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U.S. Attorney Sally Quillian Yates is doing everything she can to block William M. Windsor’s efforts to submit criminal charges against her and others to the Federal Grand Jury in Atlanta, Georgia.
Ms. Sally Yates has been warned about this repeatedly, and she simply ignores it.
Because she is tampering with the jury to interfere with charges against her personally, her actions are especially egregious….
Today, I sent a follow-up letter to Sally Yates and her accomplices, Charysse Alexander, Brenda Nelson, Christopher Huber, Neeli Ben-David, Darcy Coty, and U.S. Marshal, Tom Shell.
A courier delivered one PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL envelope for each member of the Grand Jury. I asked them to confirm that these were personally delivered to each Grand Juror. So that I can nail them on various other crimes, I have also now sent these by U.S. mail, certified, return receipt.
I warned them that interference with mail to the Grand jurors will constitute a number of crimes. Such activity is by definition in violation of federal laws: Obstruction of Correspondence – Taking of Mail — 18 U.S.C. § 1702; Theft of Mail — 18 U.S.C. § 1708; Possession of Stolen Mail — 18 U.S.C. § 1708; Obstruction of Justice — 18 U.S.C. § 1503; and Conspiracy — 18 U.S.C. § 371; and as such, said violations also constitute predicate act crimes and prove violation of the RICO statute of the State of Georgia, O.C.G.A. 16-14-1 § et seq, as well as the federal RICO statute.
Yesterday, Ms. Alexander told U.S. Marshal Tom Shell (who told me) that I was denied the opportunity to speak with the Grand Jury. She said I have to go through the FBI. This is all, of course, absolutely false.
The U.S. Attorney’s Office has no authority over the Grand Jury, and the FBI has no review rights for information communicated to a Grand Jury.
Attempting to contact or influence a grand or petit juror constitutes a crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (criminalizing attempting to contact or influence a juror); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1504 (declaring that attempting to contact a juror in writing is a separate crime). I told them I consider their actions to also be a violation of the Omnibus Provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and 18 U.S.C. § 4, and I am sure many others.
GRAND JURIES HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE ANY ALLEGED CRIME NO MATTER HOW OR BY WHOM SUGGESTED
In 1895 in Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 163, 15 S.Ct. 586, 587, 39 L.Ed. 657, 658 (1895), the Court expressed the proposition in this way: “But in this country the common practice is for the grand jury to investigate any alleged crime, no matter how or by whom suggested to them….†(Tyrone Gaither, v. United States of America, Nos. 21780, 22148, 21864, DC Circuit (04/08/69); UNITED STATES v. SMYTH, 104 F. Supp. 283 (N.D.Cal. 02/20/1952).)
Indeed, in some respects, the grand jury has even broader latitude than prosecutors. Grand jurors “may act on tips, rumors, evidence offered by the prosecutor, or their own personal knowledge” in making its decisions. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 15. The privilege of acting on “their own personal knowledge” is, of course, a vestige of the earliest grand juries, which were expected to bring their own charges, and it is reflected in the Fifth Amendment’s reference to “presentment.” (United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 05/23/2005).)
18 U.S.C. 1504 GIVES ANY CITIZEN THE RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE A REQUEST TO APPEAR BEFORE A GRAND JURY
A citizen’s right to ask a federal grand jury for permission to appear before it is now expressly protected by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1504, which prohibits attempts to improperly influence a grand juror by written communication regarding pending matters, also provides that”[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury.
THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK STATES THAT MATTERS MAY BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF A GRAND JURY BY COMMUNICATING WITH MEMBERS OF THE GRAND JURY.
The Federal Grand Jury Handbook states that the federal grand jury’s function is to determine whether a person shall be tried for a serious federal crime alleged to have been committed within the district where it sits. Matters may be brought to its attention in three ways: (1) by the United States Attorney or an Assistant United States Attorney; (2) by the court that impaneled it; and (3) from the personal knowledge of a member of the grand jury or from matters properly brought to a member’s personal attention. In all these cases, the grand jury must hear evidence before taking action. [Federal Grand Jury Handbook, P.2.]
THE GRAND JURY IS INDEPENDENT OF THE JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE, AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.
In 1992, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia explained that the grand jury is not part of the three branches of government set forth in the Constitution – Justice Scalia also says the grand jury “is an institution separate from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside.†– it is perfectly reasonable to characterize the grand jury as the “fourth branch of government.†In United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 at 47 (1992), Justice Antonin Scalia, delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court:
“[R]ooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history,†Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420, 490 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result), the grand jury is mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but not in the body of the Constitution. It has not been textually assigned, therefore, to any of the branches described in the first three Articles. It “‘is a constitutional fixture in its own right.’†United States v. Chanen, 549 F. 2d 1306, 1312 (CA9) (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 58, 70, n. 54, 487 F. 2d 700, 712, n. 54 (1973)), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 825 (1977).â€
Justice Scalia also says this:
“. . . In fact, the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 61 (1906); G. Edwards, The Grand Jury 28-32 (1906). Although the grand jury normally operates, of course, in the courthouse and under judicial auspices, its institutional relationship with the Judicial Branch has traditionally been, so to speak, at arm’s length. Judges’ direct involvement in the functioning of the grand jury has generally been confined to the constitutive one of calling the grand jurors together and administering their oaths of office. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 6(a). [504 U.S. 36, 48]â€
The grand jury, classically, is meant to be an independent check on the ability of the government to bring criminal charges against individuals. It “serv[es] as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people,” United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992), “protect[ing] . . . citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions,” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). The grand jury also has another role, as an investigatory and accusatory body. The federal grand jury “has not been textually assigned” to any of the three branches of federal government. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47. The institution is not mentioned in the body of the Constitution, but in the Bill of Rights. Id.; U.S. Const. amend. V. It is thus a “constitutional fixture in its own right”; it is not an arm of the district court. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977)). Indeed, “the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government.” Id. Thus, the grand jury remains functionally and constitutionally “at arm’s length” from the judicial branch. Id.; see also Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 15 (1st Cir. 2000). (In re United States, 441 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 03/24/2006).)
THE GRAND JURY IS INDEPENDENT OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY OR ANY JUDGE.
This is protected by the Fifth Amendment. Every circuit court has acknowledged this in orders, and the U.S. Supreme Court has stated this a number of times.
The Fifth Amendment “presupposes an investigative body acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.” United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Amendment may be violated if the independence of the grand jury in performing its historical function is substantially infringed. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1988). (United States of America v. Elide T. Caruto, No. 09-50309 WQH-1, (9th Cir. 12/08/2010).) United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 18, 93 S.Ct. 764, 773, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (finding that a grand jury “must be free to pursue its investigations unhindered by external influence”); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962) (recognizing “[t]he necessity to society of an independent and informed grand jury”); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960); United States v. Rodriguez, 738 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 06/26/1984); United States v. McCourty, No. 07-3862-cr (2d Cir. 04/09/2009); United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 10/26/1979); United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 06/29/2001); United States v. Chambers, 408 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 04/29/2005); United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231 (6th Cir. 04/10/1989); United States v. Muelbl, 739 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 07/02/1984); United States v. Sohn, 567 F.3d 392 (8th Cir. 05/28/2009); United States v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 719 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 09/19/1983); United States v. Curls, No. 06-5124 (10th Cir. 03/05/2007) ; United States v. Sigma International, Inc., 244 F.3d 841 (11th Cir. 03/15/2001); John Roe, Inc. v. United States (In re: Grand Jury Proceedings), 142 F.3d 1416, 1425 (11th Cir.1998); United States v. Slough, 677 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 12/31/2009); UNITED STATES v. MARA, 93 S. Ct. 774, 410 U.S. 19 (U.S. 01/22/1973); RUSSELL v. UNITED STATES, 82 S. Ct. 1038, 369 U.S. 749 (U.S. 05/21/1962); HANNAH ET AL. v. LARCHE ET AL., 80 S. Ct. 1502, 363 U.S. 420 (U.S. 06/20/1960).)
We agree with the ninth circuit’s statement in United States v. Chanen that the “tradition and the dynamics of the constitutional scheme of separation of powers define a limited function for both court and prosecutor in their dealings with the grand jury.” 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S. Ct. 72, 54 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1977) (emphasis in original). The Chanen court reasoned: In resolving disputes involving district court, prosecutor and/or grand jury, some appellate courts have attempted to pigeonhole the grand jury into one of the three branches of government created by the first three articles of the Constitution. For example, it has been said that the grand jury is essentially an agency of the court, and that it exercises its powers under the authority and supervision of the court. On the other hand, it has been asserted that grand juries are basically law enforcement agencies and are for all practical purposes an investigative and prosecutorial arm of the Executive branch of the government. To the extent that these apparently conflicting statements reflect the view that the functions of the grand jury are intimately related to the functions of court and prosecutor, we have no disagreement with them. That view is irrefutable as a matter of fact. But under the constitutional scheme, the grand jury is not and should not be captive to any of the three branches. The grand jury is a preconstitutional institution, given constitutional stature by the Fifth Amendment but not relegated by the Constitution to a position within any of the three branches of the government. Id. at 1312 (citations omitted). (United States v. Pabian, 704 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 05/19/1983).)
Strictly speaking, the grand jury is a constitutional fixture in its own right, belonging to neither the executive nor the judicial branch, see United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., 637 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961, 101 S. Ct. 3110, 69 L. Ed. 2d 972 (1981); United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S. Ct. 72, 54 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1977); Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 58, 487 F.2d 700, 712 n.54 (D.C.Cir.1973); In re Jury, 478 F.3d 581 (4th Cir. 02/22/2007); In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 86 -1-52-37, 811 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 12/31/1986); United States v. Udziela, 671 F.2d 995 (7th Cir. 02/11/1982).)
THE GRAND JURY MUST REMAIN DETACHED FROM AND INDEPENDENT OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY.
“…in order to perform its protective function, the grand jury must remain detached from and independent of the Executive Branch. Therefore, the grand jury is under no compulsion to follow the orders of the prosecutor.†(United States v. Smyth, 104 . upp. 83, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1952). See generally Note, 37 Minn. L. Rev., supra note 145, at 599-600.) (Richard M. Nixon, v. the Honorable John J. Sirica, CDC.0000249, DC Circuit (10/12/73).)
The grand jury is an independent body that acts “independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.” Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S. Ct. 270, 4 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1960). See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16, 93 S. Ct. 764, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1973), and United States v. Udziela, 671 F.2d 995, 999 (7th Cir) cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982). (In re Grand Jury Subpoena No. 86 -1-52-37, 811 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 12/31/1986).)
THE GRAND JURY REMAINS FUNCTIONALLY AND CONSTITUTIONALLY “AT ARM’S LENGTH” FROM THE JUDICIAL BRANCH.
The grand jury also has another role, as an investigatory and accusatory body. The federal grand jury “has not been textually assigned” to any of the three branches of federal government. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47. The institution is not mentioned in the body of the Constitution, but in the Bill of Rights. Id.; U.S. Const. amend. V. It is thus a “constitutional fixture in its own right”; it is not an arm of the district court. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977)). Indeed, “the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government.” Id. Thus, the grand jury remains functionally and constitutionally “at arm’s length” from the judicial branch. Id.; see also Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 15 (1st Cir. 2000). (In re United States, 441 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 03/24/2006).)
The fundamental concept underlying the Fifth Amendment guarantee is that in order for an indictment to be recognized as actually issuing from a grand jury, it must be the product of an investigative deliberation that is independent of both the prosecuting attorney and the court. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 1743, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992) (“Recognizing [the] tradition of independence [of the grand jury], we have said that the Fifth Amendment’s constitutional guarantee presupposes an investigative body acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 18, 93 S.Ct. 764, 773, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (finding that a grand jury “must be free to pursue its investigations unhindered by external influence“); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962) (recognizing “[t]he necessity to society of an independent and informed grand jury”); John Roe, Inc. v. United States (In re: Grand Jury Proceedings), 142 F.3d 1416, 1425 (11th Cir.1998) (explaining that although a grand jury relies on the judiciary when it seeks subpoenas or contempt sanctions, it “performs its investigative and deliberative functions independently”). Without a guarantee of independence, the indictment would not be the genuine issue of a grand jury within the meaning of the Constitution.
William M. Windsor
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