Bill Windsor files Motion Against Judge Thomas W Thrash

1-11-CV-01923-TWT – Motion for Reconsideration-2024-04-10

1-11-CV-01923-TWT-Letter-to-USDCNDGa-Clerk-filing-2024-04-10

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER

William M. Windsor (“Windsor” or “Plaintiff”) hereby files this MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING LEAVE.

Windsor shows the Court as follows:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

  1. On April 3, 2024, Judge Thomas W. Thrash entered this purported order [EXHIBIT A]:

“This is a pro se civil action filed against the former Clerk of Court, a number of his employees, judges of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and judges of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. It is before the Court on various motions filed by the pro se Plaintiff. After a hearing and on motion of the United States of America, on July 15, 2011 the Court issued an injunction prohibiting the Plaintiff from filing any additional Complaints against federal judges or employees of the federal judiciary without obtaining the consent of a federal judge in the district in which the action was to be filed. The injunction was issued because of the Plaintiff’s extraordinary abuse of the federal judicial system by repeatedly filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against the judges assigned to his many cases, because of the burden to clerical and judicial operations caused by his voluminous frivolous filings, and because his continuing course of conduct had become an impediment to the administration of justice. The administration of justice would suffer irreparable harm if the Plaintiff is allowed to continue filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against the judges and others involuntarily involved in his litigious campaigns. The balance of the harms and the public interest demanded that the Plaintiff be stopped.

“The Plaintiff’s most recent filings are more of the same. The Motion for Leave to Pursue Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights and Additional Causes of Action [Doc. 294] seeks permission to file a lawsuit against the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States and one of his employees because of the Plaintiff’s unhappiness with how a petition for a writ of mandamus was handled by the Court. The Motion for Leave to file a Bivens Action against Judge Thomas W. Thrash [Doc. 295], and Motion for Leave to File Purported Injunctions [Doc. 296] seek permission to file a lawsuit against this Court for limiting the Plaintiff’s ability to file frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against judges and other judicial officers. The Motion for Leave to Pursue Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights and Addition Causes of Action [Doc. 294] is DENIED. The Motion for Leave to file a Bivens Action against Judge Thomas W. Thrash [Doc. 295], and Motion for Leave to File Purported Injunctions [Doc. 296] are DENIED. The Court notes that the proposed Bivens action against it is clearly barred by the statute of limitations and absolute judicial immunity. Leave to file the proposed Complaints is DENIED.”

  1. On May 20, 2011, Windsor filed the Verified Complaint in the Superior Court of Fulton County. The Civil Action was assigned No.
  2. On June 14, 2011, Windsor filed a Motion to Deny Removal and a RESPONSE TO THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER. This was never addressed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, and he never addressed jurisdiction.  Therefore, this latest purported Order by Judge Thomas W. Thrash is a void order.
  3. Docket Numbers 294, 295, and 296 were not submitted to Judge Thomas W. Thrash. They were submitted to the Presiding Judge, Timothy Batten.
  1. THE ORDER IS DEFECTIVE AS JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH HAS NO JURISDICTION.
  2. On June 14, 2011, Windsor filed a Motion to Deny Removal and a RESPONSE TO THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER. This was never addressed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, and he never addressed jurisdiction.
  3. The ORDER must be vacated.
  1. THE ORDER CITES NO CASE LAW AND NO STATUTE IN SUPPORT.
  2. The ORDER is completely void of any authority. Judge Thomas W. cited no case law and no Rules or other authority.
  3. The ORDER must be vacated.

III. THE MOTIONS WERE SUBMITTED TO PRESIDING JUDGE TIMOTHY BATTEN, NOT JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH.

  1. Docket Numbers 294, 295, and 296 were not submitted to Judge Thomas W. Thrash. They were submitted to the Presiding Judge, Timothy Batten. [EXHIBIT B.]
  1. WINDSOR HAS NEVER ABUSED THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, AND JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH CAN CITE NO FACTS TO SHOW THAT HE DID.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash falsely and maliciously wrote in this ORDER: “The injunction was issued because of the Plaintiff’s extraordinary abuse of the federal judicial system by repeatedly filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against the judges assigned to his many cases.”
  3. Judge Thomas W. Thrash can cite no facts to support this outrageous claim.
  1. WINDSOR HAS NEVER FILED A FRIVOULOUS FILING. ALL OF HIS FILINGS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY RESEARCHED AND HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE FACTS AND THE LAW.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash false, maliciously, and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “…because of the burden to clerical and judicial operations caused by his voluminous frivolous filings, and because his continuing course of conduct had become an impediment to the administration of justice.”
  1. WINDSOR HAS NEVER FILED A malicious or vexatious lawsuit against anyone. ALL OF HIS FILINGS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY RESEARCHED AND HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE FACTS AND THE LAW.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash false, maliciously, and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The administration of justice would suffer irreparable harm if the Plaintiff is allowed to continue filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against the judges and others involuntarily involved in his litigious campaigns. The balance of the harms and the public interest demanded that the Plaintiff be stopped.”
  3. Judge Thomas W. Thrash is a corrupt judge who has committed one crime after another against Windsor. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET.]

VII.  WINDSOR HAS NEVER FILED A malicious or vexatious lawsuit against anyone.  ALL OF HIS FILINGS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY RESEARCHED AND HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE FACTS AND THE LAW.

  1. Judge Thomas W. Thrash maliciously and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The Plaintiff’s most recent filings are more of the same.”
  2. There are no facts to support this outrageous statement.

VIII.  WINDSOR HAS NOT SOUGHT TO PURSUE A LEGAL ACTION AGAINST the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States and one of his employees because of the Plaintiff’s unhappiness with how a petition for a writ of mandamus was handled by the Court. HE SOUGHT IT DUE TO GROSS VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW AND THE RULES.

  1. Judge Thomas W. Thrash maliciously and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The Motion for Leave to Pursue Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights and Additional Causes of Action [Doc. 294] seeks permission to file a lawsuit against the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States and one of his employees because of the Plaintiff’s unhappiness with how a petition for a writ of mandamus was handled by the Court.”
  2. They violated the Rules and the law.  They likely committed criminal violations as well.
  1. WINDSOR HAS NOT SOUGHT TO PURSUE A LEGAL ACTION AGAINST JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH FOR IMPROPER PURPOSES. HE SOUGHT IT DUE TO GROSS VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW AND THE RULES.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash maliciously and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The Motion for Leave to file a Bivens Action against Judge Thomas W. Thrash [Doc. 295], and Motion for Leave to File Purported Injunctions [Doc. 296] seek permission to file a lawsuit against this Court for limiting the Plaintiff’s ability to file frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against judges and other judicial officers.”
  3. The United States Constitution gives pro se parties the right to file lawsuits, and this right may not be taken away absent a Constitutional amendment.
  1. WINDSOR HAS NOT SOUGHT TO PURSUE A LEGAL ACTION BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR A CLAIM OF ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash maliciously and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The proposed Bivens action against it is clearly barred by the statute of limitations and absolute judicial immunity.”
  3. The proposed action is not barred by the statute of limitations. Judge Thomas W. Thrash again makes such a claim with no legal authority cited.  State law establishes the statute of limitations, and this ORDER is yet another violation that will be subject to a claim for denial of Constitutional rights.
  4. There is no such thing as “absolute judicial immunity.” Judge Thomas W. Thrash again makes such a claim with no legal authority cited.
  1. THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The NOTICE OF removal is procedurally defective, and thE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.
  2. The NOTICE OF REMOVAL had procedural defects that make it void on its face.
  3. There is a presumption against removal jurisdiction, and this Court must strictly construe the removal statute. (Fajen v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir.1982).) The party seeking removal has the burden of proving the jurisdictional and procedural requirements for removal. (Laughlin v. Prudential Ins. Co., 882 F.2d. 187 (5th Cir. 1989).)
  4. The NOTICE OF REMOVAL fails on all accounts, so the MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL must be granted, and the ORDER must be vacated.

XII.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is procedurally defective FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT DEFENDANTS MUST MAKE AN APPEARANCE, and thE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.

  1. None of the Defendants had made an appearance.
  2. None of the Defendants had filed a CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT as required by N.D.Ga Local Rule 3.3 and FRCP 7.1, which was due to be filed with the Clerk “at the time of first appearance. [1-11-CV-0192-TWT Docket].
  3. The U.S. Attorneys, Sally Quillian Yates and Christopher Huber, had no authority to appear for the Defendants.
  4. Christopher Huber was representing one of the Defendants in two legal actions before Defendant Judge Duffey. There are an assortment of other conflicts that made it impossible for Christopher Huber to represent many of the Defendants.
  5. Nothing had been filed with any court giving the U.S. Attorneys the authority to appear for any of the Defendants.
  6. None of the Defendants were identified in the signature block on the NOTICE OF REMOVAL, so the Petition was not filed on behalf of any of the Defendants
  7. There is no indication that any of the Defendants have signed a sworn affidavit in regard to representation or the NOTICE OF REMOVAL.
  8. The ORDER must be vacated.

XIII. THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is procedurally defective BECAUSE THE ACTION WAS NOT YET PENDING IN FULTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT AS 28 U.S.C. § 1442 REQUIRES, SO THE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.

  1. The removal statute requires service prior to removal in the state of Georgia. The removal statute states that an action must be “pending” in a state court before it may be removed.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (noting that civil action may be removed to the district court “embracing the place wherein it is pending”).
  2. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the word pending means “remaining undecided” or “awaiting decision.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 (7th ed. 1999).  An action must have “commenced” before it can be “pending.”  A determination of whether the action was pending in a Georgia court at the time of removal requires reference to Georgia law.  Under Georgia law, “there is a substantial difference between the commencement of an action and its being a suit pending between the parties.” (McClendon v. Hernando Phosphate Co., 28 S.E. 152, 153 (Ga. 1897).)   Georgia law preserves this distinction, as filing a suit “is still not the commencement of suit unless followed by service within a reasonable time.” (Franek v. Ray, 236 S.E.2d 629, 632 (Ga. 1977).)  Thus, under Georgia law, “an action is not a ‘pending’ suit until after service of process is perfected.” (Steve A. Martin Agency, Inc. v. PlantersFIRST Corp., 678 S.E.2d 186, 188 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); see also Jenkins v. Crea, 656 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“An action is not a pending suit until service is perfected.”)
  3. Defendants Judge Julie E. Carnes, Judge Joel F. Dubina, Judge Ed Carnes, Judge Rosemary Barkett, and B. Grutby have not been served with process. Windsor also filed a motion with the Fulton County Superior Court seeking to add six additional Defendants.
  4. Since the Civil Action was not yet “pending” in Fulton County Georgia Superior Court, the text of the removal statute prevents removal prior to service on Judge Julie E. Carnes, Judge Joel F. Dubina, Judge Ed Carnes, Judge Rosemary Barkett, and B. Grutby. (28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).)

XIV.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is procedurally defective FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE RULE OF UNANIMITY, and this MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED.

  1. Another defect in the NOTICE OF REMOVAL is its failure to comply with the rule of unanimity.
  2. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) states that “defendants desiring to remove any civil action . . . shall file in the district court of the United States . . . a notice of removal.” There are 16 Defendants in this Civil Action, and all 16 Defendants have not filed the NOTICE OF REMOVAL.
  3. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 requires the unanimous consent of all defendants to the removal. (Russell Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 09/06/2001); Loftis v. U.S. Parcel Serv., Inc., 342 F.3d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 2003).)  The NOTICE OF REMOVAL failed to claim the consent of ANY Defendant, and it clearly fails to explain the absence of consent to the removal by at least nine of the Defendants, so it is defective for violating the rule of unanimity.  Since some of the Defendants did not join in the notice of removal and the NOTICE OF REMOVAL failed to account or the lack of their consent, the NOTICE OF REMOVAL is procedurally defective and cannot withstand the MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL.

“… all of the defendants must consent to removal.” (Wisc. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 393 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).)

“The unanimity requirement mandates that in cases involving multiple defendants, all defendants must consent to removal.” Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1044 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247-48, 20 S.Ct. 854, 855, 44 L.Ed. 1055 (1900) (deriving from a removal statute the rule that all defendants must join in removal)).  (See also In re Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp., 837 F.2d 432 (11th Cir. 01/19/1988); In re Ocean Marine Mut. Protection and Indem. Ass’n, Ltd., 3 F.3d 353, 355-56 (11th Cir. 1993); Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 754 (8th Cir. 2001); Balazik v. County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Kerwood, 969 F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 1992); Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1986); N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 272-73 (7th Cir.1982); Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686 (10th Cir. 1981); 11C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3731 (3d. ed. 1998); Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 590 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 12/30/2009).)

  1. THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is defective BECAUSE THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION, SO thE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.
  2. This Court lacks federal-question jurisdiction because there is no dispute as to the validity, construction or effect of a federal statute with a cause of action “arising under” the laws of the United States.
  3. This Civil Action is pursuant to the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. No federal statute has been included in the causes of action.
  4. There is no federal question presented on the face of the Verified Complaint. Windsor intends this Civil Action to be solely based on Georgia law.  Windsor specifically excluded federal statutes that could have been raised so this action would remain in Georgia courts.

Federal courts use the “well-pleaded complaint” rule to determine “arising under” jurisdiction. Long, 201 F.3d at 758. That rule provides that “‘federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.’” Id. (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). “[T]he party who brings the suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon.” The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).

This court has held that for a paper to fall within the removal statutes, it must be unambiguous. Cf. Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (10th Cir. 1998)

XVI.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is defective PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C § 1442 (a)(1) BECAUSE FEDERAL OFFICERS HAVE NOT RAISED A FEDERAL DEFENSE, SO THE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.

  1. The U.S. Attorney erroneously cited 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) as a basis for the removal.

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) provides that “a civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress….”

  1. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) does not apply because the Verified Complaint is not about suing “in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office or… under any Act of Congress….”

The U.S. Supreme Court holds that the jurisdictional provision found in 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) required federal officers to raise a federal defense before removing to federal court.  Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 109 S. Ct. 959, 103 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1989).

  1. None of the other Defendants raised any defense whatsoever to the Civil Action. The ONLY statement made by the U.S. Attorney in the NOTICE OF REMOVAL is: “This action is one that may be removed to the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2679.”
  2. There is no citation of case law to support such a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) has nothing to do with defenses this Civil Action, so no defense has been raised.

The Supreme Court has held that “the right of removal [under § 1442(a)(1)] is absolute for conduct performed under color of federal office,” Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242, 101 S. Ct. 1657, 1664, 68 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1981), and that 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) “is broad enough to cover all cases where federal officers can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty to enforce federal law.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406-07, 89 S. Ct. 1813, 1816, 23 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1969). The Court agreed with the government that “the removal statute is an incident of federal supremacy, and that one of its purposes [is] to provide a federal forum for cases where federal officials must raise defenses arising from their official duties.” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405, 89 S. Ct. at 1815.

The purpose of section 1442(a)(1) is to “permit[ ] the removal of those actions commenced in state court that expose a federal official to potential civil liability or criminal penalty for an act performed … under color of office.” Murray v. Murray, 621 F.2d 103, 107 (5th Cir.1980). In Willingham, the Supreme Court noted that “the removal statute is an incident of federal supremacy, and that one of its purposes was to provide a federal forum for cases where federal officials must raise defenses arising from their official duties.” 395 U.S. at 405, 89 S. Ct. at 1815. “The test for removal should be broader, not narrower, than the test for official immunity.” Id.

  1. The U.S. Attorney has failed to meet the Supreme Court’s stated requirements for removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) that are binding precedents recognized by the Eleventh Circuit.

Proper removal of an action under section 1442(a)(1) has historically required the satisfaction of two separate requirements. First, the defendant must advance a “colorable defense arising out of [his] duty to enforce federal law.” Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 133, 109 S. Ct. 959, 966-67, 103 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1989) (quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406-07, 89 S. Ct. at 1816). That defense need only be plausible; its ultimate validity is not to be determined at the time of removal. Id. at 129, 109 S. Ct. at 964. However, absent the assertion of a federal defense, a state court action against a federal officer is not removable. Id. [emphasis added.]

Second, the defendant must establish that there is a “causal connection between what the officer has done under asserted official authority” and the action against him. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33, 46 S. Ct. 185, 190, 70 L. Ed. 449 (1926) (interpreting predecessor statute); see also Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409, 89 S. Ct. at 1817. However, the Supreme Court has held that, in a civil suit such as this, it is sufficient for the defendant to show that his relationship to the plaintiff “derived solely from [his] official duties.” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409, 89 S. Ct. at 1817. In such a case, the causal connection requirement “consists, simply enough, of the undisputed fact that [the defendant was] on duty, at [his] place of federal employment, at all the relevant times.” Id. If the question raised by the plaintiff is whether the defendant was engaged in “some kind of frolic,” or acting in contravention of his official duties, the parties will have the opportunity to present their versions of the facts to a federal court. Id. (Magnin v. Teledyne Continental Motors, 91 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 08/15/1996).)  [emphasis added.]

  1. It is impossible for a Defendant to raise a colorable defense to charges of racketeering as racketeering is not something that one may do under their federal employment.
  2. The federal interest in this matter is insubstantial, and the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction would disrupt the Congressionally-approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.

“[F]ederal jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. Those advantages are “the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.” Id. at 312.

More recently, in Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290 (C.A. 11, Dec. 19, 2008), plaintiffs brought, inter alia, a defamation claim based on the defendants’ statements that the plaintiffs had violated federal gun laws. See 552 F.3d at 1293-94. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that federal question jurisdiction was appropriate, concluding that the federal interest involved was insubstantial. See id. at 1301-03.

Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 234 F.3d 514, 518 (11th Cir. 2000) serves to illustrate this point.  In Ayres, the plaintiff brought suit under Georgia’s civil RICO statute, alleging that the defendant had violated the federal National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and, by so doing, had committed federal mail and wire fraud, which were predicate offenses constituting racketeering. See 234 F.3d at 516-17. The Eleventh Circuit found federal question jurisdiction was appropriate because “this case requires that we decide whether or not a breach of the disclosure duty under the [National Traffic and Motor Vehicle] Safety Act constitutes a federal mail and wire fraud crime.” Id. at 519. In other words, because the meaning of a federal statute was at issue, a substantial federal question was involved. See id.

(“[F]ederal question jurisdiction exists where a plaintiff’s cause of action has as an essential element the existence of a right under federal law which will be supported by a construction of the federal law concluding that the federal crime is established, but defeated by another construction concluding the opposite”). Where, however, “allegations of violations of federal law as predicate acts under a state RICO act” do not “require the court to interpret an independent federal statute,” federal question jurisdiction is inappropriate. See Austin v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1227-28 (N.D. Ga. 2007); accord, e.g., Neighborhood Mortgage, Inc. v. Fegans, No. 1:06-CV-1984-JOF, 2007 WL 2479205, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2007) (“Unlike Ayres where the court had to decide whether the federal mail and wire fraud statutes would also constitute a breach of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, where there is no other federal question, . . . the mere citation of federal mail and wire fraud as predicate acts to a state RICO action is not sufficiently substantial to confer federal jurisdiction”). [emphasis added.]

As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Adventure Outdoors: Ayres involved two levels of federal questions. The need to construe independent bodies of federal law and to determine the legal effect of the interaction of those two bodies of law made the federal question in Ayres far more substantial than the one presented by Adventure Outdoors’s defamation claim. 552 F.3d at 1302. The same is also true here because this matter has nothing to do with the construction of federal regulations. Consequently, this Court should decline to exercise federal-question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claim and remand this matter to the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia.

  1. This Court’s exercise of federal-question jurisdiction over this state-law claim would be inappropriate because there is no dispute as to any federal statute.

“‘A removing defendant bears the burden of proving proper federal

jurisdiction.’” Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11thCir. 2008) (quoting Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002)). “All doubts about the propriety of federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.” Id. (citing Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996)); accord Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[W]here a plaintiff and defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand”).

The test for whether federal jurisdiction should be exercised over embedded federal issues in state-law claims between non-diverse parties is whether “a state law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).

 

  1. In this matter, NO federal issue exists. There is no disputed question of federal law.

Federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims is confined to those claims that “‘really and substantially involv[e] a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.’” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)). (See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (Vinson, J., dissenting).)

  1. This Civil Action does not seek to hold an officer of the United States in violation of state law while simultaneously executing his duties as prescribed by federal law. In this Civil Action, federal employees ignored the limitations on their powers.  They intentionally committed acts that violate the Georgia RICO Act, and they knowingly participated in an enterprise designed to damage Windsor.  It is well established that a federal employee’s actions lie outside the scope of his or her authority when he or she fails to comply with the affirmative requirements of the law.

we look to (1) whether the officers were acting “within the outer perimeter of [their] line of duty” as defined by federal statutory and regulatory law, Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1434 (1959) (plurality opinion), and (2) whether “in doing [those acts, they] did no more than what was necessary and proper for [them] to do” as demarcated by the Constitution, see Neagle, 135 U.S. at 57, 10 S.Ct. at 666. As the Supreme Court explained, “a federal official may not with impunity ignore the limitations which the controlling law has placed on his powers.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 489, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2902, 57 L.Ed. 2d 895 (1978). Indeed, it is a tautology that a federal officer’s actions lie outside the scope of his authority when the officer fails to comply with the affirmative requirements of federal statutory or regulatory law, see id. at 489–91, 98 S.Ct. at 2902–03; Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 390–91 (5th Cir. 2009); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 837 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir.1988), and his actions fail to qualify as “necessary and proper” if committed in violation of the negative injunctions of the Constitution, see Butz, 438 U.S. at 489–91, 98 S.Ct. at 2902–03; Castro, 560 F.3d at 389; Medina, 259 F.3d at 225; Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 800 F.2d at 1196; see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–90, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1461, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170–71 (1803).

XVII.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is defective PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C §2679 BECAUSE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WERE NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES WHEN THEY PARTICIPATED IN THE VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTES TO DAMAGE WINDSOR, SO THE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.

  1. The Defendants were not acting within the scope of their official duties when they committed acts of racketeering against Windsor.
  2. The Verified Complaint specifies violation of the following Georgia statutes as the sole basis for the RICO claim: Obstruction of Justice and Tampering with Evidence pursuant to O.C.G.A. 16-10-94; Perjury – Violation of C.G.A. 16-10-70; Subornation of Perjury – Violation of O.C.G.A. 16-10-72, and O.C.G.A.16-10-93; Theft by Deception – O.C.G.A.16-8-3.

In Mesa v. California, the Supreme Court denied removal under the federal officer removal statute to two postal employees, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), because they failed to establish that they were acting within the scope of their official duties and therefore, had no colorable federal defense to the state law charges of reckless driving and related offenses. 489 U.S. 121, 127–28, 109 S.Ct. 959, 963–64, 103 L.Ed. 2d 99 (1989). Because the federal employees’ actions fell outside the scope of their federal duties, California’s interest in vindicating the rights of its citizens did not frustrate any valid federal interest. (Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 07/15/2009).)

The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction and doubt is resolved in favor of remand. Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979); Prize Frize Inc. v. Matrix Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999).

  1. The question of whether an employee’s conduct was within the scope of his employment “is governed by the law of the state where the incident occurred.” See S.J. & W. Ranch, 913 F.2d at 1542; Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 76 S. Ct. 100, 100 L. Ed. 761 (1955) (per curiam), vacating 215 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1954); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Georgia law does not permit anyone to violate the Georgia RICO Act.  Georgia law says the conduct must be within the general duties of employment for which the employee was hired, and none of the Defendants were hired with duties to violate criminal statutes and commit racketeering.
  2. The U.S. Attorney is not impartial; the U.S. Attorneys are “interested parties.” The U.S. Attorneys are representing some of the Defendants in related matters against Windsor.

Moreover, the statutory interpretation urged by defendant Lehtinen is particularly suspect because it leaves the determination of a dispositive issue in FTCA cases to an interested party. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c), the Attorney General is required to “defend any civil action or proceeding brought in any court against any employee of the Government . . . for any such damage or injury.” Id. We do not believe Congress intended to entrust the party responsible for providing the federal employee’s defense with the power to make a scope determination that will have the result of dismissing the plaintiff’s suit for lack of jurisdiction. Nasuti, 906 F.2d at 812-13; Petrousky, 728 F. Supp. at 894; see Gogek, 729 F. Supp. at 933. Our concern with the impartiality of the scope determination is especially acute in a situation like the one in this case where the authority to make scope certifications has been delegated to the federal employee defendant or his colleagues. (S.J. & W. Ranch Inc. v. Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 10/10/1990).)

  1. This Civil Action is about the corrupt practices of the Defendants, using the federal court system in Fulton County Georgia to commit criminal acts against Windsor and others. Windsor must argue that under these circumstances, this Civil Action could not be moved to the same federal court system that Windsor is suing.  The very clerks that Windsor has charged with racketeering are the clerks who will be handling the various filings in this matter.  The judges named as Defendants are friends of this Court.  Windsor can be treated fairly and impartially only if he is on the neutral turf of the Fulton County Superior Court.

XVIII.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The POSITION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE NOTICE OF REMOVAL IS SUBJECT TO LITIGATION, AND IF THIS COURT DOES NOT DENY REMOVAL AND DOES NOT VACATE THE ORDER FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED ABOVE, WINDSOR DEMANDS DISCOVERY AND AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

  1. Should this Court ignore and fail to deny removal on the grounds specified above, the district court must conduct a de novo hearing on whether the Defendants were not acting within the scope of their official duties when they committed acts that Windsor complains of in the Verified Complaint. This Court must permit Windsor full discovery on the scope question. (J. & W. Ranch Inc. v. Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 10/10/1990).)

 

XIX.  THIS COURT VIOLATED FRCP RULE 7.1 AND DENIED WINDSOR’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS BY GRANTING THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S MOTION.

  1. The U.S. Attorney’s Motion was not an emergency motion, and it was not expedited.
  2. D.Ga. Local Rule 7.1 gave Windsor 14 days to respond to the U.S. Attorney’s motion.
  3. This Court denied Windsor’s right to file a response before the Court considered the motion.

64.             When attorneys have motions filed against their clients by a pro se party, the attorneys are given the opportunity to present their arguments to the judge in a response.  Windsor is pro se, and he has been denied this right of due process.  He has been treated as a different class of litigant, and he has been denied equal protection.  Windsor has a Constitutional guarantee that he will not be denied protections under the law that are enjoyed by attorneys, but this Court has violated Windsor’s Constitutional rights.  This Court has also denied due process.If due process is to be secured, the laws must operate alike upon all and not subject the individual to the arbitrary exercise of governmental power unrestrained by established principles of private rights and distributive justice. (Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).) In 1934, the United States Supreme Court held that due process is violated “if a practice or rule offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).)   As construed by the courts, due process includes… the opportunity to be heard …  and that the person or panel making the final decision over the proceedings be impartial in regards to the matter before them.  (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).) (See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).) “…wherever it is necessary for the protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought.”  (Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701, 708.) “The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions.  The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual.  Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment. . . .”’  (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 -81 (1972).)

  1. WINDSOR HAD NO LEGAL OBLIGATION TO SEEK LEAVE TO FILE ANYTHING.

65.             There is no valid order requiring Windsor to seek leave.

 

CONCLUSION

  1. Judge Thomas W. Thrash has made statements in this ORDER that are false, malicious, and not supported by any facts in the case. The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests upon the party seeking removal, and Defendants failed to carry this burden and Judge Thomas W. Thrash intentionally violated the law and the Rules.  Absent a valid Notice of Removal, this Court had no jurisdiction to grant any motion by the Federal Defendants.
  2. This Court denied Windsor’s most basic fundamental rights to due process.

68.             There is no valid order requiring Windsor to seek leave.

  1. For all of the reasons expressed above, this Court must VACATE THE ORDER.

WHEREFORE, Windsor respectfully requests:

  1. grant this Motion;
  2. vacate the ORDER dated April 3, 2024; and

c.      grant any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of April, 2024.

_______________________________

William M. Windsor

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-661-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

VERIFICATION OF WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

I, William M. Windsor, swear that I am authorized to make this verification and that the facts alleged in the foregoing MOTION are true and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters I believe them to be true.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge.

This 10th day of April, 2024,

_______________________________

William M. Windsor

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-661-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

As required by Local Rule 7.1D, N.D. Ga., I hereby certify that this pleading has been prepared in Times New Roman 14-point font, one of the font and point selections approved by this Court in Local Rule 5.1B, N.D. Ga.

_______________________________

William M. Windsor

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-661-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing MOTION to each Defendant by mail with sufficient postage addressed with the addresses for service shown in the Verified Complaint and by mail and email to:

CHRISTOPHER J. HUBER

ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

Georgia Bar No. 545627

600 Richard B. Russell Federal Bldg.

75 Spring Street, S.W. — Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Telephone: 404-581-6292 — Facsimile: 404-581-6181

Email: chris.huber@usdoj.gov

This 10th day of April, 2024,

_______________________________

William M. Windsor

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-661-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Windsor Petition for Rehearing En Banc

The following is the Windsor Petition for Rehearing En Banc.  It was copied and pasted here from the Federal Court document.  This Petition for Rehearing En Banc shows how judges ignore the law to screw a self-represented litigant (pro se).  (It may be easier to read the Petition from the pdf scanned by the Eleventh Circuit.

Judges nationwide HATE Bill Windsor because he is committed to exposing their evildoings.  See https://AANL.net for his latest plan to save America from judicial corruption and denial of our Constitutional rights.  He has published thousands of articles on LawlessAmerica.com since 2008.  He is not a lawyer, and he cannot give legal advice, but he can and does help his friends with his experience.

Please forgive the spacing and numbering because Word and WordPress just don’t always cooperate.  Photos and links have been added that are not in the legal Petition.

APPEAL NO. 22-12038 and 22-12411

_______________________________________________________

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________________________________________

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

versus

James N. Hatten, et al,

Defendants

________________________________________________________

United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division

D.C. Docket No. 1:11-CV-01923-TWT

Judge Thomas Woodrow Thrash

thrash-thomas

_________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________

bill windsor

William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Avenue PMB 1134, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

Phone: 352-###-####, Email: windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com

PRO SE FOR PLAINTIFF/ APPELLANT, WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR REHEARING

and en banc determination

William M. Windsor (“WINDSOR”) hereby requests that the Court relieve WINDSOR from the Judgment and OPINION dated 1/25/2024 in USCA11 Case No. 22-12038 and USCA11 Case No. 22-12411, pursuant to Rules 35 and 40 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”).

  1. WINDSOR references and incorporates herein the entire dockets and their contents in 1-11-01923-TWT (”01923”) [APPENDIX 128], USCA11 Case 22-12038 (“22-12038”) [APPENDIX 129, and USCA11 Case 22-12411 (“22-12411”) [APPENDIX 130.]

FIRST PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED

BY THE SECOND PANEL

  1. The decisions of the “SECOND PANEL” of the Eleventh Circuit (Judges Robin Rosenbaum, Elizabeth Branch, and Britt Grant) conflict with decisions of every U.S. Court of Appeals, recent decisions in this case [APPENDIX 131 and APPENDIX 132], and Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (11th Cir. 1993); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 1986); Riccard v. Prudential,307 F.3d 1277, 1295 n.15 (11th Cir. 2002); Klay v. United, 376 F.3d 1092, 1099-1102 (11th Cir. 2004); Dinardo v. Palm Beach Judge, 199 Fed.Appx. 731 (11th Cir. 07/18/2006).  Consideration by the full Court is therefore necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the Court’s decisions.

Judge Britt Grant

  1. The one Appealed Order in 22-12411 is APPENDIX 135. It purports to place restrictions on state courts, so the Appeal must be granted.
  2. The four appealed orders in 22-12038 are APPENDIX 137, APPENDIX 4, APPENDIX 138, and APPENDIX 135. Each purports to place restrictions on state courts, so the Appeals must be granted.
  3. Article Three of the U.S. Constitution empowers the courts to handle cases or controversies arising under federal law. Article 3 grants no powers over state courts; a federal order for filing restrictions cannot apply to states.
  4. WINDSOR has researched “filing restrictions” referencing the three key federal precedents. The decisions in all eleven Circuits appear to be unanimous in providing that federal courts are unable to approve federal courts issuing orders that apply to state courts.
  5. BUT, there is one and only one circuit that has allowed a federal judge to approve federal courts issuing orders that apply to state courts. It’s the 11TH CIRCUIT, but only in appeals involving WINDSOR.
  6. WINDSOR could find NO OTHER CASE to support the actions of JUDGE Thomas W. THRASH. There has never been another appellate decision that disagrees with Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 191-92 (5th Cir. 2008); Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1344 (10th Cir. 2006); and Martin-Trigona v. Lavien, 737 F.2d 1254, 1263 (2d Cir. 1984).  See also Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 05/20/1985)APPENDIX 21 is a Memorandum of Law on 137 applicable federal cases as of 08/08/2020.

SECOND PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The SECOND PANEL violated the September 7, 2022 Order of this Court [APPENDIX 131] and ignored the Law of the Case Doctrine.
  2. The SECOND PANEL has outrageously dismissed WINDSOR’s appeals [APPENDIX 133] and [APPENDIX 134] falsely claiming he abandoned them.
  3. WINDSOR has been pursuing the corrupt acts of JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and the Eleventh Circuit, for 15 years. He has never abandoned anything.
  4. From the first sentence in the Opinions, the SECOND PANEL has shown they have a complete bias against WINDSOR.
  5. The STATEMENTS REGARDING APPEAL [APPENDIX 139] and [APPENDIX 140] were required to establish that the Appeals were not frivolous, and it was determined by Eleventh Circuit Judges Adalberto Jordan, Jill A. Pryor, and Andrew L. Brasher (“FIRST PANEL”) on 9/7/2022 that the appeals were not frivolous. [APPENDIX 133] and [APPENDIX 134]. They ruled:

“With respect to both the appeal statement associated with appeal no. 22-12038 and the appeal statement associated with appeal no. 22-12411, the Court finds that Appellant has raised a non-frivolous issue, specifically whether a pre-filing injunction may be extended to filings in state court. See, e.g., Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F .3d 181, 192 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, these appeals survive the frivolity screening required by this Court’s December 21, 2011 order.” [emphasis added.] [22-12038-Docket-13-ORDER-Not-Frivolous-Stay-Consolidated-2022-09-07.] [APPENDIX 131.]

  1. Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F .3d 181, 192 (5th Cir. 2008) was cited by the FIRST PANEL. It says:

“The district court abused its discretion in extending the pre-filing injunction to filings in state courts, state agencies, and this Court.

“Baum argues that even if the injunction is proper for federal courts, ‘[a]buse of state judicial process is not per se a threat to the jurisdiction of Article III courts and does not per se implicate other federal interests.’  Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d at 1263.

“In Martin-Trigona, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court ‘erred in its blanket extension of the [pre-filing] injunction to state courts….’ [737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984).]

Blue Moon does not cite to any authority that upholds a federal court’s pre-filing injunction against state court and state agency filings.

“The Tenth Circuit held that (2) a district court’s pre-filing injunction may not extend to filings in any federal appellate court, and (3) a district court’s pre-filing injunction may not extend to filings in any state court. Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1344 (10th Cir.2006).”

  1. Yet in the first sentence of the OPINIONS, the SECOND PANEL stated: “This appeal is the latest in a line of frivolous litigation pursued by William Windsor.” There is no evidence of this.  This violates Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) Rule 602.  This DIRECTLY contradicts the 9/7/2022 Order of the Eleventh Circuit [APPENDIX 131.]
  2. There is absolutely NO EVIDENCE that WINDSOR has ever filed anything in any court anywhere that was frivolous. This SECOND PANEL cannot show evidence to the contrary.
  3. The Eleventh Circuit decided that issue in these cases on 9/7/2022. The “law of the case doctrine” provides that an appellate court’s determination of a legal issue binds both the trial court and the court on appeal in any subsequent retrial or appeal involving the same case and substantially the same facts. The appellate court’s holdings on the questions presented to it on review become the “law of the case.” The purpose of the doctrine is to promote finality and judicial economy by minimizing unnecessary relitigation of legal issues once they have been resolved by the appellate court.  Instead, the SECOND PANEL thumbed its nose at judicial economy and created unnecessary litigation.
  4. WINDSOR will file Judicial Complaints against Robin Rosenbaum, Elizabeth Branch, and Britt Grant.

 

THIRD PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The Second Panel did not issue an Opinion on one of the Appealed Orders.
  2. On Page 6 of [APPENDIX 133 and APPENDIX 134] in the next to last paragraph of the “Background” section, each states: “… his appeals were allowed to proceed as to the district court’s May 21, 2022, and June 30, 2022, orders.”
  3. There is no May 21, 2022 Order as proven by the dockets. [APPENDIX 128, APPENDIX 129, APPENDIX 130.] Therefore, one of the orders appealed has not been addressed, and this PETITION must be granted.

 

FOURTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The SECOND PANEL’s Opinions cause significant confusion as to what in the world they are pretending to say.
  2. On January 25, 2024, an OPINION was docketed in USCA11 Case 22-12038 (“22-12038”) – DOCKET 50 [APPENDIX 133] and USCA11 Case 22-12411 (“22-12411”) [APPENDIX 134] by this SECOND PANEL
  3. A JUDGMENT was also docketed in both cases as shown on the Dockets. [APPENDIX 129 and APPENDIX 130.]
  4. The File Stamp at the top of each page docketed in 22-12038 on APPENDIX 129 says “USCA11 Case 22-12038.”
  5. The File Stamp at the top of each page docketed in 22-12411 on APPENDIX 130 says “USCA11 Case 22-12038.”
  6. The Case Numbers on both APPENDIX 132 and APPENDIX 133 show BOTH Case Numbers on Page 2 of USCA11 Document 51-1.

 

FIFTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. Only two cases were cited by the SECOND PANEL in the OPINIONS.  Neither is applicable to the instant case.
  2. One of the two cases was cited by the Appellees in the BRIEF OF APPELLEE. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 – DOCKET 39.] [APPENDIX 141] Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) appears on PP.6–7 of the OPINION [APPENDIX 133] and on P.12 of the BRIEF OF APPELLEE [APPENDIX 141]. The Sapuppo Order [APPENDIX 142] briefly references Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.2008) [APPENDIX 143,P.3.]
  3. None of WINDSOR’s authority was cited by the SECOND PANEL. WINDSOR cited 58 cases, eight statutes, and other authorities in his NOTICE OF APPEAL [APPENDIX 17 and APPENDIX 25]; 88 cases, 13 statutes, and nine other authorities in his APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146]; 36 cases, three statutes, and three other authorities in his APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF [APPENDIX 144.]
  4. Timson v. Sampson was cited by the SECOND PANEL [OPINION, PP.7-8] APPENDIX 143] as purported authority that WINDSOR abandoned his claims:

“Although “we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally,” we

nonetheless deem “issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant . . . abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). “Moreover, we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief.” Id.”

 

  1. But the SECOND PANEL misrepresented the facts and what Timson actually provides that is relevant to the instant case.
  2. Timson v. Sampson [APPENDIX 143] actually says:

“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, Lorisme v. I.N.S., 129 F.3d 1441, 1444 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1997), issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.  Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2002).

Moreover, we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief.  Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003).  Timson, thus, abandoned this issue.” [emphasis added.]

 

  1. Lovett v. Ray, says: “Because he raises that argument for the first time in his reply brief, it is not properly before us.” [emphasis added.] [APPENDIX 145.]
  2. WINDSOR raised this issue from Day 1. In WINDSOR’s 420-page APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF [APPENDIX 144], he begins by saying “This Court must base its analysis on the 2011 and 2018 orders, and he explains why.  The SECOND PANEL ignored all of this.
  3. WINDSOR PLAINLY AND PROMINENTLY RAISED ISSUES IN HIS REPLY BRIEF in all caps, bold type, and underlined:
  • THERE WAS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ORDERS EXHIBIT-1 1-026 AND EXHIBIT-11-048 (“APPEALED ORDERS” THE APPELLEE’S BRIEF MUST BE DISREGARDED AS TO ANYTHING THAT APPEARS TO BE CLAIMS OF FACT. But, Factual Basis was raised on P.8 of the NOTICE OF APPEAL [APPENDIX 25].  This violates FRE Rule 602.

 

  • AS THE BRIEF IS UNSWORN, AND THERE IS NO FACTUAL SUPPORT FOR ANY CLAIMS OF FACT. Factual Basis was raised on P.8 of the NOTICE OF APPEAL [APPENDIX 25].  This violates FRE Rule 602.
  • EXHIBITS TO THE APPELLEE’S BRIEF MUST BE DISREGARDED AS THEY ARE UNAUTHENTICATED. Factual Basis was raised on P.8 of the NOTICE OF APPEAL [APPENDIX 25].  This violates FRE Rule 901.
  • THIS COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT IT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER WINDSOR’S CHALLENGES TO DISTRICT COURT’S 2011 AND 2018 ORDERS. See STATEMENT REGARDING APPEAL PP.7-8; APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.
  • APPELLEE’S BRIEF ISSUE #1: THIS COURT DOES NOT LACK JURISDICTION OVER WINDSOR’S APPEAL OF THE 2022 ORDERS AS THE APPELLEES HAVE FALSELY CLAIMED.
  • APPELLEE’S BRIEF ISSUE #2: THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER WINDSOR’S APPEAL OF THE 2022 ORDERS. See APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.
  • APPELLEE’S BRIEF ISSUE #3: WINDSOR DID NOT ABANDON A CHALLENGE TO THE 2022 ORDERS BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY ANY LEGAL ERRORS SPECIFIC TO THOSE ORDERS AS THE APPELLEES HAVE FALSELY STATED. See APPENDIX 141, PP.1-12.

 

  1. WINDSOR identified all the legal errors that applied to the 2022 orders.
  2. The terms are very clear “…filing any complaint or initiating any proceeding, including any new lawsuit or administrative proceeding [APPELLANT’S BRIEF] [APPENDIX 146-P.13-¶99.]
  3. The APPEALED ORDERS have nothing to do with filing a complaint, filing a new lawsuit, or filing an administrative proceeding. A Texas application for guardianship in an existing probate court matter is not the filing of a lawsuit and is not an administrative proceeding. And it is a matter over which JUDGE THRASH has no jurisdiction.
  4. Contrary to the outlandish claim of the APPELLEES, this clearly explains why the 2022 Orders are void. WINDSOR explained that the so-called permanent injunctions do not restrict a Texas application for guardianship in an existing probate court matter as it is not the filing of a lawsuit and is not an administrative proceeding.
  5. See APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146], P.xxvii, P.l,¶¶25-26. See P.3,¶38: Neither the motion to deny removal nor jurisdiction were ever addressed by JUDGE THRASH in 01923.
  6. WINDSOR has never filed anything frivolous, and he has not abused the federal judicial system.
  7. The U.S. Attorney continues to violate the Constitution and the law by claiming a federal judge has jurisdiction over state court matters.

 

SIXTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDERS ARE VOID AND INVALID.

See STATEMENT REGARDING APPEAL P.7; APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.

 

SEVENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

WINDSOR AND HIS ACQUAINTANCES WERE DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 

See STATEMENT REGARDING APPEAL P.9; APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146],P.xvi.

 

EIGHTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF LAW

AND FACT

WINDSOR ABSOLUTELY, POSITIVELY, MORE THAN ADEQUATELY BRIEFED HIS CLAIM.  HE PLAINLY AND PROMINENTLY RAISED IT BY DEVOTING DISCRETE SECTIONS OF HIS ARGUMENT.

 

  1. This SECOND PANEL either didn’t review the filings or corruptly invented an issue that does not exist. [OPINION – APPENDIX 133 and APPENDIX 134, P.6, II. Discussion, ¶1.]
  2. The FRAP requires that an APPELLANT’S BRIEF be filed, and on 6/7/2023, WINDSOR filed 65 pages verified under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 USC 1746. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 APPENDIX 146], P.65.] It identifies and attaches a copy of the Order Appealed. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34] [APPENDIX 146, P.45,¶¶98,100.]  It is titled “APPEAL NO. 22-12038-J AND 22-12411-J.”
  3. The APPELLANT’S BRIEF TABLE OF CONTENTS [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34, P.xv] [APPENDIX 146] has a major heading “ARGUMENT” and five arguments PLAINLY AND PROMINENTLY identified:
  • A FEDERAL COURT JUDGE DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO PLACE RESTRICTIONS ON THE OPERATION OF STATE COURTS, SO ALL OF THE APPEALS MUST BE GRANTED. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.]
  • ALL ORDERS OF JUDGE THRASH MUST BE DECLARED VOID BECAUSE FEDERAL COURT ORDERS ARE VOID WHEN JURISDICTION IS NEVER DETERMINED. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.]
  • JUDGE THRASH’S FEDERAL COURT ORDERS PLACING RESTRICTIONS ON THE OPERATION OF STATE COURTS ARE VOID ORDERS. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146], PP.xv-xvi.]
  • IN GEORGIA, A PARTY APPLYING FOR IN FORMA PAUPERIS IS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES OF THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF A SPOUSE. SO DENIAL OF IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS TO WINDSOR WAS UNLAWFUL. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146], P.xvi.]
  • Windsor’s constitutional due process rights have been violated, so the appeals must be granted. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146, P.xvi.]
  1. WINDSOR has filed detailed information with this Court in the Statement of Appeal, Notice of Appeal, Responses to Questions from the Clerk, Appellant’s Brief, and Appellant’s Reply Brief. Virtually everything he has filed has been sworn under penalty of perjury.
  2. As to the June 30, 2022 Order of Judge Thomas W. Thrash [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17] is the “NOTICE OF APPEAL.” FRAP Rule 3 requires that such a Notice must be filed to initiate an appeal, and WINDSOR filed it on 7/18/2022.  It identifies and attaches a copy of the Order Appealed. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278, P.1.] [APPENDIX 17.]  It lists the Constitutional rights violated. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.1-2.]
  3. It raised the following:
    1. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER IS VOID AND INVALID. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.4-5.]
    2. WINDSOR AND HIS ACQUAINTANCES WERE DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.6-8.]
    3. THERE WAS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ORDER. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], P.8.]
    4. THE ORDER IS VAGUE, AND IT IS TOO BROAD. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.8-10.]
    5. JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO ISSUE ORDERS ON STATE COURT MATTERS. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.10-12.]
    6. JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO ISSUE ORDERS DENYING LEGAL RIGHTS TO ACQUAINTANCES OF WINDSOR [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.12-13.]
  4. The 7/26/2022 “STATEMENT REGARDING APPEAL” [APPENDIX 147] was required to establish that the Appeal was not frivolous, and it was so determined. It identified and attached a copy of the Order Appealed. [APPENDIX 147, P.13.]  APPENDIX 147 provided a concise summary of the issues.
  5. It raised the following:

 

NINTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The Judgment is VOID.
  2. A court must have jurisdiction to enter a valid, enforceable judgment on a claim. Where jurisdiction is lacking, litigants may retroactively challenge the validity of a judgment. [https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/subject_matter_jurisdiction.]
  3. WINDSOR has consistently denied jurisdiction for 12+ Years. [APPENDIX 128.]
  4. The requirement that a court have subject-matter jurisdiction means that the court can only assume power over a claim that it is authorized to hear under the laws of the jurisdiction. All Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. They only have the power to hear cases that arise under federal law, The instant case was brought in state court for violation of Georgia statutes and has no grant of subject matter jurisdiction.  [APPENDIX 19.]  See Const. Art. III, Sec. 2.
  5. A threshold concern for all federal courts is the presence, or absence, of Constitutional standing. The standing requirement does not exist in the instant case.  Subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist in the absence of constitutional standing. This restriction prevents courts—whose members are not elected and are therefore not politically accountable—from influencing the law in a legislative capacity. In this sense, the standing doctrine and subject-matter jurisdiction facilitate the separation of powers.
  6. Under federal question jurisdiction, a litigant—regardless of the value of the claim—may bring a claim in federal court if it arises under federal law, including the U.S. Constitution. See 28 USC 1331. Federal question jurisdiction requires that the federal element appears on the face of a well-plead complaint, and it does not
  7. The jurisdictional division between state and federal tribunals is an essential component of American federalism. Federalism is the Constitutional division of power between state governments and the federal government of the United States.
  8. Article Three of the U.S. Constitution establishes the judicial branch of the U.S. federal government. Article Three empowers the courts to handle cases or controversies arising under federal law. There is no federal law regarding guardianship of state citizens.
  9. Federal case law establishes that a federal judge has no jurisdiction over state courts, and a federal order for filing restrictions cannot apply to state courts. There are many 11TH CIRCUIT precedents.  See Paragraph 3 above.

 

TENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. Applying the Judgment prospectively is no longer equitable.
  2. In addition to the many other issues, WINDSOR is in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy and has no access to funds required by the purported Injunction.
  3. The JUDGMENT closes the courthouse doors to WINDSOR, which is a significant violation of Constitutional rights.

 

ELEVENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

Judge Elizabeth BranchJudge Robin RosenbaumJudge Britt Grant

  1. The SECOND PANEL appears to WINDSOR to be totally corrupt.
  2. The U.S. Constitution does not give federal judges jurisdiction over state courts. This SECOND PANEL has pretended this isn’t one of the most-notable Constitutional provisions.  Unless they didn’t bother to read the file, the FIRST PANEL did this work for them and ordered as they did in APPENDIX 133 and APPENDIX 134.
  3. Each justice or judge of the United Statesis required to take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his or her office:

“I, ___________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.” [28 USC 453.]

U.S. Constitution

  1. JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH and judges with the Eleventh Circuit have chosen to ignore the Constitution for 15 years when it comes to WINDSOR, and no one else. EVERY Federal Circuit has established precedents on this specific issue, including the Eleventh Circuit.  JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH and judges with the Eleventh Circuit have all violated their Oath of Office.

 

TWELFTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. When there is no legal basis for jurisdiction or an Injunction, the fact that a judge issues void orders does not make them lawful.
  2. The Appellate Courts have the power to correct such overwhelming violations of the Constitution and the law at any time.
  3. The SECOND PANEL is wrong in ignoring the VOID Injunctions that are the basis for the APPEALED ORDERS.

 

THIRTEENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. Judge Thomas W. Thrash’s basis for denying WINDSOR’s APPEALS is to falsely and maliciously claim that WINDSOR did something in the past, so he no longer has his Constitutional right to file anything in any legal matter.

 

FOURTEENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The SECOND PANEL falsely claimed on P.4. of the OPINIONS [APPENDIX 133 and APPENDIX 134] that the case was removed from state court.
  2. JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH never ruled on jurisdiction, and he never issued an order in response to WINDSOR’s reply and objection [APPENDIX 19 and APPENDIX 128.]

 

Wanda Dutschmann

FIFTEENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT:

MOM IS DEAD

  1. Wanda Dutschmann is dead. She was known as MOM, and WINDSOR is writing a book titled “KILLING MOM.”

Killing Mom

  1. WINDSOR believes JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH and the SECOND PANEL contributed to her death by denying WINDSOR the opportunity to save her and her Estate through Guardianship in Texas. This is one of the APPEALED ORDERS [01923 – Docket ] [APPENDIX 135].

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, WINDSOR requests that this PETITION is granted; relieve WINDSOR from the Judgments and OPINIONS dated 1/25/2024; grant WINDSOR’s APPEALS; and grant such other and further relief as is deemed just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 7th day of February, 2024,

_______________________________
William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Bill Windsor verifies

VERIFICATION OF WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

I, William M. Windsor, swear that I am authorized to make this verification and that the facts alleged in the foregoing PETITION are true and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

In accordance with 28 USC 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge.

This 7th day of February, 2024,

_______________________________
William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this pleading has been prepared in Times New Roman 14-point font, one of the font and point selections required by the Rules.  There are 3891 words.

This 7th day of February, 2024,

_______________________________
William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing to each Defendant by Federal Express to:

RYAN K. BUCHANAN – GABRIEL A. MENDEL

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY — ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

600 United States Courthouse

75 Ted Turner Drive, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Telephone: (404) 581-6000 — Facsimile: (404) 581-6181

Email: gabriel.mendel@usdoj.gov

This 7th day of February, 2024,

_______________________________
William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Complaint for VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Columbia

Complaint PDF  —  EXHIBITS PDF

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,                           )

Plaintiff                                                                     )

)           CIVIL ACTION NO.

Scott S. Harris and                                                 )           ________________________

Rashonda Garner,                                                  )

Defendants.                                                             )

                                                                               

 

Complaint for VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

AND ADDITIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION

The Parties to This Complaint

 The Plaintiff

William Michael Windsor (“WINDSOR”) is a citizen of the United States and is a resident of Lincoln County, South Dakota.

Name:                       William Michael Windsor

Address:                    5013 S. Louise Avenue #1134, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

County:                     Lincoln

Telephone:                352-###-####

Email:                        windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com

 

  1. The Defendants

Scott S. Harris (“HARRIS”) is a citizen of the United States, an employee of the federal government in Washington, DC, and a federal official.  HARRIS is sued as an individual.

Name:                        Scott S. Harris

Address:                    Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone:                202-479-3025

Email:                        pio@supremecourt.gov

 

Rashonda Garner (“GARNER”) is a citizen of the United States, an employee of the federal government in Washington, DC, and a federal official.  GARNER is sued as an individual.

Name:                       Rashonda Garner

Address:                    Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone:                202-479-3025

Email:                        PMcCabe@supremecourt.gov

 

  1. I Basis for Jurisdiction

[X]  Federal Officials (a Bivens Claim)

Constitutional rights the Plaintiff claims are being violated by federal officials (HARRIS and GARNER), including Denial of Due Process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) provides: “A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated….”

III.       Statement of Claim

   Where did the events giving rise to your claims occur?

The events took place at the Supreme Court building in Washington, DC and in Lincoln County South Dakota and Sumter County Florida.

  1. What date and approximate time did the events giving rise to your claims occur?

May 10, 2023; May 23, 2023; June 1, 2023; July 20, 2023; September 26, 2023; October 1, 2023; October 2, 2023; October 27, 2023; October 31, 2023; November 3, 2023; November 20, 2023; November 21, 2023; November 22, 2023; November 27, 2023; December 18, 2023, December 19, 2023; December 20, 2023, December 21, 2023.

What are the facts underlying your claims?

  1. On May 10, 2023, William M. Windsor (“Windsor”), an individual, filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition and Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (“PETITION”). [EXHIBIT A – May 10, 2023.] This Filing was made in compliance with the United States Supreme Court’s Rule 29 and in the manner required by the Rules, as shown on the Certificate of Service. [EXHIBIT B, Pages 51-52.]  The appropriate number of copies were mailed to the Clerk, and a copy was sent to the Solicitor General and the attorney involved in the case.
  2. On May 10, 2023, the Docket of the United States Supreme Court shows: “Application (22A1009) to file petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in excess of page limits, submitted to Justice Thomas.” [EXHIBIT A, May 10, 2023.]
  3. On May 23, 2023, Justice Clarence Thomas granted the Application (22A1009) “to file petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in excess of page limits. The petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition may not exceed 49 pages.” [EXHIBIT A, May 23, 2023.]  It was filed.
  4. On June 1, 2023, the Waiver of the Right of Respondent United States to respond was filed. [EXHIBIT A, June 1, 2023.]
  5. On July 20, 2023, the PETITION was “DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/26/2023.” [EXHIBIT A, July 20, 2023.]
  6. WINDSOR spoke by telephone with Jake in the United States Supreme Court Clerk’s Office. Jake explained that WINDSOR’s PETITION would be considered by the nine Justices in a “Conference.”
  7. The “Filing and Rules” section for the United States Supreme Court Clerk’s Office explains:

“The timing for placing petitions on a conference list and distributing them to the Justices is governed by Rule 15.5, which provides as follows: “The Clerk will distribute the petition to the Court for its consideration upon receiving an express waiver of the right to file a brief in opposition, or, if no waiver or brief in opposition is filed, upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing. If a brief in opposition is timely filed, the Clerk will distribute the petition, brief in opposition, and any reply brief to the Court for its consideration no less than 14 days after the brief in opposition is filed, unless the petitioner expressly waives the 14-day waiting period.” [https://www.supremecourt.gov/casedistribution/casedistributionschedule.aspx.]

  1. United States Supreme Court Clerk Scott S. Harris has explained Conference Scheduling in a memorandum. [https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/Guidance-on-Scheduling-2023.pdf.] [EXHIBIT K.]
  2. The Supreme Court Historical Society explains the Conference process. [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/.] [EXHIBIT C.]
  3. On September 26, 2023, the Docket of the United States Supreme Court indicates a Conference was held by the nine Justices in Case No. 22-7648. [EXHIBIT A, September 26, 2023.]
  4. On October 2, 2023, the United States Supreme Court’s Docket shows “Petition DENIED.” [EXHIBIT A, October 2, 2023.]
  5. On October 27, 2023, WINDSOR filed a Motion for Rehearing just to be safe. [EXHIBIT E.] It was sent by USPS. [EXHIBITS F and G.]   This was 25 days after the Docket claims the Petition was denied, so it would have been timely if an order had been issued.
  6. On October 31, 2023, WINDSOR received a letter from Scott S. Harris dated October 2, 2023. [EXHIBIT D.] The letter is not even signed; it’s a stamp.  It bears no seal, and it is not signed by a Justice.  The letter does not qualify as an Order required after a Conference.  And the time has not started to run on the filing of a motion for rehearing.
  7. On November 3, 2023, a letter was dated to WINDSOR by Rashonda Garner for Scott S. Harris. [EXHIBIT H.] The letter is not an order.  All copies of WINDSOR’s Filing were returned. [EXHIBIT I.]  The original copy is stamped “RECEIVED OCT 30 2023 Office of the Clerk Supreme Court U.S.” [EXHIBIT I.]
  8. On November 20, 2023, the letter dated November 3, 2023 was received by WINDSOR. [EXHIBIT J.] The letter is not an order.
  9. On November 21, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail.
  10. On November 21, 2023, Rashonda Garner left a voicemail saying she didn’t understand WINDSOR’s message. [EXHIBIT L.]
  11. On November 22, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail.
  12. On November 27, 2023, all of the mail dated November 3, 2023 regarding the Motion for Rehearing was sent certified mail return receipt to Rashonda Garner. [EXHIBIT H and EXHIBIT J.]
  13. On November 27, 2023, WINDSOR submitted 11 copies of a “MOTION” to the United States Supreme Court.
  14. On December 18, 2023, WINDSOR received a return of all of his November 27, 2023 mailing in a box. [EXHIBIT S.] This is all about WINDSOR’s Petition regarding violations of his Constitutional rights.  USSC Case #22-7648 —   https://lawlessamerica.com/motion-for-compliance-with-rules-of-u-s-supreme-court-was-filed-by-bill-windsor/?fbclid=IwAR14vsRgJBVkismog3TBwe88_GxfP98RcmMOmyLcHUwyt5hVBh3V8sLlENg.  This is the case chosen as one of the approximately 8,000 cases submitted in 2023 that the nine justices were actually to hear on September 26, 2023. https://lawlessamerica.com/74-year-old-disabled-man-with-use-of-only-one-finger-will-have-all-nine-u-s-supreme-court-justices-hear-his-pro-se-petition/?fbclid=IwAR1ExGhpVh0dTM8WRD_Bxr6cA_-NB2Hxg6I5adfB41Z7-FXc_zeQQl-MGQ4
  15. On December 19, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail. [EXHIBIT M.]
  16. On December 19, 2023, WINDSOR again called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail. [EXHIBIT N.] [EXHIBIT O.]
  17. On December 20, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner yet again and left a detailed voicemail. [EXHIBIT P.]  The call was not returned.
  18. On December 20, 2023, the Docket of the United States Supreme Court in Case #22-7648 shows no entries after October 2, 2023. [EXHIBIT Q.]
  19. As of December 26, 2023, Rashonda Garner still has not returned WINDSOR’s

 

PREVIOUS LAWSUITS AND ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF

The PLAINTIFF has not filed other lawsuits in state or federal court that deal with the same facts involved in this action.

Arguments – claims for relief

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #1 — Bivens Claim

  1. WINDSOR’s Constitutional rights are being violated by federal officials, Harris and Garner, including Denial of Due Process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. HARRIS and GARNER violated WINDSOR’s Constitutional rights, and those rights were so clearly established that a reasonable person would have known they were being violated.
  2. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.

 

  1. WINDSOR has been denied Constitutional Due Process Rights
  2. Due process requires that the government respect all of the legal rights that are owed to a person according to the law. Procedural due process guarantees protection to everyone so that statutes, regulations, and enforcement actions ensure that no one is deprived of “life, liberty, or property” without a fair opportunity to affect the judgment or result.  Judges have shown absolutely no respect for Windsor’s legal rights.  They have ignored the law and the facts.  Windsor has been denied the most fundamental right to not have his legal rights stolen by dishonest judges.
  3. This is not abuse of discretion; they violated the Constitution and laws intentionally. (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).)
  4. In Case No. 2018-CA-010270 in THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA (“010270”), the fundamental right to have the courts accept Windsor’s sworn affidavits as true has been violated. (Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).)
  5. Judges are required to be impartial. Judges have demonstrated pervasive bias against Windsor.  They haven’t shown an ounce of impartiality. (Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).)
  6. In “Some Kind of Hearing,” Judge Henry Friendly said that an important right of due process is “a decision based exclusively on the evidence presented.” Florida judges have not made decisions based upon the evidence presented.
  7. Due process is “an established course for judicial proceedings or other governmental activities designed to safeguard the legal rights of the individual.” Action denying the process that is “due” is unconstitutional.  In 010270, judges have denied the process that is due.  (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).)
  8. Litigants allegedly have the right to protections expressly created in statute and case law precedent. Statutes have been violated and overwhelming case law has been ignored by judges.
  9. Litigants have the right to equal protection of the law regardless of race, creed, color, religion, ethnic origin, age, handicaps, or sex. Windsor is 75, handicapped, and he has not received equal protection as a pro se party.
  10. Litigants have the right to a remedy, by recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs that they may receive in their person, property, or character. Windsor has been denied recourse.
  11. Litigants have the right to justice, without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without undue delay; in conformance with the laws. Florida judges have denied justice and have not conformed with the laws.
  12. The principle of due process of law is one of the most important protections against arbitrary rule.
  13. An inherent right is the honesty of the judge. Judges in Florida have committed perjury and obstruction of justice; they have violated many canons of the Code of Judicial Procedure as well as rules in the Florida Code of Professional Conduct.  Inherent in due process is the expectation that the judge will not violate criminal statutes, but they have.
  14. Judges in Florida have violated Windsor’s rights by using their power to inflict their bias.
  15. For due process, Windsor has the right to protections expressly created in statute and case law. Due process allegedly ensures that the government will respect all of a person’s legal rights and guarantee fundamental fairness and justice.  Due process holds the government subservient to the law of the land, protecting individual persons from the state.
  16. Due process requires an established course for judicial proceedings designed to safeguard the legal rights of the individual. Action denying the process that is “due” is unconstitutional.  Inherent in the expectation of due process is that the judge will abide by the rules.   Judges in Florida have violated rules for the purpose of damaging Windsor.
  17. An inherent Constitutional right is the honesty of the judge. Judges in Florida have not been honest.  They have violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
  18. The Constitution guarantees Windsor a fair and impartial judge. Florida judges denied Windsor’s guarantee to inflict their extra-judicial bias.

Every person “has a constitutional and statutory right to an impartial and fair judge at all stages of the proceeding.” (Liteky v U.S., 510 US 540 (1994).  (See Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037; Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971); accord Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pension, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (citation omitted).)

  1. Due process is supposed to guarantee basic fairness and to make people feel that they have been treated fairly.

“justice must give the appearance of justice” (Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1954).)  (Peters v. Kiff, 407, U.S. 493, 502 (1972).)

48.              At a basic level, procedural due process is essentially based on the concept of “fundamental fairness.”  For example, in 1934, the United States Supreme Court held that due process is violated “if a practice or rule offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”

49.              Where an individual is facing a (1) deprivation of (2) life, liberty, or property, (3) procedural due process mandates that he or she is entitled to adequate notice, a hearing, and a neutral judge.  Substantive due process refers to the rights granted in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.  Fifth Amendment due process means substantially the same as Fourteenth Amendment due process.

50.              Judges and Federal officers have a Constitutional duty to Windsor.  The DEFENDANTS breached their Constitutional duties through action and inaction.

  1. They have violated Windsor’s civil and Constitutional rights under color of law.

“[t]rial before an ‘unbiased judge’ is essential to due process.” Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971); accord Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pension, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (citation omitted). (Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972)

  1. The due process clauses of the Constitutions of Florida, South Dakota, and the United States guarantee a party an impartial and disinterested tribunal in civil cases. (Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 1613 (1980).)

Partiality in favor of the government may raise a defendant’s due process concerns. (In re United States of America, 441 F.3d at 66 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).)

  1. Judges in Florida have effectively denied Windsor’s rights of equal protection under the law in Article VI of the Constitution. Their actions prove that they have exercised their power in this and other actions for their own personal purposes rather than the will of the law.

Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412 (7th Cir. 1972), citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed 204 (1824); U.S. v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1990).

  1. The orders issued by judges in Florida suggest “the appearance of” animosity towards Windsor.
  2. These latest purported orders from JEFF ASHTON deny WINDSOR his fundamental Constitutional right of access to the courts, “unquestionably a right of considerable constitutional significance.” (Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2008).) Meaningful access to the courts is a constitutional right. (Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en banc).) [emphasis added.]

 

  1. AN ORDER was not ISSUED ON THE CONFERENCE DECISION OF SEPTEMBER 26, 2023.
  2. The Rules of the United States Supreme Court require valid evidence of the October 2, 2023 alleged denial by the Court of the Petition of William M. Windsor in Supreme Court Case #22-7648. An Order was not issued.  This is a violation of due process.
  3. The letters dated October 2, 2023 and November 3, 2023 are not orders and have no validity. [EXHIBITS D and H.] The U.S. Supreme Court Rules use the term “Letter” 13 times, and letters such as these are not authorized by the Rules.
  4. No valid evidence of the denials was attached to the letters.
  5. There is no order issued under seal, in violation of 28 U.S.C. 1691 – “All writs and process issuing from a court of the United States shall be under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk thereof.”

The word “process” at 28 U.S.C. 1691 means a court order.  See Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River Paper Co., 19 F. 252 (C.C. W.D. Wisconsin 1884);  Taylor v. U.S., 45 F. 531 (C.C. E.D. Tennessee 1891);  U.S. v. Murphy, 82 F. 893 (DCUS Delaware 1897);  Leas & McVitty v. Merriman, 132 F. 510 (C.C. W.D. Virginia 1904);  U.S. v. Sharrock, 276 F. 30 (DCUS Montana 1921);  In re Simon, 297 F. 942, 34 ALR 1404 (2nd Cir. 1924);  Scanbe Mfg. Co. v. Tryon, 400 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1968);  and Miles v. Gussin, 104 B.R. 553 (Bankruptcy D.C. 1989).

  1. There has never been an ORDER on WINDSOR’s case that was purportedly considered by the nine U.S. Supreme Court Justices on September 26, 2023. https://lawlessamerica.com/motion-for-compliance-with-rules-of-u-s-supreme-court-was-filed-by-bill-windsor/?fbclid=IwAR3ldAVwjfI4p7AZo4ILmjCRpshIx-4yAdr-nYAC_yvgz5jg_lIwN0Rfp8Q
  2. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “order” as a “mandate; precept; a command or direction authoritatively given….”
  3. gov defines “clerk of court” as “the court officer who oversees administrative functions, especially managing the flow of cases through the court.
  4. com defines “Administrative function” as that used in carrying out an administrative program and is to be broadly construed to include any aspect of agency organization, procedure, or management. In one state, for example, the term “administrative function” is defined as follows:

(1) “Administrative function” means the administration of:

(i) a law of the State;

(ii) a law of a political subdivision of the State; or

(iii) a rule, regulation, or bylaw of a public body.

(2) “Administrative function” does not include:

(i) an advisory function;

(ii) a judicial function;

(iii) a legislative function;

(iv) a quasi-judicial function; or

(v) a quasi-legislative function. [emphasis added.]

 

  1. Non-judicial court officers, such as clerks of court, will have specific tasks delegated to them by the court; they can make decisions on matters that the legal system does not consider to require judicial discretion and judgment. These are often described as “ministerial.”
  2. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “mandate:” “In practice, a judicial command or precept proceeding from a court or judicial officer, directing the proper officer to enforce a judgment, sentence, or decree. Seaman v. Clarke, 60 App. Div. 416, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1002; Horton v. State, 63 Neb. 34, 88 N. W. 146.
  3. “In the practice of the Supreme Court of the United States, the mandate is a precept or order issued upon the decision of an appeal or writ of error, directing the action to be taken, or disposition to be made of the case, by the inferior court … in some of the state jurisdictions….”
  4. WINDSOR has not received a judicial command. A letter purportedly written by the Clerk is not an order.
  5. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “precept” as “an order or direction, emanating from authority, to an officer or body of officers, commanding him or them to do some act within the scope of their powers.”
  6. A letter from the Clerk is not a Precept.
  7. The letter does not direct any proper officer to enforce a judgment, sentence, or decree.
  8. Failing to do what is required by the rules is a violation of due process, and this is a Constitutional violation.
  9. Windsor requires an order by the United States Supreme Court with a seal of the court and an actual signature of a Justice. This Due Process Notice and Service by Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, Scott S. Harris, was to be made on parties in 22-7648 of the valid record of denial of the Petition by the United States Supreme Court, if that actually happened.

 

  1. WINDSOR’S CONFERENCE DECISION WAS NOT PUBLISHED, AND IT MUST BE.
  2. United States Supreme Court’s Conference Decisions in Appeal No. 22-7648 must be published, and WINDSOR’s was not. This is a violation of due process.

“All conference decisions are published.” [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/ — EXHIBIT C, Paragraph 5.]

“When the vote has been taken on a case, the writing of an opinion is assigned—by the Chief if he voted with the majority, otherwise by the senior Justice of the majority.” [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/ — EXHIBIT C, Paragraph 6.]

 

  1. WINDSOR’S FILINGS WERE NOT DOCKETED AS THEY MUST BE.
  2. WINDSOR’S filing of a Motion for Rehearing [EXHIBIT E] has been unlawfully excluded from the Docket. [EXHIBIT A.] It was timely filed with the Clerk in paper form – an original and 10 copies.  There was no service by the United States Supreme Court.  This is a violation of due process.
  3. “Filing” is defined as:

“To place a paper in the official custody of the clerk of court to enter into the files or records of a case. [https://www.uscourts.gov/glossary#letter_f]

“the act of giving an official form or document to someone in authority in order to begin a legal process.” [Britannica Dictionary definition of FILING.]

“to deposit with the clerk of the court a written complaint or petition which is the opening step in a lawsuit and subsequent documents, including an answer, demurrer, motions, petitions, and orders. [Copyright © 1981 2005 by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill.].

 

  1. United States Supreme Court Rule 29 requires:

“1.   Any document required or permitted to be presented to the Court or to a Justice shall be filed with the Clerk in paper form.

“2.   A document is timely filed if it is received by the Clerk in paper form within the time specified for filing; or if it is sent to the Clerk through the United States Postal Service by first-class mail (including express or priority mail), postage prepaid, and bears a postmark, other than a commercial postage meter label, showing that the document was mailed on or before the last day for filing; or if it is delivered on or before the last day for filing to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery to the Clerk within 3 calendar days….”

  1. The Clerk of the United States Supreme Court seems to be routinely violating the due process requirements of many litigants. EXHIBIT R is an article written in 2012 about almost identical corruption by U.S. Supreme Court Clerk Thomas Suter.
  2. Notice and Service was not provided. Windsor demanded that it be executed immediately.
  3. Windsor asks that this Motion be docketed pursuant to Due Process and that a valid adjudication of the Motion be noticed and served on the parties.
  4. Windsor also requests all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under No. 22-7648, including all audit data. The audit data is the login name and login time of the individuals who entered any data in the records.
  5. WINDSOR believes these unlawful practices have taken place for at least 13 years. WINDSOR requests copies of all letters issued, rather than orders, in every case since 01/01/2008.

 

  1. ALL ORDERS AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH WINDSOR HAVE NOT BEEN SENT BY EMAIL AS REQUIRED.
  2. Documents attached as EXHIBITS hereto show that WINDSOR does not receive mail promptly. The American Association of Non-Lawyers requires that non-lawyers receive all communications by email.  This eliminates one of the many unfair advantages given to lawyers.  This is a violation of due process.
  3. WINDSOR must be served and communicated with at windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com.

 

  1. WINDSOR WAS NOT ISSUED AN ORDER ON HIS MOTION FOR REHEARING, AND HE MUST BE GIVEN THE PROPER TIME TO RESPOND TO ANY OBJECTION.
  2. Orders are required. This is a violation of due process.
  3. United States Supreme Court Rule 44 (2) provides: “Any petition for the rehearing of an order denying a petition for a writ of certiorari or extraordinary writ shall be filed within 25 days after the date of the order of denial….”
  4. There was no “order of denial,” so the time has not started to run on rehearing.

 

  1. THE CLERKS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, HARRIS AND GARNER, HAVE VIOLATED SUPREME COURT RULE 79 BY NOT KEEPING PROPER RECORDS.
  2. Records are required. This is a violation of due process.
  3. Rule 79 requires:

“(a) Civil Docket.

(1) In General. The clerk must keep a record known as the “civil docket” in the form and manner prescribed by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts with the approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The clerk must enter each civil action in the docket. Actions must be assigned consecutive file numbers, which must be noted in the docket where the first entry of the action is made.

(2) Items to be Entered. The following items must be marked with the file number and entered chronologically in the docket:

(A) papers filed with the clerk;

(B) process issued, and proofs of service or other returns showing execution; and

(C) appearances, orders, verdicts, and judgments.

(3) Contents of Entries; Jury Trial Demanded. Each entry must briefly show the nature of the paper filed or writ issued, the substance of each proof of service or other return, and the substance and date of entry of each order and judgment. When a jury trial has been properly demanded or ordered, the clerk must enter the word ‘jury’ in the docket.”

  1. HARRIS and GARNER have violated WINDSOR’s civil rights by failing to comply with this Rule.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #2 — CONSPIRACY

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. The Defendants, in some way or manner, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan. The mutual understanding was to break the law at some time in the future and/or to achieve a lawful aim by unlawful means.  The DEFENDANTS willfully became members of such conspiracy.  During the existence of the conspiracy, various DEFENDANTS knowingly committed at least one overt act in an effort to carry out or accomplish some object of the conspiracy.  The conspiracy was designed to deprive the PLAINTIFF of legal rights and deceive the courts to obtain an illegal objective.  Each of the DEFENDANTS is responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrongs. DEFENDANTS reached agreement to commit these overt acts.  They committed to support their efforts with a series of lies, to conceal documents, to falsify documents, to lie, and to undertake a variety of actions designed to damage the PLAINTIFF.  At least one of the DEFENDANTS knowingly committed at least two of the overt acts. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct). The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #3 — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. The DEFENDANTS have shown extreme and outrageous conduct. The PLAINTIFF has been under extreme emotional distress for 15 months.
  3. DEFENDANTS intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the PLAINTIFF through defamation, fraud, conspiracy, and violation of civil and Constitutional rights.
  4. DEFENDANTS inflicted emotional distress on the PLAINTIFF.  DEFENDANTS acted intentionally or recklessly.
  5. Some of the damaging words about the PLAINTIFF and actions against the Plaintiff are not defamatory, and it is these words and actions for which the PLAINTIFF seeks recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
  6. Conduct of DEFENDANTS was extreme and outrageous. These outrageously false and/or criminal claims and the wide variety of things that DEFENDANTS have done would prompt an average member of the community to exclaim “outrageous!”
  7. The activities of DEFENDANTS have been so extreme that it has gone well beyond all possible bounds of decency, and it must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. All of the acts of DEFENDANTS taken together amount to the type of extreme conduct that qualifies as intentional infliction of emotional distress.
  8. The conduct of Defendants caused the distress.
  9. The distress caused was severe emotional distress to the PLAINTIFF. The outrageous harassment, lies, libel, slander, and defamation are bad alone, but the effect on the PLAINTIFF’s mental health has been severe.
  10. There are no alternative causes of action that would provide a remedy for the severe emotional distress caused by DEFENDANTS’ conduct that does not meet whatever standard the Court decides is appropriate for defamation.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #4 — 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) – Violation of Federal Civil RICO Act

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. The conduct of DEFENDANTS violates the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (“Federal RICO”).
  3. DEFENDANTS, individually and in conspiracy with one another, are all RICO persons who violated RICO by engaging in (1) “racketeering activity,” (2) conducted through a “pattern,” (3) affecting an “enterprise,” (4) impacting interstate commerce. DEFENDANTS also violated 18 USC §1962(d) by conspiring as alleged herein to violate 18 USC §1962(c). All of DEFENDANTS’ predicate acts have a similar purpose – to damage the PLAINTIFF – all have similar victims, the PLAINTIFF, all have had similar results, and the methods of commission have been virtually identical.
  4. Racketeering Activity included violations of section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), and other sections.
  5. A number of crimes were committed by DEFENDANTS. Interstate crimes of wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and criminal conspiracy were committed between the District of Columbia, South Dakota, and Florida.
  6. DEFENDANTS knowingly devised or participated in a scheme to defraud the PLAINTIFF and did so willingly with an intent to defraud. The activity engaged in consists of two or more predicate acts of racketeering activity, the most recent of which occurred within hours after the commission of a prior act.
  7. The DEFENDANTS committed violations of Federal RICO and RICO Conspiracy – 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct: knowledge of, participation in, and benefit from a RICO enterprise). In addition to the substantive offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961, a criminal conspiracy to commit these offenses is a RICO predicate act.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #5 — Violation of Federal RICO Conspiracy Offense — 18 USC § 1962(d)

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. The DEFENDANTS, in some way or manner, came to mutual understandings to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan as described herein. The mutual understanding was to break the law. The DEFENDANTS willfully became members of such conspiracy.
  3. During the existence of the conspiracy, various DEFENDANTS knowingly violated the Federal RICO Act. These violations were knowingly committed in an effort to carry out or accomplish some object of the conspiracy.
  4. The conspiracy was designed to deprive the PLAINTIFF of Constitutional rights and legal rights and to deceive the courts to obtain an illegal objective. Each of the DEFENDANTS is responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrongs. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct: knowledge of, participation in, and benefit from a RICO enterprise).  The predicate acts are identified herein, and those paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #6 — Violation of Due Process and Deprivation of Rights — 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. HARRIS, GARNER, and UNIDENTIFIED DOES conspired for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, and/or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice with intent to deny PLAINTIFF due process and to injure him while attempting to enforce his right to self-representation, and this violated the equal protection of the laws.. HARRIS, GARNER, and UNIDENTIFIED DOES have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #5 — Violation of Constitutional Rights

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. DEFENDANTS had a Constitutional duty to the PLAINTIFF.  They breached their Constitutional duties to the PLAINTIFF through action and inaction.  This caused damage to the PLAINTIFF.
  3. The PLAINTIFF brings this action against HARRIS and GARNER, pursuant in part to 28 U.S. C. § 1331, in claims arising from violations of federal constitutional rights guaranteed in the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and redressable pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents 403 U.S. 388 (1971). HARRIS and GARNER subjected the PLAINTIFF to deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.
  4. HARRIS and GARNER’s actions are non-judicial, and there is no immunity. The PLAINTIFF has been damaged.  The PLAINTIFF prays for monetary damages against HARRIS and GARNER based upon violations of federal Constitutional rights pursuant to Bivens.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #6 — Fraud

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. Defendants intentionally misstated material facts, omitted material facts, and made false representations. Defendants knew they made false statements or omitted material facts, or they had a reckless disregard for the truth.  The PLAINTIFF and the courts relied upon the intentional misstatements and/or omission of material facts.  Defendants committed fraud.  The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct).

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #7 — Common Law Fraud

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. Defendants misrepresented material facts. These Defendants had knowledge of the falsity.  Their intent was that the representations would be acted upon by people ignorant of the falsity, relied on the truth of the representations, and had a right to rely upon it.
  3. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct). The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #8 — Violation of Pro Se Rights

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. Pro se parties are a minority class of people. The PLAINTIFF objects to the treatment of pro se parties in state and federal courts.  The PLAINTIFF, Pro Se, has been repeatedly denied rights and abused.  Judges and judicial officers have violated the Constitutional rights of the PLAINTIFF and other pro se parties.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #9 — Constitutional and Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1988 — Violation of First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint for purposes of this claim.
  2. The PLAINTIFF was denied due process and his rights were violated when filings were not filed or considered.
  3. The PLAINTIFF was denied access to a court to seek redress of grievances.
  4. Defendants directly participated in the infraction, after learning of it, failed to remedy the wrong, and created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred or allowed such policy or custom to continue.
  5. As a direct result of the actions, statements and / or policies of the Defendants, the PLAINTIFF suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
  6. Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s known statutory and Constitutional rights.
  7. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, the PLAINTIFF has suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe and substantial damages. These damages include lost income, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental and emotional anguish, and distress.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #10 — Violation of Fourth Amendment Failure to Train and Supervise — 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint for purposes of this claim.
  2. The Defendants’ immediate supervisors, had a duty to train and supervise them to ensure they were not engaging in conduct that violated the civil rights of citizens like the PLAINTIFF.
  3. Instead of carrying out this duty, Defendants chose to encourage the misconduct of needless escalation and aggression witnessed by the Defendants against the PLAINTIFF in this case.
  4. DefendantS’ use of excessive force and their illegal seizure and assault upon the PLAINTIFF was the direct result of their supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the civil rights of citizens and of disabled citizens in particular, and his repeated failure and refusal to intervene to supervise, train, or otherwise put a stop to such misconduct.
  5. All of the acts described herein were done by Defendants intentionally, knowingly, willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and recklessly in disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s federally protected rights, and they were done pursuant to the pre-existing and ongoing deliberately indifferent customs, policies and practices of the Clerk of Court, under color of law.
  6. Upon information and belief, the Clerk of Court’s customs and practices of unlawful conduct (and failures to train/supervise to prevent the same) proximately causing the harms described herein to the PLAINTIFF.
  7. Upon information and belief, it is the custom and practice at the Clerk of Court’s Office of the United States Supreme Court to regularly violate the civil rights of citizens like the PLAINTIFF and intentionally, knowingly, willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and recklessly operate in disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s federally protected rights;
  8. Upon information and belief, it is the custom and practice at the Clerk of Court’s Office to try and cover-up and justify such wrongdoing.
  9. Upon information and belief, it is the custom and practice by the Clerk of Court to refuse to discipline its employees for misconduct and to refuse to ever find its employees have engaged in wrongdoing, in the face of obvious and repeated constitutional violations, which resulted in a foreseeable culture of dishonesty and silence in the face of ongoing and repeated civil rights violations.
  10. The unlawful conduct of Defendants as set forth in detail herein, amounts to a custom and well-settled, widespread overall practice of fraud and corruption deliberately insulated from law enforcement accountability, throughout the Defendants, even if not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, and is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.
  11. Through the Defendants’ continuous ratification of unconstitutional actions and inactions, Defendants have condoned and become the driving force of the Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct.
  12. Defendants failed to properly train and supervise its employees to avoid their foreseeable use of unconstitutional conduct.
  13. Defendants’ policies, customs, and practices in failing to properly train and supervise its employees were the moving force and proximate cause of the violations to the PLAINTIFF’s constitutional rights.
  14. The custom, policy, and practice of Defendants of encouraging, condoning, tolerating, and ratifying the unconstitutional conduct, as described herein, were the moving force behind and the proximate cause of, the violations to the PLAINTIFF’s Constitutional rights.
  15. Upon information and belief, Defendants have been deliberately obfuscatory and in other litigation involving claims against its officers, has made concerted efforts to withhold, destroy, conceal and delay the release of documents and correspondence that relate to the unconstitutional policies, customs, and practices set forth above, and which also evidence Defendants’ unconstitutional practices, customs, failures to train, and supervise Defendant officers as set forth above.
  16. The acts or omissions of Defendants caused the PLAINTIFF to suffer physical and mental pain, among other injuries, damages, and losses.
  17. The actions and omissions of Defendants as described herein deprived the PLAINTIFF of the rights, privileges, liberties, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States of America and caused his other damages.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #11 — Constitutional and Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1988 — Violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
  2. The PLAINTIFF was denied due process and his rights were violated when Defendants gave false information to WINDSOR and judges.
  3. Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s known statutory and Constitutional rights.
  4. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, the PLAINTIFF has suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe and substantial damages. These damages include lost income, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental and emotional anguish, and distress.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #12 — Monell Claim

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
  2. At all relevant times herein, the Clerk of Court’s Office developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned de facto policies, practices, and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the PLAINTIFF’s Constitutional rights which caused the violation of such rights.
  3. Defendants ‘ unlawful actions were done willfully, knowingly, and with the specific intent to deprive the PLAINTIFF of his Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
  4. The Constitutional abuses and violations of the Clerk of Court’s Office, were and are directly and proximately caused by policies, practices and/or customs developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged and sanctioned by Defendants, including the failure: (a) to adequately supervise and train its officers and agents, including the Defendants, thereby failing to adequately discourage further Constitutional violations on the part of its Clerk of Court’s Office, and their employees; (b) to properly and adequately monitor and discipline its employees, including Defendants; and (c) to adequately and properly investigate citizen complaints of misconduct, and, instead, acts of misconduct were tolerated.
  5. Upon information and belief, Defendants acting through its Clerk of Court’s Office, developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned a de facto policy, practice, and/or custom of unlawfully interfering with and/or arresting, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, individuals who exercise their rights under the First Amendment by engaging in monitoring and documenting law enforcement and judicial misconduct.
  6. Defendants’ unlawful actions were done willfully, knowingly, and with the specific intent to deprive the PLAINTIFF of his Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
  7. The PLAINTIFF has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer serious and irreparable harm to his Constitutional rights unless Defendants are enjoined from continuing their unlawful policies, practices, and/or customs which have directly and proximately caused such Constitutional abuses.
  8. Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s known statutory and Constitutional rights.
  9. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, the PLAINTIFF has suffered, and will continue to suffer severe and substantial damages. These damages include lost income, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental and emotional anguish, and distress.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #13 — CIVIL CONSPIRACY

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
  2. Defendants conspired to damage the PLAINTIFF.
  3. Defendants formed and operated the conspiracy. The object to be accomplished was to defame, libel, slander, harass, cyberstalk, invade his privacy, falsely charge the PLAINTIFF with felonies, cause emotional distress, invade his privacy, and damage him. Evidence shows that Defendants had a meeting of the minds and actively worked together toward this objective.
  4. Multiple unlawful, overt acts were committed. There was specific intent to agree to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means.  The conspiracy occurred in the District of Columbia.  The act in, and effect on, the District of Columbia was a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy.
  5. There are underlying torts that support the conspiracy cause of action.
  6. Damage resulted to the PLAINTIFF from acts done in furtherance of the common design. The PLAINTIFF has been caused pain and suffering, emotional distress, lost enjoyment of life, loss of his marriage, damage to his relationship with his family, severe damage to his reputation, damage to his career, and more.  The PLAINTIFF’s business relationships have been severely damaged.
  7. The PLAINTIFF’s reputation is now sullied by false, defamatory information online. This defamation likely can never be erased because it is breeding in cyberspace.
  8. There was extreme risk by Defendants as there was not a remote possibility of injury or even a high probability of minor harm, but rather the likelihood of serious injury to the PLAINTIFF.
  9. Actual awareness existed because Defendants knew about the peril, but their acts demonstrated they did not care.
  10. Some Defendants aided and abetted the conspiracy and underlying torts.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #14 — EXEMPLARY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
  2. Defendants acted intentionally to damage the PLAINTIFF.
  3. Defendants committed fraud, malice, and gross negligence. This isn’t the case of someone slipping up and making one false statement.  The actions of Defendants were deliberate.
  4. Conduct of Defendants, as described above, is willful, wanton, wicked, intentional, and malicious resulting from fraud, insult, and malice, and it is associated with aggravating circumstances, including willfulness, wantonness, malice, oppression, outrageous conduct, insult, and fraud, thus warranting the PLAINTIFF’s recovery of punitive damages from each of the Defendants.
  5. The entire want of care by the Defendants shows that the acts complained of were the result of conscious indifference to the rights or welfare of the PLAINTIFF.
  6. The PLAINTIFF should receive an award of punitive/exemplary damages. Exemplary damages serve to provide the claimant with recovery above and beyond compensatory damages in order to punish the wrongdoers for egregious conduct and to deter the wrongdoers and others from similar conduct in the future.
  7. Since the PLAINTIFF’s damages can never be erased in this case; there is no amount of money that could compensate the PLAINTIFF for the loss of life as he knew it; there is no amount of money to compensate a decent, honest, law-abiding citizen for the destruction of his reputation.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #15 — INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

 

  1. If not enjoined by this Court, Defendants and their agents, representatives, and employees will continue to implement similar policies and practices that deny citizens their Constitutional rights without due process, violate their right to equal protection of the laws, and deprive people of the privileges or immunities of citizenship. This course of conduct will cause citizens to suffer irreparable injury, including but not limited to, loss of business opportunities and the deprivation of their livelihoods.  Citizens have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law for such an injury.  Accordingly, injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other authority is appropriate.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #16 — RICO RELIEF

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF asks that this Court liberally construe the RICO laws and thereby find that all Defendants, both jointly and severally, have acquired and maintained, both directly and indirectly, an interest in and/or control of a RICO enterprise of persons and of other individuals who were associated in fact, all of whom engaged in, and whose activities did affect, interstate and foreign commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); that all Defendants be required to account for all gains, profits, and advantages derived from their several acts of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s); that judgment be entered for the PLAINTIFF and against all Defendants for the PLAINTIFF’s actual damages, and for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF treble (triple) damages, under authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), according to the best available proof; that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF all damages sustained by the PLAINTIFF in consequence of Defendants’ several violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF his costs of the lawsuit incurred herein including, but not limited to, all necessary research, all non-judicial enforcement, and all reasonable counsel’s fees; that all damages caused by all Defendants, and all gains, profits, and advantages derived by all Defendants, from their several acts of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s), be deemed to be held in constructive trust for the benefit of the PLAINTIFF, his heirs and assigns; that the PLAINTIFF has such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper, under the circumstances of this action; that Defendants have conspired to acquire and maintain an interest in, and/or conspired to acquire and maintain control of, a RICO enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962(c) and (d); that Defendants have conspired to conduct and participate in said RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962(c) and (d); that all Defendants be required to account for all gains, profits, and advantages derived from their several acts of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s); that judgment be entered for the PLAINTIFF and against all Defendants for the PLAINTIFF’s actual damages, and for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF treble damages, under authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF all damages sustained by the PLAINTIFF in consequence of Defendants’ several violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF his costs of the lawsuit incurred herein including, but not limited to, all necessary research, all non-judicial enforcement, and all reasonable counsel’s fees; and that all damages caused by all Defendants, and all gains, profits, and advantages derived by all Defendants, from their several acts of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s), be deemed to be held in constructive trust for the benefit of the PLAINTIFF, his heirs and assigns.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #17 — Violations of Title II of Americans With Disabilities Act — 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213

 

  1. All preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated here for purposes of this Claim.
  2. Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from discrimination on the basis of a disability.
  3. The DEFENDANTS failed to provide modifications or reasonable accommodations to the PLAINTIFF in light of his disabilities, and the Clerk of Court HARRIS failed to adopt policies and procedures, or adequately train his staff to safely interact with people who suffer such disabilities.
  4. Some reasonable accommodations for a litigant functioning alone with Cognitive Decline and use of only one hand while traveling a thousand miles from home is to allow recording, provide all communications in writing, and communicate by email for the fastest possible delivery.
  5. Unlawful discrimination, pursuant to DOJ regulation, includes a failure to make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.” 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(7).
  6. As a proximate result of actions of the DEFENDANTS, the PLAINTIFF was injured, suffered physically and emotionally, has been unable to comply with requests of the Clerk of Court, and continues to experience fear, trauma, and anxiety.
  7. As a result of the DEFENDANTS’ violations of Title II of the ADA, the PLAINTIFF is entitled to compensatory damages.

 

  1. INJURIES

 

________________________________________________________________

 

  1. RELIEF

 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Windsor respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in his favor and against the Defendants:

  1. that this COMPLAINT be granted;
  1. Appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the unlawful and unconstitutional acts and practices of the Defendants;

 

  1. Compensatory and consequential damages, including damages for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of liberty, privacy, sense of security and individual dignity, and other pain and suffering on all claims allowed by law;

 

  1. Appropriate equitable relief against all Defendants as allowed by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including the enjoining and permanent restraining of these violations, and direction to Defendants to take such affirmative action as is necessary to ensure that the effects of the unconstitutional and unlawful practices are eliminated and do not continue to affect the PLAINTIFF or others;

 

  1. All economic losses and damages on all claims allowed by law to be established at trial;

 

  1. Punitive damages on all claims allowed by law and in an amount to be determined at trial;

 

  1. that an order be issued confirming if there was a Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648;

 

  1. that an order be issued reflecting the Due Process Notice and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. Harris, on parties in Case No. 22-7648 of the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court;

 

  1. that the Opinion of the Court in Case No. 22-7648 be provided;

 

  1. that the vote of each Justice be indicated in Case No. 22-7648;

 

  1. that the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process;

 

  1. that an order be issued that WINDSOR must be served and communicated with at windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com;

 

  1. that this Motion be granted – motion TO REQUIRE confirmation OF A Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648 and ISSUANCE OF AN Order SO CONFIRMING; order reflecting the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court in Case No. 22 7648, the Due Process Notice, and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. HARRIS, of OPINION in Case No. 22-7648 on EACH partY; RECORD OF VOTES BY EACH JUSTICE in Case No. 22-7648; ORDER THAT the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that this Motion DATED NOVEMBER 27, 2023 be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648 AT NO charge, including all audit data; AND if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. HARRIS be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648, at no charge, including all audit data; that Windsor be provided copies of letters and orders issued in every case considered in Conference since 02/01/2008; that if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. Harris;

 

  1. Issuance of an Order mandating appropriate equitable relief, including, but not limited to: (1) The imposition of policy changes designed to avoid future similar misconduct by Defendants; (2) Mandatory training designed to prevent future similar misconduct by Defendants;

 

  1. Pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate; and

 

  1. Any further relief to which PLAINTIFF may show himself justly entitled.

 

Submitted this 26th day of December 2023,

 

 

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

VERIFICATION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C.§1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NOT.

This 26th day of December 2023,

 

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this COMPLAINT has been prepared in Times New Roman 12-point font, one of the font and point selections approved by this Court and meets the requirements of this Court.

This 26th day of December 2023,

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

WINDSOR is a private individual.  He is not a nongovernmental corporation so a corporate disclosure statement is not appropriate or required by Rule 7.1.

This 26th day of December 2023,

 

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, William Michael Windsor, do swear that on this date, December 26, 2023, I have served the enclosed COMPLAINT on the DEFENDANTS in the above proceeding or their counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with first-class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days.

The names and addresses of those served are as follows:

Name:                       Scott S. Harris

Address:                    Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone:                202-479-3025

Email:                        pio@supremecourt.gov

 

Name:                       Rashonda Garner

Address:                    Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone:                202-479-3025

Email:                        PMcCabe@supremecourt.gov

 

This 26th day of December 2023,

 

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY

 

THE PLAINTIFF REQUESTS TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE.

 

This 26th day of December 2023,

 

_______________________________
WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR
,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Motion for Compliance with Rules of U.S. Supreme Court was Filed by Bill Windsor

United States Supreme Court Crime Scene

On November 27, 2023, a Motion for Compliance with Rules of U.S. Supreme Court was filed by Bill Windsor

No. 22-7648

In The Supreme Court of the United States

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Petitioner

v.

James N. Hatten, et al, Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition To The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

 Motion to Require Confirmation of a Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648 and Issuance of an Order so Confirming; order reflecting the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court in Case No. 22 7648, the Due Process Notice, and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. Harris, of Opinion in Case No. 22-7648 on each party; Reord of votes by each Justice in Case No. 22-7648; Order that the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that this Motion dated November 27, 2023 be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648 at no charge, including all audit data; and if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. Harris.

 

William M. Windsor, Pro Se – Self-Represented Litigant,

and Founding Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####, windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

    1. On May 10, 2023, William M. Windsor (“Windsor”), an individual, filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition and Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (“PETITION”). [EXHIBIT A – May 10, 2023.] This Filing was made in compliance with this Court’s Rule 29 and in the manner required by the Rules, as shown on the Certificate of Service. [EXHIBIT A, Pages 51-52.]  The appropriate number of copies were mailed to the Clerk, and a copy was sent to the Solicitor General and the attorney involved in the case.
    2. On May 10, 2023, the Docket of this Court shows: “Application (22A1009) to file petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in excess of page limits, submitted to Justice Thomas.” [EXHIBIT A, May 10, 2023.]
    3. On May 23, 2023, Justice Clarence Thomas granted the Application (22A1009) “to file petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in excess of page limits. The petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition may not exceed 49 pages.” [EXHIBIT A, May 23, 2023.]
    4. On June 1, 2023, the Waiver of the Right of Respondent United States to respond was filed. [EXHIBIT A, June 1, 2023.]
    5. On July 20, 2023, the PETITION was “DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/26/2023.” [EXHIBIT A, July 20, 2023.]
    6. WINDSOR spoke by telephone with Jake in the Clerk’s Office. Jake explained that WINDSOR’s PETITION would be considered by the nine Justices in a “Conference.”
    7. This Court’s “Filing and Rules” section explains:

“The timing for placing petitions on a conference list and distributing them to the Justices is governed by Rule 15.5, which provides as follows: “The Clerk will distribute the petition to the Court for its consideration upon receiving an express waiver of the right to file a brief in opposition, or, if no waiver or brief in opposition is filed, upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing. If a brief in opposition is timely filed, the Clerk will distribute the petition, brief in opposition, and any reply brief to the Court for its consideration no less than 14 days after the brief in opposition is filed, unless the petitioner expressly waives the 14-day waiting period.” [https://www.supremecourt.gov/casedistribution/casedistributionschedule.aspx.]

    1. Clerk Scott S. Harris has explained Conference Scheduling in a memorandum. [https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/Guidance-on-Scheduling-2023.pdf.] [EXHIBIT K.]
    2. The Supreme Court Historical Society explains the Conference process. [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/.] [EXHIBIT C.]
    3. On October 2, 2023, this Court’s Docket shows “Petition DENIED.” [EXHIBIT A, October 2, 2023.]
    4. On October 31, 2023, WINDSOR received a letter from Scott S. Harris dated October 2, 2023. [EXHIBIT D.] The letter is not even signed; it’s a stamp.  It bears no seal, and it is not signed by the Justices.  The letter does not qualify as an Order required after a Conference.  And the time has not started to run on the filing of a motion for rehearing.
    5. On October 27, 2023, WINDSOR filed a Motion for Rehearing just to be safe. [EXHIBIT E.]  It was sent by USPS. [EXHIBIT F and EXHIBIT G.]   This was 25 days after the Docket claims the Petition was denied, so it was timely (though an order has not been issued).
    6. On November 3, 2023, a letter was dated to WINDSOR by Rashonda Garner for Scott S. Harris. [EXHIBIT H.] The letter is not an order.  All copies of WINDSOR ‘s Filing were returned. [EXHIBIT I.]  The original copy is stamped “RECEIVED OCT 30 2023 Office of the Clerk Supreme Court U.S. [EXHIBIT I.]
    7. On November 20, 2023, the letter dated November 3, 2023 was received by WINDSOR. [EXHIBIT J.] The letter is not an order.
    8. On November 21, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail.
    9. On November 21, 2023, Rashonda Garner left a voicemail saying she didn’t understand WINDSOR’s message.
    10. On November 22, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail.
    11. On November 27, 2023, all of the unlawful mail dated November 3, 2023 regarding the Motion for Rehearing was sent certified mail return receipt to Rashonda Garner. [EXHIBIT H and EXHIBIT J.]

ARGUMENTS

AN ORDER MUST BE ISSUED ON THE CONFERENCE DECISION

    1. The Rules of this Court require valid evidence of the October 2, 2023 alleged denial by the Court of the Petition of William M. Windsor in Supreme Court Case #22-7648.
    2. The letters dated October 2, 2023 and November 3, 2023 are not orders and have no validity. [EXHIBIT D and EXHIBIT H.] The U.S. Supreme Court rules use the term “Letter” 13 times, and letters such as these are not authorized by the Rules.
    3. No valid evidence of the denials was attached to the letters.
    4. There is no order issued under seal, in violation of 28 U.S.C. 1691 – “All writs and process issuing from a court of the United States shall be under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk thereof.”

The word “process” at 28 U.S.C. 1691 means a court order.  See Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River Paper Co., 19 F. 252 (C.C. W.D. Wisconsin 1884);  Taylor v. U.S., 45 F. 531 (C.C. E.D. Tennessee 1891);  U.S. v. Murphy, 82 F. 893 (DCUS Delaware 1897);  Leas & McVitty v. Merriman, 132 F. 510 (C.C. W.D. Virginia 1904);  U.S. v. Sharrock, 276 F. 30 (DCUS Montana 1921);  In re Simon, 297 F. 942, 34 ALR 1404 (2nd Cir. 1924);  Scanbe Mfg. Co. v. Tryon, 400 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1968);  and Miles v. Gussin, 104 B.R. 553 (Bankruptcy D.C. 1989).

    1. Therefore, Windsor is requesting an order by the Court with a seal of the court and an actual signature of Scott S. Harris. This Due Process Notice and Service by Clerk of the Court Scott S. Harris is to be made on parties in 22-7648 of the valid record of denial of the Petition by the Court.

WINDSOR’S CONFERENCE DECISION MUST BE PUBLISHED

    1. This Court’s Conference Decisions must be published, and WINDSOR’s has not.

“All conference decisions are published.” [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/ — EXHIBIT C, Paragraph 5.]

“When the vote has been taken on a case, the writing of an opinion is assigned—by the Chief if he voted with the majority, otherwise by the senior Justice of the majority.” [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/ — EXHIBIT C, Paragraph 6.]

WINDSOR’S FILINGS MUST BE DOCKETED

    1. WINDSOR’S filing of a Motion for Rehearing [EXHIBIT E.] has been unlawfully excluded from the Docket. [EXHIBIT A.] It was timely filed with the Clerk in paper form – an original and 10 copies.  There was no service by this Cour.
    2. “Filing” is defined as:

“To place a paper in the official custody of the clerk of court to enter into the files or records of a case. [https://www.uscourts.gov/glossary#letter_f]

“the act of giving an official form or document to someone in authority in order to begin a legal process.” [Britannica Dictionary definition of FILING.]

“to deposit with the clerk of the court a written complaint or petition which is the opening step in a lawsuit and subsequent documents, including an answer, demurrer, motions, petitions, and orders. [Copyright © 1981 2005 by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill.].

      1. This Court’s Rule 29 requires:

“1. Any document required or permitted to be presented to the Court or to a Justice shall be filed with the Clerk in paper form.

“2. A document is timely filed if it is received by the Clerk in paper form within the time specified for filing; or if it is sent to the Clerk through the United States Postal Service by first-class mail (including express or priority mail), postage prepaid, and bears a postmark, other than a commercial postage meter label, showing that the document was mailed on or before the last day for filing; or if it is delivered on or before the last day for filing to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery to the Clerk within 3 calendar days….”

    1. Clerk Scott S. Harris of the United States Supreme Court seems to be routinely violating the due process requirements of many litigants.
    2. Such Notice and Service are overdue, and Windsor demands that it be executed immediately.
    3. Windsor asks that this Motion be docketed pursuant to Due Process and that a valid adjudication of the Motion be noticed and served on the parties.
    4. Windsor also requests all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under No. 22-7648, including all audit data. The audit data is the login name and login time of the individuals who entered any data in the records.
    5. WINDSOR believes these unlawful practices have taken place for at least 15 years. WINDSOR requests copies of all letters issued rather than orders in every case since 01/01/2008.

ALL ORDERS AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH WINDSOR

MUST BE SENT BY EMAIL

    1. Documents attached hereto show that WINDSOR does not receive mail promptly. The American Association of Non-Lawyers requires that non-lawyers receive all communications by email.  This eliminates one of the many unfair advantages given to lawyers.
    2. WINDSOR is a resident of South Dakota by using a mail service and registering with the state. It seems to take at least seven days for mail to get to South Dakota.  As WINDSOR lives full-time in a camper, it takes at least another seven days for mail to be forwarded to whatever RV Park he is visiting.  Because of attempts to murder him and recent death threats, safety requires that WINDSOR move a lot.  This can cause additional delays.
    3. WINDSOR must be served and communicated with at windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com.

WINDSOR MUST BE ISSUED AN ORDER ON HIS MOTION FOR REHEARING, AND HE MUST BE GIVEN THE PROPER TIME TO RESPOND TO ANY OBJECTION

    1. Rule 44 (2) provides: “Any petition for the rehearing of an order denying a petition for a writ of certiorari or extraordinary writ shall be filed within 25 days after the date of the order of denial….”
    2. There has been no “order of denial,” so the time has not started to run on rehearing.
    3. WINDSOR is a private individual. He is not a nongovernmental corporation so a corporate disclosure statement is not appropriate or required.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Windsor respectfully requests:

    1. that this Motion be granted;
    2. that an order be issued confirming that there was a Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648;
    3. that an order be issued reflecting the Due Process Notice and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. Harris, on parties in Case No. 22-7648 of the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court;
    4. that the Opinion of the Court be provided;
    5. that the vote of each Justice be indicated in Case No. 22-7648;
    6. that the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process;
    7. that an order be issued that WINDSOR must be served and communicated with at windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com;
    8. that this Motion be granted – motion Tto require confirmation of a Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648 and Issuance of an Order so confirming; order reflecting the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court in Case No. 22 7648, the Due Process Notice, and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. Harris, of OPINION in Case No. 22-7648 on each party; Record of votes by each Justice in Case No. 22-7648; Order that the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that this Motion dated November 27, 2023 be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648 at no charge, including all audit data; and if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. Harris be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648, at no charge, including all audit data; that Windsor be provided copies of letters and orders issued in every case considered in Conference since 02/01/2008; that if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. Harris;
    9. that this Court grant such other relief as is appropriate.

Submitted this 27th day of November 2023,

William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

VERIFICATION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C.§1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NOT.

This 27th day of November 2023,

 William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this Application has been prepared in Century 12-point font, one of the font and point selections approved by this Court and meets the requirements of this Court.

William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, William M. Windsor, do swear that on this date, November 27, 2023, I have served the enclosed MOTION on the DEFENDANTS in the above proceeding or their counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with first-class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days.

The names and addresses of those served are as follows:

Solicitor General of the United States

Room 5614, Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20530–0001.

RYAN K. BUCHANAN – GABRIEL A. MENDEL

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY — ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

600 United States Courthouse

75 Ted Turner Drive, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Telephone: 404-581-6000 — Facsimile: 404-581-6181

Email: gabriel.mendel@usdoj.gov

 

This 27th day of November 2023,

William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

 

Facebook Groups Battling Corruption

Fight corruption

Bill Windsor is a member of these Groups that are battling corruption and INjustice.  So far, he has calculated 495,243 Members with 111 Groups yet to be calculated.

You are encouraged to support these Groups:

    #              Group Name and Link……………………………..  Members

1 18th Judicial Circuit Court Corruption, Fraud, Racketeering/RICO, Cover-ups 991
2 4 Family Justice
3 A LIST OF ALL MY GROUPS FOR MOTHERS AND CHILDREN’S RIGHTS! 1600
4 A.I.B. Radio with Rod Class & Team Fan Group
5 ABC Investigate CPS #FOSTERWAR
6 Abused Foster kids #FOSTERWAR
7 Accountability For Ryan Ferguson
8 Activist Community Classifieds
9 ACTUAL INNOCENCE
10 Adoption Truth and Transparency Worldwide Information Network
11 Advocates Against CPS Corruption 699
12 AFFIDAVITS OF TRUTH
13 AGAINST CPS/FAMILY COURT CORRUPTION 9800
14 AGAINST CPS/FAMILY COURT CORRUPTION 2 2900
15 Agent Gaia – Anti-corruption Cell 346
16 ALARM – Advocating Legislation for the Adoption Reform Movement
17 Alienation Anonymous
18 Alleghany County Copwatch
19 Amarillo,Texas Parental Alienation Awareness 69
20 AMERICA FIRST WITH DONALD J TRUMP 71000
21 American Citizens Against Family Court Corruption And Human Trafficking 2100
22 American Fathers Liberation Army
23 Americans Against Corruption Los Angeles County 104
24 AMERICANS AGAINST FORECLOSURE ( AAF ) 2600
25 Americans Fighting for Justice 144
26 Americans for a Reformed Family Court System 315
27 Americas Wrongfully Convicted
28 Among The Wolves
29 Andrew Breitbart- King of the New Media
30 ANONYMOUS GLOBAL SOLIDARITY ALLIANCE – GSA
31 Anonymous To Expose Corruption 8100
32 ANTI CORRUPTION EXPOSE FRAUD INSALUBRITE
33 ANTI OFFICIAL CORRUPTION SOCIAL JUSTICE UNDERGROUND NETWORK 121
34 Anti-Corruption Network 7900
35 ATROCITIES AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND THOSE WHO COMMIT THEM
36 Attorneys who Fight Child Protection Services False Accusations #FosterWar 16200
37 BCA
38 BEATING THE DRUM FOR JUSTICE FOR OUR CHILDREN!!!
39 BeLoud Erie/Niagara New York 747
40 Birthday Wishes for Little Sabrina 95
41 Boomers & Others Against Corruption in Government 11800
42 Bring back our kids #FOSTERWAR
43 Bring our Mom Betty Hayes Home 501
44 C.A.M.S (Child Abuse Must Stop) 3200
45 C.A.N. Law public notice for Pro Se’ Litigants 273
46 California DCFS/Court Watch & Support Group/cps, etcetera ALL 1700
47 California Parents Advocacy Group (CPAG)
48 California Targeted Parents
49 Camp Patriot 2015
50 CERN- Large Hadron Collider
51 CHILD ABUSE & MURDER CPS MUST REFORM 48
52 CHILD PROTECTION WILL REFORM SOOM!!!!! 3
53 Child Protective Services Endanger Child 98
54 Child Safety Advocate
55 Children’s Rights 16500
56 Christopher Slitor Memorial Page
57 CITIES OF THE WORLD
58 Citizens Against Corruption Group
59 Citizens Against Injustice And Corruption (CAIAC) 1400
60 Citizens for Criminal JUSTICE
61 Citizens that have been denied “Due Process” in the courts 603
62 Class Action Lawsuits (Minnesota only at this time)
63 Cobb County Corruption 271
64 Collection of Best Against CPS Corruption Quotes 1600
65 Colorado Corruption 141
66 Come Clean On Child Abuse 2000
67 Commission on Judicial Performance Reform Project
68 Concerned Citizens Against Corruption 1200
69 Constitution Society
70 Constitutional Sheriffs and Peace Officers Association
71 Continue the Fight
72 CopBlock.org Fan Group
73 CORRUPTIN IN HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
74 Corruption 2500
75 Corruption Central CA$, CP$, Police and Judges 2200
76 Corruption Crime Victims United. CCVU 372
77 Corruption in Our Local Government 21
78 CORRUPTION INJUNCTION 248
79 Corruption is the Issue! 1600
80 CORRUPTION WITHIN AMERICA ! 276
81 COUNTERFEIT JUSTICE NO MORE IN THE USA! CONGRESS MUST ACT!
82 COURT FALSIFICATION BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 36
83 Court Reform
84 COURT VICTIM NETWORK 2
85 CPS & Family Court Corruption #Reform 4600
86 CPS & Kangaroo Courthouse Psych Injustice TAKEDOWN! 48
87 CPS Corruption-Stop The Inhumanity!! 685
88 CPS Involvement, Past or Present, Prayer Chain 111
89 CPS Victims 742
90 CPS/FAMILY COURT CORRUPTION SUCKS !! 971
91 CPS/Family court corruption support group 357
92 CPS/FAMILY COURT Corruption​ Support Group Henderson County, TX 2900
93 CREATE LEGAL DOCUMENTS USING DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN FILED AGAINST YOU
94 Criminal Injustice & Prison Reform
95 Crooked Judges 326
96 Cumberland county pennsylvania corruption civil and criminal 12
97 DANGERS AND CORRUPTION IN MODERN MEDICINE…. 586
98 Daveyone FamilyLawman:(1958) Fan Club!
99 Dcf corruption 354
100 Dcyf Reform
101 Death Penalty News
102 DEVIN S INJUSTICE
103 Doll Alternative Truth
104 DON SIEGELMAN AND OTHER INNOCENT PEOPLE SHOULD BE FREE
105 Dr Phil Expose CPS #FOSTERWAR 13100
106 draw attention to the PAS: Parental Alienation Syndrome ; issue.
107 Elder Abuse must STOP!!!
108 Ellis County Texas UNCENSORED
109 Emotional Abuse Awareness
110 END CPS CRIMES – BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY 4100
111 End Michigan Probate Corruption
112 Estate Theft Corruption Probate 305
113 Every Child Deserves Care
114 Exoneration by DNA
115 Expose Corruption, Civil Rights Violations, Judges, Cps 4000
116 Expose Fraud and Corruption in Family Court 17700
117 Exposing Corruption 1100
118 Exposing corruption in the justice system Group 195
119 Faces Of Child Abuse
120 Faces on Death Row
121 False & Compromised Domestic Violence Allegations
122 Falsely Accused Network
123 Families of the Wrongfully Convicted
124 Families United! (against CPS and Family Court corruption)
125 Family Court Corruption 124
126 family court corruption 490
127 Family Court Reform 28
128 Family Forward Project
129 Family Welfare Cooperative Membership Group
130 FATHERS RIGHTS
131 Fathers Rights (USA Group)
132 fight cps corruption 8900
133 Fight CPS in Maine 305
134 Fight DCFS Corruption 368
135 Fight for your rights
136 Fight the unconstitutional per se laws! 5
137 fightcps 2.0 257
138 FightCPS.com — Fight CPS, Fix CPS 9200
139 Fighting for Families Support Group 1700
140 Fighting for the Constitution 8400
141 First amendment audits pro constitutional rights anti color of law 2100
142 Florida Corruption/Warriors and Whistleblowers/Exposing the Truth 250
143 Florida Father’s Coalition
144 Foreclosure Fraud Discussion Group
145 Forsyth County, Georgia: LAW v. POLITICS
146 Frank Report Exposé – Family Court Corruption 156
147 Free David Camm
148 Free Hannah Overton
149 Free Larry Bones 78
150 Free Rodney Lincoln NOW!!!!
151 Free Thalia Outlaw
152 Free The Wrongfully Convicted
153 Freedom for Michael Amick
154 FREEDOM4Yankton4
155 Fruithunter Films
156 FTP= FILM THE POLICE… EVERYWHERE.. MAKE THEM ACCOUNTABLE
157 GD Non Attorney Pro Se Consultant 294
158 George – Injustice Talk
159 Georgia Ethics
160 Georgia Peace and Justice Coalition
161 Georgians For Constitutional Government 1600
162 GL?BAL CHILD/HUMAN TRAFFICKING WILL END (SPREAD AWARENESS) WORLDWIDE
163 Government & corruption everywhere 30
164 Government corruption/Legal child kidnapping rings. Doc’s/Cps/Dhs/MCFD. 1100
165 Grandparents against cps corruption 433
166 GRAVE INJUSTICE IN MISSISSIPPI – THE WRONGFUL CONVICTION OF MICHAEL LINDSEY
167 Greg Laurie we demand you expose CPS 759
168 Guardianship Court Corruption Victims 2021 222
169 Hope for Prison Inmate Families
170 I Hate CPS – (Child Protective Services) 6800
171 I Hate Liars
172 I Stand With Lou Pelletier: Free Justina!
173 I support the Constitution and Bill of Rights 449
174 Indiana – Grandparent Rights Advocates National Delegation USA
175 Injustice Anywhere – wrongful convictions
176 Injustice Everywhere – Victims of Law
177 Injustice Utah
178 Innocent Beat!! Beating the Drum for the Wrongly Accused
179 Insanity In Government Cannot Be Tolerated Anymore
180 International Association of Victims of Parental Alienation
181 ISLIP TOWN CORRUPTION 137
182 It’s all about the kids. Voices of Silence
183 J.E.R.K. O.F.F. (Judicial Ethics Reporting Knowingly Organizing Fraud to F 216
184 JACKASS JUDGES 832
185 Jade Helm 15 Research Lab
186 JAM (Judicial Accountability Movement) 5700
187 Joint Custody with an Abuser
188 Judges and Judiciary USA: 1st Amendment Politically Protected Speech 151
189 JUDICIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
190 Judicial Corruption and Separation of Power Vote Lawyers OUT! 727
191 JURY TRIALS FOR PARENTS 532
192 Justice Denied?? You Decide !! 381
193 JUSTICE FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN FOR ALL CHILDREN KIDNAPPED THEIR NAMES 1800
194 Justice for Heather Lenaye Hanson #WWHD
195 Justice For Jamie Snow
196 Justice for Lawless America’s Bill Windsor 22
197 Justice For My Brother
198 Justice for Nick Christie , Murdered by LCSO Deputies 72
199 Justice for Victoria “Tori” Herr
200 Justice Reform Discussion
201 Keyboard Warriors
202 Kidnapping Cops
203 Leesburg Fl Breaking News
204 Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
205 Liberal Revolutionaries Fighting Inequality & Corruption 3000
206 Liberty and Justice for all (The Nancy Schaefer Project) 107
207 Los Angeles Superior Court Corruption 386
208 Make PARENTAL ALIENATION a crime
209 MAKING FRIENDS THROUGH LIBERTY!!!!!
210 MASSACHUSETTS MOTHERS Call To Action
211 Men’s Rights Movement
212 Men’s Space
213 Michigan government corruption 59
214 Minnesota Parental Alienation Monthly
215 Missourians Against Probate Guardianship Abuse and Corruption 196
216 National Coalition for Criminal Justice Reform
217 Neighbors Against Corruption 963
218 New England First Amendment Coalition
219 New England News Events and Commerce
220 OCCUPY CENTRAL
221 OCCUPY GLOBAL NETWORK
222 Occupy Justice
223 OCCUPY ROUND TABLE
224 Of the people, by the people, for the people 106
225 Official Jeff Havard Discussion Group
226 ok
227 Op Expose CPS Iowa #OpExposeCPS 199
228 Op Expose DHR/CPS Alabama #OpExposeCPS 498
229 OpExposeCPS Operation Expose CPS 6000
230 Oregon Fighting CPS Corruption 139
231 Parental Alienation 7900
232 Parental Alienation (moderated)
233 Parental Alienation Awareness of America
234 Parental Alienation Awareness Organization USA
235 PARENTAL ALIENATION AWARENESS, IOWA
236 Parental Alienation IS Child Abuse
237 Parental Alienation Support and Information Solution
238 Parental Revolution
239 Parenting is a Civil Right!
240 Parents against CHILD PREDATORS
241 parents against cps corruption 293
242 Parents Against CPS Corruption (PACPSC) 2000
243 Parents fighting back against CPS CORRUPTION in the U.S. 5500
244 Parents in Custody Battles Support Group 20700
245 PARENTS OF LEGALLY STOLEN CHILDREN CPS Corruption 463
246 Parents Of Murdered & Missing Children
247 Parent’s Rights Call to Action
248 Parents united
249 Parents United For The Love Of Our Children
250 Parents United to Expose DCF/CPS Corruption 1500
251 Parents” CA-CPS”, Experienced, Educated, and United 148
252 PASG – Parental Alienation Support Group
253 PASO-Arizona
254 PATRIOT INVESTIGATORS 32
255 Patriots Devoted to Freedom 6700
256 Pay it forward
257 People v Money: Big Business, Judicial Corruption, and You 1800
258 People’s Party
259 Petitions make change possible
260 PETITIONS to Restore the Constitution and the Rule of Law in the USA 887
261 PFM / Child Support Reform
262 Playing it forward
263 Police Accountability
264 POLICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND FASCISM IN THE US 195
265 Police Brutality / Corruption / Excessive Force (WE ARE WATCHING) 525
266 Police Corruption And Wrongdoing
267 Police corruption bentley hospital corruption alex christianopoulos story
268 Police Shootings,Brutality,Corruption,Misconduct & Government Corruption 2700
269 Porthole To Justice Est. 2014
270 Press For Truth 6800
271 Prison Reform Movement
272 Prison Reform Unity Project
273 Prisoners and family support
274 Pro Se For All 20
275 Pro Se Litigants 61
276 Pro Se Support Group 374
277 Pro Se USA 30
278 ProSe Law School 2
279 Protest against public corruption FACEBOOK GROUP 413
280 PsychSearch
281 PUBG MOBİLE ?VS ?CLASH OF CLANS YARDIMLAŞMA
282 PUBLIC OFFICIAL AND JUDICIAL CORRUPTION 661
283 Race and Injustice
284 Raising Awareness of Forced Adoption and Parental Alienation
285 Reach Higher Ground
286 Red Oak Talk 2.0 8300
287 Reform Family Court/End Government Corruption 1900
288 Reform Family Law Courts 3600
289 REMEMBERING OUR ANGELS. GRAPHICS WITH LOVE
290 Remove Family And Matrimonial Court Corruption 145
291 Report Corruption In Hawaii
292 Restoring America Together 7800
293 Saving my stolen daughter…A mother’s worse nightmare turned reality.
294 Scream The News
295 SERGEANT MAJOR’S TRUTHER INFO
296 Siskiyou County Corruption and Injustices 192
297 Social Services and the Family Court (Help & Guidance) UK
298 Social Worker of the Year #FOSTERWAR
299 SOMEWHERE ELSE – SOME VERY GOOD POSTS OF WORLD-CLASS QUALITY
300 Soul awareness
301 Stand against Child Abuse
302 Standing Up For Shawn
303 State Wide Accountability for Judicial Officers 342
304 STOLEN MONTANA
305 Stop Abuse Campaign Action Team
306 Stop Abuse For Everyone
307 Stop Child Abuse. 9100
308 Stop convicting the innocent
309 Stop CPS Corruption & End Child Trafficking 108
310 Stop False Accusations Against Innocent Men
311 Stop government abuse of power
312 Stop Parent Alienation
313 STOP POLICE BRUTALITY
314 Stop Police Violence EVERYWHERE
315 STOP RECORDING FRAUD, HOLD THE PUBLIC SERVANTS ACCOUNTABLE (SECURE)
316 stop social services taking children in to care for the wrong reasons 14300
317 stopping cps dhs from taking our children 3
318 STORIES FOR OUR CHILDREN THAT HAS BEEN STOLEN BY CPS 216
319 SUI JURIS
320 Sui Juris Committe
321 Support Assange and WikiLeaks Coalition (SAWC)
322 SUPPORT WHISTLEBLOWERS 7900
323 Tactical [sovereignty], administrating the Estate & today’s Matrix.
324 Take back America :Are you in or out.The GROUP
325 TAKEN:PHOTOS OF AMERICAS CHILDREN TAKEN BY CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 5200
326 The ABQ OFFICE of JUDICIAL CORRUPTION & CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS REPORTING 100
327 The Californa Women’s Think Tank
328 THE FAMILY VIOLENCE PROJECT 593
329 The Mississippi Justice Project
330 The Original Americans Defending Freedom
331 The Outcome of How Alienation Or Court Ordered Visits Affected You
332 The people against forced adoption
333 The People Against Negligent Social Workers… 2200
334 The Pro Se’ Tech Center files 757
335 The Secret / Shadow Goverment
336 THE TRUTH IS OUT!!!
337 The Who’s Who of Family Rights
338 The Worlds Wrongfully Convicted
339 TIs Media Team
340 TO SERVE AND PROTECT THE CHILDREN-(REAL PARENTS, FIGHTING FOR CHILDREN
341 Troy Citizens United (TCU)
342 Trump’s Victory
343 Truth Finders For Justice ~ Network Free Discuss Room
344 TRUTH MOVEMENT CANADA – TMC [GSA]
345 Unite As One Group.
346 United Bikers For Unjust Causes and Tragedies
347 United Parents for Children, NY
348 Uniting and fighting. GIVE OUR CHILDREN BACK!
349 Unjustly Taken National
350 US Attorney General Save Matthew Moore
351 US Bolshevism is an enemy of human rights 192
352 USA/EU Corporate Media Lies & Deception: Betraying Own People 15600
353 UTAH 4 JUSTICE
354 Victims of Judicial Corruption—Make Your Voices Heard 1700
355 Voices for Victims-Justice 4 All
356 Wake up: The World Needs You 33200
357 WARRIORS OF LIGHT AND LIGHT KEEPERS
358 WE ARE AGAINST FAMILY COURT JUDGES
359 We Stand for Darlie Routier
360 We the People 16700
361 We the People For Donald Trump 10400
362 WE TOLD U SO
363 Welcome Home Brad Cooper
364 West coast parents united
365 When We Stand Together We Take Back America Campaign
366 WHISTLE-BLOWERS & VICTIMS FIGHTING AGAINST CPS/SS/FAMILY COURT CORRUPTION! 2100
367 WIN “Wrongfully Convicted, Inmate Support, Needs Encouragement”
368 Wrongly Convicted Group
369 Your Rights and the Law
370 YOUR VOICE… AN OIL MARKET RANT! ENOUGH IS ENOUGH! TIME FOR COMMON SENSE! 4

William M. Windsor

I, William M. Windsor, am not an attorney.  This website expresses my OPINIONS.   The comments of visitors or guest authors to the website are their opinions and do not therefore reflect my opinions.  Anyone mentioned by name in any article is welcome to file a response.   This website does not provide legal advice.  I do not give legal advice.  I do not practice law.  This website is to expose government corruption, law enforcement corruption, political corruption, and judicial corruption.  Whatever this website says about the law is presented in the context of how I or others perceive the applicability of the law to a set of circumstances if I (or some other author) was in the circumstances under the conditions discussed.  Despite my concerns about lawyers in general, I suggest that anyone with legal questions consult an attorney for an answer, particularly after reading anything on this website.  The law is a gray area at best.  Please read our Legal Notice and Terms.

Proposed Legislation to Save America Ignored by the U.S. Congress

U.S. Congress was a no-show meeting regarding legislation to fix corruptionProposed Legislation to Save America was presented to the U.S. Congress

in 2013 by Lawless America.

It was hand-delivered by constituents.  We invited them to a meeting at our hotel.  This photo shows the turnout.  This was completely ignored.

Here is the proposal:  Word File — PDF File

Can 750 Nobodies save America? Apparently not.  So, we are going for hundreds of thousands.

Please read the sections of the PDF file that apply to your interests, and email bill@lawlessamerica.com with suggested changes, additions, and deletions.

Honesty….1

Accountability & Grand Juries…..2

Immunity…..4

Judges…..4

Legal Procedures…..7

Legal Costs…..9

Legal Procedures…..10

Statute of Limitations…..13

Law Enforcement…..13

Criminal Courts…..14

Military Courts…..17

Guardianship & Elder Abuse…..18

Property & Foreclosure…..18

Children & Family Courts……18

Divorce court…..22

Domestic Violence…..22

Congress…..22

Elections…..23

Restitution…..23

William Michael Windsor will be publishing this as a book, along with your input.  The book is titled “SAVING AMERICA.”

Crowd cheering about proposed legislation to Save America.
Crowd cheering about proposed legislation to Save America.

A vital part of the plan to Save America is to build an association to compete with the American Bar Association and the corrupt judges.

Please Join Bill Windsor for The Pro-Se Podcast.

The Pro-Se Podcast will focus on building an association to compete with the American Bar Association.  63% of the people in court today are not represented by attorneys or members of the BAR, and they usually lose.  They suffer a complete deprivation of Constitutional rights.
Bill Windsor spent 16 years compiling a book of the Top Secret Rules used by judges to inflict corruption.  It’s titled Benchbook for U.S. Judges – Corruption Edition. We need to build an association to compete.  It is our best hope to save America.

Register at TalkShoe.com.

All you need is a cellphone or microphone for your PC.  If you have a webcam, you also have the option to participate by video.
If you aren’t already registered with Talkshoe, it’s simple and FREE here — REGISTER AT TALKSHOE.
Bill Windsor will host and operate the control panel.  At the start, he will do an introduction.  He will explain a brief history of the American Bar Association and provide statistics to show the numbers we need to compete.
Then Bill will open the microphones of those who “raise their hand” and ask to speak. unless they are known scumbags.
We will discuss why this could be an excellent option for beating corruption in our courts.
We will discuss the best day and time and discuss realistic ways we can amass big numbers of members.
We will discuss names.  We will discuss website options.
Membership in this new association of Pro-Se litigants does have a fee — one penny.
We will discuss less expensive ways for people to pay their penny to become a member of this new association to compete with the BAR Association.
If you buy the book that identifies the Corruption Rules used by corrupt judges and lawyers, email Bill Windsor at Pro-Se-1@outlook.com to inform Bill that you have done so, and he will donate a penny to make you a member.
We will discuss connections — your connections with groups. Post this on the Groups you are a member of, and ask the Admins to post this and encourage every member to participate.
The Pro-Se Podcast will be held each week.

Login at TalkShoe.com, or Dial: 605-562-0444 – Show ID: 7863630.

windsor-bill-1983-04-02-ranch-facebook-photo-200w
Friday, October 13, 2023 at 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time.
Please send Bill Windsor an email to Pro-Se-1@outlook.com so he can put you on his email list and won’t waste time hunting for it.
WE MUST SAVE AMERICA!

William M. Windsor

I, William M. Windsor, am not a lawyer.  This website expresses my OPINIONS.   The comments of visitors or guest authors to the website are their opinions and do not therefore reflect my opinions.  Anyone mentioned by name in any article is welcome to file a response.   This website does not provide legal advice.  I do not give legal advice.  I do not practice law.  This website is to expose government corruption, law enforcement corruption, political corruption, and judicial corruption.  Whatever this website says about the law is presented in the context of how I or others perceive the applicability of the law to a set of circumstances if I (or some other author) was in the circumstances under the conditions discussed.  Despite my concerns about lawyers in general, I suggest that anyone with legal questions consult an attorney for an answer, particularly after reading anything on this website.  The law is a gray area at best.  Please read our Legal Notice and Terms.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HEARS WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR’S PETITION

MIDNIGHT SEPTEMBER 26, 2023. THE DAY HAS COME. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HEARS WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR’S PETITION.
Nine of the most famous people in America will sit down at a special conference table in the Supreme Court building in Washington, DC today and discuss me and my case.
It is historic for a pro se party to have done this. A WIN will make it even more historic — first pro se party to prevail at the United States Supreme Court in 52 years, and only the second in HISTORY.
This should set precedents that will be cited from now on. It will help all pro se parties and the 63% who cannot afford an attorney.
I don’t know when their opinion will be announced. I plan to call Jake, the Clerk to Justice Clarence Thomas, at the end of the day. I’ll apologize for calling, and I’ll ask if he can tell me what happened.

Bill Windsor has published BENCHBOOK for U.S. JUDGES – Corruption Edition

Benchbook for U.S. Judges - Corruption Edition

 

Order your copy at Amazon.

 
Please buy (only $9.99), and please SHARE this with everyone you know. I make $3.32 per sale, and that money will be used to issue a national news release on my historic case with the United States Supreme Court that will be heard by the nine justices on September 26, 2023
 
I humbly believe this book has the potential to make the greatest impact ever made in the battle against judicial corruption.
BENCHBOOK for U.S. JUDGES: Corruption Edition is a statement of the Rules used by judges when they feel Corruption is needed.
This is a TOP SECRET set of Rules that is unlawful and is carefully guarded by judges nationwide.
There are 30 Corruption Rules explained:

Rule #1: LIE;  Rule #2: Lie Some More;  Rule #3: Deny Constitutional Rights;  Rule #4: Ignore the Law;  Rule #5: Cite Invalid Law;  Rule #6: Ignore the Facts;  Rule #7: Ignore Issues;  Rule #8: Say Nothing in Orders;  Rule #9: Dismiss Cases or Grant Summary Judgment; Rule #10: Refuse to Disqualify Yourself;  Rule #11: Violate Your Oath of Office and the Code of Judicial Conduct;  Rule #12: Conceal Evidence;  Rule #13: Tamper with Evidence;  Rule #14: Order Monetary Sanctions Against Parties You Want to Damage;  Rule #15: Violate and Ignore the Rules of Civil Procedure;  Rule #16: Automatically Rule against Certain Classes of People;  Rule #17: Order Monetary Sanctions Against Parties You Want to Sanction;  Rule #18: Conspire with Fellow Judges and Judicial Employees;  Rule #19: Allow Perjury;  Rule #20: Deny Hearings;  Rule #21: Practice Simulated Litigation;  Rule #22: Deny Jury Trials;  Rule #23: Don’t Publish Improper Orders;  Rule #24: Deny Right to Obtain Discovery;  Rule #25: Deny Right to File Actions;  Rule #26: Order a Disfavored Party to Appear in Person When You Know They Can’t;  Rule #27: Bring in a Judge from Another County to Serve as Your Executioner;  Rule #28: Communicate with Court Employees, Attorneys, Judges, Law Enforcement, Government Agencies, and Others Unlawfully;  Rule #29: Deny In Forma Pauperis Status;  Rule #30: Simply Do Nothing.

Key Corruption Terms are defined: The Favored Party, The Designated Loser, The Naughty List.
Annotations have been provided. These are used primarily to inform litigants of ways to deal with these secret rules.

Ku Klux Klan Act – 42 USC 1983 – Sue for Violation of Civil Rights

Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 200w

This is an article I published in 2010.  There is a lot of excellent information about a federal lawsuit against the City of Amarillo and 50 criminals and for Ellis County and a boatload of criminals from Ellis County that John Eric Armstrong is expected to file Here’s the Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit. It is pursuant to The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.  You may know it as 42 U.S.C. 1983.  

I copied it from http://www.constitution.org/brief/forsythe_42-1983.htm

A GUIDE TO CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

AN OVERVIEW OF SUPREME COURT AND ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT

IAN D. FORSYTHE

Hilyard, Bogan, Palmer & Lockeby, P.A.

105 East Robinson Street, Suite 201

Orlando, Florida 32801

Tel. (407) 425-4251

forsythe@forsythelaw.com

 

42 u s c 1983 n 640w


I.           INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

42 U.S.C. § 1983, commonly referred to as “section 1983” provides:

Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.  For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).

Section 1983 was enacted on April 20, 1871 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and is also known as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” because one of its primary purposes was to provide a civil remedy against the abuses that were being committed in the southern states, especially by the Ku Klux Klan.  While the existing law protected all citizens in theory, its protection in practice was unavailable to some because those persons charged with the enforcement of the laws were unable or unwilling to do so.[1] The Act was intended to provide a private remedy for such violations of federal law, and has subsequently been interpreted to create a species of tort liability.[2]

The number of cases that have been brought under section 1983 has dramatically increased since 1961 when the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape.[3] In Monroe, the Supreme Court held that a police officer was acting “under color of state law” even though his actions violated state law.[4] This was the first case in which the Supreme Court allowed liability to attach where a government official acted outside the scope of the authority granted to him by state law.  Since Monroe v. Pape was decided, an extensive body of law has developed to govern section 1983 claims.  This article is intended to provide an overview of that extensive body of law, and will include seminal precedent from the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals–a comprehensive study of all law related to section 1983 is beyond the scope of this article.

II.            ELEMENTS OF A SECTION 1983 CLAIM

(i)            “Every person . . .”

Only “persons” under the statute are subject to liability.[5] A state is not a person subject to suit under section 1983,[6] but a state officer can be sued in his official capacity for prospective or injunctive relief[7] despite the fact that an suit against a government official in his official capacity represents nothing more than a suit against the government entity itself![8] Despite this logical inconsistency, the current state of the law is that a state may not be sued for damages, but may be sued for declaratory or injunctive relief.  Municipalities and local governments are persons subject to suit for damages and prospective relief,[9] but the United States Government is not.[10] Individual employees of federal,[11] state[12] and local[13] government may be sued in their individual capacities[14] for damages, declaratory or injunctive relief.

While the determination of who is a “person” is a matter of federal statutory interpretation, the matter of who has the capacity to be sued is determined by the law of the forum state.[15] Likewise, the law of the forum is to be applied in actions under section 1983 where the law of section 1983 provides no guidance.[16]

(ii)            “. . . who under color of [state law][17] . . .”

The traditional definition of acting under the color of state law requires that the defendant have exercised power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law,”[18] and such actions may result in liability even if the defendant abuses the position given to him by the state.[19] A private actor may also act under color of state law under certain circumstances.[20] For example, it has been held that a physician who contracts with the state to provide medical care to inmates acts under the color of state law.[21] For all practical purposes, the “color of state law” requirement is identical to the “state action” prerequisite to constitutional liability.[22]

(iii)            “. . . subjects or causes to be subjected . . .”

Section 1983 does not impose a state of mind requirement independent of the underlying basis for liability,[23] but there must be a causal connection between the defendant’s actions and the harm that results.[24] In order to hold a local government liable under section 1983, the Supreme Court has interpreted this causation element to require that the harm be the result of action on the part of the government entity that implemented or executed a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers, or the result of the entity’s custom.[25] Further, the entity’s policy or custom must have been the “moving force” behind the alleged deprivation.[26] This “custom or policy” requirement is a dramatic departure from the rule of respondeat superior that prevails in many common law actions.[27]

A local government is said to have an unconstitutional policy when it fails to train its employees, and the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to an obvious need for such training, and the failure train will likely result in the employee making a wrong decision.[28] An unconstitutional policy may also exist if an isolated action of a government employee is dictated by a “final policymaker,”[29] or if the authorized policymaker approves a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.[30] However, a supervisor can only be liable in his individual capacity if he directly participates in causing the harm–relying upon respondeat superior is insufficient.[31] The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a plaintiff must meet a heightened pleading standard to state a claim against a municipality for an unconstitutional custom or policy.[32]

(iv) “. . . [any person to] the deprivation of rights . . .”

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, it merely provides a method for the vindication of rights elsewhere conferred in the United States Constitution and Laws.[33] Therefore, a plaintiff may prevail only if he can demonstrate that he was deprived of rights secured by the United States Constitution or federal statutes.  It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of the rights available under the United States Constitution, nevertheless, this article will provide an overview of perhaps the most utilized of all constitutional provisions–the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause [hereinafter “the Due Process Clause”].[34]

The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause was not intended to supplant tort law, or to become “a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the states.”[35] Against this backdrop, to state a claim for a deprivation of Due Process, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he possessed a constitutionally protected property interest; and (2) that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law.[36] Due process property interests are created by “existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law–rules or understanding that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”[37] To have a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause, “a person must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.  He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.  He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”[38] While the existence of a protected property interest is decided by reference to state law, the determination of whether due process was accorded is decided by reference to the Constitution.[39] Due process requires that “a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,'”[40] but the state does not have to provide the same remedies available under section 1983 in order to satisfy due process.[41]

In construing the Due Process Clause, the United States Supreme Court has held that negligent acts by state actors do not effect a “deprivation” for the purposes of the Due Process Clause,[42] and the random and unauthorized conduct of a government actor, even if intentional, does not implicate the Due Process Clause if the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy, such as, for example, a tort remedy in its own courts.[43] However, where the state can feasibly provide a pre-deprivation hearing, it must do so regardless of the post-deprivation remedies available,[44] and in the absence of a special relationship created or assumed by the state, a state’s failure to protect an individual from violence or injury caused by private actors cannot state a violation of the Due Process Clause.[45]

In addition to protection against deprivations of procedural due process, the Due Process Clause has two substantive components–the substantive due process simpliciter, and incorporated substantive due process.  In order to state a claim for a violation of the substantive due process simpliciter, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in conduct that was “arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.”[46] This form of due process has very limited application,[47] but, in contrast to certain procedural due process claims,[48] the existence of adequate post-deprivation remedies does not bar a substantive due process claim.[49] With respect to incorporated substantive due process, the plaintiff may state a claim by proving a violation of one of the Bill of Rights.  The Supreme Court has held that one of the substantive elements of the Due Process Clause protects those rights that are fundamental–rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and has, over time, held that virtually all of the Bill of Rights protect such fundamental rights and has likewise held that they apply to the states through the “liberty” interest of the Due Process Clause.[50] However, the Court has held that when a specific provision within the Bill of Rights already provides protection, the more generalized notion of due process should not be used to define constitutional rights.[51]

In addition to providing a remedy for deprivations of constitutional rights, section 1983 also makes actionable violations of federal “Laws.”[52] A violation of a federal statute is cognizable only when the violation trammels a right secured by federal law.[53] However, a statute is said to create a federal right only when “the provision in question is intended to benefit the putative plaintiff,”[54] unless it reflects merely a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct rather than a binding obligation on the government unit,[55] or unless the putative plaintiff’s interest is too vague and amorphous such that it is beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.[56]

(v) ” . . . shall be liable . . . in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . “

There is no requirement that the plaintiff sue in federal court because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction,[57] and the usual rule is exhaustion of administrative and judicial state remedies is not a prerequisite to a section 1983 action.[58] Also, the existence of concurrent state remedies is not a bar to a section 1983 action.[59] With respect to the extent of damages available, the Supreme Court has noted that the basic purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate the victims of official misconduct, and therefore held that there is no limit on actual damages if they can be proven.[60] But where they are not proved, only nominal damages of $1.00 may be awarded.[61] Punitive damages may also be awarded, but not against a municipality.[62] Injunctive relief is also permitted.[63]

III.            DEFENSES AND IMMUNITIES

States and state agencies are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court,[64] but local governments have no immunity from damages flowing from their constitutional violations, and may not assert the good faith of its agents as a defense to liability.[65] Further, state law sovereign immunity and state law limitations on damages do not protect local governments from liability under section 1983,[66] and state laws requiring pre-suit notification prior to initiating an action against the state or its subdivisions similarly do not apply.[67] Therefore, local governments are left in the unique and unhappy situation of being subject to suit without the benefit of any form of immunity.

In contrast to the distinct lack of immunity available to local governments, individual capacity defendants are protected by qualified immunity.[68] Qualified immunity is a powerful tool that shields individual officials who are performing discretionary activities unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”[69] A government official is entitled to qualified immunity unless his “act is so obviously wrong, in the light of preexisting law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing.”[70] The qualified immunity inquiry is purely objective–the subjective intentions of the actor is irrelevant.[71] Qualified immunity is not only immunity from liability, but it is immunity from suit as well,[72] and shields individual capacity defendants even where a constitutional violation may have occurred.  Likewise, a court should scrutinize a plaintiff’s claim to determine if the plaintiff states a constitutional claim at all, prior to analyzing whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.[73] The burden of proving that the law was clearly established cannot be carried by stating constitutional rights in general terms–a plaintiff within the eleventh circuit must cite to specific decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Court of Appeals, or the highest state court in which the case arose.[74]

Qualified immunity must be plead as an affirmative defense by the defendant official,[75] and becomes a matter for the court to decide, even if it requires a factual determination as to whether the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances,[76] and the court should rule on the issue of qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage of litigation.[77] An individual defendant in federal court[78] may immediately appeal a denial of qualified immunity,[79] even if a prior appeal of the denial of qualified immunity was unsuccessful, and even if other claims remain for trial.[80] Until the issue of qualified immunity is decided, the defendant official may resist discovery,[81] and there is authority to the effect that he may stay the entire proceedings during an appeal of the denial of qualified immunity.[82] While the Supreme Court has rejected a heightened pleading standard for claims against local governments, a plaintiff must nevertheless plead facts with specificity to overcome an individual capacity defendant’s qualified immunity.[83]

Private individuals who perform state functions,[84] and private corporations who contract with the government[85] may not be entitled to qualified immunity.  State and local legislators[86] and judges[87] are protected by absolute immunity when sued in their individual capacity for damages or injunctive relief, while prosecutors[88] are entitled to absolute immunity when sued in their individual capacities for damages only.  In any event, as discussed above, all individual capacity defendants are, at a minimum, entitled to qualified immunity.

The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts did not contain a statute of limitations for section 1983 actions, and it is appropriate to adopt a local time limitation so long as it is not inconsistent with federal law.[89] The Supreme Court has held that section 1983 is best characterized as a tort action for the recovery of damages, and therefore held that the appropriate statute of limitations to be adopted is the state statute applicable to personal injury actions.[90]

IV.            ATTORNEY’S FEES

The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976[91] provides that one who prevails[92] in a section 1983 action is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees.  There is little doubt that the addition of this attorney’s fee provision fueled the growth in the number of section 1983 cases that have been filed because it has been held that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust, while a prevailing defendant may be awarded attorneys’ fees only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad fait

 

1983

[1]. The catalyst for the enactment of the Act was the “campaign of violence and deception in the South, fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying citizens their civil and political rights.”  Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).  The following quote from Representative Lowe of the 42nd Congress is illustrative:

While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and banishing have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrators have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective.  Combinations, darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice.  Immunity is given to crime and the records of public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress.

Cong. Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess., 374 (1871)(remarks of Rep. Lowe)(quoted in Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276)).

[2]. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986).

[3]. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

[4]. See section II(ii), infra, for a discussion of the “under color of state law” requirement.

[5]. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

[6]. Id.

[7]. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

[8]. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 25, 31 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).

[9]. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).

[10]. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

[11]. Id.

[12]. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 25 (1991).

[13]. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).

[14]. Government officials may be sued in their individual capacity.  Such a suit does not represent a suit against the government entity for which he is associated. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).  The failure to identify in which capacity a defendant is being sued is a critical pleading defect.  Colvin v. McDougall, 62 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1995).

[15]. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 210 (11th Cir. 1992); Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b).  For example, Florida law provides that divisions of local governments, such as police departments, do not have the capacity to be sued.  Florida City Police Department v. Corcoran, 661 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

[16]. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980).

[17]. Section 1983’s requirement that a person act “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory or District of Columbia” is commonly abbreviated as “under color of state law.”

[18]. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).  However, in the only case in which the Supreme Court held that a government employee did not act under color of sate law, the Court held that a public defender does not act under color of state law while performing a lawyer’s traditional function of representing criminal defendants. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

[19]. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).

[20]. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 162 (1992); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982).

[21]. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Ort v. Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105 (11th Cir. 1986).

[22]. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982).

[23]. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

[24]. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977).

[25]. Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691, (1978).  This “custom or policy” requirement has also been applied to private corporations who contract with the state to provide medical care to prisoners. Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723-24 (11th Cir.), order vacating appeal, 931 F.2d 711, 712 (11th Cir. 1991), partially reinstated and appealed sub nom, Howell v. Burden, 12 F.3d 190 (11th Cir. 1994).

[26]. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

[27]. Monell, at 691-695; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir. 1985).  Isolated unconstitutional incidents, without more, cannot bind a municipality.  Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).

[28]. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Gold v. City of Miami, 1998 WL 54803 (11th Cir. 1998); Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488 (11th. Cir. 1997).  However, where the employee’s proper course of action “is obvious to all without training or supervision, then the failure to train or supervise is generally not ‘so likely’ to produce a wrong decision as to support an inference of deliberate indifference by city policymakers to the need to train or supervise.”  Sewell, 117 F.3d at 490.

[29]. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).  Who is a “final policymaker” is decided by reference to state law.  Pembaur, at 483; McMillan v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997).

[30]. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988).  However, merely going along with the discretionary decisions made by subordinates is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy.  Id.

[31]. Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836 (11th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990); Zatler v. Wainewright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986).

[32]. Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).  There is, however, a heightened pleading standard for individual capacity claims.  See note 83 infra, and accompanying text.

[33]. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).  Section 1983 does not provide for the vindication of rights secured by state law.  Id. at 145-146; Almand v. DeKalb County, 103 F.3d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1997).

[34].  U.S.Const. amend. XIV, §1.  The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause is a limitation on state power, while the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause limits federal power.  Halinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 319 (1892).

[35]. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).

[36]. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).

[37]. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972);  See also, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976).

[38]. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 576.

[39]. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).

[40]. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542.

[41]. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-544 (1981).

[42]. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

[43]. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)(“[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the due process clause of the 14th amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.  For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state’s action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy.”).  The Court later held that negligence does not constitute a “deprivation.”  Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).  See also, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990).

[44]. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132.

[45]. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Santamorena v. Georgia Military College, 147 F.3d 1337, 1339-1340 (11th Cir. 1998).  As with all actions predicated upon a violation of the United States Constitution, in order to state a claim for a deprivation of due process, “state action” must be present.  The eleventh circuit has recognized three primary tests to determine whether the actions of a private entity constitute state action: (1) the public function test; (2) the state compulsion test; and (3) the nexus/joint action test.  National Broad Co. v. Communications Workers of Am., 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1988).

[46]. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992); Rymer v. Douglas County, 764 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1985).

[47]. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125(“As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.”).  See also, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)(high speed police chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability for violation of substantive due process); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-272 (plaintiff could not make out substantive due process claim for alleged prosecution without probable cause because Fourth Amendment is more appropriately considered); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)(claims of force arrest by police officer during arrest or detention cannot state a substantive due process claim–it is more appropriately analyzed under Fourth Amendment); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994)(in non-legislative cases, only procedural due process claims are available to pretextually terminated employees).

[48]. See note 46, supra, and accompanying text.

[49]. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994).

[50]. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).  For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy public trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), apply to the states.

[51]. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).

[52]. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).

[53]. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 101, 106 (1989) (“Section 1983 speaks in terms of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities,’ not violations of federal law.”).

[54]. Id.

[55]. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981).

[56]. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1987)).  See also, Maynard v. Williams, 72 F.3d 848, 851 (11th Cir. 1996).

[57]. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).  Of course, a defendant in state court may remove to federal court.  28 U.S.C. § 1441.

[58]. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)(exhaustion of judicial remedies is not a prerequisite); Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982)(exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite).  But see, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)(a federal plaintiff is barred from seeking declaratory or injunctive relief relating to ongoing state criminal judicial proceedings); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)(plaintiff must prove that a conviction or sentence has been reversed prior to recovering damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a prisoner’s civil rights lawsuit may be delayed up to 180 days to require the prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies).

[59]. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124 (1990).

[60]. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).

[61]. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-267 (1978).

[62]. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981).  A municipality may, however, be jointly and severally liable.  Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1989).

[63]. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

[64]. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).  But as discussed above, because states are not “persons” under the statute, they cannot be sued in either state or federal court.  See note 6, supra, and accompanying text.

[65]. Owen v. City of Independence, MO, 445 U.S. 621 (1980); Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 699-700 (1978).

[66]. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766, 770 (11th Cir. 1989).

[67]. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).

[68]. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).  See also, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University Board of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1994)(en banc).

[69]. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817; Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149.

[70]. Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149; Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1406 (11th Cir. 1998)(the plaintiff must point to case law which predates the official’s alleged improper conduct, involves materially similar facts, and truly compels the conclusion that the plaintiff had a right under federal law).

[71]. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987); Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

[72]. “One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit.”  Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).  See also, Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir. 1991).

[73]. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991); GJR Investments Inc. v. Escambia County, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998).  Courts should not assume that the plaintiff states a constitutional claim simply to get to the qualified immunity issue.  Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232.

[74]. Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 826-27 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997)(en banc).  “Public officials are not obligated to be creative or imaginative in drawing analogies from previously decided cases.” Id. at 827.

[75]. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.

[76]. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991); Stone v. Peacock, 968 F.2d 1163, 1166 (11th Cir. 1992)(if there are disputed factual issues regarding qualified immunity that a jury should resolve, special interrogatories would be appropriate).

[77]. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991).  A defendant official may assert the qualified immunity defense in 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, as an affirmative defense in a 12(c) request for judgment on the pleadings, and on a Rule 56(e) summary judgment motion.  Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 1991).

[78]. A defendant in state court does not necessarily have the right to an interlocutory appeal.  Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997).  But see, Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(viii).

[79]. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985).  However, a defendant may not appeal the denial of a summary judgment motion on the issue of qualified immunity if the denial was based solely upon the existence of disputed factual issues, as opposed to a finding that the law was not clearly established, or that the defendant did not act objectively reasonably.  Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).

[80]. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997)(“[I]f [qualified immunity] is found applicable at any stage of the proceedings, it determines the outcome of the litigation by shielding the official from damages liability); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305-11 (1996).  The other claims that remain for trial may consist of a claim against the official in his official capacity. Id.

[81]. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)(“If the defendant does plead the immunity defense, the district court should resolve that threshold question before permitting discovery”); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)(“Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before commencement of discovery.”).

[82]. Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. James, 1998 WL 125776 (M.D.Ala. 1998)(citing Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 123 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1997))(relating to appeal of Eleventh Amendment immunity).

[83]. GJR Investments, Inc. v. Escambia County, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998).

[84]. See, Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997)(private prison guards are not entitled to qualified immunity); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992)(private individuals who invoked state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statutes were not entitled to qualified immunity).  However, the Supreme Court did not “foreclose the possibility that private defendants . . . could be entitled to an affirmative defense based upon good faith and/or probable cause or that § 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens.”  Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169.

[85]. See, McDuffie v. Hooper, 982 F.Supp. 817 (M.D. Ala. 1997)(private corporate health care providers who contract with government agencies are not entitled to qualified immunity); Hartman v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 960 F.Supp 1577, 1582 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Smith v. United States, 850 F.Supp 984, 986 (M.D. Fla. 1994).  But see, Blumel v. Mylander, 954 F.Supp 1547, 1560 (M.D. Fla. 1997).

[86]. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).  However, individual legislative immunity does not apply where the decision is an application of policy to a specific party.  In that instance, the act is said to be administrative as opposed to legislative. Crymes v. DeKalb County, 923 F.2d 1482, 1486 (11th Cir. 1991).

[87]. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was amended in 1996 to provide judicial officers with immunity from injunctive relief.  This amendment partially overruled Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), which provided that judges were immune from suits for damages, but not injunctive relief.

[88]. Prosecutors are entitled to immunity for activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” but a prosecutor engaged in investigative or administrative activities is only entitled to a good faith defense.  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).  See also, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997).

[89]. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980).

[90]. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).  But accrual of the statute of limitations is governed by federal law, while tolling of the statute of limitations is governed by state law.  Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987).  See also, Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989).

[91]. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

[92]. One who recovers nominal damages is not a prevailing party.  Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992).  The Court reasoned that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained.  Id. at 114 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)).  Also, see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), for a discussion of the interplay between 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and the offer of judgment provision contained in Fed.R.Civ.P 68.

[93]. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).

Thanks,


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William M. Windsor

I, William M. Windsor, am not an attorney.  This website expresses my OPINIONS.   The comments of visitors or guest authors to the website are their opinions and do not therefore reflect my opinions.  Anyone mentioned by name in any article is welcome to file a response.   This website does not provide legal advice.  I do not give legal advice.  I do not practice law.  This website is to expose government corruption, law enforcement corruption, political corruption, and judicial corruption.   Whatever this website says about the law is presented in the context of how I or others perceive the applicability of the law to a set of circumstances if I (or some other author) was in the circumstances under the conditions discussed.  Despite my concerns about lawyers in general, I suggest that anyone with legal questions consult an attorney for an answer, particularly after reading anything on this website.  The law is a gray area at best.  Please read our Legal Notice and Terms.

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74-YEAR-OLD DISABLED MAN WITH USE OF ONLY ONE FINGER WILL HAVE ALL NINE U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES HEAR HIS PRO SE PETITION.

Bill Windsor filming Lawless AmericaI am Bill Windsor.  I am 74 years old and disabled.  I have the use of only one finger.

I live alone full-time in an RV.  It is currently at an RV Park in the Orlando, Florida area.

On May 25, 2023, I filed a petition with the United States Supreme Court.  I typed every word with my right index finger and the mouse.

 

Justice Clarence ThomasU.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICE CLARENCE THOMAS GAVE BILL WINDSOR’S PETITION A BIG THUMBS UP.

Bill Windsor qualified for In Forma Pauperis and had his Petition reviewed AND APPROVED by Justice Clarence Thomas.

So, that was two hurdles successfully jumped. There are only three hurdles. ALL of the justices have now been sent Bill Windsor‘s Petition for consideration.

The main issue is so fundamental that it’s hard to imagine that I won’t get 18 Thumbs Up. But they grant very few original petitions for extraordinary relief.

Judges often exert their essentially unlimited powers and just deny such petitions or never let them get past either of the first two hurdles.

I was informed on June 1, 2023 by Jake in the United States Supreme Court Clerk’s Office that the Petition will be decided by a vote of all nine justices. BLOW ME AWAY!

I think they should give it to me just for being able to type a 77-page document with only one finger.

I am VERY EXCITED about this because a personal goal has been to set some precedents that could benefit other pro se parties. This will do that.

This may be EXTRA SPECIAL because I have been able to find just one U.S. Supreme Court Petition from a Pro Se Party that was granted.  Mine could be the second and the first one in 52 years. I would looooove that.

      • James Blumstein was the first.  He represented himself before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1971. Blumstein had recently moved to Tennessee, and he had sought to register to vote. At the time, Tennessee refused to allow anyone to register to vote unless the registrant had lived in Tennessee for at least one year. Blumstein argued that the durational residency requirement for voter registration was unconstitutional. Blumstein won his case 6–1.
      • Bill Windsor should be the second.
  • Two Defendants have won pro se over the years:

In the past decade, approximately 7,000-8,000 new cases are filed in the United States Supreme Court each year. Plenary review, with oral arguments by attorneys, is granted in about 80 of those cases, and the Court typically disposes of about 100 or more cases without plenary review — fewer than 3% of the total.

Can you even imagine the significance? My Petition is one of 8,000. 180 of those get reviewed, and mine is one of those 180. I’m proud….and just a little bit humble.

The Petition is about pro se rights. One of my favorite lines in it is: “Poor people deserve justice, too.”

You can read Bill Windsor’s U.S. Supreme Court Petition here.

Very, very, very few attorneys ever get to have a case before the United States Supreme Court. This is my second. Nanny Nanny Boo Boo.

If you know me, you are aware I rarely pull many punches. This Petition is only slightly tamer than most, but I flat call the judges involved corrupt again and again.

I hope this case gets national publicity. That will be great for the fight against INjustice and corruption.

July 24, 2023 was not a good day for me.  But at 3:11 a.m. on July 25, 2023, I checked the Docket of the United States Supreme Court, and I found this!

Supreme Court Docket

https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=10231840526702658&set=a.3465500322805

IU.S. Supreme Court Justics

On September 26, 2023, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice Elena Kagan, Associate Justice Amy Coney Barrett, Associate Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, Associate Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, and Associate Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson will sit around a table in DC and decide if they will grant little Billy Windsor’s Pro Se Petition.

Approximately 8,000 petitions were submitted. 180 made the cut, and mine is one of the 180 to be decided by THE SUPREMES.

Two months ago, a man named Jake who claimed to be a Clerk for Judge Clarence Thomas called to inform me that my Petition was accepted. I guess he really was a Clerk.  I couldn’t help but worry this was some kind of hoax.

From my research, I appear to be only the second Pro Se party in history to reach the United States Supreme Court with a chance to get a favorable decision by all the justices.

So, September 26, 2023 is THE BIG DAY. The Opinion will issue sometime thereafter — probably the first of October as that is when the 2023 Term begins.

Notice the Jun 01 2023 Docket Entry. The Solicitor General of the United States read my Brief and chose not to file a response. I take that as a “We can’t beat this guy on the law, and he’ll come after us if we file a frivolous brief, so we won’t oppose it.” YAHOO!!!!!

https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=10231840526702658&set=a.3465500322805

*** *** ***

These are the QUESTIONS PRESENTED for the consideration of the justices:

The Petitioner brought suit in Case No. 2011-CV-200971 in the Superior Court of Fulton County Georgia for Violation of state laws.

Case No. 2011-CV-200971 was unlawfully removed to federal court where the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (“DISTRICT COURT) never addressed the removal and never determined jurisdiction. A series of Void Orders and Void Judgments were issued by the DISTRICT COURT, including Permanent Injunction Orders that purported to deny William M. Windsor (“WINDSOR) the right to file any action in a state court anywhere in America.

WINDSOR was denied appeals by wrongful denial of In Forma Pauperis status.

This Petition arises out of orders in the DISTRICT COURT and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the ELEVENTH CIRCUIT (“11TH CIRCUIT”).

I. Is a federal court order void when jurisdiction is never determined? If so, every order of the DISTRICT COURT and 11TH CIRCUIT is invalid, and this Court’s task is simple.

II. Does a federal court judge lack jurisdiction to place restrictions on the operation of state courts?

III. Is a federal court order placing restrictions on the operation of state courts a void order?

IV. Did the 11TH CIRCUIT err by denying appeals of William M. Windsor (“WINDSOR”) that incorporate the jurisdiction issue and the state court authority issue?

V. Did the DISTRICT COURT and the 11TH CIRCUIT err by denying In Forma Pauperis status to WINDSOR?

VI. Are there exceptional circumstances that require this Court to issue a Writ?

*** *** ***

The impact may be that we will have a modern-day U.S. Supreme Court decision clarifying what constitutes a void order.

We will have the first-ever U.S. Supreme Court decision declaring federal courts have no jurisdiction over state court matters. The Eleventh Circuit should be hammered for making me the only appellant in history who can’t file anything in a state court. Hundreds of decisions of appellate courts make it clear that federal courts have no jurisdiction over state courts. The Eleventh Circuit has said so repeatedly, except in my cases. LMFAO.

Hopefully, the Court will clarify that far more people will qualify for indigent status — those in bankruptcy and those from states that do not have community property.

Bottom Line: This Windsor case will be cited by attorneys and courts forever.

Unfortunately, this does not involve the case of my attempted murder. Praying Justice Thomas will like it as well.