazy are you crazy cropped 200h

Is Judge Dan L. Schaap aka “Big Chief” crazy? It has been a very busy week in the case of Hunter Tyler Schreck’s case. Hunter was almost murdered on June 24, 2020 by as many as 15 Amarillo, Texas Police officers and civilians. Hunter had done absolutely nothing. Judge Daniel Leon Schaap has just issued one of the craziest orders I have ever seen.

Judge Dan L. Schaap issued a CRAZY ORDER order asking the Randall County District Attorney if he had an objection to the termination of Hunter Schreck’s corrupt court-appointed attorney. Seriously. This guy has to be nuts. The prosecuting attorney has no say in who a criminal defendant chooses to use. The court-appointed attorney works for and is paid by Randall County.

crazy are you crazy


This is the CRAZY JUDGE — Judge Dan L. Schaap aka Judge Daniel Leon Schaap aka Leon aka Big Chief:

 

Schaap Judge Dan 900w
                Judge Dan L. Schaap — BIG CHIEF


BILL WINDSOR COMMENT: Judge Dan L. Schaap is the lowest of low-life judges. I’ve dealt with or been aware of thousands of corrupt judges, but they’re usually just dishonest a$$hole$. Judge Dan L. Schaap is trying to murder a disabled boy. I hope there is a very special place in Hell for Judge Dan L. Schaap.

Marcie Schreck has filed a Motion in response to the CRAZY ORDER:

COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT, Hunter Tyler Schreck (“Hunter” or “DEFENDANT”) through Marcie Schreck and William M. Windsor, who have his power of Attorney for all legal matters, and hereby files this Motion to Strike Order Setting Hearing by Submission (“MOTION”).  There is no legal basis for this MOTION.

1.                  On 11/23/2021, Judge Dan L. Schaap signed the ORDER SETTING HEARING BY SUBMISSION (“ORDER”). [EXHIBIT 389.] 

2.                  JUDGE DAN L. SCHAAP DOES NOT HAVE JURIDICTION BECAUSE JUDGE ANA ESTEVEZ HAS GIVEN PLENARY JURISDICTION TO JUDGE KENT SIMS.

3.                  The ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT granted plenary power to Judge Kent Sims. [EXHIBIT 317.] 

4.                  A plenary power or plenary authority is a complete and absolute power to take action, with no limitations.

5.                  JUDGE DAN L. SCHAAP HAS NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE THERE ARE TWO MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY PENDING AGAINST HIM, AND THE 11/18/2021 HEARING IS VOID.

6.                  Case law requires that the disqualification hearing must be an evidentiary hearing.  Judge Kent Sims denied evidence.  He refused to swear in Marcie Schreck.

“Judge Brown did not afford Durden an evidentiary hearing on his motion to disqualify/recuse; therefore, we conditionally grant the petition in part and direct
Judge Brown to vacate his ‘Order on Motion to Recuse and Jeopardy Motion for Dismissal.’…” (In re State ex rel. Durden, 587 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App. 2019).)

“On appeal, Sanchez complains that an evidentiary hearing was mandatory under TEX.R.CIV.P. 18a once the recusal motion was referred to the administrative
judge. We agree.” (Sanchez v. State, 926 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App. 1996).)

“Sanchez complains that an evidentiary hearing was mandatory under TEX.R.CIV.P. 18a once the recusal motion was referred to the administrative judge. We
agree.”  (Sanchez v. State, 927 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App. 1996).)

“Accordingly, the respondent abused his discretion in disqualifying Zayas without notice and an evidentiary hearing.” (In re Lopez, 286 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.
2008).)

“…the only order the trial court had authority to enter after it refused to recuse itself was an order of referral. State ex rel. Millsap, 692 S.W.2d at 481. Because
the trial court neither granted the motion to recuse nor referred the matter to the presiding judge, any other order made thereafter was void.” (Crawford v.
State
, 807 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App. 1991).)

7.                  THERE IS NO LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ALLOW THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY TO OBJECT TO OR OPPOSE THE WITHDRAWAL OF A COURT-APPOINTED DEFENSE ATTORNEY WHO WAS TERMINATED MONTHS AGO.

8.                  Brooks Barfield has begged to withdraw. [EXHIBIT 310.] [EXHIBIT 311.]

9.                  The DEFENDANT has filed motions to dismiss Brooks Barfield as he was terminated on October 12, 2021. [EXHIBIT 2.]  [EXHIBIT 16.] [EXHIBIT 188.]

10.              JUDGE DAN L. SCHAAP TOLD THE DEFENDANT AND MARCIE SCHRECK THAT HUNTER COULD TERMINATE BROOKS BARFIELD AT ANY TIME.

11.              The Zoom call was tape recorded.  EXHIBIT 134 is a transcript of the call.  EXHIBIT 297 is the Audio Recording.

12.              The DEFENDANT recorded a video for Judge Dan L. Schaap explaining that he does not want Brooks Barfield.  The DEFENDANT refuses to work with Brooks Barfield. [EXHIBIT 156 and EXHIBIT 157.] [EXHIBIT 377.] [EXHIBIT 392.]

13.              THE DEFENDANT HAS FILED A STATE BAR OF TEXAS GRIEVANCE AGAINST BROOKS BARFIELD, AND HE IS SEEKING HIS DISBARMENT.

14.              The Grievance was filed by Fax on 11/24/2021. [EXHIBIT 388.]

15.              Marcie Schreck is also seeking a protective order against Brooks Barfield. [EXHIBIT 308 and EXHIBIT 309.]

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the DEFENDANT prays that the Court strike the ORDER SETTING HEARING BY SUBMISSION; sign the order [EXHIBIT 188] removing Brooks Barfield from the case and order him to immediately deliver the case file and all evidence to HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK; order all filings received by the Clerk of Court to be docketed; enter an order recognizing that Marcie Schreck and William M. Windsor are authorized by Texas law Chapter 752 to represent HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK as his Attorney-in-Fact [EXHIBIT 400]; schedule a hearing on the Motion to Quash the Purported Indictments and Motion to Dismiss; schedule a hearing on the Motion for Discharge due to failure to provide a Speedy Trial; and for such other and further relief in connection therewith that is proper.

 

Photo Hunter Schreck and Marcie Schreck happier times 2015 CROPPED 640w
                      Hunter Tyler Schreck and Marcie Schreck BEFORE Hunter was almost murdered
and suffered a Traumatic Brain Injury

 

Marcie Schreck believes Judge Dan L. Schaap may be mentally ill.

There have been a lot of significant developments in the case of HUNTER TYLER SHRECK this week. It appears the CRAZY ORDER should lead to the removal of BROOKS BARFIELD, the clueless attorney of Amarillo. We are waiting with baited breath to see if Big Chief Dan L. Schaap recognizes the law that makes Marcie Schreck and Bill Windsor the Attorneys-in-Fact for Hunter Tyler Schreck.

If he does, it’s ramming speed!

If Big Chief Dan L. Schaap doesn’t schedule hearings on the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Provide a Speedy Trial after 525 days and the Motion to Quash the Indictments, then it’s time for the Court of Appeals.

We have noticed many depositions. We have sent many demands for criminal investigations against the army of evildoers. We have been speaking with the top attorneys in the country who might like to make $20 million handling Hunter Schreck’s civil case. We have emailed the defendants in the civil case maaaany times. Marcie has been receiving wonderful help from Easter Seals. We have filed two Bar Association Complaints. We are prepared to file a Judicial Misconduct Complaint against Big Chief. We have done background checks on every potential defendant using MyLife’s 96-hour introductory trial special for $1. That’s how we managed to get Big Chief’s personal emails. 🙂

 

Marcie has had a lot of success getting chances for desperately-needed medical care for Hunter and Logan. She somehow is managing to get $15,000 in dental work done for Logan for FREE.

Stay tuned for more news from Big Chief. Maybe they are finally ready to give up and dismisss the case.


 

Other Articles about Hunter Tyler Schreck:

Hunter Tyler Schreck – a Disabled Young Man – has been Victimized by Police, District Attorney, and Pentecostal Church Members in Amarillo Texas

Just Like the Man who has Done Nothing Wrong by Hunter Tyler Schreck

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 1

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 2

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 3

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 4

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 5

It’s the Belt — Secrets of the Clever Mom of Hunter Tyler Schreck

 

Beware of Brooks Barfield

 

Bar Grievance Against Brooks Barfield

 

Bar Grievance Against The D.A. Robert Love

 

Crazy Judge Dan L. Schaap ak BIG CHIEF

Copyright LawlessAmerica.com
Bill Windsor went to high school and college in Lubbock, Texas — just a short drive from Amarillo, Texas.  This gives him a special interest in exposing the scum in the area of the country he has loved so much. 


 

windsor bill 2012 09 28 cropped tight edited 200w

Bill Windsor

I, William M. Windsor, am not an attorney.  This website expresses my OPINIONS.   The comments of visitors or guest authors to the website are their opinions and do not therefore reflect my opinions.  Anyone mentioned by name in any article is welcome to file a response.   This website does not provide legal advice.  I do not give legal advice.  I do not practice law.   This website is to expose government corruption, law enforcement corruption, political corruption, and judicial corruption.   Whatever this website says about the law is presented in the context of how I or others perceive the applicability of the law to a set of circumstances if I (or some other author) was in the circumstances under the conditions discussed.  Despite my concerns about lawyers in general, I suggest that anyone with legal questions consult an attorney for an answer, particularly after reading anything on this website.  The law is a gray area at best.  Please read our  Legal Notice and Terms

 

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Hunter Tyler Schreck Legal Update – 11-22-2021

 

crazy are you crazy cropped 200h

Update since Hunter Tyler Schreck filed a Mega-Million federal lawsuit in Amarillo, Texas on 10/29/2021 for violation of his Constitutional rights. It has been a very busy week. Hunter was almost murdered on June 24, 2020 by as many as 15 Amarillo, Texas Police officers and civilians. Hunter had done absolutely nothing.

Hunter Schreck has filed his lawsuit pro se. He has named 58 Defendants and 100 John Doe Defendants (gangsters he will identify in discovery). Here is Civil Action No. 2-21CV-220-Z – Schreck v City of Amarillo, Et al. – Verified Complaint2-21CV-220-Z – Schreck v City of Amarillo, Et al. – Verified Complaint.

crazy are you crazy


On 10/28/2021, BROOKS BARFIELD sent Marcie Schreck notice of a “Show Cause Hearing” in the Randall County 47th Judicial District Court on 11/2/2021 at 1:30 p.m. [EXHIBIT 211.]  She was told by Billy Maples of Judy’s Bail Bonds that HUNTER’s bond would be revoked and he would be arrested if he wasn’t there.  Marcie Schreck checked the docket, and there was no hearing shown.

BILL WINDSOR COMMENT: There was no such hearing scheduled. Just one of the almost never-ending lies of BROOKS BARFIELD, Public Pretender and criminal.

On 10/28/2021 at 11:38 a.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD advising him to notify his malpractice carrier that a malpractice lawsuit was being filed against him. [EXHIBIT 208.]
On 10/28/2021 at 8:24 p.m., Marcie Schreck sent a CEASE-AND-DESIST notice by email to BROOKS BARFIELD. [EXHIBIT 207.] It said:

Mr. Barfield: Please CEASE AND DESIST.  Hunter, William, Logan, and I don’t ever want to hear from you again.  I thought that was made quite clear from earlier messages and filings. Once again:  Do not show up anywhere that Hunter and I are.  Do not contact us in any manner.  No email.  No mail.  No couriers.  No phone calls.  No visits.  No courthouse contact.  No telegrams.  No trick or treating.  NOTHING. CEASE AND DESIST. You have made threats to me.  I am asking the police to pursue criminal charges against you for what you have already done.  If you contact us again, we will go seek a STALKING, Harassment, and Cyber Terrorism Protective Order.  I am copying several people so they are aware of this. Marcie Schreck – Attorney-in-Fact for Hunter Tyler Schreck

On 10/29/2021, Marcie Schreck (“MOMMA SCHRECK”) filed the Verified Complaint with Alice in the Clerk’s Office of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. She filed the Verified Complaint, a Civil Cover Sheet, a Certificate of Interested Persons, and a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Costs. She also delivered 58 Summons Foms for signature by the Clerk once In Forma Pauperis status is approved.

On 10/29/2021 and 10/30/2021, Marcie Schreck emailed a copy of the federal court Verified Complaint to BROOKS BARFIELD and the other defendants with known email addresses.

On 10/29/2021 at 8:27 a.m., Marcie Schreck received an email from Sandy Russell of Randall County that shows the federal court Verified Complaint to BROOKS BARFIELD and the other defendants with known email addresses was received. [EXHIBIT 209.]

On 10/31/2021, Billy Maples of Judy’s Bail Bonds texted Marcie Schreck at 10:11 a.m. with notice of a “Status Hearing” in the Randall County 47th Judicial District Court on 11/2021 at 1:30 pm.  Neither HUNTER nor Marcie Schreck knew anything about this.  He asked Marcie Schreck to confirm receipt.  He said: “Your attendance is required for this hearing.  When you arrive at court, you are required to text or call.  Then when the hearing is concluded, contact us again to report the outcome.  We also need a copy of any and all court documents that you received.  You can send them by email or text or by simply taking a photo of them and email.  I wish you the best outcome.”

On 11/1/2021 at 10:13 p.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD with instructions on what he must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD.  [EXHIBIT 136.]  BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/1/2021 at 10:22 p.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD with instructions on what he must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD.  [EXHIBIT 136.]  BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/1/2021 at 10:22 p.m., Marcie Schreck sent another email to BROOKS BARFIELD with instructions on what he must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD.  [EXHIBIT 136.]  BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/1/2021 at 10:28 p.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to Samantha Wilson of the BARFIELD Law Firm with instructions on what BROOKS BARFIELD must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD.  [EXHIBIT 136.]  BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/2/2021 at 4:10 a.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to Samantha Wilson of the BARFIELD Law Firm with instructions on what BROOKS BARFIELD must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD.  [EXHIBIT 136.]  BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/2/2021 at 4:15 a.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD with instructions on what he must file and do since he had not exited from the case. included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD.  [EXHIBIT 136.]  BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/2/2021 at 4:19 a.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD with instructions on what he must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD.  [EXHIBIT 136.]  BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/2/2021 at 4:28 a.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD with instructions on what he must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD.  [EXHIBIT 136.]  BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/2/2021 at 8:56 a.m., BROOKS BARFIELD filed a MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL.” [EXHIBIT 163.]  It says: “Good cause exists for withdrawal as counsel in that Movant is unable to effectively communicate with Hunter Schreck so as to be able to adequately represent Defendant. Hunter Schreck no longer desires that Movant represent him and desires to be self-represented or “pro se.” Defendant and Defendant’s mother (Marcie Schreck) has filed a frivolous law suit in Federal Court cause number2-21CV-220-Z.”

On 11/2/2021, Billy Maples of Judy’s Bail Bonds texted Marcie Schreck to ask if she received his message regarding the “Status Hearing” today.  Marcie Schreck responded “Yes.”  Marcie Schreck informed him that HUNTER is bedridden, but she is going, armed to the teeth with lots of filings.  Marcie Schreck thanked him and asked whether this was a Status or Show Cause hearing.  Billy Maples responded: “Call me please.”  Marcie Schreck asked him to call her to confirm that BROOKS BARFIELD was no longer HUNTER’s attorney.

On 11/2/2021, Billy Maples of Judy’s Bail Bonds called Marcie Schreck.  He told her that if HUNTER did not come to the Status Hearing, he will revoke the bond, and if he doesn’t, then Judge Dan L. Schaap will do it for him, put a warrant out for his arrest, rearrest HUNTER, and put him back in jail.  Marcie Schreck advised Billy Maples that HUNTER is extremely ill.  He cannot and will not be at the Status Hearing today.  He’s in bed.  Marcie Schreck advised Billy Maples that she has called two doctors asking for letters of confirmation that HUNTER cannot attend.  She reported that she gets voice mails saying it will take 24-hours for them to call back.  Marcie Schreck told him that she truly tried reaching a doctor in this emergency, and no call has been returned.

On 11/2/2021 at approximately 12:30 p.m., BROOKS BARFIELD called Marcie Schreck.  He was lying on the phone.  He asked Marcie Schreck to let him represent HUNTER.  He said “I am a good lawyer.”  Marcie Schreck told him: “NO.”  She had to cut him short as she wasn’t dressed and the calls from Billy Maples and him threatening HUNTER and her with jail were going to cause her to be late for court.  Marcie Schreck has a tape recording of this call.

BILL WINDSOR COMMENT: I have long since learned that Marcie Schreck has a tape recording of everything. She has successfuly downloaded 15 of her recording devices to a Flash Drive. I believe that resulted in 850 files. She has two different types of recorders that she has not yet figured out how to download.

On 11/2/2021, Billy Maples of Judy’s Bail Bonds texted Marcie Schreck.  She left her phone at home (to keep it safe in the event she was arrested), so her husband, William Schreck, responded to inform him that she was on her way to the courthouse.  Billy Maples said: “So HUNTER isn’t coming?”  William Schreck responded: “Hunter is not able to make it.”

On 11/2/2021 at 1:31 p.m., Billy Maples of Judy’s Bail Bonds texted Marcie Schreck: “Is HUNTER coming to the hearing?  You requested for me to be here, and you are not.  I’m not seeing you or him.”

BILL WINDSOR COMMENT: I believe Billy Maples is part of the Criminal Racketeering Enterprise in Amarillo. It seems to me he is acting as an agent fior the evildoers.

On November 2, 2021 at 1:30 p.m., there was an event called a “hearing” in the 47th Judicial District Court in Amarillo, Texas (state court — criminal action). Hunter Tyler Schreck never received an order or any notice of this event.

On 11/2/2021 at 1:33 p.m., Marcie Schreck walked into the courtroom.  BROOKS BARFIELD was not there.  Marcie Schreck was looking at her papers.  Brad Parker, Bailiff, walked up and handed her a piece of paper from Judge Dan L. Schaap.  Marcie Schreck smiled at him and asked if he was Brad Parker.  He said “I am.” She said “I’m Marcie Schreck, nice to meet you.”  Marcie Schreck shook his hand.

 

BARF bowl
                                                                            Brooks BARField makes me want to BARF.


On 11/2/2021 at 1:43 p.m., BROOKS BARFIELD walked into the courtroom.  Marcie Schreck approached him and said: “May I speak with you?  Billy Maples has threatened to revoke HUNTER’s bond.  You have threatened me.  PLEASE tell the judge HUNTER is extremely ill in bed and can’t come.”  BROOKS BARFIELD would not let Marcie Schreck say more.  Marcie Schreck walked into the courtroom and took a seat behind what she believes was a member of the DA’s Office.  Marcie Schreck was approximately 40-feet from the bench.  She was surprised to see a lot of people in the audience for the hearing.

 

Schaap Judge Dan 900w
                 Judge Dan L. Schaap — Lowlife


On 11/2/2021 at approximately 1:50 p.m., Judge Dan L. Schaap walked in.  A court reporter was there.  BROOKS BARFIELD told the judge HUNTER was not there.  He did not explain why.  BROOKS BARFIELD told the judge that a federal lawsuit was filed last Friday, and “she” named 58 defendants and maybe 100 more.”  BROOKS BARFIELD said: “I put in my withdrawal to you on November 1, 2021.”  He said something about it being a conflict of interest.  The judge and BROOKS BARFIELD then said some legal terms that Marcie Schreck did not understand.  Marcie Schreck had trouble hearing Judge Dan L. Schaap.  She did hear the judge say: “It may be a conflict of interest with me as well.  I don’t know yet.”  The court reporter’s transcript should indicate exactly what was said.

Marcie Schreck raised her hand.  Judge Dan L. Schaap nodded at her.  Marcie Schreck asked: “Your honor, may I speak?”  The judge said: “Yes.”  Marcie Schreck said: “My son is Autistic, and I have education about that.”  Judge Dan L. Schaap immediately told her: “If you cross that boundary with me; you have crossed that boundary with me; you will not like it.  You will see.”  He was very condescending and threatening to Marcie SchreckMarcie Schreck tried to speak politely, but Judge Dan L. Schaap then threatened her.  He said in a louder voice: “DO YOU UNDERSTAND?”  Marcie Schreck didn’t, but she said “Your honor, yes, thank you.”  The judge said something about needing to hear from HUNTER about BROOKS BARFIELD.

BILL WINDSOR COMMENT: Judge Dan L. Schaap is the lowest of low-life judges. I’ve dealt with or been aware of thousands of corrupt judges, but they’re usually just dishonest a$$hole$. Judge Dan L. Schaap ids trying to murder a disabled boy. I hope there is a very special place in Hell for Judge Dan L. Schaap.

On 11/2/2021, after the hearing, Billy Maples told Marcie Schreck he heard the DA and attorneys that they had plans to take her down and arrest her right there.  He said they really wanted to, and if she had said one more word, she would have been arrested and gone to jail.  Billy Maples talked with the same people after the hearing, and they said they were really wanting to arrest Marcie Schreck.

On 11/2/2021 at 7:27 p.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD with a CEASE-AND-DESIST notice [EXHIBIT 210]: “Cease and desist.  Do not contact Hunter or me.  We want NOTHING to do with you except in your capacity as a Defendant in Schreck v. City of Amarillo, Et al. You lied to me today.  You lied to Judge Dan L. Schaap today.  I believe you are someone who finds it impossible to tell the truth.I believe your only interest is harming my family and me. The law and the Rules say you are terminated, so go away.  You have a conflict of interest, as YOU told me. Hunter will be informing the judge (who has no jurisdiction) exactly what he thinks of you.  Hunter had you pegged from the start — someone who does not have his best interests in mind and someone he does not trust.  Mr. BARField, you are INCOMPETENT.”

The evening of 11/2/2021, Marcie Schreck and her husband decided to record a video of HUNTER that they could send to the judge expressing Hunter Schreck’s feelings about BROOKS BARFIELD.  Marcie Schreck’s affidavit shows what HUNTER said. [EXHIBIT 156.]   William Schreck’s affidavit shows what HUNTER said. [EXHIBIT 157.]  HUNTER made it clear he doesn’t want anything to do with BROOKS BARFIELD.

On 11/3/2021, BROOKS BARFIELD wrote a letter to HUNTER SCHRECK and mailed it Certified Mail Return Receipt. [EXHIBIT 163.]

On 11/5/2021, the mailman delivered the 11/3/2021 letter from BROOKS BARFIELD. [EXHIBIT 163.]  No one signed for it.  The green return receipt card had been removed from the envelope before it was delivered.  The letter told HUNTER to communicate directly with him.  This is a clear violation of the Cease-and-Desist and an effort to damage HUNTER with a panic attack and anxiety.

On 11/8/2021, the Register of Actions in the case shows that none of the purported filings in the case that never appeared on the Docket still are not on the Docket. [EXHIBIT 212.]

BROOKS BARFIELD violated the rules of professional conduct; engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation; engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and more.  HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK had a right to expect BROOKS BARFIELD to abide by Texas law, Texas rules, Texas Rules of Professional Conduct (“TRPC”), and the Constitutions.  HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK had a right to expect BROOKS BARFIELD and JUDGE DAN L. SCHAAP to refrain from doing acts that injured HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK.  BROOKS BARFIELD and JUDGE DAN L. SCHAAP have committed professional misconduct and have violated state and federal statutes, Rules, Texas Rules of Professional Conduct (“TRPC”), and the Constitutions.  BROOKS BARFIELD and JUDGE DAN L. SCHAAP committed acts that injured HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK.

HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK has been under extreme emotional distress for 15 months.  BROOKS BARFIELD intentionally inflicted emotional distress on HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK through defamation, fraud, conspiracy, and violation of civil and Constitutional rights.

 

Barfield law firm 2


BROOKS BARFIELD inflicted emotional distress HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK.  He acted intentionally and recklessly.

The conduct of BROOKS BARFIELD was extreme and outrageous.  An average member of the community to exclaim “outrageous!”

The activities of BROOKS BARFIELD have been so extreme that it has gone well beyond all possible bounds of decency, and it must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.  The conduct of BROOKS BARFIELD caused extreme distress to HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK.  The distress caused was severe emotional distress to HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK.  The outrageous harassment, lies, libel, slander, and defamation are bad alone, but the effect on HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK’s mental health has been severe.

BROOKS BARFIELD has repeatedly ignored Cease-and-Desist notices.  He has repeatedly threatened Marcie Schreck.  He has damaged HUNTER, and Marcie Schreck believes he is attempting to kill HUNTER.  BROOKS BARFIELD makes Marcie Schreck’s entire family fear even leaving their home because of what BROOKS BARFIELD may do personally or may arrange to have done to them.

 

Photo Hunter Schreck and Marcie Schreck happier times 2015 CROPPED 640w
Hunter Tyler Schreck and Marcie Schreck BEFORE Hunter was almost murdered
and suffered a Traumatic Brain Injury

 

Marcie Schreck believes BROOKS BARFIELD is a criminal and is mentally ill.  He has caused HUNTER and Marcie Schreck to fear for their lives.

BILL WINDSOR COMMENT: Thanks to Marcie Schreck for providing this information to me. It comes from her Appolication for Protective Order that she is preparing to file against W BROOKS BARFIELD.

Much more news to report….


 

Other Articles about Hunter Tyler Schreck:

Hunter Tyler Schreck – a Disabled Young Man – has been Victimized by Police, District Attorney, and Pentecostal Church Members in Amarillo Texas

Just Like the Man who has Done Nothing Wrong by Hunter Tyler Schreck

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 1

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 2

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 3

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 4

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 5

Copyright LawlessAmerica.com
Bill Windsor went to high school and college in Lubbock, Texas — just a short drive from Amarillo, Texas.  This gives him a special interest in exposing the scum in the area of the country that he has loved so much. 


 

windsor bill 2012 09 28 cropped tight edited 200w

Bill Windsor

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Motion for Compliance with Rules of U.S. Supreme Court was Filed by Bill Windsor

United States Supreme Court Crime Scene

On November 27, 2023, a Motion for Compliance with Rules of U.S. Supreme Court was filed by Bill Windsor

No. 22-7648

In The Supreme Court of the United States

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Petitioner

v.

James N. Hatten, et al, Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition To The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

 Motion to Require Confirmation of a Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648 and Issuance of an Order so Confirming; order reflecting the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court in Case No. 22 7648, the Due Process Notice, and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. Harris, of Opinion in Case No. 22-7648 on each party; Reord of votes by each Justice in Case No. 22-7648; Order that the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that this Motion dated November 27, 2023 be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648 at no charge, including all audit data; and if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. Harris.

 

William M. Windsor, Pro Se – Self-Represented Litigant,

and Founding Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####, windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

    1. On May 10, 2023, William M. Windsor (“Windsor”), an individual, filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition and Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (“PETITION”). [EXHIBIT A – May 10, 2023.] This Filing was made in compliance with this Court’s Rule 29 and in the manner required by the Rules, as shown on the Certificate of Service. [EXHIBIT A, Pages 51-52.]  The appropriate number of copies were mailed to the Clerk, and a copy was sent to the Solicitor General and the attorney involved in the case.
    2. On May 10, 2023, the Docket of this Court shows: “Application (22A1009) to file petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in excess of page limits, submitted to Justice Thomas.” [EXHIBIT A, May 10, 2023.]
    3. On May 23, 2023, Justice Clarence Thomas granted the Application (22A1009) “to file petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in excess of page limits. The petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition may not exceed 49 pages.” [EXHIBIT A, May 23, 2023.]
    4. On June 1, 2023, the Waiver of the Right of Respondent United States to respond was filed. [EXHIBIT A, June 1, 2023.]
    5. On July 20, 2023, the PETITION was “DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/26/2023.” [EXHIBIT A, July 20, 2023.]
    6. WINDSOR spoke by telephone with Jake in the Clerk’s Office. Jake explained that WINDSOR’s PETITION would be considered by the nine Justices in a “Conference.”
    7. This Court’s “Filing and Rules” section explains:

“The timing for placing petitions on a conference list and distributing them to the Justices is governed by Rule 15.5, which provides as follows: “The Clerk will distribute the petition to the Court for its consideration upon receiving an express waiver of the right to file a brief in opposition, or, if no waiver or brief in opposition is filed, upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing. If a brief in opposition is timely filed, the Clerk will distribute the petition, brief in opposition, and any reply brief to the Court for its consideration no less than 14 days after the brief in opposition is filed, unless the petitioner expressly waives the 14-day waiting period.” [https://www.supremecourt.gov/casedistribution/casedistributionschedule.aspx.]

    1. Clerk Scott S. Harris has explained Conference Scheduling in a memorandum. [https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/Guidance-on-Scheduling-2023.pdf.] [EXHIBIT K.]
    2. The Supreme Court Historical Society explains the Conference process. [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/.] [EXHIBIT C.]
    3. On October 2, 2023, this Court’s Docket shows “Petition DENIED.” [EXHIBIT A, October 2, 2023.]
    4. On October 31, 2023, WINDSOR received a letter from Scott S. Harris dated October 2, 2023. [EXHIBIT D.] The letter is not even signed; it’s a stamp.  It bears no seal, and it is not signed by the Justices.  The letter does not qualify as an Order required after a Conference.  And the time has not started to run on the filing of a motion for rehearing.
    5. On October 27, 2023, WINDSOR filed a Motion for Rehearing just to be safe. [EXHIBIT E.]  It was sent by USPS. [EXHIBIT F and EXHIBIT G.]   This was 25 days after the Docket claims the Petition was denied, so it was timely (though an order has not been issued).
    6. On November 3, 2023, a letter was dated to WINDSOR by Rashonda Garner for Scott S. Harris. [EXHIBIT H.] The letter is not an order.  All copies of WINDSOR ‘s Filing were returned. [EXHIBIT I.]  The original copy is stamped “RECEIVED OCT 30 2023 Office of the Clerk Supreme Court U.S. [EXHIBIT I.]
    7. On November 20, 2023, the letter dated November 3, 2023 was received by WINDSOR. [EXHIBIT J.] The letter is not an order.
    8. On November 21, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail.
    9. On November 21, 2023, Rashonda Garner left a voicemail saying she didn’t understand WINDSOR’s message.
    10. On November 22, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail.
    11. On November 27, 2023, all of the unlawful mail dated November 3, 2023 regarding the Motion for Rehearing was sent certified mail return receipt to Rashonda Garner. [EXHIBIT H and EXHIBIT J.]

ARGUMENTS

AN ORDER MUST BE ISSUED ON THE CONFERENCE DECISION

    1. The Rules of this Court require valid evidence of the October 2, 2023 alleged denial by the Court of the Petition of William M. Windsor in Supreme Court Case #22-7648.
    2. The letters dated October 2, 2023 and November 3, 2023 are not orders and have no validity. [EXHIBIT D and EXHIBIT H.] The U.S. Supreme Court rules use the term “Letter” 13 times, and letters such as these are not authorized by the Rules.
    3. No valid evidence of the denials was attached to the letters.
    4. There is no order issued under seal, in violation of 28 U.S.C. 1691 – “All writs and process issuing from a court of the United States shall be under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk thereof.”

The word “process” at 28 U.S.C. 1691 means a court order.  See Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River Paper Co., 19 F. 252 (C.C. W.D. Wisconsin 1884);  Taylor v. U.S., 45 F. 531 (C.C. E.D. Tennessee 1891);  U.S. v. Murphy, 82 F. 893 (DCUS Delaware 1897);  Leas & McVitty v. Merriman, 132 F. 510 (C.C. W.D. Virginia 1904);  U.S. v. Sharrock, 276 F. 30 (DCUS Montana 1921);  In re Simon, 297 F. 942, 34 ALR 1404 (2nd Cir. 1924);  Scanbe Mfg. Co. v. Tryon, 400 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1968);  and Miles v. Gussin, 104 B.R. 553 (Bankruptcy D.C. 1989).

    1. Therefore, Windsor is requesting an order by the Court with a seal of the court and an actual signature of Scott S. Harris. This Due Process Notice and Service by Clerk of the Court Scott S. Harris is to be made on parties in 22-7648 of the valid record of denial of the Petition by the Court.

WINDSOR’S CONFERENCE DECISION MUST BE PUBLISHED

    1. This Court’s Conference Decisions must be published, and WINDSOR’s has not.

“All conference decisions are published.” [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/ — EXHIBIT C, Paragraph 5.]

“When the vote has been taken on a case, the writing of an opinion is assigned—by the Chief if he voted with the majority, otherwise by the senior Justice of the majority.” [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/ — EXHIBIT C, Paragraph 6.]

WINDSOR’S FILINGS MUST BE DOCKETED

    1. WINDSOR’S filing of a Motion for Rehearing [EXHIBIT E.] has been unlawfully excluded from the Docket. [EXHIBIT A.] It was timely filed with the Clerk in paper form – an original and 10 copies.  There was no service by this Cour.
    2. “Filing” is defined as:

“To place a paper in the official custody of the clerk of court to enter into the files or records of a case. [https://www.uscourts.gov/glossary#letter_f]

“the act of giving an official form or document to someone in authority in order to begin a legal process.” [Britannica Dictionary definition of FILING.]

“to deposit with the clerk of the court a written complaint or petition which is the opening step in a lawsuit and subsequent documents, including an answer, demurrer, motions, petitions, and orders. [Copyright © 1981 2005 by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill.].

      1. This Court’s Rule 29 requires:

“1. Any document required or permitted to be presented to the Court or to a Justice shall be filed with the Clerk in paper form.

“2. A document is timely filed if it is received by the Clerk in paper form within the time specified for filing; or if it is sent to the Clerk through the United States Postal Service by first-class mail (including express or priority mail), postage prepaid, and bears a postmark, other than a commercial postage meter label, showing that the document was mailed on or before the last day for filing; or if it is delivered on or before the last day for filing to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery to the Clerk within 3 calendar days….”

    1. Clerk Scott S. Harris of the United States Supreme Court seems to be routinely violating the due process requirements of many litigants.
    2. Such Notice and Service are overdue, and Windsor demands that it be executed immediately.
    3. Windsor asks that this Motion be docketed pursuant to Due Process and that a valid adjudication of the Motion be noticed and served on the parties.
    4. Windsor also requests all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under No. 22-7648, including all audit data. The audit data is the login name and login time of the individuals who entered any data in the records.
    5. WINDSOR believes these unlawful practices have taken place for at least 15 years. WINDSOR requests copies of all letters issued rather than orders in every case since 01/01/2008.

ALL ORDERS AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH WINDSOR

MUST BE SENT BY EMAIL

    1. Documents attached hereto show that WINDSOR does not receive mail promptly. The American Association of Non-Lawyers requires that non-lawyers receive all communications by email.  This eliminates one of the many unfair advantages given to lawyers.
    2. WINDSOR is a resident of South Dakota by using a mail service and registering with the state. It seems to take at least seven days for mail to get to South Dakota.  As WINDSOR lives full-time in a camper, it takes at least another seven days for mail to be forwarded to whatever RV Park he is visiting.  Because of attempts to murder him and recent death threats, safety requires that WINDSOR move a lot.  This can cause additional delays.
    3. WINDSOR must be served and communicated with at windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com.

WINDSOR MUST BE ISSUED AN ORDER ON HIS MOTION FOR REHEARING, AND HE MUST BE GIVEN THE PROPER TIME TO RESPOND TO ANY OBJECTION

    1. Rule 44 (2) provides: “Any petition for the rehearing of an order denying a petition for a writ of certiorari or extraordinary writ shall be filed within 25 days after the date of the order of denial….”
    2. There has been no “order of denial,” so the time has not started to run on rehearing.
    3. WINDSOR is a private individual. He is not a nongovernmental corporation so a corporate disclosure statement is not appropriate or required.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Windsor respectfully requests:

    1. that this Motion be granted;
    2. that an order be issued confirming that there was a Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648;
    3. that an order be issued reflecting the Due Process Notice and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. Harris, on parties in Case No. 22-7648 of the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court;
    4. that the Opinion of the Court be provided;
    5. that the vote of each Justice be indicated in Case No. 22-7648;
    6. that the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process;
    7. that an order be issued that WINDSOR must be served and communicated with at windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com;
    8. that this Motion be granted – motion Tto require confirmation of a Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648 and Issuance of an Order so confirming; order reflecting the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court in Case No. 22 7648, the Due Process Notice, and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. Harris, of OPINION in Case No. 22-7648 on each party; Record of votes by each Justice in Case No. 22-7648; Order that the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that this Motion dated November 27, 2023 be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648 at no charge, including all audit data; and if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. Harris be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648, at no charge, including all audit data; that Windsor be provided copies of letters and orders issued in every case considered in Conference since 02/01/2008; that if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. Harris;
    9. that this Court grant such other relief as is appropriate.

Submitted this 27th day of November 2023,

William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

VERIFICATION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C.§1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NOT.

This 27th day of November 2023,

 William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this Application has been prepared in Century 12-point font, one of the font and point selections approved by this Court and meets the requirements of this Court.

William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, William M. Windsor, do swear that on this date, November 27, 2023, I have served the enclosed MOTION on the DEFENDANTS in the above proceeding or their counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with first-class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days.

The names and addresses of those served are as follows:

Solicitor General of the United States

Room 5614, Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530–0001.

RYAN K. BUCHANAN – GABRIEL A. MENDEL

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY — ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

600 United States Courthouse

75 Ted Turner Drive, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Telephone: 404-581-6000 — Facsimile: 404-581-6181

Email: gabriel.mendel@usdoj.gov

 

This 27th day of November 2023,

William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com