Bill Windsor files Motion Against Judge Thomas W Thrash

1-11-CV-01923-TWT – Motion for Reconsideration-2024-04-10

1-11-CV-01923-TWT-Letter-to-USDCNDGa-Clerk-filing-2024-04-10

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER

William M. Windsor (“Windsor” or “Plaintiff”) hereby files this MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER DENYING LEAVE.

Windsor shows the Court as follows:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

  1. On April 3, 2024, Judge Thomas W. Thrash entered this purported order [EXHIBIT A]:

“This is a pro se civil action filed against the former Clerk of Court, a number of his employees, judges of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and judges of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. It is before the Court on various motions filed by the pro se Plaintiff. After a hearing and on motion of the United States of America, on July 15, 2011 the Court issued an injunction prohibiting the Plaintiff from filing any additional Complaints against federal judges or employees of the federal judiciary without obtaining the consent of a federal judge in the district in which the action was to be filed. The injunction was issued because of the Plaintiff’s extraordinary abuse of the federal judicial system by repeatedly filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against the judges assigned to his many cases, because of the burden to clerical and judicial operations caused by his voluminous frivolous filings, and because his continuing course of conduct had become an impediment to the administration of justice. The administration of justice would suffer irreparable harm if the Plaintiff is allowed to continue filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against the judges and others involuntarily involved in his litigious campaigns. The balance of the harms and the public interest demanded that the Plaintiff be stopped.

“The Plaintiff’s most recent filings are more of the same. The Motion for Leave to Pursue Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights and Additional Causes of Action [Doc. 294] seeks permission to file a lawsuit against the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States and one of his employees because of the Plaintiff’s unhappiness with how a petition for a writ of mandamus was handled by the Court. The Motion for Leave to file a Bivens Action against Judge Thomas W. Thrash [Doc. 295], and Motion for Leave to File Purported Injunctions [Doc. 296] seek permission to file a lawsuit against this Court for limiting the Plaintiff’s ability to file frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against judges and other judicial officers. The Motion for Leave to Pursue Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights and Addition Causes of Action [Doc. 294] is DENIED. The Motion for Leave to file a Bivens Action against Judge Thomas W. Thrash [Doc. 295], and Motion for Leave to File Purported Injunctions [Doc. 296] are DENIED. The Court notes that the proposed Bivens action against it is clearly barred by the statute of limitations and absolute judicial immunity. Leave to file the proposed Complaints is DENIED.”

  1. On May 20, 2011, Windsor filed the Verified Complaint in the Superior Court of Fulton County. The Civil Action was assigned No.
  2. On June 14, 2011, Windsor filed a Motion to Deny Removal and a RESPONSE TO THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER. This was never addressed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, and he never addressed jurisdiction.  Therefore, this latest purported Order by Judge Thomas W. Thrash is a void order.
  3. Docket Numbers 294, 295, and 296 were not submitted to Judge Thomas W. Thrash. They were submitted to the Presiding Judge, Timothy Batten.
  1. THE ORDER IS DEFECTIVE AS JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH HAS NO JURISDICTION.
  2. On June 14, 2011, Windsor filed a Motion to Deny Removal and a RESPONSE TO THE FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER. This was never addressed by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, and he never addressed jurisdiction.
  3. The ORDER must be vacated.
  1. THE ORDER CITES NO CASE LAW AND NO STATUTE IN SUPPORT.
  2. The ORDER is completely void of any authority. Judge Thomas W. cited no case law and no Rules or other authority.
  3. The ORDER must be vacated.

III. THE MOTIONS WERE SUBMITTED TO PRESIDING JUDGE TIMOTHY BATTEN, NOT JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH.

  1. Docket Numbers 294, 295, and 296 were not submitted to Judge Thomas W. Thrash. They were submitted to the Presiding Judge, Timothy Batten. [EXHIBIT B.]
  1. WINDSOR HAS NEVER ABUSED THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, AND JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH CAN CITE NO FACTS TO SHOW THAT HE DID.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash falsely and maliciously wrote in this ORDER: “The injunction was issued because of the Plaintiff’s extraordinary abuse of the federal judicial system by repeatedly filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against the judges assigned to his many cases.”
  3. Judge Thomas W. Thrash can cite no facts to support this outrageous claim.
  1. WINDSOR HAS NEVER FILED A FRIVOULOUS FILING. ALL OF HIS FILINGS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY RESEARCHED AND HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE FACTS AND THE LAW.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash false, maliciously, and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “…because of the burden to clerical and judicial operations caused by his voluminous frivolous filings, and because his continuing course of conduct had become an impediment to the administration of justice.”
  1. WINDSOR HAS NEVER FILED A malicious or vexatious lawsuit against anyone. ALL OF HIS FILINGS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY RESEARCHED AND HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE FACTS AND THE LAW.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash false, maliciously, and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The administration of justice would suffer irreparable harm if the Plaintiff is allowed to continue filing frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against the judges and others involuntarily involved in his litigious campaigns. The balance of the harms and the public interest demanded that the Plaintiff be stopped.”
  3. Judge Thomas W. Thrash is a corrupt judge who has committed one crime after another against Windsor. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET.]

VII.  WINDSOR HAS NEVER FILED A malicious or vexatious lawsuit against anyone.  ALL OF HIS FILINGS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY RESEARCHED AND HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE FACTS AND THE LAW.

  1. Judge Thomas W. Thrash maliciously and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The Plaintiff’s most recent filings are more of the same.”
  2. There are no facts to support this outrageous statement.

VIII.  WINDSOR HAS NOT SOUGHT TO PURSUE A LEGAL ACTION AGAINST the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States and one of his employees because of the Plaintiff’s unhappiness with how a petition for a writ of mandamus was handled by the Court. HE SOUGHT IT DUE TO GROSS VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW AND THE RULES.

  1. Judge Thomas W. Thrash maliciously and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The Motion for Leave to Pursue Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights and Additional Causes of Action [Doc. 294] seeks permission to file a lawsuit against the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States and one of his employees because of the Plaintiff’s unhappiness with how a petition for a writ of mandamus was handled by the Court.”
  2. They violated the Rules and the law.  They likely committed criminal violations as well.
  1. WINDSOR HAS NOT SOUGHT TO PURSUE A LEGAL ACTION AGAINST JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH FOR IMPROPER PURPOSES. HE SOUGHT IT DUE TO GROSS VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW AND THE RULES.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash maliciously and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The Motion for Leave to file a Bivens Action against Judge Thomas W. Thrash [Doc. 295], and Motion for Leave to File Purported Injunctions [Doc. 296] seek permission to file a lawsuit against this Court for limiting the Plaintiff’s ability to file frivolous, malicious and vexatious lawsuits against judges and other judicial officers.”
  3. The United States Constitution gives pro se parties the right to file lawsuits, and this right may not be taken away absent a Constitutional amendment.
  1. WINDSOR HAS NOT SOUGHT TO PURSUE A LEGAL ACTION BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR A CLAIM OF ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY.
  2. Judge Thomas W. Thrash maliciously and without factual support wrote in his ORDER: “The proposed Bivens action against it is clearly barred by the statute of limitations and absolute judicial immunity.”
  3. The proposed action is not barred by the statute of limitations. Judge Thomas W. Thrash again makes such a claim with no legal authority cited.  State law establishes the statute of limitations, and this ORDER is yet another violation that will be subject to a claim for denial of Constitutional rights.
  4. There is no such thing as “absolute judicial immunity.” Judge Thomas W. Thrash again makes such a claim with no legal authority cited.
  1. THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The NOTICE OF removal is procedurally defective, and thE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.
  2. The NOTICE OF REMOVAL had procedural defects that make it void on its face.
  3. There is a presumption against removal jurisdiction, and this Court must strictly construe the removal statute. (Fajen v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir.1982).) The party seeking removal has the burden of proving the jurisdictional and procedural requirements for removal. (Laughlin v. Prudential Ins. Co., 882 F.2d. 187 (5th Cir. 1989).)
  4. The NOTICE OF REMOVAL fails on all accounts, so the MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL must be granted, and the ORDER must be vacated.

XII.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is procedurally defective FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT DEFENDANTS MUST MAKE AN APPEARANCE, and thE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.

  1. None of the Defendants had made an appearance.
  2. None of the Defendants had filed a CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT as required by N.D.Ga Local Rule 3.3 and FRCP 7.1, which was due to be filed with the Clerk “at the time of first appearance. [1-11-CV-0192-TWT Docket].
  3. The U.S. Attorneys, Sally Quillian Yates and Christopher Huber, had no authority to appear for the Defendants.
  4. Christopher Huber was representing one of the Defendants in two legal actions before Defendant Judge Duffey. There are an assortment of other conflicts that made it impossible for Christopher Huber to represent many of the Defendants.
  5. Nothing had been filed with any court giving the U.S. Attorneys the authority to appear for any of the Defendants.
  6. None of the Defendants were identified in the signature block on the NOTICE OF REMOVAL, so the Petition was not filed on behalf of any of the Defendants
  7. There is no indication that any of the Defendants have signed a sworn affidavit in regard to representation or the NOTICE OF REMOVAL.
  8. The ORDER must be vacated.

XIII. THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is procedurally defective BECAUSE THE ACTION WAS NOT YET PENDING IN FULTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT AS 28 U.S.C. § 1442 REQUIRES, SO THE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.

  1. The removal statute requires service prior to removal in the state of Georgia. The removal statute states that an action must be “pending” in a state court before it may be removed.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (noting that civil action may be removed to the district court “embracing the place wherein it is pending”).
  2. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the word pending means “remaining undecided” or “awaiting decision.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 (7th ed. 1999).  An action must have “commenced” before it can be “pending.”  A determination of whether the action was pending in a Georgia court at the time of removal requires reference to Georgia law.  Under Georgia law, “there is a substantial difference between the commencement of an action and its being a suit pending between the parties.” (McClendon v. Hernando Phosphate Co., 28 S.E. 152, 153 (Ga. 1897).)   Georgia law preserves this distinction, as filing a suit “is still not the commencement of suit unless followed by service within a reasonable time.” (Franek v. Ray, 236 S.E.2d 629, 632 (Ga. 1977).)  Thus, under Georgia law, “an action is not a ‘pending’ suit until after service of process is perfected.” (Steve A. Martin Agency, Inc. v. PlantersFIRST Corp., 678 S.E.2d 186, 188 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); see also Jenkins v. Crea, 656 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“An action is not a pending suit until service is perfected.”)
  3. Defendants Judge Julie E. Carnes, Judge Joel F. Dubina, Judge Ed Carnes, Judge Rosemary Barkett, and B. Grutby have not been served with process. Windsor also filed a motion with the Fulton County Superior Court seeking to add six additional Defendants.
  4. Since the Civil Action was not yet “pending” in Fulton County Georgia Superior Court, the text of the removal statute prevents removal prior to service on Judge Julie E. Carnes, Judge Joel F. Dubina, Judge Ed Carnes, Judge Rosemary Barkett, and B. Grutby. (28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).)

XIV.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is procedurally defective FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE RULE OF UNANIMITY, and this MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED.

  1. Another defect in the NOTICE OF REMOVAL is its failure to comply with the rule of unanimity.
  2. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) states that “defendants desiring to remove any civil action . . . shall file in the district court of the United States . . . a notice of removal.” There are 16 Defendants in this Civil Action, and all 16 Defendants have not filed the NOTICE OF REMOVAL.
  3. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 requires the unanimous consent of all defendants to the removal. (Russell Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 09/06/2001); Loftis v. U.S. Parcel Serv., Inc., 342 F.3d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 2003).)  The NOTICE OF REMOVAL failed to claim the consent of ANY Defendant, and it clearly fails to explain the absence of consent to the removal by at least nine of the Defendants, so it is defective for violating the rule of unanimity.  Since some of the Defendants did not join in the notice of removal and the NOTICE OF REMOVAL failed to account or the lack of their consent, the NOTICE OF REMOVAL is procedurally defective and cannot withstand the MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL.

“… all of the defendants must consent to removal.” (Wisc. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 393 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).)

“The unanimity requirement mandates that in cases involving multiple defendants, all defendants must consent to removal.” Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1044 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247-48, 20 S.Ct. 854, 855, 44 L.Ed. 1055 (1900) (deriving from a removal statute the rule that all defendants must join in removal)).  (See also In re Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp., 837 F.2d 432 (11th Cir. 01/19/1988); In re Ocean Marine Mut. Protection and Indem. Ass’n, Ltd., 3 F.3d 353, 355-56 (11th Cir. 1993); Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 754 (8th Cir. 2001); Balazik v. County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Kerwood, 969 F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 1992); Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1986); N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 272-73 (7th Cir.1982); Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686 (10th Cir. 1981); 11C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3731 (3d. ed. 1998); Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 590 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 12/30/2009).)

  1. THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is defective BECAUSE THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION, SO thE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.
  2. This Court lacks federal-question jurisdiction because there is no dispute as to the validity, construction or effect of a federal statute with a cause of action “arising under” the laws of the United States.
  3. This Civil Action is pursuant to the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. No federal statute has been included in the causes of action.
  4. There is no federal question presented on the face of the Verified Complaint. Windsor intends this Civil Action to be solely based on Georgia law.  Windsor specifically excluded federal statutes that could have been raised so this action would remain in Georgia courts.

Federal courts use the “well-pleaded complaint” rule to determine “arising under” jurisdiction. Long, 201 F.3d at 758. That rule provides that “‘federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.’” Id. (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). “[T]he party who brings the suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon.” The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).

This court has held that for a paper to fall within the removal statutes, it must be unambiguous. Cf. Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (10th Cir. 1998)

XVI.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is defective PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C § 1442 (a)(1) BECAUSE FEDERAL OFFICERS HAVE NOT RAISED A FEDERAL DEFENSE, SO THE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.

  1. The U.S. Attorney erroneously cited 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) as a basis for the removal.

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) provides that “a civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any of the following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office or on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress….”

  1. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) does not apply because the Verified Complaint is not about suing “in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office or… under any Act of Congress….”

The U.S. Supreme Court holds that the jurisdictional provision found in 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) required federal officers to raise a federal defense before removing to federal court.  Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 109 S. Ct. 959, 103 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1989).

  1. None of the other Defendants raised any defense whatsoever to the Civil Action. The ONLY statement made by the U.S. Attorney in the NOTICE OF REMOVAL is: “This action is one that may be removed to the United States District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2679.”
  2. There is no citation of case law to support such a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) has nothing to do with defenses this Civil Action, so no defense has been raised.

The Supreme Court has held that “the right of removal [under § 1442(a)(1)] is absolute for conduct performed under color of federal office,” Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 242, 101 S. Ct. 1657, 1664, 68 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1981), and that 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) “is broad enough to cover all cases where federal officers can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty to enforce federal law.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406-07, 89 S. Ct. 1813, 1816, 23 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1969). The Court agreed with the government that “the removal statute is an incident of federal supremacy, and that one of its purposes [is] to provide a federal forum for cases where federal officials must raise defenses arising from their official duties.” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 405, 89 S. Ct. at 1815.

The purpose of section 1442(a)(1) is to “permit[ ] the removal of those actions commenced in state court that expose a federal official to potential civil liability or criminal penalty for an act performed … under color of office.” Murray v. Murray, 621 F.2d 103, 107 (5th Cir.1980). In Willingham, the Supreme Court noted that “the removal statute is an incident of federal supremacy, and that one of its purposes was to provide a federal forum for cases where federal officials must raise defenses arising from their official duties.” 395 U.S. at 405, 89 S. Ct. at 1815. “The test for removal should be broader, not narrower, than the test for official immunity.” Id.

  1. The U.S. Attorney has failed to meet the Supreme Court’s stated requirements for removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) that are binding precedents recognized by the Eleventh Circuit.

Proper removal of an action under section 1442(a)(1) has historically required the satisfaction of two separate requirements. First, the defendant must advance a “colorable defense arising out of [his] duty to enforce federal law.” Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 133, 109 S. Ct. 959, 966-67, 103 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1989) (quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406-07, 89 S. Ct. at 1816). That defense need only be plausible; its ultimate validity is not to be determined at the time of removal. Id. at 129, 109 S. Ct. at 964. However, absent the assertion of a federal defense, a state court action against a federal officer is not removable. Id. [emphasis added.]

Second, the defendant must establish that there is a “causal connection between what the officer has done under asserted official authority” and the action against him. Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33, 46 S. Ct. 185, 190, 70 L. Ed. 449 (1926) (interpreting predecessor statute); see also Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409, 89 S. Ct. at 1817. However, the Supreme Court has held that, in a civil suit such as this, it is sufficient for the defendant to show that his relationship to the plaintiff “derived solely from [his] official duties.” Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409, 89 S. Ct. at 1817. In such a case, the causal connection requirement “consists, simply enough, of the undisputed fact that [the defendant was] on duty, at [his] place of federal employment, at all the relevant times.” Id. If the question raised by the plaintiff is whether the defendant was engaged in “some kind of frolic,” or acting in contravention of his official duties, the parties will have the opportunity to present their versions of the facts to a federal court. Id. (Magnin v. Teledyne Continental Motors, 91 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir. 08/15/1996).)  [emphasis added.]

  1. It is impossible for a Defendant to raise a colorable defense to charges of racketeering as racketeering is not something that one may do under their federal employment.
  2. The federal interest in this matter is insubstantial, and the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction would disrupt the Congressionally-approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.

“[F]ederal jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. Those advantages are “the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.” Id. at 312.

More recently, in Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290 (C.A. 11, Dec. 19, 2008), plaintiffs brought, inter alia, a defamation claim based on the defendants’ statements that the plaintiffs had violated federal gun laws. See 552 F.3d at 1293-94. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that federal question jurisdiction was appropriate, concluding that the federal interest involved was insubstantial. See id. at 1301-03.

Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 234 F.3d 514, 518 (11th Cir. 2000) serves to illustrate this point.  In Ayres, the plaintiff brought suit under Georgia’s civil RICO statute, alleging that the defendant had violated the federal National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and, by so doing, had committed federal mail and wire fraud, which were predicate offenses constituting racketeering. See 234 F.3d at 516-17. The Eleventh Circuit found federal question jurisdiction was appropriate because “this case requires that we decide whether or not a breach of the disclosure duty under the [National Traffic and Motor Vehicle] Safety Act constitutes a federal mail and wire fraud crime.” Id. at 519. In other words, because the meaning of a federal statute was at issue, a substantial federal question was involved. See id.

(“[F]ederal question jurisdiction exists where a plaintiff’s cause of action has as an essential element the existence of a right under federal law which will be supported by a construction of the federal law concluding that the federal crime is established, but defeated by another construction concluding the opposite”). Where, however, “allegations of violations of federal law as predicate acts under a state RICO act” do not “require the court to interpret an independent federal statute,” federal question jurisdiction is inappropriate. See Austin v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1227-28 (N.D. Ga. 2007); accord, e.g., Neighborhood Mortgage, Inc. v. Fegans, No. 1:06-CV-1984-JOF, 2007 WL 2479205, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2007) (“Unlike Ayres where the court had to decide whether the federal mail and wire fraud statutes would also constitute a breach of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, where there is no other federal question, . . . the mere citation of federal mail and wire fraud as predicate acts to a state RICO action is not sufficiently substantial to confer federal jurisdiction”). [emphasis added.]

As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Adventure Outdoors: Ayres involved two levels of federal questions. The need to construe independent bodies of federal law and to determine the legal effect of the interaction of those two bodies of law made the federal question in Ayres far more substantial than the one presented by Adventure Outdoors’s defamation claim. 552 F.3d at 1302. The same is also true here because this matter has nothing to do with the construction of federal regulations. Consequently, this Court should decline to exercise federal-question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claim and remand this matter to the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia.

  1. This Court’s exercise of federal-question jurisdiction over this state-law claim would be inappropriate because there is no dispute as to any federal statute.

“‘A removing defendant bears the burden of proving proper federal

jurisdiction.’” Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11thCir. 2008) (quoting Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002)). “All doubts about the propriety of federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.” Id. (citing Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1996)); accord Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[W]here a plaintiff and defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand”).

The test for whether federal jurisdiction should be exercised over embedded federal issues in state-law claims between non-diverse parties is whether “a state law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).

 

  1. In this matter, NO federal issue exists. There is no disputed question of federal law.

Federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims is confined to those claims that “‘really and substantially involv[e] a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.’” Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)). (See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (Vinson, J., dissenting).)

  1. This Civil Action does not seek to hold an officer of the United States in violation of state law while simultaneously executing his duties as prescribed by federal law. In this Civil Action, federal employees ignored the limitations on their powers.  They intentionally committed acts that violate the Georgia RICO Act, and they knowingly participated in an enterprise designed to damage Windsor.  It is well established that a federal employee’s actions lie outside the scope of his or her authority when he or she fails to comply with the affirmative requirements of the law.

we look to (1) whether the officers were acting “within the outer perimeter of [their] line of duty” as defined by federal statutory and regulatory law, Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1434 (1959) (plurality opinion), and (2) whether “in doing [those acts, they] did no more than what was necessary and proper for [them] to do” as demarcated by the Constitution, see Neagle, 135 U.S. at 57, 10 S.Ct. at 666. As the Supreme Court explained, “a federal official may not with impunity ignore the limitations which the controlling law has placed on his powers.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 489, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2902, 57 L.Ed. 2d 895 (1978). Indeed, it is a tautology that a federal officer’s actions lie outside the scope of his authority when the officer fails to comply with the affirmative requirements of federal statutory or regulatory law, see id. at 489–91, 98 S.Ct. at 2902–03; Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 390–91 (5th Cir. 2009); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 837 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir.1988), and his actions fail to qualify as “necessary and proper” if committed in violation of the negative injunctions of the Constitution, see Butz, 438 U.S. at 489–91, 98 S.Ct. at 2902–03; Castro, 560 F.3d at 389; Medina, 259 F.3d at 225; Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 800 F.2d at 1196; see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689–90, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1461, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170–71 (1803).

XVII.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The removal is defective PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C §2679 BECAUSE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WERE NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES WHEN THEY PARTICIPATED IN THE VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTES TO DAMAGE WINDSOR, SO THE MOTION TO DENY REMOVAL MUST BE GRANTED, AND THE ORDER MUST BE VACATED.

  1. The Defendants were not acting within the scope of their official duties when they committed acts of racketeering against Windsor.
  2. The Verified Complaint specifies violation of the following Georgia statutes as the sole basis for the RICO claim: Obstruction of Justice and Tampering with Evidence pursuant to O.C.G.A. 16-10-94; Perjury – Violation of C.G.A. 16-10-70; Subornation of Perjury – Violation of O.C.G.A. 16-10-72, and O.C.G.A.16-10-93; Theft by Deception – O.C.G.A.16-8-3.

In Mesa v. California, the Supreme Court denied removal under the federal officer removal statute to two postal employees, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), because they failed to establish that they were acting within the scope of their official duties and therefore, had no colorable federal defense to the state law charges of reckless driving and related offenses. 489 U.S. 121, 127–28, 109 S.Ct. 959, 963–64, 103 L.Ed. 2d 99 (1989). Because the federal employees’ actions fell outside the scope of their federal duties, California’s interest in vindicating the rights of its citizens did not frustrate any valid federal interest. (Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 07/15/2009).)

The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction and doubt is resolved in favor of remand. Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979); Prize Frize Inc. v. Matrix Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999).

  1. The question of whether an employee’s conduct was within the scope of his employment “is governed by the law of the state where the incident occurred.” See S.J. & W. Ranch, 913 F.2d at 1542; Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 76 S. Ct. 100, 100 L. Ed. 761 (1955) (per curiam), vacating 215 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1954); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Georgia law does not permit anyone to violate the Georgia RICO Act.  Georgia law says the conduct must be within the general duties of employment for which the employee was hired, and none of the Defendants were hired with duties to violate criminal statutes and commit racketeering.
  2. The U.S. Attorney is not impartial; the U.S. Attorneys are “interested parties.” The U.S. Attorneys are representing some of the Defendants in related matters against Windsor.

Moreover, the statutory interpretation urged by defendant Lehtinen is particularly suspect because it leaves the determination of a dispositive issue in FTCA cases to an interested party. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c), the Attorney General is required to “defend any civil action or proceeding brought in any court against any employee of the Government . . . for any such damage or injury.” Id. We do not believe Congress intended to entrust the party responsible for providing the federal employee’s defense with the power to make a scope determination that will have the result of dismissing the plaintiff’s suit for lack of jurisdiction. Nasuti, 906 F.2d at 812-13; Petrousky, 728 F. Supp. at 894; see Gogek, 729 F. Supp. at 933. Our concern with the impartiality of the scope determination is especially acute in a situation like the one in this case where the authority to make scope certifications has been delegated to the federal employee defendant or his colleagues. (S.J. & W. Ranch Inc. v. Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 10/10/1990).)

  1. This Civil Action is about the corrupt practices of the Defendants, using the federal court system in Fulton County Georgia to commit criminal acts against Windsor and others. Windsor must argue that under these circumstances, this Civil Action could not be moved to the same federal court system that Windsor is suing.  The very clerks that Windsor has charged with racketeering are the clerks who will be handling the various filings in this matter.  The judges named as Defendants are friends of this Court.  Windsor can be treated fairly and impartially only if he is on the neutral turf of the Fulton County Superior Court.

XVIII.  THIS COURT IMPROPERLY OVERLOOKED THAT The POSITION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE NOTICE OF REMOVAL IS SUBJECT TO LITIGATION, AND IF THIS COURT DOES NOT DENY REMOVAL AND DOES NOT VACATE THE ORDER FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED ABOVE, WINDSOR DEMANDS DISCOVERY AND AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

  1. Should this Court ignore and fail to deny removal on the grounds specified above, the district court must conduct a de novo hearing on whether the Defendants were not acting within the scope of their official duties when they committed acts that Windsor complains of in the Verified Complaint. This Court must permit Windsor full discovery on the scope question. (J. & W. Ranch Inc. v. Lehtinen, 913 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 10/10/1990).)

 

XIX.  THIS COURT VIOLATED FRCP RULE 7.1 AND DENIED WINDSOR’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS BY GRANTING THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S MOTION.

  1. The U.S. Attorney’s Motion was not an emergency motion, and it was not expedited.
  2. D.Ga. Local Rule 7.1 gave Windsor 14 days to respond to the U.S. Attorney’s motion.
  3. This Court denied Windsor’s right to file a response before the Court considered the motion.

64.             When attorneys have motions filed against their clients by a pro se party, the attorneys are given the opportunity to present their arguments to the judge in a response.  Windsor is pro se, and he has been denied this right of due process.  He has been treated as a different class of litigant, and he has been denied equal protection.  Windsor has a Constitutional guarantee that he will not be denied protections under the law that are enjoyed by attorneys, but this Court has violated Windsor’s Constitutional rights.  This Court has also denied due process.If due process is to be secured, the laws must operate alike upon all and not subject the individual to the arbitrary exercise of governmental power unrestrained by established principles of private rights and distributive justice. (Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).) In 1934, the United States Supreme Court held that due process is violated “if a practice or rule offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).)   As construed by the courts, due process includes… the opportunity to be heard …  and that the person or panel making the final decision over the proceedings be impartial in regards to the matter before them.  (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).) (See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).) “…wherever it is necessary for the protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought.”  (Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701, 708.) “The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions.  The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual.  Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment. . . .”’  (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 -81 (1972).)

  1. WINDSOR HAD NO LEGAL OBLIGATION TO SEEK LEAVE TO FILE ANYTHING.

65.             There is no valid order requiring Windsor to seek leave.

 

CONCLUSION

  1. Judge Thomas W. Thrash has made statements in this ORDER that are false, malicious, and not supported by any facts in the case. The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests upon the party seeking removal, and Defendants failed to carry this burden and Judge Thomas W. Thrash intentionally violated the law and the Rules.  Absent a valid Notice of Removal, this Court had no jurisdiction to grant any motion by the Federal Defendants.
  2. This Court denied Windsor’s most basic fundamental rights to due process.

68.             There is no valid order requiring Windsor to seek leave.

  1. For all of the reasons expressed above, this Court must VACATE THE ORDER.

WHEREFORE, Windsor respectfully requests:

  1. grant this Motion;
  2. vacate the ORDER dated April 3, 2024; and

c.      grant any other relief this Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of April, 2024.

_______________________________

William M. Windsor

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-661-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

VERIFICATION OF WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

I, William M. Windsor, swear that I am authorized to make this verification and that the facts alleged in the foregoing MOTION are true and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters I believe them to be true.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge.

This 10th day of April, 2024,

_______________________________

William M. Windsor

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-661-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

As required by Local Rule 7.1D, N.D. Ga., I hereby certify that this pleading has been prepared in Times New Roman 14-point font, one of the font and point selections approved by this Court in Local Rule 5.1B, N.D. Ga.

_______________________________

William M. Windsor

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-661-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing MOTION to each Defendant by mail with sufficient postage addressed with the addresses for service shown in the Verified Complaint and by mail and email to:

CHRISTOPHER J. HUBER

ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

Georgia Bar No. 545627

600 Richard B. Russell Federal Bldg.

75 Spring Street, S.W. — Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Telephone: 404-581-6292 — Facsimile: 404-581-6181

Email: chris.huber@usdoj.gov

This 10th day of April, 2024,

_______________________________

William M. Windsor

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-661-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Windsor Petition for Rehearing En Banc

The following is the Windsor Petition for Rehearing En Banc.  It was copied and pasted here from the Federal Court document.  This Petition for Rehearing En Banc shows how judges ignore the law to screw a self-represented litigant (pro se).  (It may be easier to read the Petition from the pdf scanned by the Eleventh Circuit.

Judges nationwide HATE Bill Windsor because he is committed to exposing their evildoings.  See https://AANL.net for his latest plan to save America from judicial corruption and denial of our Constitutional rights.  He has published thousands of articles on LawlessAmerica.com since 2008.  He is not a lawyer, and he cannot give legal advice, but he can and does help his friends with his experience.

Please forgive the spacing and numbering because Word and WordPress just don’t always cooperate.  Photos and links have been added that are not in the legal Petition.

APPEAL NO. 22-12038 and 22-12411

_______________________________________________________

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________________________________________

WILLIAM M. WINDSOR,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

versus

James N. Hatten, et al,

Defendants

________________________________________________________

United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division

D.C. Docket No. 1:11-CV-01923-TWT

Judge Thomas Woodrow Thrash

thrash-thomas

_________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________

bill windsor

William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Avenue PMB 1134, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

Phone: 352-###-####, Email: windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com

PRO SE FOR PLAINTIFF/ APPELLANT, WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR REHEARING

and en banc determination

William M. Windsor (“WINDSOR”) hereby requests that the Court relieve WINDSOR from the Judgment and OPINION dated 1/25/2024 in USCA11 Case No. 22-12038 and USCA11 Case No. 22-12411, pursuant to Rules 35 and 40 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”).

  1. WINDSOR references and incorporates herein the entire dockets and their contents in 1-11-01923-TWT (”01923”) [APPENDIX 128], USCA11 Case 22-12038 (“22-12038”) [APPENDIX 129, and USCA11 Case 22-12411 (“22-12411”) [APPENDIX 130.]

FIRST PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED

BY THE SECOND PANEL

  1. The decisions of the “SECOND PANEL” of the Eleventh Circuit (Judges Robin Rosenbaum, Elizabeth Branch, and Britt Grant) conflict with decisions of every U.S. Court of Appeals, recent decisions in this case [APPENDIX 131 and APPENDIX 132], and Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (11th Cir. 1993); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 1986); Riccard v. Prudential,307 F.3d 1277, 1295 n.15 (11th Cir. 2002); Klay v. United, 376 F.3d 1092, 1099-1102 (11th Cir. 2004); Dinardo v. Palm Beach Judge, 199 Fed.Appx. 731 (11th Cir. 07/18/2006).  Consideration by the full Court is therefore necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the Court’s decisions.

Judge Britt Grant

  1. The one Appealed Order in 22-12411 is APPENDIX 135. It purports to place restrictions on state courts, so the Appeal must be granted.
  2. The four appealed orders in 22-12038 are APPENDIX 137, APPENDIX 4, APPENDIX 138, and APPENDIX 135. Each purports to place restrictions on state courts, so the Appeals must be granted.
  3. Article Three of the U.S. Constitution empowers the courts to handle cases or controversies arising under federal law. Article 3 grants no powers over state courts; a federal order for filing restrictions cannot apply to states.
  4. WINDSOR has researched “filing restrictions” referencing the three key federal precedents. The decisions in all eleven Circuits appear to be unanimous in providing that federal courts are unable to approve federal courts issuing orders that apply to state courts.
  5. BUT, there is one and only one circuit that has allowed a federal judge to approve federal courts issuing orders that apply to state courts. It’s the 11TH CIRCUIT, but only in appeals involving WINDSOR.
  6. WINDSOR could find NO OTHER CASE to support the actions of JUDGE Thomas W. THRASH. There has never been another appellate decision that disagrees with Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 191-92 (5th Cir. 2008); Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1344 (10th Cir. 2006); and Martin-Trigona v. Lavien, 737 F.2d 1254, 1263 (2d Cir. 1984).  See also Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 05/20/1985)APPENDIX 21 is a Memorandum of Law on 137 applicable federal cases as of 08/08/2020.

SECOND PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The SECOND PANEL violated the September 7, 2022 Order of this Court [APPENDIX 131] and ignored the Law of the Case Doctrine.
  2. The SECOND PANEL has outrageously dismissed WINDSOR’s appeals [APPENDIX 133] and [APPENDIX 134] falsely claiming he abandoned them.
  3. WINDSOR has been pursuing the corrupt acts of JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, and the Eleventh Circuit, for 15 years. He has never abandoned anything.
  4. From the first sentence in the Opinions, the SECOND PANEL has shown they have a complete bias against WINDSOR.
  5. The STATEMENTS REGARDING APPEAL [APPENDIX 139] and [APPENDIX 140] were required to establish that the Appeals were not frivolous, and it was determined by Eleventh Circuit Judges Adalberto Jordan, Jill A. Pryor, and Andrew L. Brasher (“FIRST PANEL”) on 9/7/2022 that the appeals were not frivolous. [APPENDIX 133] and [APPENDIX 134]. They ruled:

“With respect to both the appeal statement associated with appeal no. 22-12038 and the appeal statement associated with appeal no. 22-12411, the Court finds that Appellant has raised a non-frivolous issue, specifically whether a pre-filing injunction may be extended to filings in state court. See, e.g., Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F .3d 181, 192 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, these appeals survive the frivolity screening required by this Court’s December 21, 2011 order.” [emphasis added.] [22-12038-Docket-13-ORDER-Not-Frivolous-Stay-Consolidated-2022-09-07.] [APPENDIX 131.]

  1. Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F .3d 181, 192 (5th Cir. 2008) was cited by the FIRST PANEL. It says:

“The district court abused its discretion in extending the pre-filing injunction to filings in state courts, state agencies, and this Court.

“Baum argues that even if the injunction is proper for federal courts, ‘[a]buse of state judicial process is not per se a threat to the jurisdiction of Article III courts and does not per se implicate other federal interests.’  Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d at 1263.

“In Martin-Trigona, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court ‘erred in its blanket extension of the [pre-filing] injunction to state courts….’ [737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1984).]

Blue Moon does not cite to any authority that upholds a federal court’s pre-filing injunction against state court and state agency filings.

“The Tenth Circuit held that (2) a district court’s pre-filing injunction may not extend to filings in any federal appellate court, and (3) a district court’s pre-filing injunction may not extend to filings in any state court. Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1344 (10th Cir.2006).”

  1. Yet in the first sentence of the OPINIONS, the SECOND PANEL stated: “This appeal is the latest in a line of frivolous litigation pursued by William Windsor.” There is no evidence of this.  This violates Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) Rule 602.  This DIRECTLY contradicts the 9/7/2022 Order of the Eleventh Circuit [APPENDIX 131.]
  2. There is absolutely NO EVIDENCE that WINDSOR has ever filed anything in any court anywhere that was frivolous. This SECOND PANEL cannot show evidence to the contrary.
  3. The Eleventh Circuit decided that issue in these cases on 9/7/2022. The “law of the case doctrine” provides that an appellate court’s determination of a legal issue binds both the trial court and the court on appeal in any subsequent retrial or appeal involving the same case and substantially the same facts. The appellate court’s holdings on the questions presented to it on review become the “law of the case.” The purpose of the doctrine is to promote finality and judicial economy by minimizing unnecessary relitigation of legal issues once they have been resolved by the appellate court.  Instead, the SECOND PANEL thumbed its nose at judicial economy and created unnecessary litigation.
  4. WINDSOR will file Judicial Complaints against Robin Rosenbaum, Elizabeth Branch, and Britt Grant.

 

THIRD PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The Second Panel did not issue an Opinion on one of the Appealed Orders.
  2. On Page 6 of [APPENDIX 133 and APPENDIX 134] in the next to last paragraph of the “Background” section, each states: “… his appeals were allowed to proceed as to the district court’s May 21, 2022, and June 30, 2022, orders.”
  3. There is no May 21, 2022 Order as proven by the dockets. [APPENDIX 128, APPENDIX 129, APPENDIX 130.] Therefore, one of the orders appealed has not been addressed, and this PETITION must be granted.

 

FOURTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The SECOND PANEL’s Opinions cause significant confusion as to what in the world they are pretending to say.
  2. On January 25, 2024, an OPINION was docketed in USCA11 Case 22-12038 (“22-12038”) – DOCKET 50 [APPENDIX 133] and USCA11 Case 22-12411 (“22-12411”) [APPENDIX 134] by this SECOND PANEL
  3. A JUDGMENT was also docketed in both cases as shown on the Dockets. [APPENDIX 129 and APPENDIX 130.]
  4. The File Stamp at the top of each page docketed in 22-12038 on APPENDIX 129 says “USCA11 Case 22-12038.”
  5. The File Stamp at the top of each page docketed in 22-12411 on APPENDIX 130 says “USCA11 Case 22-12038.”
  6. The Case Numbers on both APPENDIX 132 and APPENDIX 133 show BOTH Case Numbers on Page 2 of USCA11 Document 51-1.

 

FIFTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. Only two cases were cited by the SECOND PANEL in the OPINIONS.  Neither is applicable to the instant case.
  2. One of the two cases was cited by the Appellees in the BRIEF OF APPELLEE. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 – DOCKET 39.] [APPENDIX 141] Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) appears on PP.6–7 of the OPINION [APPENDIX 133] and on P.12 of the BRIEF OF APPELLEE [APPENDIX 141]. The Sapuppo Order [APPENDIX 142] briefly references Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir.2008) [APPENDIX 143,P.3.]
  3. None of WINDSOR’s authority was cited by the SECOND PANEL. WINDSOR cited 58 cases, eight statutes, and other authorities in his NOTICE OF APPEAL [APPENDIX 17 and APPENDIX 25]; 88 cases, 13 statutes, and nine other authorities in his APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146]; 36 cases, three statutes, and three other authorities in his APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF [APPENDIX 144.]
  4. Timson v. Sampson was cited by the SECOND PANEL [OPINION, PP.7-8] APPENDIX 143] as purported authority that WINDSOR abandoned his claims:

“Although “we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally,” we

nonetheless deem “issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant . . . abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). “Moreover, we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief.” Id.”

 

  1. But the SECOND PANEL misrepresented the facts and what Timson actually provides that is relevant to the instant case.
  2. Timson v. Sampson [APPENDIX 143] actually says:

“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, Lorisme v. I.N.S., 129 F.3d 1441, 1444 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1997), issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.  Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2002).

Moreover, we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply brief.  Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003).  Timson, thus, abandoned this issue.” [emphasis added.]

 

  1. Lovett v. Ray, says: “Because he raises that argument for the first time in his reply brief, it is not properly before us.” [emphasis added.] [APPENDIX 145.]
  2. WINDSOR raised this issue from Day 1. In WINDSOR’s 420-page APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF [APPENDIX 144], he begins by saying “This Court must base its analysis on the 2011 and 2018 orders, and he explains why.  The SECOND PANEL ignored all of this.
  3. WINDSOR PLAINLY AND PROMINENTLY RAISED ISSUES IN HIS REPLY BRIEF in all caps, bold type, and underlined:
  • THERE WAS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ORDERS EXHIBIT-1 1-026 AND EXHIBIT-11-048 (“APPEALED ORDERS” THE APPELLEE’S BRIEF MUST BE DISREGARDED AS TO ANYTHING THAT APPEARS TO BE CLAIMS OF FACT. But, Factual Basis was raised on P.8 of the NOTICE OF APPEAL [APPENDIX 25].  This violates FRE Rule 602.

 

  • AS THE BRIEF IS UNSWORN, AND THERE IS NO FACTUAL SUPPORT FOR ANY CLAIMS OF FACT. Factual Basis was raised on P.8 of the NOTICE OF APPEAL [APPENDIX 25].  This violates FRE Rule 602.
  • EXHIBITS TO THE APPELLEE’S BRIEF MUST BE DISREGARDED AS THEY ARE UNAUTHENTICATED. Factual Basis was raised on P.8 of the NOTICE OF APPEAL [APPENDIX 25].  This violates FRE Rule 901.
  • THIS COURT INCORRECTLY HELD THAT IT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER WINDSOR’S CHALLENGES TO DISTRICT COURT’S 2011 AND 2018 ORDERS. See STATEMENT REGARDING APPEAL PP.7-8; APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.
  • APPELLEE’S BRIEF ISSUE #1: THIS COURT DOES NOT LACK JURISDICTION OVER WINDSOR’S APPEAL OF THE 2022 ORDERS AS THE APPELLEES HAVE FALSELY CLAIMED.
  • APPELLEE’S BRIEF ISSUE #2: THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER WINDSOR’S APPEAL OF THE 2022 ORDERS. See APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.
  • APPELLEE’S BRIEF ISSUE #3: WINDSOR DID NOT ABANDON A CHALLENGE TO THE 2022 ORDERS BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY ANY LEGAL ERRORS SPECIFIC TO THOSE ORDERS AS THE APPELLEES HAVE FALSELY STATED. See APPENDIX 141, PP.1-12.

 

  1. WINDSOR identified all the legal errors that applied to the 2022 orders.
  2. The terms are very clear “…filing any complaint or initiating any proceeding, including any new lawsuit or administrative proceeding [APPELLANT’S BRIEF] [APPENDIX 146-P.13-¶99.]
  3. The APPEALED ORDERS have nothing to do with filing a complaint, filing a new lawsuit, or filing an administrative proceeding. A Texas application for guardianship in an existing probate court matter is not the filing of a lawsuit and is not an administrative proceeding. And it is a matter over which JUDGE THRASH has no jurisdiction.
  4. Contrary to the outlandish claim of the APPELLEES, this clearly explains why the 2022 Orders are void. WINDSOR explained that the so-called permanent injunctions do not restrict a Texas application for guardianship in an existing probate court matter as it is not the filing of a lawsuit and is not an administrative proceeding.
  5. See APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146], P.xxvii, P.l,¶¶25-26. See P.3,¶38: Neither the motion to deny removal nor jurisdiction were ever addressed by JUDGE THRASH in 01923.
  6. WINDSOR has never filed anything frivolous, and he has not abused the federal judicial system.
  7. The U.S. Attorney continues to violate the Constitution and the law by claiming a federal judge has jurisdiction over state court matters.

 

SIXTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDERS ARE VOID AND INVALID.

See STATEMENT REGARDING APPEAL P.7; APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.

 

SEVENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

WINDSOR AND HIS ACQUAINTANCES WERE DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 

See STATEMENT REGARDING APPEAL P.9; APPELLANT’S BRIEF [APPENDIX 146],P.xvi.

 

EIGHTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF LAW

AND FACT

WINDSOR ABSOLUTELY, POSITIVELY, MORE THAN ADEQUATELY BRIEFED HIS CLAIM.  HE PLAINLY AND PROMINENTLY RAISED IT BY DEVOTING DISCRETE SECTIONS OF HIS ARGUMENT.

 

  1. This SECOND PANEL either didn’t review the filings or corruptly invented an issue that does not exist. [OPINION – APPENDIX 133 and APPENDIX 134, P.6, II. Discussion, ¶1.]
  2. The FRAP requires that an APPELLANT’S BRIEF be filed, and on 6/7/2023, WINDSOR filed 65 pages verified under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 USC 1746. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 APPENDIX 146], P.65.] It identifies and attaches a copy of the Order Appealed. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34] [APPENDIX 146, P.45,¶¶98,100.]  It is titled “APPEAL NO. 22-12038-J AND 22-12411-J.”
  3. The APPELLANT’S BRIEF TABLE OF CONTENTS [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34, P.xv] [APPENDIX 146] has a major heading “ARGUMENT” and five arguments PLAINLY AND PROMINENTLY identified:
  • A FEDERAL COURT JUDGE DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO PLACE RESTRICTIONS ON THE OPERATION OF STATE COURTS, SO ALL OF THE APPEALS MUST BE GRANTED. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.]
  • ALL ORDERS OF JUDGE THRASH MUST BE DECLARED VOID BECAUSE FEDERAL COURT ORDERS ARE VOID WHEN JURISDICTION IS NEVER DETERMINED. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146], P.xv.]
  • JUDGE THRASH’S FEDERAL COURT ORDERS PLACING RESTRICTIONS ON THE OPERATION OF STATE COURTS ARE VOID ORDERS. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146], PP.xv-xvi.]
  • IN GEORGIA, A PARTY APPLYING FOR IN FORMA PAUPERIS IS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES OF THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF A SPOUSE. SO DENIAL OF IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS TO WINDSOR WAS UNLAWFUL. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146], P.xvi.]
  • Windsor’s constitutional due process rights have been violated, so the appeals must be granted. [USCA11 Case 22-12038 DOCKET 34 [APPENDIX 146, P.xvi.]
  1. WINDSOR has filed detailed information with this Court in the Statement of Appeal, Notice of Appeal, Responses to Questions from the Clerk, Appellant’s Brief, and Appellant’s Reply Brief. Virtually everything he has filed has been sworn under penalty of perjury.
  2. As to the June 30, 2022 Order of Judge Thomas W. Thrash [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17] is the “NOTICE OF APPEAL.” FRAP Rule 3 requires that such a Notice must be filed to initiate an appeal, and WINDSOR filed it on 7/18/2022.  It identifies and attaches a copy of the Order Appealed. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278, P.1.] [APPENDIX 17.]  It lists the Constitutional rights violated. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.1-2.]
  3. It raised the following:
    1. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER IS VOID AND INVALID. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.4-5.]
    2. WINDSOR AND HIS ACQUAINTANCES WERE DENIED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.6-8.]
    3. THERE WAS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ORDER. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], P.8.]
    4. THE ORDER IS VAGUE, AND IT IS TOO BROAD. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.8-10.]
    5. JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO ISSUE ORDERS ON STATE COURT MATTERS. [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.10-12.]
    6. JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO ISSUE ORDERS DENYING LEGAL RIGHTS TO ACQUAINTANCES OF WINDSOR [1-11-CV-01923-TWT DOCKET 278 [APPENDIX 17], PP.12-13.]
  4. The 7/26/2022 “STATEMENT REGARDING APPEAL” [APPENDIX 147] was required to establish that the Appeal was not frivolous, and it was so determined. It identified and attached a copy of the Order Appealed. [APPENDIX 147, P.13.]  APPENDIX 147 provided a concise summary of the issues.
  5. It raised the following:

 

NINTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The Judgment is VOID.
  2. A court must have jurisdiction to enter a valid, enforceable judgment on a claim. Where jurisdiction is lacking, litigants may retroactively challenge the validity of a judgment. [https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/subject_matter_jurisdiction.]
  3. WINDSOR has consistently denied jurisdiction for 12+ Years. [APPENDIX 128.]
  4. The requirement that a court have subject-matter jurisdiction means that the court can only assume power over a claim that it is authorized to hear under the laws of the jurisdiction. All Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. They only have the power to hear cases that arise under federal law, The instant case was brought in state court for violation of Georgia statutes and has no grant of subject matter jurisdiction.  [APPENDIX 19.]  See Const. Art. III, Sec. 2.
  5. A threshold concern for all federal courts is the presence, or absence, of Constitutional standing. The standing requirement does not exist in the instant case.  Subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist in the absence of constitutional standing. This restriction prevents courts—whose members are not elected and are therefore not politically accountable—from influencing the law in a legislative capacity. In this sense, the standing doctrine and subject-matter jurisdiction facilitate the separation of powers.
  6. Under federal question jurisdiction, a litigant—regardless of the value of the claim—may bring a claim in federal court if it arises under federal law, including the U.S. Constitution. See 28 USC 1331. Federal question jurisdiction requires that the federal element appears on the face of a well-plead complaint, and it does not
  7. The jurisdictional division between state and federal tribunals is an essential component of American federalism. Federalism is the Constitutional division of power between state governments and the federal government of the United States.
  8. Article Three of the U.S. Constitution establishes the judicial branch of the U.S. federal government. Article Three empowers the courts to handle cases or controversies arising under federal law. There is no federal law regarding guardianship of state citizens.
  9. Federal case law establishes that a federal judge has no jurisdiction over state courts, and a federal order for filing restrictions cannot apply to state courts. There are many 11TH CIRCUIT precedents.  See Paragraph 3 above.

 

TENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. Applying the Judgment prospectively is no longer equitable.
  2. In addition to the many other issues, WINDSOR is in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy and has no access to funds required by the purported Injunction.
  3. The JUDGMENT closes the courthouse doors to WINDSOR, which is a significant violation of Constitutional rights.

 

ELEVENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

Judge Elizabeth BranchJudge Robin RosenbaumJudge Britt Grant

  1. The SECOND PANEL appears to WINDSOR to be totally corrupt.
  2. The U.S. Constitution does not give federal judges jurisdiction over state courts. This SECOND PANEL has pretended this isn’t one of the most-notable Constitutional provisions.  Unless they didn’t bother to read the file, the FIRST PANEL did this work for them and ordered as they did in APPENDIX 133 and APPENDIX 134.
  3. Each justice or judge of the United Statesis required to take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his or her office:

“I, ___________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.” [28 USC 453.]

U.S. Constitution

  1. JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH and judges with the Eleventh Circuit have chosen to ignore the Constitution for 15 years when it comes to WINDSOR, and no one else. EVERY Federal Circuit has established precedents on this specific issue, including the Eleventh Circuit.  JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH and judges with the Eleventh Circuit have all violated their Oath of Office.

 

TWELFTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. When there is no legal basis for jurisdiction or an Injunction, the fact that a judge issues void orders does not make them lawful.
  2. The Appellate Courts have the power to correct such overwhelming violations of the Constitution and the law at any time.
  3. The SECOND PANEL is wrong in ignoring the VOID Injunctions that are the basis for the APPEALED ORDERS.

 

THIRTEENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. Judge Thomas W. Thrash’s basis for denying WINDSOR’s APPEALS is to falsely and maliciously claim that WINDSOR did something in the past, so he no longer has his Constitutional right to file anything in any legal matter.

 

FOURTEENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT

  1. The SECOND PANEL falsely claimed on P.4. of the OPINIONS [APPENDIX 133 and APPENDIX 134] that the case was removed from state court.
  2. JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH never ruled on jurisdiction, and he never issued an order in response to WINDSOR’s reply and objection [APPENDIX 19 and APPENDIX 128.]

 

Wanda Dutschmann

FIFTEENTH PARTICULARITY AS TO POINTS OF

LAW AND FACT:

MOM IS DEAD

  1. Wanda Dutschmann is dead. She was known as MOM, and WINDSOR is writing a book titled “KILLING MOM.”

Killing Mom

  1. WINDSOR believes JUDGE THOMAS W. THRASH and the SECOND PANEL contributed to her death by denying WINDSOR the opportunity to save her and her Estate through Guardianship in Texas. This is one of the APPEALED ORDERS [01923 – Docket ] [APPENDIX 135].

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, WINDSOR requests that this PETITION is granted; relieve WINDSOR from the Judgments and OPINIONS dated 1/25/2024; grant WINDSOR’s APPEALS; and grant such other and further relief as is deemed just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 7th day of February, 2024,

_______________________________
William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Bill Windsor verifies

VERIFICATION OF WILLIAM M. WINDSOR

I, William M. Windsor, swear that I am authorized to make this verification and that the facts alleged in the foregoing PETITION are true and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

In accordance with 28 USC 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge.

This 7th day of February, 2024,

_______________________________
William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this pleading has been prepared in Times New Roman 14-point font, one of the font and point selections required by the Rules.  There are 3891 words.

This 7th day of February, 2024,

_______________________________
William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served the foregoing to each Defendant by Federal Express to:

RYAN K. BUCHANAN – GABRIEL A. MENDEL

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY — ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY

600 United States Courthouse

75 Ted Turner Drive, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Telephone: (404) 581-6000 — Facsimile: (404) 581-6181

Email: gabriel.mendel@usdoj.gov

This 7th day of February, 2024,

_______________________________
William M. Windsor

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Complaint for VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Columbia

Complaint PDF  —  EXHIBITS PDF

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,                           )

Plaintiff                                                                     )

)           CIVIL ACTION NO.

Scott S. Harris and                                                 )           ________________________

Rashonda Garner,                                                  )

Defendants.                                                             )

                                                                               

 

Complaint for VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

AND ADDITIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION

The Parties to This Complaint

 The Plaintiff

William Michael Windsor (“WINDSOR”) is a citizen of the United States and is a resident of Lincoln County, South Dakota.

Name:                       William Michael Windsor

Address:                    5013 S. Louise Avenue #1134, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

County:                     Lincoln

Telephone:                352-###-####

Email:                        windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com

 

  1. The Defendants

Scott S. Harris (“HARRIS”) is a citizen of the United States, an employee of the federal government in Washington, DC, and a federal official.  HARRIS is sued as an individual.

Name:                        Scott S. Harris

Address:                    Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone:                202-479-3025

Email:                        pio@supremecourt.gov

 

Rashonda Garner (“GARNER”) is a citizen of the United States, an employee of the federal government in Washington, DC, and a federal official.  GARNER is sued as an individual.

Name:                       Rashonda Garner

Address:                    Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone:                202-479-3025

Email:                        PMcCabe@supremecourt.gov

 

  1. I Basis for Jurisdiction

[X]  Federal Officials (a Bivens Claim)

Constitutional rights the Plaintiff claims are being violated by federal officials (HARRIS and GARNER), including Denial of Due Process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) provides: “A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated….”

III.       Statement of Claim

   Where did the events giving rise to your claims occur?

The events took place at the Supreme Court building in Washington, DC and in Lincoln County South Dakota and Sumter County Florida.

  1. What date and approximate time did the events giving rise to your claims occur?

May 10, 2023; May 23, 2023; June 1, 2023; July 20, 2023; September 26, 2023; October 1, 2023; October 2, 2023; October 27, 2023; October 31, 2023; November 3, 2023; November 20, 2023; November 21, 2023; November 22, 2023; November 27, 2023; December 18, 2023, December 19, 2023; December 20, 2023, December 21, 2023.

What are the facts underlying your claims?

  1. On May 10, 2023, William M. Windsor (“Windsor”), an individual, filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition and Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (“PETITION”). [EXHIBIT A – May 10, 2023.] This Filing was made in compliance with the United States Supreme Court’s Rule 29 and in the manner required by the Rules, as shown on the Certificate of Service. [EXHIBIT B, Pages 51-52.]  The appropriate number of copies were mailed to the Clerk, and a copy was sent to the Solicitor General and the attorney involved in the case.
  2. On May 10, 2023, the Docket of the United States Supreme Court shows: “Application (22A1009) to file petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in excess of page limits, submitted to Justice Thomas.” [EXHIBIT A, May 10, 2023.]
  3. On May 23, 2023, Justice Clarence Thomas granted the Application (22A1009) “to file petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in excess of page limits. The petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition may not exceed 49 pages.” [EXHIBIT A, May 23, 2023.]  It was filed.
  4. On June 1, 2023, the Waiver of the Right of Respondent United States to respond was filed. [EXHIBIT A, June 1, 2023.]
  5. On July 20, 2023, the PETITION was “DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/26/2023.” [EXHIBIT A, July 20, 2023.]
  6. WINDSOR spoke by telephone with Jake in the United States Supreme Court Clerk’s Office. Jake explained that WINDSOR’s PETITION would be considered by the nine Justices in a “Conference.”
  7. The “Filing and Rules” section for the United States Supreme Court Clerk’s Office explains:

“The timing for placing petitions on a conference list and distributing them to the Justices is governed by Rule 15.5, which provides as follows: “The Clerk will distribute the petition to the Court for its consideration upon receiving an express waiver of the right to file a brief in opposition, or, if no waiver or brief in opposition is filed, upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing. If a brief in opposition is timely filed, the Clerk will distribute the petition, brief in opposition, and any reply brief to the Court for its consideration no less than 14 days after the brief in opposition is filed, unless the petitioner expressly waives the 14-day waiting period.” [https://www.supremecourt.gov/casedistribution/casedistributionschedule.aspx.]

  1. United States Supreme Court Clerk Scott S. Harris has explained Conference Scheduling in a memorandum. [https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/Guidance-on-Scheduling-2023.pdf.] [EXHIBIT K.]
  2. The Supreme Court Historical Society explains the Conference process. [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/.] [EXHIBIT C.]
  3. On September 26, 2023, the Docket of the United States Supreme Court indicates a Conference was held by the nine Justices in Case No. 22-7648. [EXHIBIT A, September 26, 2023.]
  4. On October 2, 2023, the United States Supreme Court’s Docket shows “Petition DENIED.” [EXHIBIT A, October 2, 2023.]
  5. On October 27, 2023, WINDSOR filed a Motion for Rehearing just to be safe. [EXHIBIT E.] It was sent by USPS. [EXHIBITS F and G.]   This was 25 days after the Docket claims the Petition was denied, so it would have been timely if an order had been issued.
  6. On October 31, 2023, WINDSOR received a letter from Scott S. Harris dated October 2, 2023. [EXHIBIT D.] The letter is not even signed; it’s a stamp.  It bears no seal, and it is not signed by a Justice.  The letter does not qualify as an Order required after a Conference.  And the time has not started to run on the filing of a motion for rehearing.
  7. On November 3, 2023, a letter was dated to WINDSOR by Rashonda Garner for Scott S. Harris. [EXHIBIT H.] The letter is not an order.  All copies of WINDSOR’s Filing were returned. [EXHIBIT I.]  The original copy is stamped “RECEIVED OCT 30 2023 Office of the Clerk Supreme Court U.S.” [EXHIBIT I.]
  8. On November 20, 2023, the letter dated November 3, 2023 was received by WINDSOR. [EXHIBIT J.] The letter is not an order.
  9. On November 21, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail.
  10. On November 21, 2023, Rashonda Garner left a voicemail saying she didn’t understand WINDSOR’s message. [EXHIBIT L.]
  11. On November 22, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail.
  12. On November 27, 2023, all of the mail dated November 3, 2023 regarding the Motion for Rehearing was sent certified mail return receipt to Rashonda Garner. [EXHIBIT H and EXHIBIT J.]
  13. On November 27, 2023, WINDSOR submitted 11 copies of a “MOTION” to the United States Supreme Court.
  14. On December 18, 2023, WINDSOR received a return of all of his November 27, 2023 mailing in a box. [EXHIBIT S.] This is all about WINDSOR’s Petition regarding violations of his Constitutional rights.  USSC Case #22-7648 —   https://lawlessamerica.com/motion-for-compliance-with-rules-of-u-s-supreme-court-was-filed-by-bill-windsor/?fbclid=IwAR14vsRgJBVkismog3TBwe88_GxfP98RcmMOmyLcHUwyt5hVBh3V8sLlENg.  This is the case chosen as one of the approximately 8,000 cases submitted in 2023 that the nine justices were actually to hear on September 26, 2023. https://lawlessamerica.com/74-year-old-disabled-man-with-use-of-only-one-finger-will-have-all-nine-u-s-supreme-court-justices-hear-his-pro-se-petition/?fbclid=IwAR1ExGhpVh0dTM8WRD_Bxr6cA_-NB2Hxg6I5adfB41Z7-FXc_zeQQl-MGQ4
  15. On December 19, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail. [EXHIBIT M.]
  16. On December 19, 2023, WINDSOR again called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail. [EXHIBIT N.] [EXHIBIT O.]
  17. On December 20, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner yet again and left a detailed voicemail. [EXHIBIT P.]  The call was not returned.
  18. On December 20, 2023, the Docket of the United States Supreme Court in Case #22-7648 shows no entries after October 2, 2023. [EXHIBIT Q.]
  19. As of December 26, 2023, Rashonda Garner still has not returned WINDSOR’s

 

PREVIOUS LAWSUITS AND ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF

The PLAINTIFF has not filed other lawsuits in state or federal court that deal with the same facts involved in this action.

Arguments – claims for relief

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #1 — Bivens Claim

  1. WINDSOR’s Constitutional rights are being violated by federal officials, Harris and Garner, including Denial of Due Process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. HARRIS and GARNER violated WINDSOR’s Constitutional rights, and those rights were so clearly established that a reasonable person would have known they were being violated.
  2. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.

 

  1. WINDSOR has been denied Constitutional Due Process Rights
  2. Due process requires that the government respect all of the legal rights that are owed to a person according to the law. Procedural due process guarantees protection to everyone so that statutes, regulations, and enforcement actions ensure that no one is deprived of “life, liberty, or property” without a fair opportunity to affect the judgment or result.  Judges have shown absolutely no respect for Windsor’s legal rights.  They have ignored the law and the facts.  Windsor has been denied the most fundamental right to not have his legal rights stolen by dishonest judges.
  3. This is not abuse of discretion; they violated the Constitution and laws intentionally. (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).)
  4. In Case No. 2018-CA-010270 in THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA (“010270”), the fundamental right to have the courts accept Windsor’s sworn affidavits as true has been violated. (Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).)
  5. Judges are required to be impartial. Judges have demonstrated pervasive bias against Windsor.  They haven’t shown an ounce of impartiality. (Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).)
  6. In “Some Kind of Hearing,” Judge Henry Friendly said that an important right of due process is “a decision based exclusively on the evidence presented.” Florida judges have not made decisions based upon the evidence presented.
  7. Due process is “an established course for judicial proceedings or other governmental activities designed to safeguard the legal rights of the individual.” Action denying the process that is “due” is unconstitutional.  In 010270, judges have denied the process that is due.  (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).)
  8. Litigants allegedly have the right to protections expressly created in statute and case law precedent. Statutes have been violated and overwhelming case law has been ignored by judges.
  9. Litigants have the right to equal protection of the law regardless of race, creed, color, religion, ethnic origin, age, handicaps, or sex. Windsor is 75, handicapped, and he has not received equal protection as a pro se party.
  10. Litigants have the right to a remedy, by recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs that they may receive in their person, property, or character. Windsor has been denied recourse.
  11. Litigants have the right to justice, without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without undue delay; in conformance with the laws. Florida judges have denied justice and have not conformed with the laws.
  12. The principle of due process of law is one of the most important protections against arbitrary rule.
  13. An inherent right is the honesty of the judge. Judges in Florida have committed perjury and obstruction of justice; they have violated many canons of the Code of Judicial Procedure as well as rules in the Florida Code of Professional Conduct.  Inherent in due process is the expectation that the judge will not violate criminal statutes, but they have.
  14. Judges in Florida have violated Windsor’s rights by using their power to inflict their bias.
  15. For due process, Windsor has the right to protections expressly created in statute and case law. Due process allegedly ensures that the government will respect all of a person’s legal rights and guarantee fundamental fairness and justice.  Due process holds the government subservient to the law of the land, protecting individual persons from the state.
  16. Due process requires an established course for judicial proceedings designed to safeguard the legal rights of the individual. Action denying the process that is “due” is unconstitutional.  Inherent in the expectation of due process is that the judge will abide by the rules.   Judges in Florida have violated rules for the purpose of damaging Windsor.
  17. An inherent Constitutional right is the honesty of the judge. Judges in Florida have not been honest.  They have violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
  18. The Constitution guarantees Windsor a fair and impartial judge. Florida judges denied Windsor’s guarantee to inflict their extra-judicial bias.

Every person “has a constitutional and statutory right to an impartial and fair judge at all stages of the proceeding.” (Liteky v U.S., 510 US 540 (1994).  (See Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037; Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971); accord Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pension, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (citation omitted).)

  1. Due process is supposed to guarantee basic fairness and to make people feel that they have been treated fairly.

“justice must give the appearance of justice” (Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1954).)  (Peters v. Kiff, 407, U.S. 493, 502 (1972).)

48.              At a basic level, procedural due process is essentially based on the concept of “fundamental fairness.”  For example, in 1934, the United States Supreme Court held that due process is violated “if a practice or rule offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”

49.              Where an individual is facing a (1) deprivation of (2) life, liberty, or property, (3) procedural due process mandates that he or she is entitled to adequate notice, a hearing, and a neutral judge.  Substantive due process refers to the rights granted in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.  Fifth Amendment due process means substantially the same as Fourteenth Amendment due process.

50.              Judges and Federal officers have a Constitutional duty to Windsor.  The DEFENDANTS breached their Constitutional duties through action and inaction.

  1. They have violated Windsor’s civil and Constitutional rights under color of law.

“[t]rial before an ‘unbiased judge’ is essential to due process.” Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971); accord Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pension, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (citation omitted). (Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972)

  1. The due process clauses of the Constitutions of Florida, South Dakota, and the United States guarantee a party an impartial and disinterested tribunal in civil cases. (Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 1613 (1980).)

Partiality in favor of the government may raise a defendant’s due process concerns. (In re United States of America, 441 F.3d at 66 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).)

  1. Judges in Florida have effectively denied Windsor’s rights of equal protection under the law in Article VI of the Constitution. Their actions prove that they have exercised their power in this and other actions for their own personal purposes rather than the will of the law.

Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412 (7th Cir. 1972), citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed 204 (1824); U.S. v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1990).

  1. The orders issued by judges in Florida suggest “the appearance of” animosity towards Windsor.
  2. These latest purported orders from JEFF ASHTON deny WINDSOR his fundamental Constitutional right of access to the courts, “unquestionably a right of considerable constitutional significance.” (Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2008).) Meaningful access to the courts is a constitutional right. (Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en banc).) [emphasis added.]

 

  1. AN ORDER was not ISSUED ON THE CONFERENCE DECISION OF SEPTEMBER 26, 2023.
  2. The Rules of the United States Supreme Court require valid evidence of the October 2, 2023 alleged denial by the Court of the Petition of William M. Windsor in Supreme Court Case #22-7648. An Order was not issued.  This is a violation of due process.
  3. The letters dated October 2, 2023 and November 3, 2023 are not orders and have no validity. [EXHIBITS D and H.] The U.S. Supreme Court Rules use the term “Letter” 13 times, and letters such as these are not authorized by the Rules.
  4. No valid evidence of the denials was attached to the letters.
  5. There is no order issued under seal, in violation of 28 U.S.C. 1691 – “All writs and process issuing from a court of the United States shall be under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk thereof.”

The word “process” at 28 U.S.C. 1691 means a court order.  See Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River Paper Co., 19 F. 252 (C.C. W.D. Wisconsin 1884);  Taylor v. U.S., 45 F. 531 (C.C. E.D. Tennessee 1891);  U.S. v. Murphy, 82 F. 893 (DCUS Delaware 1897);  Leas & McVitty v. Merriman, 132 F. 510 (C.C. W.D. Virginia 1904);  U.S. v. Sharrock, 276 F. 30 (DCUS Montana 1921);  In re Simon, 297 F. 942, 34 ALR 1404 (2nd Cir. 1924);  Scanbe Mfg. Co. v. Tryon, 400 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1968);  and Miles v. Gussin, 104 B.R. 553 (Bankruptcy D.C. 1989).

  1. There has never been an ORDER on WINDSOR’s case that was purportedly considered by the nine U.S. Supreme Court Justices on September 26, 2023. https://lawlessamerica.com/motion-for-compliance-with-rules-of-u-s-supreme-court-was-filed-by-bill-windsor/?fbclid=IwAR3ldAVwjfI4p7AZo4ILmjCRpshIx-4yAdr-nYAC_yvgz5jg_lIwN0Rfp8Q
  2. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “order” as a “mandate; precept; a command or direction authoritatively given….”
  3. gov defines “clerk of court” as “the court officer who oversees administrative functions, especially managing the flow of cases through the court.
  4. com defines “Administrative function” as that used in carrying out an administrative program and is to be broadly construed to include any aspect of agency organization, procedure, or management. In one state, for example, the term “administrative function” is defined as follows:

(1) “Administrative function” means the administration of:

(i) a law of the State;

(ii) a law of a political subdivision of the State; or

(iii) a rule, regulation, or bylaw of a public body.

(2) “Administrative function” does not include:

(i) an advisory function;

(ii) a judicial function;

(iii) a legislative function;

(iv) a quasi-judicial function; or

(v) a quasi-legislative function. [emphasis added.]

 

  1. Non-judicial court officers, such as clerks of court, will have specific tasks delegated to them by the court; they can make decisions on matters that the legal system does not consider to require judicial discretion and judgment. These are often described as “ministerial.”
  2. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “mandate:” “In practice, a judicial command or precept proceeding from a court or judicial officer, directing the proper officer to enforce a judgment, sentence, or decree. Seaman v. Clarke, 60 App. Div. 416, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1002; Horton v. State, 63 Neb. 34, 88 N. W. 146.
  3. “In the practice of the Supreme Court of the United States, the mandate is a precept or order issued upon the decision of an appeal or writ of error, directing the action to be taken, or disposition to be made of the case, by the inferior court … in some of the state jurisdictions….”
  4. WINDSOR has not received a judicial command. A letter purportedly written by the Clerk is not an order.
  5. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “precept” as “an order or direction, emanating from authority, to an officer or body of officers, commanding him or them to do some act within the scope of their powers.”
  6. A letter from the Clerk is not a Precept.
  7. The letter does not direct any proper officer to enforce a judgment, sentence, or decree.
  8. Failing to do what is required by the rules is a violation of due process, and this is a Constitutional violation.
  9. Windsor requires an order by the United States Supreme Court with a seal of the court and an actual signature of a Justice. This Due Process Notice and Service by Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, Scott S. Harris, was to be made on parties in 22-7648 of the valid record of denial of the Petition by the United States Supreme Court, if that actually happened.

 

  1. WINDSOR’S CONFERENCE DECISION WAS NOT PUBLISHED, AND IT MUST BE.
  2. United States Supreme Court’s Conference Decisions in Appeal No. 22-7648 must be published, and WINDSOR’s was not. This is a violation of due process.

“All conference decisions are published.” [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/ — EXHIBIT C, Paragraph 5.]

“When the vote has been taken on a case, the writing of an opinion is assigned—by the Chief if he voted with the majority, otherwise by the senior Justice of the majority.” [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/ — EXHIBIT C, Paragraph 6.]

 

  1. WINDSOR’S FILINGS WERE NOT DOCKETED AS THEY MUST BE.
  2. WINDSOR’S filing of a Motion for Rehearing [EXHIBIT E] has been unlawfully excluded from the Docket. [EXHIBIT A.] It was timely filed with the Clerk in paper form – an original and 10 copies.  There was no service by the United States Supreme Court.  This is a violation of due process.
  3. “Filing” is defined as:

“To place a paper in the official custody of the clerk of court to enter into the files or records of a case. [https://www.uscourts.gov/glossary#letter_f]

“the act of giving an official form or document to someone in authority in order to begin a legal process.” [Britannica Dictionary definition of FILING.]

“to deposit with the clerk of the court a written complaint or petition which is the opening step in a lawsuit and subsequent documents, including an answer, demurrer, motions, petitions, and orders. [Copyright © 1981 2005 by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill.].

 

  1. United States Supreme Court Rule 29 requires:

“1.   Any document required or permitted to be presented to the Court or to a Justice shall be filed with the Clerk in paper form.

“2.   A document is timely filed if it is received by the Clerk in paper form within the time specified for filing; or if it is sent to the Clerk through the United States Postal Service by first-class mail (including express or priority mail), postage prepaid, and bears a postmark, other than a commercial postage meter label, showing that the document was mailed on or before the last day for filing; or if it is delivered on or before the last day for filing to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery to the Clerk within 3 calendar days….”

  1. The Clerk of the United States Supreme Court seems to be routinely violating the due process requirements of many litigants. EXHIBIT R is an article written in 2012 about almost identical corruption by U.S. Supreme Court Clerk Thomas Suter.
  2. Notice and Service was not provided. Windsor demanded that it be executed immediately.
  3. Windsor asks that this Motion be docketed pursuant to Due Process and that a valid adjudication of the Motion be noticed and served on the parties.
  4. Windsor also requests all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under No. 22-7648, including all audit data. The audit data is the login name and login time of the individuals who entered any data in the records.
  5. WINDSOR believes these unlawful practices have taken place for at least 13 years. WINDSOR requests copies of all letters issued, rather than orders, in every case since 01/01/2008.

 

  1. ALL ORDERS AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH WINDSOR HAVE NOT BEEN SENT BY EMAIL AS REQUIRED.
  2. Documents attached as EXHIBITS hereto show that WINDSOR does not receive mail promptly. The American Association of Non-Lawyers requires that non-lawyers receive all communications by email.  This eliminates one of the many unfair advantages given to lawyers.  This is a violation of due process.
  3. WINDSOR must be served and communicated with at windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com.

 

  1. WINDSOR WAS NOT ISSUED AN ORDER ON HIS MOTION FOR REHEARING, AND HE MUST BE GIVEN THE PROPER TIME TO RESPOND TO ANY OBJECTION.
  2. Orders are required. This is a violation of due process.
  3. United States Supreme Court Rule 44 (2) provides: “Any petition for the rehearing of an order denying a petition for a writ of certiorari or extraordinary writ shall be filed within 25 days after the date of the order of denial….”
  4. There was no “order of denial,” so the time has not started to run on rehearing.

 

  1. THE CLERKS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, HARRIS AND GARNER, HAVE VIOLATED SUPREME COURT RULE 79 BY NOT KEEPING PROPER RECORDS.
  2. Records are required. This is a violation of due process.
  3. Rule 79 requires:

“(a) Civil Docket.

(1) In General. The clerk must keep a record known as the “civil docket” in the form and manner prescribed by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts with the approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The clerk must enter each civil action in the docket. Actions must be assigned consecutive file numbers, which must be noted in the docket where the first entry of the action is made.

(2) Items to be Entered. The following items must be marked with the file number and entered chronologically in the docket:

(A) papers filed with the clerk;

(B) process issued, and proofs of service or other returns showing execution; and

(C) appearances, orders, verdicts, and judgments.

(3) Contents of Entries; Jury Trial Demanded. Each entry must briefly show the nature of the paper filed or writ issued, the substance of each proof of service or other return, and the substance and date of entry of each order and judgment. When a jury trial has been properly demanded or ordered, the clerk must enter the word ‘jury’ in the docket.”

  1. HARRIS and GARNER have violated WINDSOR’s civil rights by failing to comply with this Rule.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #2 — CONSPIRACY

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. The Defendants, in some way or manner, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan. The mutual understanding was to break the law at some time in the future and/or to achieve a lawful aim by unlawful means.  The DEFENDANTS willfully became members of such conspiracy.  During the existence of the conspiracy, various DEFENDANTS knowingly committed at least one overt act in an effort to carry out or accomplish some object of the conspiracy.  The conspiracy was designed to deprive the PLAINTIFF of legal rights and deceive the courts to obtain an illegal objective.  Each of the DEFENDANTS is responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrongs. DEFENDANTS reached agreement to commit these overt acts.  They committed to support their efforts with a series of lies, to conceal documents, to falsify documents, to lie, and to undertake a variety of actions designed to damage the PLAINTIFF.  At least one of the DEFENDANTS knowingly committed at least two of the overt acts. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct). The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #3 — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. The DEFENDANTS have shown extreme and outrageous conduct. The PLAINTIFF has been under extreme emotional distress for 15 months.
  3. DEFENDANTS intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the PLAINTIFF through defamation, fraud, conspiracy, and violation of civil and Constitutional rights.
  4. DEFENDANTS inflicted emotional distress on the PLAINTIFF.  DEFENDANTS acted intentionally or recklessly.
  5. Some of the damaging words about the PLAINTIFF and actions against the Plaintiff are not defamatory, and it is these words and actions for which the PLAINTIFF seeks recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
  6. Conduct of DEFENDANTS was extreme and outrageous. These outrageously false and/or criminal claims and the wide variety of things that DEFENDANTS have done would prompt an average member of the community to exclaim “outrageous!”
  7. The activities of DEFENDANTS have been so extreme that it has gone well beyond all possible bounds of decency, and it must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. All of the acts of DEFENDANTS taken together amount to the type of extreme conduct that qualifies as intentional infliction of emotional distress.
  8. The conduct of Defendants caused the distress.
  9. The distress caused was severe emotional distress to the PLAINTIFF. The outrageous harassment, lies, libel, slander, and defamation are bad alone, but the effect on the PLAINTIFF’s mental health has been severe.
  10. There are no alternative causes of action that would provide a remedy for the severe emotional distress caused by DEFENDANTS’ conduct that does not meet whatever standard the Court decides is appropriate for defamation.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #4 — 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) – Violation of Federal Civil RICO Act

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. The conduct of DEFENDANTS violates the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (“Federal RICO”).
  3. DEFENDANTS, individually and in conspiracy with one another, are all RICO persons who violated RICO by engaging in (1) “racketeering activity,” (2) conducted through a “pattern,” (3) affecting an “enterprise,” (4) impacting interstate commerce. DEFENDANTS also violated 18 USC §1962(d) by conspiring as alleged herein to violate 18 USC §1962(c). All of DEFENDANTS’ predicate acts have a similar purpose – to damage the PLAINTIFF – all have similar victims, the PLAINTIFF, all have had similar results, and the methods of commission have been virtually identical.
  4. Racketeering Activity included violations of section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), and other sections.
  5. A number of crimes were committed by DEFENDANTS. Interstate crimes of wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and criminal conspiracy were committed between the District of Columbia, South Dakota, and Florida.
  6. DEFENDANTS knowingly devised or participated in a scheme to defraud the PLAINTIFF and did so willingly with an intent to defraud. The activity engaged in consists of two or more predicate acts of racketeering activity, the most recent of which occurred within hours after the commission of a prior act.
  7. The DEFENDANTS committed violations of Federal RICO and RICO Conspiracy – 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct: knowledge of, participation in, and benefit from a RICO enterprise). In addition to the substantive offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961, a criminal conspiracy to commit these offenses is a RICO predicate act.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #5 — Violation of Federal RICO Conspiracy Offense — 18 USC § 1962(d)

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. The DEFENDANTS, in some way or manner, came to mutual understandings to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan as described herein. The mutual understanding was to break the law. The DEFENDANTS willfully became members of such conspiracy.
  3. During the existence of the conspiracy, various DEFENDANTS knowingly violated the Federal RICO Act. These violations were knowingly committed in an effort to carry out or accomplish some object of the conspiracy.
  4. The conspiracy was designed to deprive the PLAINTIFF of Constitutional rights and legal rights and to deceive the courts to obtain an illegal objective. Each of the DEFENDANTS is responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrongs. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct: knowledge of, participation in, and benefit from a RICO enterprise).  The predicate acts are identified herein, and those paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #6 — Violation of Due Process and Deprivation of Rights — 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. HARRIS, GARNER, and UNIDENTIFIED DOES conspired for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, and/or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice with intent to deny PLAINTIFF due process and to injure him while attempting to enforce his right to self-representation, and this violated the equal protection of the laws.. HARRIS, GARNER, and UNIDENTIFIED DOES have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #5 — Violation of Constitutional Rights

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. DEFENDANTS had a Constitutional duty to the PLAINTIFF.  They breached their Constitutional duties to the PLAINTIFF through action and inaction.  This caused damage to the PLAINTIFF.
  3. The PLAINTIFF brings this action against HARRIS and GARNER, pursuant in part to 28 U.S. C. § 1331, in claims arising from violations of federal constitutional rights guaranteed in the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and redressable pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents 403 U.S. 388 (1971). HARRIS and GARNER subjected the PLAINTIFF to deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.
  4. HARRIS and GARNER’s actions are non-judicial, and there is no immunity. The PLAINTIFF has been damaged.  The PLAINTIFF prays for monetary damages against HARRIS and GARNER based upon violations of federal Constitutional rights pursuant to Bivens.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #6 — Fraud

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. Defendants intentionally misstated material facts, omitted material facts, and made false representations. Defendants knew they made false statements or omitted material facts, or they had a reckless disregard for the truth.  The PLAINTIFF and the courts relied upon the intentional misstatements and/or omission of material facts.  Defendants committed fraud.  The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct).

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #7 — Common Law Fraud

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. Defendants misrepresented material facts. These Defendants had knowledge of the falsity.  Their intent was that the representations would be acted upon by people ignorant of the falsity, relied on the truth of the representations, and had a right to rely upon it.
  3. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct). The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #8 — Violation of Pro Se Rights

 

  1. The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
  2. Pro se parties are a minority class of people. The PLAINTIFF objects to the treatment of pro se parties in state and federal courts.  The PLAINTIFF, Pro Se, has been repeatedly denied rights and abused.  Judges and judicial officers have violated the Constitutional rights of the PLAINTIFF and other pro se parties.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #9 — Constitutional and Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1988 — Violation of First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint for purposes of this claim.
  2. The PLAINTIFF was denied due process and his rights were violated when filings were not filed or considered.
  3. The PLAINTIFF was denied access to a court to seek redress of grievances.
  4. Defendants directly participated in the infraction, after learning of it, failed to remedy the wrong, and created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred or allowed such policy or custom to continue.
  5. As a direct result of the actions, statements and / or policies of the Defendants, the PLAINTIFF suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
  6. Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s known statutory and Constitutional rights.
  7. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, the PLAINTIFF has suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe and substantial damages. These damages include lost income, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental and emotional anguish, and distress.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #10 — Violation of Fourth Amendment Failure to Train and Supervise — 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint for purposes of this claim.
  2. The Defendants’ immediate supervisors, had a duty to train and supervise them to ensure they were not engaging in conduct that violated the civil rights of citizens like the PLAINTIFF.
  3. Instead of carrying out this duty, Defendants chose to encourage the misconduct of needless escalation and aggression witnessed by the Defendants against the PLAINTIFF in this case.
  4. DefendantS’ use of excessive force and their illegal seizure and assault upon the PLAINTIFF was the direct result of their supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the civil rights of citizens and of disabled citizens in particular, and his repeated failure and refusal to intervene to supervise, train, or otherwise put a stop to such misconduct.
  5. All of the acts described herein were done by Defendants intentionally, knowingly, willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and recklessly in disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s federally protected rights, and they were done pursuant to the pre-existing and ongoing deliberately indifferent customs, policies and practices of the Clerk of Court, under color of law.
  6. Upon information and belief, the Clerk of Court’s customs and practices of unlawful conduct (and failures to train/supervise to prevent the same) proximately causing the harms described herein to the PLAINTIFF.
  7. Upon information and belief, it is the custom and practice at the Clerk of Court’s Office of the United States Supreme Court to regularly violate the civil rights of citizens like the PLAINTIFF and intentionally, knowingly, willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and recklessly operate in disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s federally protected rights;
  8. Upon information and belief, it is the custom and practice at the Clerk of Court’s Office to try and cover-up and justify such wrongdoing.
  9. Upon information and belief, it is the custom and practice by the Clerk of Court to refuse to discipline its employees for misconduct and to refuse to ever find its employees have engaged in wrongdoing, in the face of obvious and repeated constitutional violations, which resulted in a foreseeable culture of dishonesty and silence in the face of ongoing and repeated civil rights violations.
  10. The unlawful conduct of Defendants as set forth in detail herein, amounts to a custom and well-settled, widespread overall practice of fraud and corruption deliberately insulated from law enforcement accountability, throughout the Defendants, even if not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, and is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.
  11. Through the Defendants’ continuous ratification of unconstitutional actions and inactions, Defendants have condoned and become the driving force of the Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct.
  12. Defendants failed to properly train and supervise its employees to avoid their foreseeable use of unconstitutional conduct.
  13. Defendants’ policies, customs, and practices in failing to properly train and supervise its employees were the moving force and proximate cause of the violations to the PLAINTIFF’s constitutional rights.
  14. The custom, policy, and practice of Defendants of encouraging, condoning, tolerating, and ratifying the unconstitutional conduct, as described herein, were the moving force behind and the proximate cause of, the violations to the PLAINTIFF’s Constitutional rights.
  15. Upon information and belief, Defendants have been deliberately obfuscatory and in other litigation involving claims against its officers, has made concerted efforts to withhold, destroy, conceal and delay the release of documents and correspondence that relate to the unconstitutional policies, customs, and practices set forth above, and which also evidence Defendants’ unconstitutional practices, customs, failures to train, and supervise Defendant officers as set forth above.
  16. The acts or omissions of Defendants caused the PLAINTIFF to suffer physical and mental pain, among other injuries, damages, and losses.
  17. The actions and omissions of Defendants as described herein deprived the PLAINTIFF of the rights, privileges, liberties, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States of America and caused his other damages.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #11 — Constitutional and Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1988 — Violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
  2. The PLAINTIFF was denied due process and his rights were violated when Defendants gave false information to WINDSOR and judges.
  3. Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s known statutory and Constitutional rights.
  4. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, the PLAINTIFF has suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe and substantial damages. These damages include lost income, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental and emotional anguish, and distress.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #12 — Monell Claim

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
  2. At all relevant times herein, the Clerk of Court’s Office developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned de facto policies, practices, and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the PLAINTIFF’s Constitutional rights which caused the violation of such rights.
  3. Defendants ‘ unlawful actions were done willfully, knowingly, and with the specific intent to deprive the PLAINTIFF of his Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
  4. The Constitutional abuses and violations of the Clerk of Court’s Office, were and are directly and proximately caused by policies, practices and/or customs developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged and sanctioned by Defendants, including the failure: (a) to adequately supervise and train its officers and agents, including the Defendants, thereby failing to adequately discourage further Constitutional violations on the part of its Clerk of Court’s Office, and their employees; (b) to properly and adequately monitor and discipline its employees, including Defendants; and (c) to adequately and properly investigate citizen complaints of misconduct, and, instead, acts of misconduct were tolerated.
  5. Upon information and belief, Defendants acting through its Clerk of Court’s Office, developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned a de facto policy, practice, and/or custom of unlawfully interfering with and/or arresting, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, individuals who exercise their rights under the First Amendment by engaging in monitoring and documenting law enforcement and judicial misconduct.
  6. Defendants’ unlawful actions were done willfully, knowingly, and with the specific intent to deprive the PLAINTIFF of his Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
  7. The PLAINTIFF has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer serious and irreparable harm to his Constitutional rights unless Defendants are enjoined from continuing their unlawful policies, practices, and/or customs which have directly and proximately caused such Constitutional abuses.
  8. Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s known statutory and Constitutional rights.
  9. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, the PLAINTIFF has suffered, and will continue to suffer severe and substantial damages. These damages include lost income, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental and emotional anguish, and distress.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #13 — CIVIL CONSPIRACY

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
  2. Defendants conspired to damage the PLAINTIFF.
  3. Defendants formed and operated the conspiracy. The object to be accomplished was to defame, libel, slander, harass, cyberstalk, invade his privacy, falsely charge the PLAINTIFF with felonies, cause emotional distress, invade his privacy, and damage him. Evidence shows that Defendants had a meeting of the minds and actively worked together toward this objective.
  4. Multiple unlawful, overt acts were committed. There was specific intent to agree to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means.  The conspiracy occurred in the District of Columbia.  The act in, and effect on, the District of Columbia was a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy.
  5. There are underlying torts that support the conspiracy cause of action.
  6. Damage resulted to the PLAINTIFF from acts done in furtherance of the common design. The PLAINTIFF has been caused pain and suffering, emotional distress, lost enjoyment of life, loss of his marriage, damage to his relationship with his family, severe damage to his reputation, damage to his career, and more.  The PLAINTIFF’s business relationships have been severely damaged.
  7. The PLAINTIFF’s reputation is now sullied by false, defamatory information online. This defamation likely can never be erased because it is breeding in cyberspace.
  8. There was extreme risk by Defendants as there was not a remote possibility of injury or even a high probability of minor harm, but rather the likelihood of serious injury to the PLAINTIFF.
  9. Actual awareness existed because Defendants knew about the peril, but their acts demonstrated they did not care.
  10. Some Defendants aided and abetted the conspiracy and underlying torts.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #14 — EXEMPLARY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
  2. Defendants acted intentionally to damage the PLAINTIFF.
  3. Defendants committed fraud, malice, and gross negligence. This isn’t the case of someone slipping up and making one false statement.  The actions of Defendants were deliberate.
  4. Conduct of Defendants, as described above, is willful, wanton, wicked, intentional, and malicious resulting from fraud, insult, and malice, and it is associated with aggravating circumstances, including willfulness, wantonness, malice, oppression, outrageous conduct, insult, and fraud, thus warranting the PLAINTIFF’s recovery of punitive damages from each of the Defendants.
  5. The entire want of care by the Defendants shows that the acts complained of were the result of conscious indifference to the rights or welfare of the PLAINTIFF.
  6. The PLAINTIFF should receive an award of punitive/exemplary damages. Exemplary damages serve to provide the claimant with recovery above and beyond compensatory damages in order to punish the wrongdoers for egregious conduct and to deter the wrongdoers and others from similar conduct in the future.
  7. Since the PLAINTIFF’s damages can never be erased in this case; there is no amount of money that could compensate the PLAINTIFF for the loss of life as he knew it; there is no amount of money to compensate a decent, honest, law-abiding citizen for the destruction of his reputation.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #15 — INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

 

  1. If not enjoined by this Court, Defendants and their agents, representatives, and employees will continue to implement similar policies and practices that deny citizens their Constitutional rights without due process, violate their right to equal protection of the laws, and deprive people of the privileges or immunities of citizenship. This course of conduct will cause citizens to suffer irreparable injury, including but not limited to, loss of business opportunities and the deprivation of their livelihoods.  Citizens have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law for such an injury.  Accordingly, injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other authority is appropriate.

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #16 — RICO RELIEF

 

  1. The PLAINTIFF asks that this Court liberally construe the RICO laws and thereby find that all Defendants, both jointly and severally, have acquired and maintained, both directly and indirectly, an interest in and/or control of a RICO enterprise of persons and of other individuals who were associated in fact, all of whom engaged in, and whose activities did affect, interstate and foreign commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); that all Defendants be required to account for all gains, profits, and advantages derived from their several acts of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s); that judgment be entered for the PLAINTIFF and against all Defendants for the PLAINTIFF’s actual damages, and for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF treble (triple) damages, under authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), according to the best available proof; that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF all damages sustained by the PLAINTIFF in consequence of Defendants’ several violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF his costs of the lawsuit incurred herein including, but not limited to, all necessary research, all non-judicial enforcement, and all reasonable counsel’s fees; that all damages caused by all Defendants, and all gains, profits, and advantages derived by all Defendants, from their several acts of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s), be deemed to be held in constructive trust for the benefit of the PLAINTIFF, his heirs and assigns; that the PLAINTIFF has such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper, under the circumstances of this action; that Defendants have conspired to acquire and maintain an interest in, and/or conspired to acquire and maintain control of, a RICO enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962(c) and (d); that Defendants have conspired to conduct and participate in said RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962(c) and (d); that all Defendants be required to account for all gains, profits, and advantages derived from their several acts of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s); that judgment be entered for the PLAINTIFF and against all Defendants for the PLAINTIFF’s actual damages, and for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF treble damages, under authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF all damages sustained by the PLAINTIFF in consequence of Defendants’ several violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF his costs of the lawsuit incurred herein including, but not limited to, all necessary research, all non-judicial enforcement, and all reasonable counsel’s fees; and that all damages caused by all Defendants, and all gains, profits, and advantages derived by all Defendants, from their several acts of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s), be deemed to be held in constructive trust for the benefit of the PLAINTIFF, his heirs and assigns.

 

 

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #17 — Violations of Title II of Americans With Disabilities Act — 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213

 

  1. All preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated here for purposes of this Claim.
  2. Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from discrimination on the basis of a disability.
  3. The DEFENDANTS failed to provide modifications or reasonable accommodations to the PLAINTIFF in light of his disabilities, and the Clerk of Court HARRIS failed to adopt policies and procedures, or adequately train his staff to safely interact with people who suffer such disabilities.
  4. Some reasonable accommodations for a litigant functioning alone with Cognitive Decline and use of only one hand while traveling a thousand miles from home is to allow recording, provide all communications in writing, and communicate by email for the fastest possible delivery.
  5. Unlawful discrimination, pursuant to DOJ regulation, includes a failure to make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.” 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(7).
  6. As a proximate result of actions of the DEFENDANTS, the PLAINTIFF was injured, suffered physically and emotionally, has been unable to comply with requests of the Clerk of Court, and continues to experience fear, trauma, and anxiety.
  7. As a result of the DEFENDANTS’ violations of Title II of the ADA, the PLAINTIFF is entitled to compensatory damages.

 

  1. INJURIES

 

________________________________________________________________

 

  1. RELIEF

 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Windsor respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in his favor and against the Defendants:

  1. that this COMPLAINT be granted;
  1. Appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the unlawful and unconstitutional acts and practices of the Defendants;

 

  1. Compensatory and consequential damages, including damages for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of liberty, privacy, sense of security and individual dignity, and other pain and suffering on all claims allowed by law;

 

  1. Appropriate equitable relief against all Defendants as allowed by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including the enjoining and permanent restraining of these violations, and direction to Defendants to take such affirmative action as is necessary to ensure that the effects of the unconstitutional and unlawful practices are eliminated and do not continue to affect the PLAINTIFF or others;

 

  1. All economic losses and damages on all claims allowed by law to be established at trial;

 

  1. Punitive damages on all claims allowed by law and in an amount to be determined at trial;

 

  1. that an order be issued confirming if there was a Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648;

 

  1. that an order be issued reflecting the Due Process Notice and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. Harris, on parties in Case No. 22-7648 of the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court;

 

  1. that the Opinion of the Court in Case No. 22-7648 be provided;

 

  1. that the vote of each Justice be indicated in Case No. 22-7648;

 

  1. that the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process;

 

  1. that an order be issued that WINDSOR must be served and communicated with at windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com;

 

  1. that this Motion be granted – motion TO REQUIRE confirmation OF A Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648 and ISSUANCE OF AN Order SO CONFIRMING; order reflecting the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court in Case No. 22 7648, the Due Process Notice, and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. HARRIS, of OPINION in Case No. 22-7648 on EACH partY; RECORD OF VOTES BY EACH JUSTICE in Case No. 22-7648; ORDER THAT the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that this Motion DATED NOVEMBER 27, 2023 be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648 AT NO charge, including all audit data; AND if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. HARRIS be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648, at no charge, including all audit data; that Windsor be provided copies of letters and orders issued in every case considered in Conference since 02/01/2008; that if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. Harris;

 

  1. Issuance of an Order mandating appropriate equitable relief, including, but not limited to: (1) The imposition of policy changes designed to avoid future similar misconduct by Defendants; (2) Mandatory training designed to prevent future similar misconduct by Defendants;

 

  1. Pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate; and

 

  1. Any further relief to which PLAINTIFF may show himself justly entitled.

 

Submitted this 26th day of December 2023,

 

 

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

VERIFICATION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C.§1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NOT.

This 26th day of December 2023,

 

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this COMPLAINT has been prepared in Times New Roman 12-point font, one of the font and point selections approved by this Court and meets the requirements of this Court.

This 26th day of December 2023,

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

WINDSOR is a private individual.  He is not a nongovernmental corporation so a corporate disclosure statement is not appropriate or required by Rule 7.1.

This 26th day of December 2023,

 

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, William Michael Windsor, do swear that on this date, December 26, 2023, I have served the enclosed COMPLAINT on the DEFENDANTS in the above proceeding or their counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with first-class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days.

The names and addresses of those served are as follows:

Name:                       Scott S. Harris

Address:                    Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone:                202-479-3025

Email:                        pio@supremecourt.gov

 

Name:                       Rashonda Garner

Address:                    Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone:                202-479-3025

Email:                        PMcCabe@supremecourt.gov

 

This 26th day of December 2023,

 

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

 

REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY

 

THE PLAINTIFF REQUESTS TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE.

 

This 26th day of December 2023,

 

_______________________________
WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR
,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Open Letter to the FBI

I have been attempting to get the FBI to review the evidence that I have compiled against Judge Orinda D. Evans and Judge William S. Duffey

Judge Orinda D. Evans and Judge William S. Duffey are the first of Atlanta’s federal judges who need to be indicted for various criminal acts and impeached by Congress.

Here is my latest letter to the FBI:

Special Agent Mary Jo Mangrum
FBI Atlanta
2635 Century Parkway N.E., Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30345
Fax: 404-679-6289

Dear Special Agent Mangrum:

I have proof of corruption in the federal courts in Atlanta, Georgia that makes Judge Camp’s bust look like child’s play.

I have never been arrested, never been accused of anything, haven’t even had a speeding or parking ticket in over 10 years.  I don’t smoke or drink, and I have never used drugs of any type.  I’m a normal retired business executive who has run into the devils in the federal courthouse.  As many as nine federal judges in Atlanta need to be indicted and impeached.

If we can meet, I can show you the corrupt acts as well as the proof that the acts were corrupt.  The long and short of it is that these judges ignore the facts, ignore the law, and violate a number of criminal statutes from the bench.  This is one of the biggest scandals in the history of our country.

Please call me.  I carry my cell phone at all times — currently confidential.

Thanks,

Bill Windsor
Pro-Se-1@outlook.com
currently confidential

Violation #2 – Judicial Misconduct of Judge Orinda D. Evans – Ex Parte Communications

evans-orinda-d-article-article-201410271552-200w

The following information is taken from a sworn affidavit that I filed with the courts as part of complaints about the judicial misconduct of Judge Orinda D. Evans:

1.   I submit that it is possible that Judge Evans and/or a clerk for Judge Evans may have been improperly influenced in this case.  I believe it is possible that improper influence could be a criminal violation, though I have no proof.  This is only a suspicion of a possibility, and I have this suspicion because the behavior of Judge Evans in this matter makes no logical sense to me.

2.   The Time Slips of Maid’s Attorneys show that there was extensive ex parte communication between Maid’s Attorneys and Judge Evans and her staff.  While some of this may be permissible, the volume of ex parte contact certainly indicates that there was plenty of opportunity for Judge Evans to be improperly influenced.  There were conversations and communications between Judge Evans and Maid’s Attorneys that Judge Evans did not reveal to Alcatraz and me. (Exhibit #1 to Dec #23 – Evans Docket #406.)  [Evans Docket #253-8, 253-15, 253-10.]  (Exhibit #967 to Dec #25.)  (I submit that this is a violation of Rule 3.4 and 8.4 of the GCPC and Local Rule 83.1C.  I submit that this is a violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.)

3.   VIOLATIONS BY JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS — I submit that this ex parte communication is a violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.  (Proof is provided in the paragraphs above, Evans Docket #253-8, 253-15, 253-10.)  (Dec #25, Exhibit #967.)

I have filed a Judicial Misconduct Complaint against Judge Orinda D. Evans with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  I previously filed a Judicial Misconduct Complaint against Judge Evans that was ignored.  I also have a lawsuit pending against Judge Orinda D. Evans for Fraud Upon the Court (Civil Action No. 1:09-CV-02027-WSD in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

 

Violation #1 – Judicial Misconduct of Judge Orinda D. Evans – Lack of Impartiality

evans-orinda-d-article-article-201410271552-200w

The following information is taken from a sworn affidavit that I filed with the courts as part of complaints about the judicial misconduct of Judge Orinda D. Evans:

1.    Judge Evans allowed Maid’s Attorneys to run wild and abuse the legal system in this case.  Judge Evans demonstrated pervasive bias throughout this proceeding.  Judge Evans has demonstrated a personal bias in favor of Maid and a prejudice against Alcatraz and me, in particular.  Judge Evans has withheld evidence from Alcatraz and me.  Judge Evans has not demonstrated the impartiality required of a judge.  To understand the gross professional misconduct of Judge Evans, see the Second Motion to Recuse filed June 4, 2009 and Dec #23 attached thereto [Evans Docket #406] and the Motion to Disqualify and Dec #23 and 32 attached thereto [Duffey Docket #17].

2.   VIOLATIONS BY JUDGE ORINDA D. EVANS — Lack of Impartiality.  I submit that this lack of impartiality is a violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges; I submit that this lack of impartiality is a violation of Canon 2 and 2A. of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges; I submit that this lack of impartiality is a violation of Canon 3 and 3B.(5) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges.  (Proof is provided in paragraphs above, the Second Motion to Recuse filed June 4, 2009 and Dec #23 attached thereto (Evans Docket #406) and the Motion to Disqualify and Dec #23 and 32 attached thereto (Duffey Docket #17) and throughout Dec #25.)

I have filed a Judicial Misconduct Complaint against Judge Orinda D. Evans with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  I previously filed a Judicial Misconduct Complaint against Judge Evans that was ignored.  I also have a lawsuit pending against Judge Orinda D. Evans for Fraud Upon the Court (Civil Action No. 1:09-CV-02027-WSD in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

 

How Judges Break the Law

judge-gavel-cartoon-attorneys decisions 207523-1500000-200w

Judges break the law in a number of ways. 

They have a standard little bag of tricks, and they are all smart enough to know how to abuse them.

If you believe federal judges are honest, you are sorely mistaken.

Here are the main ways they break the law:

Ignore the Law

One of the primary techniques used by corrupt judges is to simply ignore the law.  One party cites the law and overwhelming case law.  The other party doesn’t have a leg to stand on.  The judge simply ignores the law and rules against the party that was legally right.

In one instance, I presented literally thousands of cases that proved that I was right.  In fact, there had never been a case in any court where there was a ruling other than one that would be in my favor.  But Judge Orinda D. Evans had one and only one motive, so she ignored the law and ruled against me.

Cite Invalid Law

Sometimes a judge will feel like the citation of case law is needed to support their ruling.  So, they cite a case that is in some way related, but they claim the case applies when it didn’t.  Judge William S. Duffey has done this a number of times.  He cites a case in his orders, and then when I review those cases, I find that they actually proved my position.  But he ruled against me because he needed to in order to shield his good friend, Judge Orinda D. Evans, from criminal prosecution and impeachment.

Lie about the Facts in Orders

Lying under oath is perjury.  Judges are always under oath, and a judge is supposed to never say or write anything that isn’t true.  So, when a judge knowingly lies in orders for the purpose of ruling against a party for the judge’s criminal reasons, it is a criminal violation of perjury.  Each such instance is a separate count.  In my case, Judge Orinda D. Evans has committed hundreds and hundreds of counts of perjury.  The record filed with the Court proves that she lied, but she gets away with it because the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ judges will lie to protect their fellow judge.

Ignore Issues

Another of Judge Evans’ favorite techniques is to simply ignore issues in orders.  She does not respond to motions on a timely basis, and then she takes many motions at once and rules on them.  This buries the fact that she ignored motions where her ruling could not possibly be explained.  So, rather than make up an explanation, she just ignores those tough issues.

Conceal Evidence 

A really dishonest judge like Judge Orinda Evans will simply conceal evidence.  In my case, she has two documents that will prove fraud by the other party and their attorney.  She simply conceals that evidence and refuses to allow it to see the light of day so her criminal efforts are not exposed.

Say Nothing in Orders

One of the favorite techniques of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals is to say nothing.  They corruptly call an appeal “frivolous” and dismiss it with no explanation whatsoever.  Sometimes they write a page or two simply reciting history of the case, so it appears it is a real order, and then they write one sentence dismissing the appeal with no valid reason or explanation.

Don’t Publish the Improper Orders

The Eleventh Circuit has NEVER published one of the orders in my appeals.  When they are violating the law, they have protection by not publishing the order.  This keeps it from the eyes of attorneys and other judges who would identify the wrongdoing.  Publishing would also make their erroneous decisions precedents for other cases.  The whole legal system would be turned even more upside down if this were to happen.

I’m sure there are other techniques.  I will add them in future articles as they come to mind.


bill windsor

Bill Windsor

I, William M. Windsor, am not an attorney.  This website expresses my OPINIONS.   The comments of visitors or guest authors to the website are their opinions and do not, therefore, reflect my opinions.  Anyone mentioned by name in any article is welcome to file a response.   This website does not provide legal advice.  I do not give legal advice.  I do not practice law.   This website is to expose judicial corruption, government corruption, law enforcement corruption, attorney wrongdoing/corruption, and political corruption.   Whatever this website says about the law is presented in the context of how I or others perceive the applicability of the law to a set of circumstances if I (or some other author) was in the circumstances under the conditions discussed.  Despite my concerns about lawyers in general, I suggest that anyone with legal questions consult an attorney for an answer, particularly after reading anything on this website.  The law is a gray area at best.  Please read our  Legal Notice and Terms

 

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