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Crazy Judge Dan L. Schaap – Hunter Tyler Schreck Legal Update – 11-29-2021

Is Judge Dan L. Schaap aka “Big Chief” crazy? It has been a very busy week in the case of Hunter Tyler Schreck’s case. Hunter was almost murdered on June 24, 2020 by as many as 15 Amarillo, Texas Police officers and civilians. Hunter had done absolutely nothing. Judge Daniel Leon Schaap has just issued one of the craziest orders I have ever seen.

Judge Dan L. Schaap issued a CRAZY ORDER order asking the Randall County District Attorney if he had an objection to the termination of Hunter Schreck’s corrupt court-appointed attorney. Seriously. This guy has to be nuts. The prosecuting attorney has no say in who a criminal defendant chooses to use. The court-appointed attorney works for and is paid by Randall County.

This is the CRAZY JUDGE — Judge Dan L. Schaap aka Judge Daniel Leon Schaap aka Leon aka Big Chief:

Judge Dan L. Schaap — BIG CHIEF

BILL WINDSOR COMMENT: Judge Dan L. Schaap is the lowest of low-life judges. I’ve dealt with or been aware of thousands of corrupt judges, but they’re usually just dishonest a$$hole$. Judge Dan L. Schaap is trying to murder a disabled boy. I hope there is a very special place in Hell for Judge Dan L. Schaap.

Marcie Schreck has filed a Motion in response to the CRAZY ORDER:

COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT, Hunter Tyler Schreck (“Hunter” or “DEFENDANT”) through Marcie Schreck and William M. Windsor, who have his power of Attorney for all legal matters, and hereby files this Motion to Strike Order Setting Hearing by Submission (“MOTION”). There is no legal basis for this MOTION.

1. On 11/23/2021, Judge Dan L. Schaap signed the ORDER SETTING HEARING BY SUBMISSION (“ORDER”). [EXHIBIT 389.]

2. JUDGE DAN L. SCHAAP DOES NOT HAVE JURIDICTION BECAUSE JUDGE ANA ESTEVEZ HAS GIVEN PLENARY JURISDICTION TO JUDGE KENT SIMS.

3. The ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT granted plenary power to Judge Kent Sims. [EXHIBIT 317.]

4. A plenary power or plenary authority is a complete and absolute power to take action, with no limitations.

5. JUDGE DAN L. SCHAAP HAS NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE THERE ARE TWO MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY PENDING AGAINST HIM, AND THE 11/18/2021 HEARING IS VOID.

6. Case law requires that the disqualification hearing must be an evidentiary hearing. Judge Kent Sims denied evidence. He refused to swear in Marcie Schreck.

“Judge Brown did not afford Durden an evidentiary hearing on his motion to disqualify/recuse; therefore, we conditionally grant the petition in part and direct
Judge Brown to vacate his ‘Order on Motion to Recuse and Jeopardy Motion for Dismissal.’…” (In re State ex rel. Durden, 587 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App. 2019).)

“On appeal, Sanchez complains that an evidentiary hearing was mandatory under TEX.R.CIV.P. 18a once the recusal motion was referred to the administrative
judge. We agree.” (Sanchez v. State, 926 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App. 1996).)

“Sanchez complains that an evidentiary hearing was mandatory under TEX.R.CIV.P. 18a once the recusal motion was referred to the administrative judge. We
agree.” (Sanchez v. State, 927 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App. 1996).)

“Accordingly, the respondent abused his discretion in disqualifying Zayas without notice and an evidentiary hearing.” (In re Lopez, 286 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.
2008).)

“…the only order the trial court had authority to enter after it refused to recuse itself was an order of referral. State ex rel. Millsap, 692 S.W.2d at 481. Because
the trial court neither granted the motion to recuse nor referred the matter to the presiding judge, any other order made thereafter was void.” (Crawford v.
State, 807 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App. 1991).)

7. THERE IS NO LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ALLOW THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY TO OBJECT TO OR OPPOSE THE WITHDRAWAL OF A COURT-APPOINTED DEFENSE ATTORNEY WHO WAS TERMINATED MONTHS AGO.

8. Brooks Barfield has begged to withdraw. [EXHIBIT 310.] [EXHIBIT 311.]

9. The DEFENDANT has filed motions to dismiss Brooks Barfield as he was terminated on October 12, 2021. [EXHIBIT 2.] [EXHIBIT 16.] [EXHIBIT 188.]

10. JUDGE DAN L. SCHAAP TOLD THE DEFENDANT AND MARCIE SCHRECK THAT HUNTER COULD TERMINATE BROOKS BARFIELD AT ANY TIME.

11. The Zoom call was tape recorded. EXHIBIT 134 is a transcript of the call. EXHIBIT 297 is the Audio Recording.

12. The DEFENDANT recorded a video for Judge Dan L. Schaap explaining that he does not want Brooks Barfield. The DEFENDANT refuses to work with Brooks Barfield. [EXHIBIT 156 and EXHIBIT 157.] [EXHIBIT 377.] [EXHIBIT 392.]

13. THE DEFENDANT HAS FILED A STATE BAR OF TEXAS GRIEVANCE AGAINST BROOKS BARFIELD, AND HE IS SEEKING HIS DISBARMENT.

14. The Grievance was filed by Fax on 11/24/2021. [EXHIBIT 388.]

15. Marcie Schreck is also seeking a protective order against Brooks Barfield. [EXHIBIT 308 and EXHIBIT 309.]

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the DEFENDANT prays that the Court strike the ORDER SETTING HEARING BY SUBMISSION; sign the order [EXHIBIT 188] removing Brooks Barfield from the case and order him to immediately deliver the case file and all evidence to HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK; order all filings received by the Clerk of Court to be docketed; enter an order recognizing that Marcie Schreck and William M. Windsor are authorized by Texas law Chapter 752 to represent HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK as his Attorney-in-Fact [EXHIBIT 400]; schedule a hearing on the Motion to Quash the Purported Indictments and Motion to Dismiss; schedule a hearing on the Motion for Discharge due to failure to provide a Speedy Trial; and for such other and further relief in connection therewith that is proper.

Photo Hunter Schreck and Marcie Schreck happier times 2015 CROPPED 640w

Hunter Tyler Schreck and Marcie Schreck BEFORE Hunter was almost murdered
and suffered a Traumatic Brain Injury

Marcie Schreck believes Judge Dan L. Schaap may be mentally ill.

There have been a lot of significant developments in the case of HUNTER TYLER SHRECK this week. It appears the CRAZY ORDER should lead to the removal of BROOKS BARFIELD, the clueless attorney of Amarillo. We are waiting with baited breath to see if Big Chief Dan L. Schaap recognizes the law that makes Marcie Schreck and Bill Windsor the Attorneys-in-Fact for Hunter Tyler Schreck.

If he does, it’s ramming speed!

If Big Chief Dan L. Schaap doesn’t schedule hearings on the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Provide a Speedy Trial after 525 days and the Motion to Quash the Indictments, then it’s time for the Court of Appeals.

We have noticed many depositions. We have sent many demands for criminal investigations against the army of evildoers. We have been speaking with the top attorneys in the country who might like to make $20 million handling Hunter Schreck’s civil case. We have emailed the defendants in the civil case maaaany times. Marcie has been receiving wonderful help from Easter Seals. We have filed two Bar Association Complaints. We are prepared to file a Judicial Misconduct Complaint against Big Chief. We have done background checks on every potential defendant using MyLife’s 96-hour introductory trial special for $1. That’s how we managed to get Big Chief’s personal emails. 🙂

Marcie has had a lot of success getting chances for desperately-needed medical care for Hunter and Logan. She somehow is managing to get $15,000 in dental work done for Logan for FREE.

Stay tuned for more news from Big Chief. Maybe they are finally ready to give up and dismisss the case.

Other Articles about Hunter Tyler Schreck:

Hunter Tyler Schreck – a Disabled Young Man – has been Victimized by Police, District Attorney, and Pentecostal Church Members in Amarillo Texas

Just Like the Man who has Done Nothing Wrong by Hunter Tyler Schreck

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 1

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 2

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 3

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 4

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 5

It’s the Belt — Secrets of the Clever Mom of Hunter Tyler Schreck

Beware of Brooks Barfield

Bar Grievance Against Brooks Barfield

Bar Grievance Against The D.A. Robert Love

Crazy Judge Dan L. Schaap ak BIG CHIEF

Copyright LawlessAmerica.com
Bill Windsor went to high school and college in Lubbock, Texas — just a short drive from Amarillo, Texas. This gives him a special interest in exposing the scum in the area of the country he has loved so much.

windsor bill 2012 09 28 cropped tight edited 200w

Bill Windsor

I, William M. Windsor, am not an attorney. This website expresses my OPINIONS. The comments of visitors or guest authors to the website are their opinions and do not therefore reflect my opinions. Anyone mentioned by name in any article is welcome to file a response. This website does not provide legal advice. I do not give legal advice. I do not practice law. This website is to expose government corruption, law enforcement corruption, political corruption, and judicial corruption. Whatever this website says about the law is presented in the context of how I or others perceive the applicability of the law to a set of circumstances if I (or some other author) was in the circumstances under the conditions discussed. Despite my concerns about lawyers in general, I suggest that anyone with legal questions consult an attorney for an answer, particularly after reading anything on this website. The law is a gray area at best. Please read our Legal Notice and Terms.

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Hunter Tyler Schreck Legal Update – 11-22-2021

Update since Hunter Tyler Schreck filed a Mega-Million federal lawsuit in Amarillo, Texas on 10/29/2021 for violation of his Constitutional rights. It has been a very busy week. Hunter was almost murdered on June 24, 2020 by as many as 15 Amarillo, Texas Police officers and civilians. Hunter had done absolutely nothing.

Hunter Schreck has filed his lawsuit pro se. He has named 58 Defendants and 100 John Doe Defendants (gangsters he will identify in discovery). Here is Civil Action No. 2-21CV-220-Z – Schreck v City of Amarillo, Et al. – Verified Complaint2-21CV-220-Z – Schreck v City of Amarillo, Et al. – Verified Complaint.

On 10/28/2021, BROOKS BARFIELD sent Marcie Schreck notice of a “Show Cause Hearing” in the Randall County 47th Judicial District Court on 11/2/2021 at 1:30 p.m. [EXHIBIT 211.] She was told by Billy Maples of Judy’s Bail Bonds that HUNTER’s bond would be revoked and he would be arrested if he wasn’t there. Marcie Schreck checked the docket, and there was no hearing shown.

BILL WINDSOR COMMENT: There was no such hearing scheduled. Just one of the almost never-ending lies of BROOKS BARFIELD, Public Pretender and criminal.

On 10/28/2021 at 11:38 a.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD advising him to notify his malpractice carrier that a malpractice lawsuit was being filed against him. [EXHIBIT 208.]
On 10/28/2021 at 8:24 p.m., Marcie Schreck sent a CEASE-AND-DESIST notice by email to BROOKS BARFIELD. [EXHIBIT 207.] It said:

Mr. Barfield: Please CEASE AND DESIST. Hunter, William, Logan, and I don’t ever want to hear from you again. I thought that was made quite clear from earlier messages and filings. Once again: Do not show up anywhere that Hunter and I are. Do not contact us in any manner. No email. No mail. No couriers. No phone calls. No visits. No courthouse contact. No telegrams. No trick or treating. NOTHING. CEASE AND DESIST. You have made threats to me. I am asking the police to pursue criminal charges against you for what you have already done. If you contact us again, we will go seek a STALKING, Harassment, and Cyber Terrorism Protective Order. I am copying several people so they are aware of this. Marcie Schreck – Attorney-in-Fact for Hunter Tyler Schreck

On 10/29/2021, Marcie Schreck (“MOMMA SCHRECK”) filed the Verified Complaint with Alice in the Clerk’s Office of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. She filed the Verified Complaint, a Civil Cover Sheet, a Certificate of Interested Persons, and a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Costs. She also delivered 58 Summons Foms for signature by the Clerk once In Forma Pauperis status is approved.

On 10/29/2021 and 10/30/2021, Marcie Schreck emailed a copy of the federal court Verified Complaint to BROOKS BARFIELD and the other defendants with known email addresses.

On 10/29/2021 at 8:27 a.m., Marcie Schreck received an email from Sandy Russell of Randall County that shows the federal court Verified Complaint to BROOKS BARFIELD and the other defendants with known email addresses was received. [EXHIBIT 209.]

On 10/31/2021, Billy Maples of Judy’s Bail Bonds texted Marcie Schreck at 10:11 a.m. with notice of a “Status Hearing” in the Randall County 47th Judicial District Court on 11/2021 at 1:30 pm. Neither HUNTER nor Marcie Schreck knew anything about this. He asked Marcie Schreck to confirm receipt. He said: “Your attendance is required for this hearing. When you arrive at court, you are required to text or call. Then when the hearing is concluded, contact us again to report the outcome. We also need a copy of any and all court documents that you received. You can send them by email or text or by simply taking a photo of them and email. I wish you the best outcome.”

On 11/1/2021 at 10:13 p.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD with instructions on what he must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD. [EXHIBIT 136.] BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/1/2021 at 10:22 p.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD with instructions on what he must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD. [EXHIBIT 136.] BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/1/2021 at 10:22 p.m., Marcie Schreck sent another email to BROOKS BARFIELD with instructions on what he must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD. [EXHIBIT 136.] BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/1/2021 at 10:28 p.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to Samantha Wilson of the BARFIELD Law Firm with instructions on what BROOKS BARFIELD must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD. [EXHIBIT 136.] BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/2/2021 at 4:10 a.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to Samantha Wilson of the BARFIELD Law Firm with instructions on what BROOKS BARFIELD must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD. [EXHIBIT 136.] BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/2/2021 at 4:15 a.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD with instructions on what he must file and do since he had not exited from the case. included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD. [EXHIBIT 136.] BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/2/2021 at 4:19 a.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD with instructions on what he must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD. [EXHIBIT 136.] BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/2/2021 at 4:28 a.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD with instructions on what he must file and do since he had not exited from the case. Marcie Schreck included an order for Judge Dan L. Schaap to sign removing BROOKS BARFIELD. [EXHIBIT 136.] BROOKS BARFIELD has never filed these things or done anything.

On 11/2/2021 at 8:56 a.m., BROOKS BARFIELD filed a MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL.” [EXHIBIT 163.] It says: “Good cause exists for withdrawal as counsel in that Movant is unable to effectively communicate with Hunter Schreck so as to be able to adequately represent Defendant. Hunter Schreck no longer desires that Movant represent him and desires to be self-represented or “pro se.” Defendant and Defendant’s mother (Marcie Schreck) has filed a frivolous law suit in Federal Court cause number2-21CV-220-Z.”

On 11/2/2021, Billy Maples of Judy’s Bail Bonds texted Marcie Schreck to ask if she received his message regarding the “Status Hearing” today. Marcie Schreck responded “Yes.” Marcie Schreck informed him that HUNTER is bedridden, but she is going, armed to the teeth with lots of filings. Marcie Schreck thanked him and asked whether this was a Status or Show Cause hearing. Billy Maples responded: “Call me please.” Marcie Schreck asked him to call her to confirm that BROOKS BARFIELD was no longer HUNTER’s attorney.

On 11/2/2021, Billy Maples of Judy’s Bail Bonds called Marcie Schreck. He told her that if HUNTER did not come to the Status Hearing, he will revoke the bond, and if he doesn’t, then Judge Dan L. Schaap will do it for him, put a warrant out for his arrest, rearrest HUNTER, and put him back in jail. Marcie Schreck advised Billy Maples that HUNTER is extremely ill. He cannot and will not be at the Status Hearing today. He’s in bed. Marcie Schreck advised Billy Maples that she has called two doctors asking for letters of confirmation that HUNTER cannot attend. She reported that she gets voice mails saying it will take 24-hours for them to call back. Marcie Schreck told him that she truly tried reaching a doctor in this emergency, and no call has been returned.

On 11/2/2021 at approximately 12:30 p.m., BROOKS BARFIELD called Marcie Schreck. He was lying on the phone. He asked Marcie Schreck to let him represent HUNTER. He said “I am a good lawyer.” Marcie Schreck told him: “NO.” She had to cut him short as she wasn’t dressed and the calls from Billy Maples and him threatening HUNTER and her with jail were going to cause her to be late for court. Marcie Schreck has a tape recording of this call.

BILL WINDSOR COMMENT: I have long since learned that Marcie Schreck has a tape recording of everything. She has successfuly downloaded 15 of her recording devices to a Flash Drive. I believe that resulted in 850 files. She has two different types of recorders that she has not yet figured out how to download.

On 11/2/2021, Billy Maples of Judy’s Bail Bonds texted Marcie Schreck. She left her phone at home (to keep it safe in the event she was arrested), so her husband, William Schreck, responded to inform him that she was on her way to the courthouse. Billy Maples said: “So HUNTER isn’t coming?” William Schreck responded: “Hunter is not able to make it.”

On 11/2/2021 at 1:31 p.m., Billy Maples of Judy’s Bail Bonds texted Marcie Schreck: “Is HUNTER coming to the hearing? You requested for me to be here, and you are not. I’m not seeing you or him.”

BILL WINDSOR COMMENT: I believe Billy Maples is part of the Criminal Racketeering Enterprise in Amarillo. It seems to me he is acting as an agent fior the evildoers.

On November 2, 2021 at 1:30 p.m., there was an event called a “hearing” in the 47th Judicial District Court in Amarillo, Texas (state court — criminal action). Hunter Tyler Schreck never received an order or any notice of this event.

On 11/2/2021 at 1:33 p.m., Marcie Schreck walked into the courtroom. BROOKS BARFIELD was not there. Marcie Schreck was looking at her papers. Brad Parker, Bailiff, walked up and handed her a piece of paper from Judge Dan L. Schaap. Marcie Schreck smiled at him and asked if he was Brad Parker. He said “I am.” She said “I’m Marcie Schreck, nice to meet you.” Marcie Schreck shook his hand.

Brooks BARField makes me want to BARF.

On 11/2/2021 at 1:43 p.m., BROOKS BARFIELD walked into the courtroom. Marcie Schreck approached him and said: “May I speak with you? Billy Maples has threatened to revoke HUNTER’s bond. You have threatened me. PLEASE tell the judge HUNTER is extremely ill in bed and can’t come.” BROOKS BARFIELD would not let Marcie Schreck say more. Marcie Schreck walked into the courtroom and took a seat behind what she believes was a member of the DA’s Office. Marcie Schreck was approximately 40-feet from the bench. She was surprised to see a lot of people in the audience for the hearing.

Judge Dan L. Schaap — Lowlife

On 11/2/2021 at approximately 1:50 p.m., Judge Dan L. Schaap walked in. A court reporter was there. BROOKS BARFIELD told the judge HUNTER was not there. He did not explain why. BROOKS BARFIELD told the judge that a federal lawsuit was filed last Friday, and “she” named 58 defendants and maybe 100 more.” BROOKS BARFIELD said: “I put in my withdrawal to you on November 1, 2021.” He said something about it being a conflict of interest. The judge and BROOKS BARFIELD then said some legal terms that Marcie Schreck did not understand. Marcie Schreck had trouble hearing Judge Dan L. Schaap. She did hear the judge say: “It may be a conflict of interest with me as well. I don’t know yet.” The court reporter’s transcript should indicate exactly what was said.

Marcie Schreck raised her hand. Judge Dan L. Schaap nodded at her. Marcie Schreck asked: “Your honor, may I speak?” The judge said: “Yes.” Marcie Schreck said: “My son is Autistic, and I have education about that.” Judge Dan L. Schaap immediately told her: “If you cross that boundary with me; you have crossed that boundary with me; you will not like it. You will see.” He was very condescending and threatening to Marcie Schreck. Marcie Schreck tried to speak politely, but Judge Dan L. Schaap then threatened her. He said in a louder voice: “DO YOU UNDERSTAND?” Marcie Schreck didn’t, but she said “Your honor, yes, thank you.” The judge said something about needing to hear from HUNTER about BROOKS BARFIELD.

BILL WINDSOR COMMENT: Judge Dan L. Schaap is the lowest of low-life judges. I’ve dealt with or been aware of thousands of corrupt judges, but they’re usually just dishonest a$$hole$. Judge Dan L. Schaap ids trying to murder a disabled boy. I hope there is a very special place in Hell for Judge Dan L. Schaap.

On 11/2/2021, after the hearing, Billy Maples told Marcie Schreck he heard the DA and attorneys that they had plans to take her down and arrest her right there. He said they really wanted to, and if she had said one more word, she would have been arrested and gone to jail. Billy Maples talked with the same people after the hearing, and they said they were really wanting to arrest Marcie Schreck.

On 11/2/2021 at 7:27 p.m., Marcie Schreck sent an email to BROOKS BARFIELD with a CEASE-AND-DESIST notice [EXHIBIT 210]: “Cease and desist. Do not contact Hunter or me. We want NOTHING to do with you except in your capacity as a Defendant in Schreck v. City of Amarillo, Et al. You lied to me today. You lied to Judge Dan L. Schaap today. I believe you are someone who finds it impossible to tell the truth.I believe your only interest is harming my family and me. The law and the Rules say you are terminated, so go away. You have a conflict of interest, as YOU told me. Hunter will be informing the judge (who has no jurisdiction) exactly what he thinks of you. Hunter had you pegged from the start — someone who does not have his best interests in mind and someone he does not trust. Mr. BARField, you are INCOMPETENT.”

The evening of 11/2/2021, Marcie Schreck and her husband decided to record a video of HUNTER that they could send to the judge expressing Hunter Schreck’s feelings about BROOKS BARFIELD. Marcie Schreck’s affidavit shows what HUNTER said. [EXHIBIT 156.] William Schreck’s affidavit shows what HUNTER said. [EXHIBIT 157.] HUNTER made it clear he doesn’t want anything to do with BROOKS BARFIELD.

On 11/3/2021, BROOKS BARFIELD wrote a letter to HUNTER SCHRECK and mailed it Certified Mail Return Receipt. [EXHIBIT 163.]

On 11/5/2021, the mailman delivered the 11/3/2021 letter from BROOKS BARFIELD. [EXHIBIT 163.] No one signed for it. The green return receipt card had been removed from the envelope before it was delivered. The letter told HUNTER to communicate directly with him. This is a clear violation of the Cease-and-Desist and an effort to damage HUNTER with a panic attack and anxiety.

On 11/8/2021, the Register of Actions in the case shows that none of the purported filings in the case that never appeared on the Docket still are not on the Docket. [EXHIBIT 212.]

BROOKS BARFIELD violated the rules of professional conduct; engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation; engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and more. HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK had a right to expect BROOKS BARFIELD to abide by Texas law, Texas rules, Texas Rules of Professional Conduct (“TRPC”), and the Constitutions. HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK had a right to expect BROOKS BARFIELD and JUDGE DAN L. SCHAAP to refrain from doing acts that injured HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK. BROOKS BARFIELD and JUDGE DAN L. SCHAAP have committed professional misconduct and have violated state and federal statutes, Rules, Texas Rules of Professional Conduct (“TRPC”), and the Constitutions. BROOKS BARFIELD and JUDGE DAN L. SCHAAP committed acts that injured HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK.

HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK has been under extreme emotional distress for 15 months. BROOKS BARFIELD intentionally inflicted emotional distress on HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK through defamation, fraud, conspiracy, and violation of civil and Constitutional rights.

BROOKS BARFIELD inflicted emotional distress HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK. He acted intentionally and recklessly.

The conduct of BROOKS BARFIELD was extreme and outrageous. An average member of the community to exclaim “outrageous!”

The activities of BROOKS BARFIELD have been so extreme that it has gone well beyond all possible bounds of decency, and it must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. The conduct of BROOKS BARFIELD caused extreme distress to HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK. The distress caused was severe emotional distress to HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK. The outrageous harassment, lies, libel, slander, and defamation are bad alone, but the effect on HUNTER TYLER SCHRECK’s mental health has been severe.

BROOKS BARFIELD has repeatedly ignored Cease-and-Desist notices. He has repeatedly threatened Marcie Schreck. He has damaged HUNTER, and Marcie Schreck believes he is attempting to kill HUNTER. BROOKS BARFIELD makes Marcie Schreck’s entire family fear even leaving their home because of what BROOKS BARFIELD may do personally or may arrange to have done to them.

Hunter Tyler Schreck and Marcie Schreck BEFORE Hunter was almost murdered
and suffered a Traumatic Brain Injury

Marcie Schreck believes BROOKS BARFIELD is a criminal and is mentally ill. He has caused HUNTER and Marcie Schreck to fear for their lives.

BILL WINDSOR COMMENT: Thanks to Marcie Schreck for providing this information to me. It comes from her Appolication for Protective Order that she is preparing to file against W BROOKS BARFIELD.

Much more news to report….

Other Articles about Hunter Tyler Schreck:

Hunter Tyler Schreck – a Disabled Young Man – has been Victimized by Police, District Attorney, and Pentecostal Church Members in Amarillo Texas

Just Like the Man who has Done Nothing Wrong by Hunter Tyler Schreck

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 1

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 2

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 3

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 4

Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit – Chapter 5

Copyright LawlessAmerica.com
Bill Windsor went to high school and college in Lubbock, Texas — just a short drive from Amarillo, Texas. This gives him a special interest in exposing the scum in the area of the country that he has loved so much.

Bill Windsor

http://www.LawlessAmerica.com

windsorinmontana@yahoo.com

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Ku Klux Klan Act – 42 USC 1983 – Sue for Violation of Civil Rights

This is an article I published in 2010. There is a lot of excellent information about a federal lawsuit against the City of Amarillo and 50 criminals and for Ellis County and a boatload of criminals from Ellis County that John Eric Armstrong is expected to file. Here’s the Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit. It is pursuant to The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. You may know it as 42 U.S.C. 1983.

I copied it from http://www.constitution.org/brief/forsythe_42-1983.htm

A GUIDE TO CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

AN OVERVIEW OF SUPREME COURT AND ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT

IAN D. FORSYTHE

Hilyard, Bogan, Palmer & Lockeby, P.A.

105 East Robinson Street, Suite 201

Orlando, Florida 32801

Tel. (407) 425-4251

forsythe@forsythelaw.com

I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

42 U.S.C. § 1983, commonly referred to as “section 1983” provides:

Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).

Section 1983 was enacted on April 20, 1871 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and is also known as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” because one of its primary purposes was to provide a civil remedy against the abuses that were being committed in the southern states, especially by the Ku Klux Klan. While the existing law protected all citizens in theory, its protection in practice was unavailable to some because those persons charged with the enforcement of the laws were unable or unwilling to do so.^[1] The Act was intended to provide a private remedy for such violations of federal law, and has subsequently been interpreted to create a species of tort liability.^[2]

The number of cases that have been brought under section 1983 has dramatically increased since 1961 when the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape.^[3] In Monroe, the Supreme Court held that a police officer was acting “under color of state law” even though his actions violated state law.^[4] This was the first case in which the Supreme Court allowed liability to attach where a government official acted outside the scope of the authority granted to him by state law. Since Monroe v. Pape was decided, an extensive body of law has developed to govern section 1983 claims. This article is intended to provide an overview of that extensive body of law, and will include seminal precedent from the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals–a comprehensive study of all law related to section 1983 is beyond the scope of this article.

II. ELEMENTS OF A SECTION 1983 CLAIM

(i) “Every person . . .”

Only “persons” under the statute are subject to liability.^[5] A state is not a person subject to suit under section 1983,^[6] but a state officer can be sued in his official capacity for prospective or injunctive relief^[7] despite the fact that an suit against a government official in his official capacity represents nothing more than a suit against the government entity itself!^[8] Despite this logical inconsistency, the current state of the law is that a state may not be sued for damages, but may be sued for declaratory or injunctive relief. Municipalities and local governments are persons subject to suit for damages and prospective relief,^[9] but the United States Government is not.^[10] Individual employees of federal,^[11] state^[12] and local^[13] government may be sued in their individual capacities^[14] for damages, declaratory or injunctive relief.

While the determination of who is a “person” is a matter of federal statutory interpretation, the matter of who has the capacity to be sued is determined by the law of the forum state.^[15] Likewise, the law of the forum is to be applied in actions under section 1983 where the law of section 1983 provides no guidance.^[16]

(ii) “. . . who under color of [state law]^[17] . . .”

The traditional definition of acting under the color of state law requires that the defendant have exercised power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law,”^[18] and such actions may result in liability even if the defendant abuses the position given to him by the state.^[19] A private actor may also act under color of state law under certain circumstances.^[20] For example, it has been held that a physician who contracts with the state to provide medical care to inmates acts under the color of state law.^[21] For all practical purposes, the “color of state law” requirement is identical to the “state action” prerequisite to constitutional liability.^[22]

(iii) “. . . subjects or causes to be subjected . . .”

Section 1983 does not impose a state of mind requirement independent of the underlying basis for liability,^[23] but there must be a causal connection between the defendant’s actions and the harm that results.^[24] In order to hold a local government liable under section 1983, the Supreme Court has interpreted this causation element to require that the harm be the result of action on the part of the government entity that implemented or executed a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers, or the result of the entity’s custom.^[25] Further, the entity’s policy or custom must have been the “moving force” behind the alleged deprivation.^[26] This “custom or policy” requirement is a dramatic departure from the rule of respondeat superior that prevails in many common law actions.^[27]

A local government is said to have an unconstitutional policy when it fails to train its employees, and the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to an obvious need for such training, and the failure train will likely result in the employee making a wrong decision.^[28] An unconstitutional policy may also exist if an isolated action of a government employee is dictated by a “final policymaker,”^[29] or if the authorized policymaker approves a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.^[30] However, a supervisor can only be liable in his individual capacity if he directly participates in causing the harm–relying upon respondeat superior is insufficient.^[31] The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a plaintiff must meet a heightened pleading standard to state a claim against a municipality for an unconstitutional custom or policy.^[32]

(iv) “. . . [any person to] the deprivation of rights . . .”

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, it merely provides a method for the vindication of rights elsewhere conferred in the United States Constitution and Laws.^[33] Therefore, a plaintiff may prevail only if he can demonstrate that he was deprived of rights secured by the United States Constitution or federal statutes. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of the rights available under the United States Constitution, nevertheless, this article will provide an overview of perhaps the most utilized of all constitutional provisions–the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause [hereinafter “the Due Process Clause”].^[34]

The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause was not intended to supplant tort law, or to become “a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the states.”^[35] Against this backdrop, to state a claim for a deprivation of Due Process, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he possessed a constitutionally protected property interest; and (2) that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law.^[36] Due process property interests are created by “existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law–rules or understanding that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”^[37] To have a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause, “a person must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”^[38] While the existence of a protected property interest is decided by reference to state law, the determination of whether due process was accorded is decided by reference to the Constitution.^[39] Due process requires that “a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,'”^[40] but the state does not have to provide the same remedies available under section 1983 in order to satisfy due process.^[41]

In construing the Due Process Clause, the United States Supreme Court has held that negligent acts by state actors do not effect a “deprivation” for the purposes of the Due Process Clause,^[42] and the random and unauthorized conduct of a government actor, even if intentional, does not implicate the Due Process Clause if the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy, such as, for example, a tort remedy in its own courts.^[43] However, where the state can feasibly provide a pre-deprivation hearing, it must do so regardless of the post-deprivation remedies available,^[44] and in the absence of a special relationship created or assumed by the state, a state’s failure to protect an individual from violence or injury caused by private actors cannot state a violation of the Due Process Clause.^[45]

In addition to protection against deprivations of procedural due process, the Due Process Clause has two substantive components–the substantive due process simpliciter, and incorporated substantive due process. In order to state a claim for a violation of the substantive due process simpliciter, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in conduct that was “arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.”^[46] This form of due process has very limited application,^[47] but, in contrast to certain procedural due process claims,^[48] the existence of adequate post-deprivation remedies does not bar a substantive due process claim.^[49] With respect to incorporated substantive due process, the plaintiff may state a claim by proving a violation of one of the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has held that one of the substantive elements of the Due Process Clause protects those rights that are fundamental–rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and has, over time, held that virtually all of the Bill of Rights protect such fundamental rights and has likewise held that they apply to the states through the “liberty” interest of the Due Process Clause.^[50] However, the Court has held that when a specific provision within the Bill of Rights already provides protection, the more generalized notion of due process should not be used to define constitutional rights.^[51]

In addition to providing a remedy for deprivations of constitutional rights, section 1983 also makes actionable violations of federal “Laws.”^[52] A violation of a federal statute is cognizable only when the violation trammels a right secured by federal law.^[53] However, a statute is said to create a federal right only when “the provision in question is intended to benefit the putative plaintiff,”^[54] unless it reflects merely a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct rather than a binding obligation on the government unit,^[55] or unless the putative plaintiff’s interest is too vague and amorphous such that it is beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.^[56]

(v) ” . . . shall be liable . . . in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . “

There is no requirement that the plaintiff sue in federal court because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction,^[57] and the usual rule is exhaustion of administrative and judicial state remedies is not a prerequisite to a section 1983 action.^[58] Also, the existence of concurrent state remedies is not a bar to a section 1983 action.^[59] With respect to the extent of damages available, the Supreme Court has noted that the basic purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate the victims of official misconduct, and therefore held that there is no limit on actual damages if they can be proven.^[60] But where they are not proved, only nominal damages of $1.00 may be awarded.^[61] Punitive damages may also be awarded, but not against a municipality.^[62] Injunctive relief is also permitted.^[63]

III. DEFENSES AND IMMUNITIES

States and state agencies are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court,^[64] but local governments have no immunity from damages flowing from their constitutional violations, and may not assert the good faith of its agents as a defense to liability.^[65] Further, state law sovereign immunity and state law limitations on damages do not protect local governments from liability under section 1983,^[66] and state laws requiring pre-suit notification prior to initiating an action against the state or its subdivisions similarly do not apply.^[67] Therefore, local governments are left in the unique and unhappy situation of being subject to suit without the benefit of any form of immunity.

In contrast to the distinct lack of immunity available to local governments, individual capacity defendants are protected by qualified immunity.^[68] Qualified immunity is a powerful tool that shields individual officials who are performing discretionary activities unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”^[69] A government official is entitled to qualified immunity unless his “act is so obviously wrong, in the light of preexisting law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing.”^[70] The qualified immunity inquiry is purely objective–the subjective intentions of the actor is irrelevant.^[71] Qualified immunity is not only immunity from liability, but it is immunity from suit as well,^[72] and shields individual capacity defendants even where a constitutional violation may have occurred. Likewise, a court should scrutinize a plaintiff’s claim to determine if the plaintiff states a constitutional claim at all, prior to analyzing whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.^[73] The burden of proving that the law was clearly established cannot be carried by stating constitutional rights in general terms–a plaintiff within the eleventh circuit must cite to specific decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Court of Appeals, or the highest state court in which the case arose.^[74]

Qualified immunity must be plead as an affirmative defense by the defendant official,^[75] and becomes a matter for the court to decide, even if it requires a factual determination as to whether the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances,^[76] and the court should rule on the issue of qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage of litigation.^[77] An individual defendant in federal court^[78] may immediately appeal a denial of qualified immunity,^[79] even if a prior appeal of the denial of qualified immunity was unsuccessful, and even if other claims remain for trial.^[80] Until the issue of qualified immunity is decided, the defendant official may resist discovery,^[81] and there is authority to the effect that he may stay the entire proceedings during an appeal of the denial of qualified immunity.^[82] While the Supreme Court has rejected a heightened pleading standard for claims against local governments, a plaintiff must nevertheless plead facts with specificity to overcome an individual capacity defendant’s qualified immunity.^[83]

Private individuals who perform state functions,^[84] and private corporations who contract with the government^[85] may not be entitled to qualified immunity. State and local legislators^[86] and judges^[87] are protected by absolute immunity when sued in their individual capacity for damages or injunctive relief, while prosecutors^[88] are entitled to absolute immunity when sued in their individual capacities for damages only. In any event, as discussed above, all individual capacity defendants are, at a minimum, entitled to qualified immunity.

The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts did not contain a statute of limitations for section 1983 actions, and it is appropriate to adopt a local time limitation so long as it is not inconsistent with federal law.^[89] The Supreme Court has held that section 1983 is best characterized as a tort action for the recovery of damages, and therefore held that the appropriate statute of limitations to be adopted is the state statute applicable to personal injury actions.^[90]

IV. ATTORNEY’S FEES

The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976^[91] provides that one who prevails^[92] in a section 1983 action is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees. There is little doubt that the addition of this attorney’s fee provision fueled the growth in the number of section 1983 cases that have been filed because it has been held that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust, while a prevailing defendant may be awarded attorneys’ fees only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad fait

[1]. The catalyst for the enactment of the Act was the “campaign of violence and deception in the South, fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying citizens their civil and political rights.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). The following quote from Representative Lowe of the 42nd Congress is illustrative:

While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and banishing have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrators have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice. Immunity is given to crime and the records of public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress.

Cong. Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess., 374 (1871)(remarks of Rep. Lowe)(quoted in Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276)).

[2]. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986).

[3]. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

[4]. See section II(ii), infra, for a discussion of the “under color of state law” requirement.

[5]. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

[6]. Id.

[7]. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

[8]. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 25, 31 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).

[9]. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).

[10]. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

[11]. Id.

[12]. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 25 (1991).

[13]. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).

[14]. Government officials may be sued in their individual capacity. Such a suit does not represent a suit against the government entity for which he is associated. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). The failure to identify in which capacity a defendant is being sued is a critical pleading defect. Colvin v. McDougall, 62 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1995).

[15]. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 210 (11th Cir. 1992); Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b). For example, Florida law provides that divisions of local governments, such as police departments, do not have the capacity to be sued. Florida City Police Department v. Corcoran, 661 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

[16]. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980).

[17]. Section 1983’s requirement that a person act “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory or District of Columbia” is commonly abbreviated as “under color of state law.”

[18]. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). However, in the only case in which the Supreme Court held that a government employee did not act under color of sate law, the Court held that a public defender does not act under color of state law while performing a lawyer’s traditional function of representing criminal defendants. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

[19]. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).

[20]. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 162 (1992); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982).

[21]. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Ort v. Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105 (11th Cir. 1986).

[22]. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982).

[23]. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

[24]. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977).

[25]. Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691, (1978). This “custom or policy” requirement has also been applied to private corporations who contract with the state to provide medical care to prisoners. Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723-24 (11th Cir.), order vacating appeal, 931 F.2d 711, 712 (11th Cir. 1991), partially reinstated and appealed sub nom, Howell v. Burden, 12 F.3d 190 (11th Cir. 1994).

[26]. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

[27]. Monell, at 691-695; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir. 1985). Isolated unconstitutional incidents, without more, cannot bind a municipality. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).

[28]. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Gold v. City of Miami, 1998 WL 54803 (11th Cir. 1998); Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488 (11th. Cir. 1997). However, where the employee’s proper course of action “is obvious to all without training or supervision, then the failure to train or supervise is generally not ‘so likely’ to produce a wrong decision as to support an inference of deliberate indifference by city policymakers to the need to train or supervise.” Sewell, 117 F.3d at 490.

[29]. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). Who is a “final policymaker” is decided by reference to state law. Pembaur, at 483; McMillan v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997).

[30]. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). However, merely going along with the discretionary decisions made by subordinates is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy. Id.

[31]. Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836 (11th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990); Zatler v. Wainewright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986).

[32]. Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). There is, however, a heightened pleading standard for individual capacity claims. See note 83 infra, and accompanying text.

[33]. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). Section 1983 does not provide for the vindication of rights secured by state law. Id. at 145-146; Almand v. DeKalb County, 103 F.3d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1997).

[34]. U.S.Const. amend. XIV, Â§1. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause is a limitation on state power, while the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause limits federal power. Halinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 319 (1892).

[35]. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).

[36]. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).

[37]. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); See also, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976).

[38]. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 576.

[39]. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).

[40]. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542.

[41]. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-544 (1981).

[42]. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

[43]. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)(“[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the due process clause of the 14th amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available. For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state’s action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy.”). The Court later held that negligence does not constitute a “deprivation.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). See also, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990).

[44]. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132.

[45]. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Santamorena v. Georgia Military College, 147 F.3d 1337, 1339-1340 (11th Cir. 1998). As with all actions predicated upon a violation of the United States Constitution, in order to state a claim for a deprivation of due process, “state action” must be present. The eleventh circuit has recognized three primary tests to determine whether the actions of a private entity constitute state action: (1) the public function test; (2) the state compulsion test; and (3) the nexus/joint action test. National Broad Co. v. Communications Workers of Am., 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1988).

[46]. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992); Rymer v. Douglas County, 764 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1985).

[47]. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125(“As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.”). See also, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)(high speed police chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability for violation of substantive due process); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-272 (plaintiff could not make out substantive due process claim for alleged prosecution without probable cause because Fourth Amendment is more appropriately considered); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)(claims of force arrest by police officer during arrest or detention cannot state a substantive due process claim–it is more appropriately analyzed under Fourth Amendment); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994)(in non-legislative cases, only procedural due process claims are available to pretextually terminated employees).

[48]. See note 46, supra, and accompanying text.

[49]. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994).

[50]. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy public trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), apply to the states.

[51]. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).

[52]. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).

[53]. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 101, 106 (1989) (“Section 1983 speaks in terms of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities,’ not violations of federal law.”).

[54]. Id.

[55]. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981).

[56]. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1987)). See also, Maynard v. Williams, 72 F.3d 848, 851 (11th Cir. 1996).

[57]. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990). Of course, a defendant in state court may remove to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

[58]. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)(exhaustion of judicial remedies is not a prerequisite); Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982)(exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite). But see, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)(a federal plaintiff is barred from seeking declaratory or injunctive relief relating to ongoing state criminal judicial proceedings); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)(plaintiff must prove that a conviction or sentence has been reversed prior to recovering damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment); 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1997e (a prisoner’s civil rights lawsuit may be delayed up to 180 days to require the prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies).

[59]. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124 (1990).

[60]. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).

[61]. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-267 (1978).

[62]. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981). A municipality may, however, be jointly and severally liable. Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1989).

[63]. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

[64]. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). But as discussed above, because states are not “persons” under the statute, they cannot be sued in either state or federal court. See note 6, supra, and accompanying text.

[65]. Owen v. City of Independence, MO, 445 U.S. 621 (1980); Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 699-700 (1978).

[66]. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766, 770 (11th Cir. 1989).

[67]. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).

[68]. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See also, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University Board of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1994)(en banc).

[69]. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817; Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149.

[70]. Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149; Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1406 (11th Cir. 1998)(the plaintiff must point to case law which predates the official’s alleged improper conduct, involves materially similar facts, and truly compels the conclusion that the plaintiff had a right under federal law).

[71]. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987); Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

[72]. “One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). See also, Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir. 1991).

[73]. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991); GJR Investments Inc. v. Escambia County, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998). Courts should not assume that the plaintiff states a constitutional claim simply to get to the qualified immunity issue. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232.

[74]. Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 826-27 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997)(en banc). “Public officials are not obligated to be creative or imaginative in drawing analogies from previously decided cases.” Id. at 827.

[75]. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.

[76]. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991); Stone v. Peacock, 968 F.2d 1163, 1166 (11th Cir. 1992)(if there are disputed factual issues regarding qualified immunity that a jury should resolve, special interrogatories would be appropriate).

[77]. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991). A defendant official may assert the qualified immunity defense in 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, as an affirmative defense in a 12(c) request for judgment on the pleadings, and on a Rule 56(e) summary judgment motion. Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 1991).

[78]. A defendant in state court does not necessarily have the right to an interlocutory appeal. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997). But see, Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(viii).

[79]. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985). However, a defendant may not appeal the denial of a summary judgment motion on the issue of qualified immunity if the denial was based solely upon the existence of disputed factual issues, as opposed to a finding that the law was not clearly established, or that the defendant did not act objectively reasonably. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).

[80]. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997)(“[I]f [qualified immunity] is found applicable at any stage of the proceedings, it determines the outcome of the litigation by shielding the official from damages liability); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305-11 (1996). The other claims that remain for trial may consist of a claim against the official in his official capacity. Id.

[81]. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)(“If the defendant does plead the immunity defense, the district court should resolve that threshold question before permitting discovery”); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)(“Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before commencement of discovery.”).

[82]. Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. James, 1998 WL 125776 (M.D.Ala. 1998)(citing Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 123 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1997))(relating to appeal of Eleventh Amendment immunity).

[83]. GJR Investments, Inc. v. Escambia County, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998).

[84]. See, Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997)(private prison guards are not entitled to qualified immunity); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992)(private individuals who invoked state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statutes were not entitled to qualified immunity). However, the Supreme Court did not “foreclose the possibility that private defendants . . . could be entitled to an affirmative defense based upon good faith and/or probable cause or that Â§ 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens.” Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169.

[85]. See, McDuffie v. Hooper, 982 F.Supp. 817 (M.D. Ala. 1997)(private corporate health care providers who contract with government agencies are not entitled to qualified immunity); Hartman v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 960 F.Supp 1577, 1582 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Smith v. United States, 850 F.Supp 984, 986 (M.D. Fla. 1994). But see, Blumel v. Mylander, 954 F.Supp 1547, 1560 (M.D. Fla. 1997).

[86]. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). However, individual legislative immunity does not apply where the decision is an application of policy to a specific party. In that instance, the act is said to be administrative as opposed to legislative. Crymes v. DeKalb County, 923 F.2d 1482, 1486 (11th Cir. 1991).

[87]. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was amended in 1996 to provide judicial officers with immunity from injunctive relief. This amendment partially overruled Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), which provided that judges were immune from suits for damages, but not injunctive relief.

[88]. Prosecutors are entitled to immunity for activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” but a prosecutor engaged in investigative or administrative activities is only entitled to a good faith defense. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). See also, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997).

[89]. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980).

[90]. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). But accrual of the statute of limitations is governed by federal law, while tolling of the statute of limitations is governed by state law. Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987). See also, Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989).

[91]. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

[92]. One who recovers nominal damages is not a prevailing party. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992). The Court reasoned that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained. Id. at 114 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)). Also, see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), for a discussion of the interplay between 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1988 and the offer of judgment provision contained in Fed.R.Civ.P 68.

[93]. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).

Thanks,

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William M. Windsor

http://www.LawlessAmerica.com

windsorinmontana@yahoo.com

https://www.youtube.com/c/lawlessamericamovie

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Supreme Court Openly Sanctions Law Enforcement Corruption — Denies Jury Award to Innocent Man Almost Executed 7 Times

On April 12, 2011, The U.S. Supreme Court issued an OUTRAGEOUS decision in which five Republican justices overruled a jury of We the People.

They took away a $14 million jury award to a man outrageously convicted of murder when the prosecuting attorneys had evidence that proved the man was innocent.

John Thompson spent 18 years in prison and was ordered to be executed seven (7) times.

Continue reading Supreme Court Openly Sanctions Law Enforcement Corruption — Denies Jury Award to Innocent Man Almost Executed 7 Times

Grand Juries should be the Answer to Corruption — State Representative Harry Geisinger meets with Bill Windsor

Article of Amendment V of the Bill of Rights gives grand juries the power of Presentment. In a Presentment, the grand jury independently brings charges, usually against corrupt government officials.

Bill Windsor spent the afternoon of March 28, 2011 at the Fulton County Courthouse trying to get the Fulton County Georgia Grand Jury to consider criminal charges against 14 Atlanta federal judges.

The Grand Jury has been presented with the facts regarding judicial corruption and criminal acts by federal judges with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

Now the effort is to get the necessary elected official to sign the petition. That meeting is tomorrow…

Continue reading Grand Juries should be the Answer to Corruption — State Representative Harry Geisinger meets with Bill Windsor

Supreme Court Justices have lost Legal Jurisdiction to Hear Cases

On March 8, 2011,The U.S. Supreme Court issued orders in Docket No. 10-632, 10-633, and 10-690 in which the justices refused to honor their oath to defend the Constitution.

Each justice took oaths required to â€œsupport and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domesticâ€ and to â€œbear true faith and allegiance to the same.â€

But in violating that sacred oath, the Supreme Court no longer has legal jurisdiction to hear cases. Congress must impeach the entore court as soon as possible. I

Continue reading Supreme Court Justices have lost Legal Jurisdiction to Hear Cases

Supreme Court Refuses to Honor Oath to Defend Constitution

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On February 22, 2011, The U.S. Supreme Court issued an order in Docket No. 10-411 in which the justices refused to honor their oath to defend the Constitution.

Each justice took oaths required to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic” and to “bear true faith and allegiance to the same.”

But in the fifth petition presented to The Supreme Court in the last three months asking the Court to declare that federal judges do not have the right to ignore the Constitution, the Court refused again.

Continue reading Supreme Court Refuses to Honor Oath to Defend Constitution

Another Complaint against Judges of the Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta — Murder Cover-Up

Renee J. McGhee writes this story about her son, Steven Lamond Johnson.

Ms. McGhee says her son was murdered in Macon, Georgia by a probation officer while her son was handcuffed.

Judge Frank M. Hull (shown here) is one of three federal judges at the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals who Ms. McGhee says lied and covered up the murder.

Continue reading Another Complaint against Judges of the Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta — Murder Cover-Up

Fulton County Georgia Grand Jury asked to consider Criminal Charges against 14 Federal Judges

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The Fulton County Georgia Grand Jury has been asked to consider criminal charges against 14 Atlanta federal judges.

Continue reading Fulton County Georgia Grand Jury asked to consider Criminal Charges against 14 Federal Judges

Expert says Fraud in U.S. Supreme Court Records received by William M. Windsor from the Office of Clerk Suter

Were the petition and application of William M. Windsor reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court?

There is no way to tell!!! No valid judicial records have been discovered so far and in the most recent response from the office of Clerk Suter, false and deliberately misleading records have been produced by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Records received by William M. Windsor from the office of Supreme Court Clerk William K. Suter have led to the posting of an opinion of fraud by the office of Clerk Suter of the U.S. Supreme Court….

Los Angeles, February 10 – Joseph Zernik, PhD, of Human Rights Alert (NGO), has recently filed a request with the U.S. Congress for impeachment of Clerk Suter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for Deprivation of Rights:

Denying petitioners and applicants the Due Process right of notice and service of orders of the Court, and
Denying the People access to the judicial records of the court. [[i]]

Human Rights Alert further noted, that the U.S. Supreme Court, where valid judicial records in numerous cases are nowhere to be found, today fails to meet fundamental standards of an honest tribunal. [[ii]]

Now, additional records, received by petitioner William M. Windsor from the office of Clerk Suter, led to the posting of opinion of fraud by the office of Clerk Suter of the U.S. Supreme Court. [[iii]]

Windsor has been trying for sometime to discover, whether petitions and applications, which he filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in effort to protect his rights, were at all reviewed by the Court:

The online dockets of the Supreme Court of the United States note denial of Windsor’s petition and application on January 18, 2011. However, Windsor has not been duly served by Clerk Suter with the order of denial.
Consequently, Windsor has unsuccessfully attempted to discover valid judicial records of the presumed January 18, 2011, review and denial of his petition and application. [[iv]]
On January 18-21, 2011, Mr George McDermott of Maryland, unrelated to the case, attempted to access the paper and electronic files and judicial records of the U.S. Supreme Court, pertaining to Mr Windsor and others. The office of Clerk Suter denied access to the records. [[v]]
Later, as further effort to discover whether his case was at all reviewed by the Supreme Court, Windsor filed a Motion for an Order by the Court on Clerk William S. Suter for Service of Valid Evidence of Denial. On February 8, 2011, the Motion was stamped “Received” by the office of the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Now, Windsor received a response from the office of Clerk Suter on his February 8, 2011 Motion:

A February 8, 2011 letter was issued on behalf of Clerk William Suter, signed by Ms Cynthia Rapp, with no notation of her authority.
The enclosure to the February 8, 2011 Ms Rapp letter includes a copy of a record, which is an unsigned January 18, 2011 Order, denying Windsor’s Petition (10-690). Unsigned judicial records are invalid ones.
The copy of the unsigned January 18, 2011 unsigned Order was further stamped “True Copy,” but the signature on the “True Copy” stamp was an invalid signature as well.

Based on such records, Joseph Zernik, PhD, of Human Rights Alert, has issued a statement:

In the February 8, 2011 letter, invalid records are provided to William M. Windsor on behalf of Clerk William Suter of the US Supreme Court. Moreover, the February 8, 2010 letter, signed by Ms Cynthia Rapp, demonstrates ongoing efforts to mislead Mr Windsor that he has been served with valid records pertaining to the denial of his petition and application (10-690 and 10-A690) by the Supreme Court of the United States.

In addition, Dr. Zernik, PhD, has opined that conduct of the office of Clerk William Suter in this case amounts to Fraud.

Dr. Zernik has accumulated substantial experience in examining records of the U.S. and state courts, of U.S. prisons, as well as U.S. banking records. His opinions regarding such records were often supported by leading experts in related fields. [[vi]] His reviews regarding computerized court and prison records in the United States were published in international, peer-reviewed computer science journal. [[vii], [viii]] Report authored by Dr. Zernik on behalf of Human Rights Alert (NGO), was incorporated into official United Nations report with reference to “Corruption of the courts and the legal profession” in California. [[ix]]

LINKS

[i] 11-01-25 Request for Impeachment of US Supreme Court Clerk William Suter
http://www.scribd.com/doc/47539382/
[ii] 11-02-08 Where Are the Missing Records of the Supreme Court of the United States?
http://www.scribd.com/doc/48414184/
[iii] 11-02-10 Windsor v Maid of the Mist Corporation (10-690 and 10-A690) – Fraud opined in U.S. Supreme Court records, received by Mr Windsor from office of Clerk Suter
http://www.scribd.com/doc/48596120/
[iv] 11-01-28 Press Release: Windsor v Maid of the Mist (10-A690) in the U.S. Supreme Court – Alleged “Shell Game Fraud”
http://www.scribd.com/doc/47778291/
[v] 11-01-22 Declaration of George McDermott in re: Attempt to Access U.S. Supreme Court Paper and Electronic Records to Inspect and to Copy
http://www.scribd.com/doc/47455844/
[vi] 11-01-06 Joseph Zernik, PhD, Biographical Sketch
http://www.scribd.com/doc/46421113/
[vii] 10-08-18 Zernik, J: Data Mining as a Civic Duty “Online Public Prisoners” Registration Systems, International Journal on Social Media: Monitoring, Measurement, Mining 1: 84-96 (2010)
http://www.scribd.com/doc/38328591/
[viii] 10-08-18 Zernik, J: Data Mining of Online Judicial Records of the Networked U.S. Federal Courts, International Journal on Social Media: Monitoring, Measurement, Mining, 1:69-83 (2010)
http://www.scribd.com/doc/38328585/
[ix] 10-04-19 Human Rights Alert (NG0) submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council for the 2010 Review (UPR) of Human Rights in the United States as incorporated into the UPR staff report:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/38566837/

Copyright LawlessAmerica.com Bill Windsor went to high school and college in Lubbock, Texas — just a short drive from Amarillo, Texas. This gives him a special interest in exposing the scum in the area of the country he has loved so much.

Copyright LawlessAmerica.com Bill Windsor went to high school and college in Lubbock, Texas — just a short drive from Amarillo, Texas. This gives him a special interest in exposing the scum in the area of the country that he has loved so much.

In addition, Dr. Zernik, PhD, has opined that conduct of the office of Clerk William Suter in this case amounts to Fraud.

Copyright LawlessAmerica.com
Bill Windsor went to high school and college in Lubbock, Texas — just a short drive from Amarillo, Texas. This gives him a special interest in exposing the scum in the area of the country he has loved so much.

Copyright LawlessAmerica.com
Bill Windsor went to high school and college in Lubbock, Texas — just a short drive from Amarillo, Texas. This gives him a special interest in exposing the scum in the area of the country that he has loved so much.