Complaint for VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Columbia

Complaint PDF — EXHIBITS PDF

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR, )

Plaintiff )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

Scott S. Harris and ) ________________________

Rashonda Garner, )

Defendants. )

Complaint for VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

AND ADDITIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION

The Parties to This Complaint

The Plaintiff

William Michael Windsor (“WINDSOR”) is a citizen of the United States and is a resident of Lincoln County, South Dakota.

Name: William Michael Windsor

Address: 5013 S. Louise Avenue #1134, Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

County: Lincoln

Telephone: 352-###-####

Email: windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com

The Defendants

Scott S. Harris (“HARRIS”) is a citizen of the United States, an employee of the federal government in Washington, DC, and a federal official. HARRIS is sued as an individual.

Name: Scott S. Harris

Address: Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone: 202-479-3025

Email: pio@supremecourt.gov

Rashonda Garner (“GARNER”) is a citizen of the United States, an employee of the federal government in Washington, DC, and a federal official. GARNER is sued as an individual.

Name: Rashonda Garner

Address: Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone: 202-479-3025

Email: PMcCabe@supremecourt.gov

I Basis for Jurisdiction

[X] Federal Officials (a Bivens Claim)

Constitutional rights the Plaintiff claims are being violated by federal officials (HARRIS and GARNER), including Denial of Due Process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) provides: “A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated….”

III. Statement of Claim

Where did the events giving rise to your claims occur?

The events took place at the Supreme Court building in Washington, DC and in Lincoln County South Dakota and Sumter County Florida.

What date and approximate time did the events giving rise to your claims occur?

May 10, 2023; May 23, 2023; June 1, 2023; July 20, 2023; September 26, 2023; October 1, 2023; October 2, 2023; October 27, 2023; October 31, 2023; November 3, 2023; November 20, 2023; November 21, 2023; November 22, 2023; November 27, 2023; December 18, 2023, December 19, 2023; December 20, 2023, December 21, 2023.

What are the facts underlying your claims?

On May 10, 2023, William M. Windsor (“Windsor”), an individual, filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and/or Prohibition and Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (“PETITION”). [EXHIBIT A – May 10, 2023.] This Filing was made in compliance with the United States Supreme Court’s Rule 29 and in the manner required by the Rules, as shown on the Certificate of Service. [EXHIBIT B, Pages 51-52.] The appropriate number of copies were mailed to the Clerk, and a copy was sent to the Solicitor General and the attorney involved in the case.
On May 10, 2023, the Docket of the United States Supreme Court shows: “Application (22A1009) to file petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in excess of page limits, submitted to Justice Thomas.” [EXHIBIT A, May 10, 2023.]
On May 23, 2023, Justice Clarence Thomas granted the Application (22A1009) “to file petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in excess of page limits. The petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition may not exceed 49 pages.” [EXHIBIT A, May 23, 2023.] It was filed.
On June 1, 2023, the Waiver of the Right of Respondent United States to respond was filed. [EXHIBIT A, June 1, 2023.]
On July 20, 2023, the PETITION was “DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/26/2023.” [EXHIBIT A, July 20, 2023.]
WINDSOR spoke by telephone with Jake in the United States Supreme Court Clerk’s Office. Jake explained that WINDSOR’s PETITION would be considered by the nine Justices in a “Conference.”
The “Filing and Rules” section for the United States Supreme Court Clerk’s Office explains:

“The timing for placing petitions on a conference list and distributing them to the Justices is governed by Rule 15.5, which provides as follows: “The Clerk will distribute the petition to the Court for its consideration upon receiving an express waiver of the right to file a brief in opposition, or, if no waiver or brief in opposition is filed, upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing. If a brief in opposition is timely filed, the Clerk will distribute the petition, brief in opposition, and any reply brief to the Court for its consideration no less than 14 days after the brief in opposition is filed, unless the petitioner expressly waives the 14-day waiting period.” [https://www.supremecourt.gov/casedistribution/casedistributionschedule.aspx.]

United States Supreme Court Clerk Scott S. Harris has explained Conference Scheduling in a memorandum. [https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/Guidance-on-Scheduling-2023.pdf.] [EXHIBIT K.]
The Supreme Court Historical Society explains the Conference process. [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/.] [EXHIBIT C.]
On September 26, 2023, the Docket of the United States Supreme Court indicates a Conference was held by the nine Justices in Case No. 22-7648. [EXHIBIT A, September 26, 2023.]
On October 2, 2023, the United States Supreme Court’s Docket shows “Petition DENIED.” [EXHIBIT A, October 2, 2023.]
On October 27, 2023, WINDSOR filed a Motion for Rehearing just to be safe. [EXHIBIT E.] It was sent by USPS. [EXHIBITS F and G.] This was 25 days after the Docket claims the Petition was denied, so it would have been timely if an order had been issued.
On October 31, 2023, WINDSOR received a letter from Scott S. Harris dated October 2, 2023. [EXHIBIT D.] The letter is not even signed; it’s a stamp. It bears no seal, and it is not signed by a Justice. The letter does not qualify as an Order required after a Conference. And the time has not started to run on the filing of a motion for rehearing.
On November 3, 2023, a letter was dated to WINDSOR by Rashonda Garner for Scott S. Harris. [EXHIBIT H.] The letter is not an order. All copies of WINDSOR’s Filing were returned. [EXHIBIT I.] The original copy is stamped “RECEIVED OCT 30 2023 Office of the Clerk Supreme Court U.S.” [EXHIBIT I.]
On November 20, 2023, the letter dated November 3, 2023 was received by WINDSOR. [EXHIBIT J.] The letter is not an order.
On November 21, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail.
On November 21, 2023, Rashonda Garner left a voicemail saying she didn’t understand WINDSOR’s message. [EXHIBIT L.]
On November 22, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail.
On November 27, 2023, all of the mail dated November 3, 2023 regarding the Motion for Rehearing was sent certified mail return receipt to Rashonda Garner. [EXHIBIT H and EXHIBIT J.]
On November 27, 2023, WINDSOR submitted 11 copies of a “MOTION” to the United States Supreme Court.
On December 18, 2023, WINDSOR received a return of all of his November 27, 2023 mailing in a box. [EXHIBIT S.] This is all about WINDSOR’s Petition regarding violations of his Constitutional rights. USSC Case #22-7648 — https://lawlessamerica.com/motion-for-compliance-with-rules-of-u-s-supreme-court-was-filed-by-bill-windsor/?fbclid=IwAR14vsRgJBVkismog3TBwe88_GxfP98RcmMOmyLcHUwyt5hVBh3V8sLlENg. This is the case chosen as one of the approximately 8,000 cases submitted in 2023 that the nine justices were actually to hear on September 26, 2023. https://lawlessamerica.com/74-year-old-disabled-man-with-use-of-only-one-finger-will-have-all-nine-u-s-supreme-court-justices-hear-his-pro-se-petition/?fbclid=IwAR1ExGhpVh0dTM8WRD_Bxr6cA_-NB2Hxg6I5adfB41Z7-FXc_zeQQl-MGQ4
On December 19, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail. [EXHIBIT M.]
On December 19, 2023, WINDSOR again called Rashonda Garner and left a detailed voicemail. [EXHIBIT N.] [EXHIBIT O.]
On December 20, 2023, WINDSOR called Rashonda Garner yet again and left a detailed voicemail. [EXHIBIT P.] The call was not returned.
On December 20, 2023, the Docket of the United States Supreme Court in Case #22-7648 shows no entries after October 2, 2023. [EXHIBIT Q.]
As of December 26, 2023, Rashonda Garner still has not returned WINDSOR’s

PREVIOUS LAWSUITS AND ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF

The PLAINTIFF has not filed other lawsuits in state or federal court that deal with the same facts involved in this action.

Arguments – claims for relief

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #1 — Bivens Claim

WINDSOR’s Constitutional rights are being violated by federal officials, Harris and Garner, including Denial of Due Process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. HARRIS and GARNER violated WINDSOR’s Constitutional rights, and those rights were so clearly established that a reasonable person would have known they were being violated.
The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.

WINDSOR has been denied Constitutional Due Process Rights
Due process requires that the government respect all of the legal rights that are owed to a person according to the law. Procedural due process guarantees protection to everyone so that statutes, regulations, and enforcement actions ensure that no one is deprived of “life, liberty, or property” without a fair opportunity to affect the judgment or result. Judges have shown absolutely no respect for Windsor’s legal rights. They have ignored the law and the facts. Windsor has been denied the most fundamental right to not have his legal rights stolen by dishonest judges.
This is not abuse of discretion; they violated the Constitution and laws intentionally. (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).)
In Case No. 2018-CA-010270 in THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA (“010270”), the fundamental right to have the courts accept Windsor’s sworn affidavits as true has been violated. (Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).)
Judges are required to be impartial. Judges have demonstrated pervasive bias against Windsor. They haven’t shown an ounce of impartiality. (Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).)
In “Some Kind of Hearing,” Judge Henry Friendly said that an important right of due process is “a decision based exclusively on the evidence presented.” Florida judges have not made decisions based upon the evidence presented.
Due process is “an established course for judicial proceedings or other governmental activities designed to safeguard the legal rights of the individual.” Action denying the process that is “due” is unconstitutional. In 010270, judges have denied the process that is due. (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).)
Litigants allegedly have the right to protections expressly created in statute and case law precedent. Statutes have been violated and overwhelming case law has been ignored by judges.
Litigants have the right to equal protection of the law regardless of race, creed, color, religion, ethnic origin, age, handicaps, or sex. Windsor is 75, handicapped, and he has not received equal protection as a pro se party.
Litigants have the right to a remedy, by recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs that they may receive in their person, property, or character. Windsor has been denied recourse.
Litigants have the right to justice, without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without undue delay; in conformance with the laws. Florida judges have denied justice and have not conformed with the laws.
The principle of due process of law is one of the most important protections against arbitrary rule.
An inherent right is the honesty of the judge. Judges in Florida have committed perjury and obstruction of justice; they have violated many canons of the Code of Judicial Procedure as well as rules in the Florida Code of Professional Conduct. Inherent in due process is the expectation that the judge will not violate criminal statutes, but they have.
Judges in Florida have violated Windsor’s rights by using their power to inflict their bias.
For due process, Windsor has the right to protections expressly created in statute and case law. Due process allegedly ensures that the government will respect all of a person’s legal rights and guarantee fundamental fairness and justice. Due process holds the government subservient to the law of the land, protecting individual persons from the state.
Due process requires an established course for judicial proceedings designed to safeguard the legal rights of the individual. Action denying the process that is “due” is unconstitutional. Inherent in the expectation of due process is that the judge will abide by the rules. Judges in Florida have violated rules for the purpose of damaging Windsor.
An inherent Constitutional right is the honesty of the judge. Judges in Florida have not been honest. They have violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Constitution guarantees Windsor a fair and impartial judge. Florida judges denied Windsor’s guarantee to inflict their extra-judicial bias.

Every person “has a constitutional and statutory right to an impartial and fair judge at all stages of the proceeding.” (Liteky v U.S., 510 US 540 (1994). (See Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037; Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971); accord Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pension, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (citation omitted).)

Due process is supposed to guarantee basic fairness and to make people feel that they have been treated fairly.

“justice must give the appearance of justice” (Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1954).) (Peters v. Kiff, 407, U.S. 493, 502 (1972).)

48. At a basic level, procedural due process is essentially based on the concept of “fundamental fairness.” For example, in 1934, the United States Supreme Court held that due process is violated “if a practice or rule offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”

49. Where an individual is facing a (1) deprivation of (2) life, liberty, or property, (3) procedural due process mandates that he or she is entitled to adequate notice, a hearing, and a neutral judge. Substantive due process refers to the rights granted in the first eight amendments to the Constitution. Fifth Amendment due process means substantially the same as Fourteenth Amendment due process.

50. Judges and Federal officers have a Constitutional duty to Windsor. The DEFENDANTS breached their Constitutional duties through action and inaction.

They have violated Windsor’s civil and Constitutional rights under color of law.

“[t]rial before an ‘unbiased judge’ is essential to due process.” Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971); accord Concrete Pipe & Prods. V. Constr. Laborers Pension, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (citation omitted). (Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972)

The due process clauses of the Constitutions of Florida, South Dakota, and the United States guarantee a party an impartial and disinterested tribunal in civil cases. (Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 1613 (1980).)

Partiality in favor of the government may raise a defendant’s due process concerns. (In re United States of America, 441 F.3d at 66 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).)

Judges in Florida have effectively denied Windsor’s rights of equal protection under the law in Article VI of the Constitution. Their actions prove that they have exercised their power in this and other actions for their own personal purposes rather than the will of the law.

Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412 (7th Cir. 1972), citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed 204 (1824); U.S. v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1990).

The orders issued by judges in Florida suggest “the appearance of” animosity towards Windsor.
These latest purported orders from JEFF ASHTON deny WINDSOR his fundamental Constitutional right of access to the courts, “unquestionably a right of considerable constitutional significance.” (Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2008).) Meaningful access to the courts is a constitutional right. (Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en banc).) [emphasis added.]

AN ORDER was not ISSUED ON THE CONFERENCE DECISION OF SEPTEMBER 26, 2023.
The Rules of the United States Supreme Court require valid evidence of the October 2, 2023 alleged denial by the Court of the Petition of William M. Windsor in Supreme Court Case #22-7648. An Order was not issued. This is a violation of due process.
The letters dated October 2, 2023 and November 3, 2023 are not orders and have no validity. [EXHIBITS D and H.] The U.S. Supreme Court Rules use the term “Letter” 13 times, and letters such as these are not authorized by the Rules.
No valid evidence of the denials was attached to the letters.
There is no order issued under seal, in violation of 28 U.S.C. 1691 – “All writs and process issuing from a court of the United States shall be under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk thereof.”

The word “process” at 28 U.S.C. 1691 means a court order. See Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River Paper Co., 19 F. 252 (C.C. W.D. Wisconsin 1884); Taylor v. U.S., 45 F. 531 (C.C. E.D. Tennessee 1891); U.S. v. Murphy, 82 F. 893 (DCUS Delaware 1897); Leas & McVitty v. Merriman, 132 F. 510 (C.C. W.D. Virginia 1904); U.S. v. Sharrock, 276 F. 30 (DCUS Montana 1921); In re Simon, 297 F. 942, 34 ALR 1404 (2nd Cir. 1924); Scanbe Mfg. Co. v. Tryon, 400 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1968); and Miles v. Gussin, 104 B.R. 553 (Bankruptcy D.C. 1989).

There has never been an ORDER on WINDSOR’s case that was purportedly considered by the nine U.S. Supreme Court Justices on September 26, 2023. https://lawlessamerica.com/motion-for-compliance-with-rules-of-u-s-supreme-court-was-filed-by-bill-windsor/?fbclid=IwAR3ldAVwjfI4p7AZo4ILmjCRpshIx-4yAdr-nYAC_yvgz5jg_lIwN0Rfp8Q
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “order” as a “mandate; precept; a command or direction authoritatively given….”
gov defines “clerk of court” as “the court officer who oversees administrative functions, especially managing the flow of cases through the court.
com defines “Administrative function” as that used in carrying out an administrative program and is to be broadly construed to include any aspect of agency organization, procedure, or management. In one state, for example, the term “administrative function” is defined as follows:

(1) “Administrative function” means the administration of:

(i) a law of the State;

(ii) a law of a political subdivision of the State; or

(iii) a rule, regulation, or bylaw of a public body.

(2) “Administrative function” does not include:

(i) an advisory function;

(ii) a judicial function;

(iii) a legislative function;

(iv) a quasi-judicial function; or

(v) a quasi-legislative function. [emphasis added.]

Non-judicial court officers, such as clerks of court, will have specific tasks delegated to them by the court; they can make decisions on matters that the legal system does not consider to require judicial discretion and judgment. These are often described as “ministerial.”
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “mandate:” “In practice, a judicial command or precept proceeding from a court or judicial officer, directing the proper officer to enforce a judgment, sentence, or decree. Seaman v. Clarke, 60 App. Div. 416, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1002; Horton v. State, 63 Neb. 34, 88 N. W. 146.
“In the practice of the Supreme Court of the United States, the mandate is a precept or order issued upon the decision of an appeal or writ of error, directing the action to be taken, or disposition to be made of the case, by the inferior court … in some of the state jurisdictions….”
WINDSOR has not received a judicial command. A letter purportedly written by the Clerk is not an order.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “precept” as “an order or direction, emanating from authority, to an officer or body of officers, commanding him or them to do some act within the scope of their powers.”
A letter from the Clerk is not a Precept.
The letter does not direct any proper officer to enforce a judgment, sentence, or decree.
Failing to do what is required by the rules is a violation of due process, and this is a Constitutional violation.
Windsor requires an order by the United States Supreme Court with a seal of the court and an actual signature of a Justice. This Due Process Notice and Service by Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, Scott S. Harris, was to be made on parties in 22-7648 of the valid record of denial of the Petition by the United States Supreme Court, if that actually happened.

WINDSOR’S CONFERENCE DECISION WAS NOT PUBLISHED, AND IT MUST BE.
United States Supreme Court’s Conference Decisions in Appeal No. 22-7648 must be published, and WINDSOR’s was not. This is a violation of due process.

“All conference decisions are published.” [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/ — EXHIBIT C, Paragraph 5.]

“When the vote has been taken on a case, the writing of an opinion is assigned—by the Chief if he voted with the majority, otherwise by the senior Justice of the majority.” [https://supremecourthistory.org/how-the-court-works/the-justices-conference/ — EXHIBIT C, Paragraph 6.]

WINDSOR’S FILINGS WERE NOT DOCKETED AS THEY MUST BE.
WINDSOR’S filing of a Motion for Rehearing [EXHIBIT E] has been unlawfully excluded from the Docket. [EXHIBIT A.] It was timely filed with the Clerk in paper form – an original and 10 copies. There was no service by the United States Supreme Court. This is a violation of due process.
“Filing” is defined as:

“To place a paper in the official custody of the clerk of court to enter into the files or records of a case. [https://www.uscourts.gov/glossary#letter_f]

“the act of giving an official form or document to someone in authority in order to begin a legal process.” [Britannica Dictionary definition of FILING.]

“to deposit with the clerk of the court a written complaint or petition which is the opening step in a lawsuit and subsequent documents, including an answer, demurrer, motions, petitions, and orders. [Copyright © 1981 2005 by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill.].

United States Supreme Court Rule 29 requires:

“1. Any document required or permitted to be presented to the Court or to a Justice shall be filed with the Clerk in paper form.

“2. A document is timely filed if it is received by the Clerk in paper form within the time specified for filing; or if it is sent to the Clerk through the United States Postal Service by first-class mail (including express or priority mail), postage prepaid, and bears a postmark, other than a commercial postage meter label, showing that the document was mailed on or before the last day for filing; or if it is delivered on or before the last day for filing to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery to the Clerk within 3 calendar days….”

The Clerk of the United States Supreme Court seems to be routinely violating the due process requirements of many litigants. EXHIBIT R is an article written in 2012 about almost identical corruption by U.S. Supreme Court Clerk Thomas Suter.
Notice and Service was not provided. Windsor demanded that it be executed immediately.
Windsor asks that this Motion be docketed pursuant to Due Process and that a valid adjudication of the Motion be noticed and served on the parties.
Windsor also requests all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under No. 22-7648, including all audit data. The audit data is the login name and login time of the individuals who entered any data in the records.
WINDSOR believes these unlawful practices have taken place for at least 13 years. WINDSOR requests copies of all letters issued, rather than orders, in every case since 01/01/2008.

ALL ORDERS AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH WINDSOR HAVE NOT BEEN SENT BY EMAIL AS REQUIRED.
Documents attached as EXHIBITS hereto show that WINDSOR does not receive mail promptly. The American Association of Non-Lawyers requires that non-lawyers receive all communications by email. This eliminates one of the many unfair advantages given to lawyers. This is a violation of due process.
WINDSOR must be served and communicated with at windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com.

WINDSOR WAS NOT ISSUED AN ORDER ON HIS MOTION FOR REHEARING, AND HE MUST BE GIVEN THE PROPER TIME TO RESPOND TO ANY OBJECTION.
Orders are required. This is a violation of due process.
United States Supreme Court Rule 44 (2) provides: “Any petition for the rehearing of an order denying a petition for a writ of certiorari or extraordinary writ shall be filed within 25 days after the date of the order of denial….”
There was no “order of denial,” so the time has not started to run on rehearing.

THE CLERKS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, HARRIS AND GARNER, HAVE VIOLATED SUPREME COURT RULE 79 BY NOT KEEPING PROPER RECORDS.
Records are required. This is a violation of due process.
Rule 79 requires:

“(a) Civil Docket.

(1) In General. The clerk must keep a record known as the “civil docket” in the form and manner prescribed by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts with the approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The clerk must enter each civil action in the docket. Actions must be assigned consecutive file numbers, which must be noted in the docket where the first entry of the action is made.

(2) Items to be Entered. The following items must be marked with the file number and entered chronologically in the docket:

(A) papers filed with the clerk;

(B) process issued, and proofs of service or other returns showing execution; and

(3) Contents of Entries; Jury Trial Demanded. Each entry must briefly show the nature of the paper filed or writ issued, the substance of each proof of service or other return, and the substance and date of entry of each order and judgment. When a jury trial has been properly demanded or ordered, the clerk must enter the word ‘jury’ in the docket.”

HARRIS and GARNER have violated WINDSOR’s civil rights by failing to comply with this Rule.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #2 — CONSPIRACY

The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
The Defendants, in some way or manner, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan. The mutual understanding was to break the law at some time in the future and/or to achieve a lawful aim by unlawful means. The DEFENDANTS willfully became members of such conspiracy. During the existence of the conspiracy, various DEFENDANTS knowingly committed at least one overt act in an effort to carry out or accomplish some object of the conspiracy. The conspiracy was designed to deprive the PLAINTIFF of legal rights and deceive the courts to obtain an illegal objective. Each of the DEFENDANTS is responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrongs. DEFENDANTS reached agreement to commit these overt acts. They committed to support their efforts with a series of lies, to conceal documents, to falsify documents, to lie, and to undertake a variety of actions designed to damage the PLAINTIFF. At least one of the DEFENDANTS knowingly committed at least two of the overt acts. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct). The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #3 — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
The DEFENDANTS have shown extreme and outrageous conduct. The PLAINTIFF has been under extreme emotional distress for 15 months.
DEFENDANTS intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the PLAINTIFF through defamation, fraud, conspiracy, and violation of civil and Constitutional rights.
DEFENDANTS inflicted emotional distress on the PLAINTIFF. DEFENDANTS acted intentionally or recklessly.
Some of the damaging words about the PLAINTIFF and actions against the Plaintiff are not defamatory, and it is these words and actions for which the PLAINTIFF seeks recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Conduct of DEFENDANTS was extreme and outrageous. These outrageously false and/or criminal claims and the wide variety of things that DEFENDANTS have done would prompt an average member of the community to exclaim “outrageous!”
The activities of DEFENDANTS have been so extreme that it has gone well beyond all possible bounds of decency, and it must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. All of the acts of DEFENDANTS taken together amount to the type of extreme conduct that qualifies as intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The conduct of Defendants caused the distress.
The distress caused was severe emotional distress to the PLAINTIFF. The outrageous harassment, lies, libel, slander, and defamation are bad alone, but the effect on the PLAINTIFF’s mental health has been severe.
There are no alternative causes of action that would provide a remedy for the severe emotional distress caused by DEFENDANTS’ conduct that does not meet whatever standard the Court decides is appropriate for defamation.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #4 — 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) – Violation of Federal Civil RICO Act

The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
The conduct of DEFENDANTS violates the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (“Federal RICO”).
DEFENDANTS, individually and in conspiracy with one another, are all RICO persons who violated RICO by engaging in (1) “racketeering activity,” (2) conducted through a “pattern,” (3) affecting an “enterprise,” (4) impacting interstate commerce. DEFENDANTS also violated 18 USC §1962(d) by conspiring as alleged herein to violate 18 USC §1962(c). All of DEFENDANTS’ predicate acts have a similar purpose – to damage the PLAINTIFF – all have similar victims, the PLAINTIFF, all have had similar results, and the methods of commission have been virtually identical.
Racketeering Activity included violations of section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), and other sections.
A number of crimes were committed by DEFENDANTS. Interstate crimes of wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and criminal conspiracy were committed between the District of Columbia, South Dakota, and Florida.
DEFENDANTS knowingly devised or participated in a scheme to defraud the PLAINTIFF and did so willingly with an intent to defraud. The activity engaged in consists of two or more predicate acts of racketeering activity, the most recent of which occurred within hours after the commission of a prior act.
The DEFENDANTS committed violations of Federal RICO and RICO Conspiracy – 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct: knowledge of, participation in, and benefit from a RICO enterprise). In addition to the substantive offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961, a criminal conspiracy to commit these offenses is a RICO predicate act.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #5 — Violation of Federal RICO Conspiracy Offense — 18 USC § 1962(d)

The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
The DEFENDANTS, in some way or manner, came to mutual understandings to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan as described herein. The mutual understanding was to break the law. The DEFENDANTS willfully became members of such conspiracy.
During the existence of the conspiracy, various DEFENDANTS knowingly violated the Federal RICO Act. These violations were knowingly committed in an effort to carry out or accomplish some object of the conspiracy.
The conspiracy was designed to deprive the PLAINTIFF of Constitutional rights and legal rights and to deceive the courts to obtain an illegal objective. Each of the DEFENDANTS is responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrongs. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct: knowledge of, participation in, and benefit from a RICO enterprise). The predicate acts are identified herein, and those paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #6 — Violation of Due Process and Deprivation of Rights — 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)

The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
HARRIS, GARNER, and UNIDENTIFIED DOES conspired for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, and/or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice with intent to deny PLAINTIFF due process and to injure him while attempting to enforce his right to self-representation, and this violated the equal protection of the laws.. HARRIS, GARNER, and UNIDENTIFIED DOES have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #5 — Violation of Constitutional Rights

The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
DEFENDANTS had a Constitutional duty to the PLAINTIFF. They breached their Constitutional duties to the PLAINTIFF through action and inaction. This caused damage to the PLAINTIFF.
The PLAINTIFF brings this action against HARRIS and GARNER, pursuant in part to 28 U.S. C. § 1331, in claims arising from violations of federal constitutional rights guaranteed in the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and redressable pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents 403 U.S. 388 (1971). HARRIS and GARNER subjected the PLAINTIFF to deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.
HARRIS and GARNER’s actions are non-judicial, and there is no immunity. The PLAINTIFF has been damaged. The PLAINTIFF prays for monetary damages against HARRIS and GARNER based upon violations of federal Constitutional rights pursuant to Bivens.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #6 — Fraud

The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
Defendants intentionally misstated material facts, omitted material facts, and made false representations. Defendants knew they made false statements or omitted material facts, or they had a reckless disregard for the truth. The PLAINTIFF and the courts relied upon the intentional misstatements and/or omission of material facts. Defendants committed fraud. The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result. Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct).

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #7 — Common Law Fraud

The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
Defendants misrepresented material facts. These Defendants had knowledge of the falsity. Their intent was that the representations would be acted upon by people ignorant of the falsity, relied on the truth of the representations, and had a right to rely upon it.
Respondeat superior (principal is liable for agents’ misconduct). The PLAINTIFF was damaged as a result.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #8 — Violation of Pro Se Rights

The allegations in the paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.
Pro se parties are a minority class of people. The PLAINTIFF objects to the treatment of pro se parties in state and federal courts. The PLAINTIFF, Pro Se, has been repeatedly denied rights and abused. Judges and judicial officers have violated the Constitutional rights of the PLAINTIFF and other pro se parties.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #9 — Constitutional and Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1988 — Violation of First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights

The PLAINTIFF incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint for purposes of this claim.
The PLAINTIFF was denied due process and his rights were violated when filings were not filed or considered.
The PLAINTIFF was denied access to a court to seek redress of grievances.
Defendants directly participated in the infraction, after learning of it, failed to remedy the wrong, and created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred or allowed such policy or custom to continue.
As a direct result of the actions, statements and / or policies of the Defendants, the PLAINTIFF suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s known statutory and Constitutional rights.
As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, the PLAINTIFF has suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe and substantial damages. These damages include lost income, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental and emotional anguish, and distress.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #10 — Violation of Fourth Amendment Failure to Train and Supervise — 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The PLAINTIFF incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint for purposes of this claim.
The Defendants’ immediate supervisors, had a duty to train and supervise them to ensure they were not engaging in conduct that violated the civil rights of citizens like the PLAINTIFF.
Instead of carrying out this duty, Defendants chose to encourage the misconduct of needless escalation and aggression witnessed by the Defendants against the PLAINTIFF in this case.
DefendantS’ use of excessive force and their illegal seizure and assault upon the PLAINTIFF was the direct result of their supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the civil rights of citizens and of disabled citizens in particular, and his repeated failure and refusal to intervene to supervise, train, or otherwise put a stop to such misconduct.
All of the acts described herein were done by Defendants intentionally, knowingly, willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and recklessly in disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s federally protected rights, and they were done pursuant to the pre-existing and ongoing deliberately indifferent customs, policies and practices of the Clerk of Court, under color of law.
Upon information and belief, the Clerk of Court’s customs and practices of unlawful conduct (and failures to train/supervise to prevent the same) proximately causing the harms described herein to the PLAINTIFF.
Upon information and belief, it is the custom and practice at the Clerk of Court’s Office of the United States Supreme Court to regularly violate the civil rights of citizens like the PLAINTIFF and intentionally, knowingly, willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and recklessly operate in disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s federally protected rights;
Upon information and belief, it is the custom and practice at the Clerk of Court’s Office to try and cover-up and justify such wrongdoing.
Upon information and belief, it is the custom and practice by the Clerk of Court to refuse to discipline its employees for misconduct and to refuse to ever find its employees have engaged in wrongdoing, in the face of obvious and repeated constitutional violations, which resulted in a foreseeable culture of dishonesty and silence in the face of ongoing and repeated civil rights violations.
The unlawful conduct of Defendants as set forth in detail herein, amounts to a custom and well-settled, widespread overall practice of fraud and corruption deliberately insulated from law enforcement accountability, throughout the Defendants, even if not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, and is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.
Through the Defendants’ continuous ratification of unconstitutional actions and inactions, Defendants have condoned and become the driving force of the Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct.
Defendants failed to properly train and supervise its employees to avoid their foreseeable use of unconstitutional conduct.
Defendants’ policies, customs, and practices in failing to properly train and supervise its employees were the moving force and proximate cause of the violations to the PLAINTIFF’s constitutional rights.
The custom, policy, and practice of Defendants of encouraging, condoning, tolerating, and ratifying the unconstitutional conduct, as described herein, were the moving force behind and the proximate cause of, the violations to the PLAINTIFF’s Constitutional rights.
Upon information and belief, Defendants have been deliberately obfuscatory and in other litigation involving claims against its officers, has made concerted efforts to withhold, destroy, conceal and delay the release of documents and correspondence that relate to the unconstitutional policies, customs, and practices set forth above, and which also evidence Defendants’ unconstitutional practices, customs, failures to train, and supervise Defendant officers as set forth above.
The acts or omissions of Defendants caused the PLAINTIFF to suffer physical and mental pain, among other injuries, damages, and losses.
The actions and omissions of Defendants as described herein deprived the PLAINTIFF of the rights, privileges, liberties, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States of America and caused his other damages.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #11 — Constitutional and Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1988 — Violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights

The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
The PLAINTIFF was denied due process and his rights were violated when Defendants gave false information to WINDSOR and judges.
Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s known statutory and Constitutional rights.
As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, the PLAINTIFF has suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe and substantial damages. These damages include lost income, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental and emotional anguish, and distress.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #12 — Monell Claim

The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
At all relevant times herein, the Clerk of Court’s Office developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned de facto policies, practices, and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the PLAINTIFF’s Constitutional rights which caused the violation of such rights.
Defendants ‘ unlawful actions were done willfully, knowingly, and with the specific intent to deprive the PLAINTIFF of his Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
The Constitutional abuses and violations of the Clerk of Court’s Office, were and are directly and proximately caused by policies, practices and/or customs developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged and sanctioned by Defendants, including the failure: (a) to adequately supervise and train its officers and agents, including the Defendants, thereby failing to adequately discourage further Constitutional violations on the part of its Clerk of Court’s Office, and their employees; (b) to properly and adequately monitor and discipline its employees, including Defendants; and (c) to adequately and properly investigate citizen complaints of misconduct, and, instead, acts of misconduct were tolerated.
Upon information and belief, Defendants acting through its Clerk of Court’s Office, developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and sanctioned a de facto policy, practice, and/or custom of unlawfully interfering with and/or arresting, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, individuals who exercise their rights under the First Amendment by engaging in monitoring and documenting law enforcement and judicial misconduct.
Defendants’ unlawful actions were done willfully, knowingly, and with the specific intent to deprive the PLAINTIFF of his Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
The PLAINTIFF has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer serious and irreparable harm to his Constitutional rights unless Defendants are enjoined from continuing their unlawful policies, practices, and/or customs which have directly and proximately caused such Constitutional abuses.
Defendants acted intentionally and with callous disregard for the PLAINTIFF’s known statutory and Constitutional rights.
As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful actions, the PLAINTIFF has suffered, and will continue to suffer severe and substantial damages. These damages include lost income, lost career and business opportunities, litigation expenses including attorney fees, loss of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, inconvenience, mental and emotional anguish, and distress.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #13 — CIVIL CONSPIRACY

The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
Defendants conspired to damage the PLAINTIFF.
Defendants formed and operated the conspiracy. The object to be accomplished was to defame, libel, slander, harass, cyberstalk, invade his privacy, falsely charge the PLAINTIFF with felonies, cause emotional distress, invade his privacy, and damage him. Evidence shows that Defendants had a meeting of the minds and actively worked together toward this objective.
Multiple unlawful, overt acts were committed. There was specific intent to agree to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. The conspiracy occurred in the District of Columbia. The act in, and effect on, the District of Columbia was a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy.
There are underlying torts that support the conspiracy cause of action.
Damage resulted to the PLAINTIFF from acts done in furtherance of the common design. The PLAINTIFF has been caused pain and suffering, emotional distress, lost enjoyment of life, loss of his marriage, damage to his relationship with his family, severe damage to his reputation, damage to his career, and more. The PLAINTIFF’s business relationships have been severely damaged.
The PLAINTIFF’s reputation is now sullied by false, defamatory information online. This defamation likely can never be erased because it is breeding in cyberspace.
There was extreme risk by Defendants as there was not a remote possibility of injury or even a high probability of minor harm, but rather the likelihood of serious injury to the PLAINTIFF.
Actual awareness existed because Defendants knew about the peril, but their acts demonstrated they did not care.
Some Defendants aided and abetted the conspiracy and underlying torts.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #14 — EXEMPLARY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The PLAINTIFF hereby incorporates all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
Defendants acted intentionally to damage the PLAINTIFF.
Defendants committed fraud, malice, and gross negligence. This isn’t the case of someone slipping up and making one false statement. The actions of Defendants were deliberate.
Conduct of Defendants, as described above, is willful, wanton, wicked, intentional, and malicious resulting from fraud, insult, and malice, and it is associated with aggravating circumstances, including willfulness, wantonness, malice, oppression, outrageous conduct, insult, and fraud, thus warranting the PLAINTIFF’s recovery of punitive damages from each of the Defendants.
The entire want of care by the Defendants shows that the acts complained of were the result of conscious indifference to the rights or welfare of the PLAINTIFF.
The PLAINTIFF should receive an award of punitive/exemplary damages. Exemplary damages serve to provide the claimant with recovery above and beyond compensatory damages in order to punish the wrongdoers for egregious conduct and to deter the wrongdoers and others from similar conduct in the future.
Since the PLAINTIFF’s damages can never be erased in this case; there is no amount of money that could compensate the PLAINTIFF for the loss of life as he knew it; there is no amount of money to compensate a decent, honest, law-abiding citizen for the destruction of his reputation.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #15 — INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

If not enjoined by this Court, Defendants and their agents, representatives, and employees will continue to implement similar policies and practices that deny citizens their Constitutional rights without due process, violate their right to equal protection of the laws, and deprive people of the privileges or immunities of citizenship. This course of conduct will cause citizens to suffer irreparable injury, including but not limited to, loss of business opportunities and the deprivation of their livelihoods. Citizens have no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law for such an injury. Accordingly, injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other authority is appropriate.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #16 — RICO RELIEF

The PLAINTIFF asks that this Court liberally construe the RICO laws and thereby find that all Defendants, both jointly and severally, have acquired and maintained, both directly and indirectly, an interest in and/or control of a RICO enterprise of persons and of other individuals who were associated in fact, all of whom engaged in, and whose activities did affect, interstate and foreign commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); that all Defendants be required to account for all gains, profits, and advantages derived from their several acts of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s); that judgment be entered for the PLAINTIFF and against all Defendants for the PLAINTIFF’s actual damages, and for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF treble (triple) damages, under authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), according to the best available proof; that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF all damages sustained by the PLAINTIFF in consequence of Defendants’ several violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF his costs of the lawsuit incurred herein including, but not limited to, all necessary research, all non-judicial enforcement, and all reasonable counsel’s fees; that all damages caused by all Defendants, and all gains, profits, and advantages derived by all Defendants, from their several acts of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s), be deemed to be held in constructive trust for the benefit of the PLAINTIFF, his heirs and assigns; that the PLAINTIFF has such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper, under the circumstances of this action; that Defendants have conspired to acquire and maintain an interest in, and/or conspired to acquire and maintain control of, a RICO enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962(c) and (d); that Defendants have conspired to conduct and participate in said RICO enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), 1962(c) and (d); that all Defendants be required to account for all gains, profits, and advantages derived from their several acts of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s); that judgment be entered for the PLAINTIFF and against all Defendants for the PLAINTIFF’s actual damages, and for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF treble damages, under authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), for any gains, profits, or advantages attributable to all violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF all damages sustained by the PLAINTIFF in consequence of Defendants’ several violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); that all Defendants pay to the PLAINTIFF his costs of the lawsuit incurred herein including, but not limited to, all necessary research, all non-judicial enforcement, and all reasonable counsel’s fees; and that all damages caused by all Defendants, and all gains, profits, and advantages derived by all Defendants, from their several acts of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and from all other violation(s) of applicable State and federal law(s), be deemed to be held in constructive trust for the benefit of the PLAINTIFF, his heirs and assigns.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF #17 — Violations of Title II of Americans With Disabilities Act — 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213

All preceding paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated here for purposes of this Claim.
Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from discrimination on the basis of a disability.
The DEFENDANTS failed to provide modifications or reasonable accommodations to the PLAINTIFF in light of his disabilities, and the Clerk of Court HARRIS failed to adopt policies and procedures, or adequately train his staff to safely interact with people who suffer such disabilities.
Some reasonable accommodations for a litigant functioning alone with Cognitive Decline and use of only one hand while traveling a thousand miles from home is to allow recording, provide all communications in writing, and communicate by email for the fastest possible delivery.
Unlawful discrimination, pursuant to DOJ regulation, includes a failure to make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.” 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(7).
As a proximate result of actions of the DEFENDANTS, the PLAINTIFF was injured, suffered physically and emotionally, has been unable to comply with requests of the Clerk of Court, and continues to experience fear, trauma, and anxiety.
As a result of the DEFENDANTS’ violations of Title II of the ADA, the PLAINTIFF is entitled to compensatory damages.

INJURIES

________________________________________________________________

RELIEF

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Windsor respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in his favor and against the Defendants:

that this COMPLAINT be granted;

Appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the unlawful and unconstitutional acts and practices of the Defendants;

Compensatory and consequential damages, including damages for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of liberty, privacy, sense of security and individual dignity, and other pain and suffering on all claims allowed by law;

Appropriate equitable relief against all Defendants as allowed by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including the enjoining and permanent restraining of these violations, and direction to Defendants to take such affirmative action as is necessary to ensure that the effects of the unconstitutional and unlawful practices are eliminated and do not continue to affect the PLAINTIFF or others;

All economic losses and damages on all claims allowed by law to be established at trial;

Punitive damages on all claims allowed by law and in an amount to be determined at trial;

that an order be issued confirming if there was a Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648;

that an order be issued reflecting the Due Process Notice and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. Harris, on parties in Case No. 22-7648 of the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court;

that the Opinion of the Court in Case No. 22-7648 be provided;

that the vote of each Justice be indicated in Case No. 22-7648;

that the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process;

that an order be issued that WINDSOR must be served and communicated with at windsorinsouthdakota@yahoo.com;

that this Motion be granted – motion TO REQUIRE confirmation OF A Conference of the nine justices in Case No. 22-7648 and ISSUANCE OF AN Order SO CONFIRMING; order reflecting the valid record of the decision of the Petition by the Court in Case No. 22 7648, the Due Process Notice, and Service by Clerk of the Court, Scott S. HARRIS, of OPINION in Case No. 22-7648 on EACH partY; RECORD OF VOTES BY EACH JUSTICE in Case No. 22-7648; ORDER THAT the Motion for Rehearing be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that this Motion DATED NOVEMBER 27, 2023 be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648 AT NO charge, including all audit data; AND if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. HARRIS be docketed pursuant to Due Process; that Windsor be provided copies of all court records in the internal case management system of SCOTUS under Case No. 22-7648, at no charge, including all audit data; that Windsor be provided copies of letters and orders issued in every case considered in Conference since 02/01/2008; that if Case No. 22-7648 was not heard in Conference, that this Court file criminal charges against Scott S. Harris;

Issuance of an Order mandating appropriate equitable relief, including, but not limited to: (1) The imposition of policy changes designed to avoid future similar misconduct by Defendants; (2) Mandatory training designed to prevent future similar misconduct by Defendants;

Pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate; and

Any further relief to which PLAINTIFF may show himself justly entitled.

Submitted this 26th day of December 2023,

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

VERIFICATION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C.§1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct based upon my personal knowledge, except as to the matters herein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and that as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NOT.

This 26th day of December 2023,

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this COMPLAINT has been prepared in Times New Roman 12-point font, one of the font and point selections approved by this Court and meets the requirements of this Court.

This 26th day of December 2023,

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

WINDSOR is a private individual. He is not a nongovernmental corporation so a corporate disclosure statement is not appropriate or required by Rule 7.1.

This 26th day of December 2023,

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, William Michael Windsor, do swear that on this date, December 26, 2023, I have served the enclosed COMPLAINT on the DEFENDANTS in the above proceeding or their counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to each of them and with first-class postage prepaid, or by delivery to a third-party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days.

The names and addresses of those served are as follows:

Name: Scott S. Harris

Address: Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone: 202-479-3025

Email: pio@supremecourt.gov

Name: Rashonda Garner

Address: Supreme Court of the United States

Office of the Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

Telephone: 202-479-3025

Email: PMcCabe@supremecourt.gov

This 26th day of December 2023,

WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

REQUEST FOR TRIAL BY JURY

THE PLAINTIFF REQUESTS TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE.

This 26th day of December 2023,

_______________________________
WILLIAM MICHAEL WINDSOR,

Self-Represented Litigant, Pro Se

Member of the American Association of Non-Lawyers

5013 S Louise Ave #1134

Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57108

352-###-####

WindsorInSouthDakota@yahoo.com

Ku Klux Klan Act – 42 USC 1983 – Sue for Violation of Civil Rights

This is an article I published in 2010. There is a lot of excellent information about a federal lawsuit against the City of Amarillo and 50 criminals and for Ellis County and a boatload of criminals from Ellis County that John Eric Armstrong is expected to file. Here’s the Hunter Tyler Schreck Federal Lawsuit. It is pursuant to The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. You may know it as 42 U.S.C. 1983.

I copied it from http://www.constitution.org/brief/forsythe_42-1983.htm

A GUIDE TO CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

AN OVERVIEW OF SUPREME COURT AND ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT

IAN D. FORSYTHE

Hilyard, Bogan, Palmer & Lockeby, P.A.

105 East Robinson Street, Suite 201

Orlando, Florida 32801

Tel. (407) 425-4251

forsythe@forsythelaw.com

I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY

42 U.S.C. § 1983, commonly referred to as “section 1983” provides:

Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).

Section 1983 was enacted on April 20, 1871 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and is also known as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” because one of its primary purposes was to provide a civil remedy against the abuses that were being committed in the southern states, especially by the Ku Klux Klan. While the existing law protected all citizens in theory, its protection in practice was unavailable to some because those persons charged with the enforcement of the laws were unable or unwilling to do so.^[1] The Act was intended to provide a private remedy for such violations of federal law, and has subsequently been interpreted to create a species of tort liability.^[2]

The number of cases that have been brought under section 1983 has dramatically increased since 1961 when the Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape.^[3] In Monroe, the Supreme Court held that a police officer was acting “under color of state law” even though his actions violated state law.^[4] This was the first case in which the Supreme Court allowed liability to attach where a government official acted outside the scope of the authority granted to him by state law. Since Monroe v. Pape was decided, an extensive body of law has developed to govern section 1983 claims. This article is intended to provide an overview of that extensive body of law, and will include seminal precedent from the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals–a comprehensive study of all law related to section 1983 is beyond the scope of this article.

II. ELEMENTS OF A SECTION 1983 CLAIM

(i) “Every person . . .”

Only “persons” under the statute are subject to liability.^[5] A state is not a person subject to suit under section 1983,^[6] but a state officer can be sued in his official capacity for prospective or injunctive relief^[7] despite the fact that an suit against a government official in his official capacity represents nothing more than a suit against the government entity itself!^[8] Despite this logical inconsistency, the current state of the law is that a state may not be sued for damages, but may be sued for declaratory or injunctive relief. Municipalities and local governments are persons subject to suit for damages and prospective relief,^[9] but the United States Government is not.^[10] Individual employees of federal,^[11] state^[12] and local^[13] government may be sued in their individual capacities^[14] for damages, declaratory or injunctive relief.

While the determination of who is a “person” is a matter of federal statutory interpretation, the matter of who has the capacity to be sued is determined by the law of the forum state.^[15] Likewise, the law of the forum is to be applied in actions under section 1983 where the law of section 1983 provides no guidance.^[16]

(ii) “. . . who under color of [state law]^[17] . . .”

The traditional definition of acting under the color of state law requires that the defendant have exercised power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law,”^[18] and such actions may result in liability even if the defendant abuses the position given to him by the state.^[19] A private actor may also act under color of state law under certain circumstances.^[20] For example, it has been held that a physician who contracts with the state to provide medical care to inmates acts under the color of state law.^[21] For all practical purposes, the “color of state law” requirement is identical to the “state action” prerequisite to constitutional liability.^[22]

(iii) “. . . subjects or causes to be subjected . . .”

Section 1983 does not impose a state of mind requirement independent of the underlying basis for liability,^[23] but there must be a causal connection between the defendant’s actions and the harm that results.^[24] In order to hold a local government liable under section 1983, the Supreme Court has interpreted this causation element to require that the harm be the result of action on the part of the government entity that implemented or executed a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers, or the result of the entity’s custom.^[25] Further, the entity’s policy or custom must have been the “moving force” behind the alleged deprivation.^[26] This “custom or policy” requirement is a dramatic departure from the rule of respondeat superior that prevails in many common law actions.^[27]

A local government is said to have an unconstitutional policy when it fails to train its employees, and the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to an obvious need for such training, and the failure train will likely result in the employee making a wrong decision.^[28] An unconstitutional policy may also exist if an isolated action of a government employee is dictated by a “final policymaker,”^[29] or if the authorized policymaker approves a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.^[30] However, a supervisor can only be liable in his individual capacity if he directly participates in causing the harm–relying upon respondeat superior is insufficient.^[31] The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a plaintiff must meet a heightened pleading standard to state a claim against a municipality for an unconstitutional custom or policy.^[32]

(iv) “. . . [any person to] the deprivation of rights . . .”

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, it merely provides a method for the vindication of rights elsewhere conferred in the United States Constitution and Laws.^[33] Therefore, a plaintiff may prevail only if he can demonstrate that he was deprived of rights secured by the United States Constitution or federal statutes. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of the rights available under the United States Constitution, nevertheless, this article will provide an overview of perhaps the most utilized of all constitutional provisions–the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause [hereinafter “the Due Process Clause”].^[34]

The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause was not intended to supplant tort law, or to become “a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the states.”^[35] Against this backdrop, to state a claim for a deprivation of Due Process, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he possessed a constitutionally protected property interest; and (2) that he was deprived of that interest without due process of law.^[36] Due process property interests are created by “existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law–rules or understanding that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”^[37] To have a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause, “a person must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”^[38] While the existence of a protected property interest is decided by reference to state law, the determination of whether due process was accorded is decided by reference to the Constitution.^[39] Due process requires that “a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,'”^[40] but the state does not have to provide the same remedies available under section 1983 in order to satisfy due process.^[41]

In construing the Due Process Clause, the United States Supreme Court has held that negligent acts by state actors do not effect a “deprivation” for the purposes of the Due Process Clause,^[42] and the random and unauthorized conduct of a government actor, even if intentional, does not implicate the Due Process Clause if the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy, such as, for example, a tort remedy in its own courts.^[43] However, where the state can feasibly provide a pre-deprivation hearing, it must do so regardless of the post-deprivation remedies available,^[44] and in the absence of a special relationship created or assumed by the state, a state’s failure to protect an individual from violence or injury caused by private actors cannot state a violation of the Due Process Clause.^[45]

In addition to protection against deprivations of procedural due process, the Due Process Clause has two substantive components–the substantive due process simpliciter, and incorporated substantive due process. In order to state a claim for a violation of the substantive due process simpliciter, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant engaged in conduct that was “arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.”^[46] This form of due process has very limited application,^[47] but, in contrast to certain procedural due process claims,^[48] the existence of adequate post-deprivation remedies does not bar a substantive due process claim.^[49] With respect to incorporated substantive due process, the plaintiff may state a claim by proving a violation of one of the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has held that one of the substantive elements of the Due Process Clause protects those rights that are fundamental–rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and has, over time, held that virtually all of the Bill of Rights protect such fundamental rights and has likewise held that they apply to the states through the “liberty” interest of the Due Process Clause.^[50] However, the Court has held that when a specific provision within the Bill of Rights already provides protection, the more generalized notion of due process should not be used to define constitutional rights.^[51]

In addition to providing a remedy for deprivations of constitutional rights, section 1983 also makes actionable violations of federal “Laws.”^[52] A violation of a federal statute is cognizable only when the violation trammels a right secured by federal law.^[53] However, a statute is said to create a federal right only when “the provision in question is intended to benefit the putative plaintiff,”^[54] unless it reflects merely a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct rather than a binding obligation on the government unit,^[55] or unless the putative plaintiff’s interest is too vague and amorphous such that it is beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.^[56]

(v) ” . . . shall be liable . . . in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . “

There is no requirement that the plaintiff sue in federal court because state courts have concurrent jurisdiction,^[57] and the usual rule is exhaustion of administrative and judicial state remedies is not a prerequisite to a section 1983 action.^[58] Also, the existence of concurrent state remedies is not a bar to a section 1983 action.^[59] With respect to the extent of damages available, the Supreme Court has noted that the basic purpose of a section 1983 damages award is to compensate the victims of official misconduct, and therefore held that there is no limit on actual damages if they can be proven.^[60] But where they are not proved, only nominal damages of $1.00 may be awarded.^[61] Punitive damages may also be awarded, but not against a municipality.^[62] Injunctive relief is also permitted.^[63]

III. DEFENSES AND IMMUNITIES

States and state agencies are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court,^[64] but local governments have no immunity from damages flowing from their constitutional violations, and may not assert the good faith of its agents as a defense to liability.^[65] Further, state law sovereign immunity and state law limitations on damages do not protect local governments from liability under section 1983,^[66] and state laws requiring pre-suit notification prior to initiating an action against the state or its subdivisions similarly do not apply.^[67] Therefore, local governments are left in the unique and unhappy situation of being subject to suit without the benefit of any form of immunity.

In contrast to the distinct lack of immunity available to local governments, individual capacity defendants are protected by qualified immunity.^[68] Qualified immunity is a powerful tool that shields individual officials who are performing discretionary activities unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”^[69] A government official is entitled to qualified immunity unless his “act is so obviously wrong, in the light of preexisting law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing.”^[70] The qualified immunity inquiry is purely objective–the subjective intentions of the actor is irrelevant.^[71] Qualified immunity is not only immunity from liability, but it is immunity from suit as well,^[72] and shields individual capacity defendants even where a constitutional violation may have occurred. Likewise, a court should scrutinize a plaintiff’s claim to determine if the plaintiff states a constitutional claim at all, prior to analyzing whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.^[73] The burden of proving that the law was clearly established cannot be carried by stating constitutional rights in general terms–a plaintiff within the eleventh circuit must cite to specific decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Court of Appeals, or the highest state court in which the case arose.^[74]

Qualified immunity must be plead as an affirmative defense by the defendant official,^[75] and becomes a matter for the court to decide, even if it requires a factual determination as to whether the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances,^[76] and the court should rule on the issue of qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage of litigation.^[77] An individual defendant in federal court^[78] may immediately appeal a denial of qualified immunity,^[79] even if a prior appeal of the denial of qualified immunity was unsuccessful, and even if other claims remain for trial.^[80] Until the issue of qualified immunity is decided, the defendant official may resist discovery,^[81] and there is authority to the effect that he may stay the entire proceedings during an appeal of the denial of qualified immunity.^[82] While the Supreme Court has rejected a heightened pleading standard for claims against local governments, a plaintiff must nevertheless plead facts with specificity to overcome an individual capacity defendant’s qualified immunity.^[83]

Private individuals who perform state functions,^[84] and private corporations who contract with the government^[85] may not be entitled to qualified immunity. State and local legislators^[86] and judges^[87] are protected by absolute immunity when sued in their individual capacity for damages or injunctive relief, while prosecutors^[88] are entitled to absolute immunity when sued in their individual capacities for damages only. In any event, as discussed above, all individual capacity defendants are, at a minimum, entitled to qualified immunity.

The Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts did not contain a statute of limitations for section 1983 actions, and it is appropriate to adopt a local time limitation so long as it is not inconsistent with federal law.^[89] The Supreme Court has held that section 1983 is best characterized as a tort action for the recovery of damages, and therefore held that the appropriate statute of limitations to be adopted is the state statute applicable to personal injury actions.^[90]

IV. ATTORNEY’S FEES

The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976^[91] provides that one who prevails^[92] in a section 1983 action is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees. There is little doubt that the addition of this attorney’s fee provision fueled the growth in the number of section 1983 cases that have been filed because it has been held that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust, while a prevailing defendant may be awarded attorneys’ fees only “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad fait

[1]. The catalyst for the enactment of the Act was the “campaign of violence and deception in the South, fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying citizens their civil and political rights.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). The following quote from Representative Lowe of the 42nd Congress is illustrative:

While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and banishing have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrators have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice. Immunity is given to crime and the records of public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress.

Cong. Globe, 42d Cong. 1st Sess., 374 (1871)(remarks of Rep. Lowe)(quoted in Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276)).

[2]. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986).

[3]. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

[4]. See section II(ii), infra, for a discussion of the “under color of state law” requirement.

[5]. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

[6]. Id.

[7]. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

[8]. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 25, 31 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).

[9]. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).

[10]. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

[11]. Id.

[12]. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 25 (1991).

[13]. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).

[14]. Government officials may be sued in their individual capacity. Such a suit does not represent a suit against the government entity for which he is associated. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). The failure to identify in which capacity a defendant is being sued is a critical pleading defect. Colvin v. McDougall, 62 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1995).

[15]. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 210 (11th Cir. 1992); Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b). For example, Florida law provides that divisions of local governments, such as police departments, do not have the capacity to be sued. Florida City Police Department v. Corcoran, 661 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

[16]. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980).

[17]. Section 1983’s requirement that a person act “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory or District of Columbia” is commonly abbreviated as “under color of state law.”

[18]. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). However, in the only case in which the Supreme Court held that a government employee did not act under color of sate law, the Court held that a public defender does not act under color of state law while performing a lawyer’s traditional function of representing criminal defendants. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

[19]. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).

[20]. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 162 (1992); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982).

[21]. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Ort v. Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105 (11th Cir. 1986).

[22]. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982).

[23]. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

[24]. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977).

[25]. Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691, (1978). This “custom or policy” requirement has also been applied to private corporations who contract with the state to provide medical care to prisoners. Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 723-24 (11th Cir.), order vacating appeal, 931 F.2d 711, 712 (11th Cir. 1991), partially reinstated and appealed sub nom, Howell v. Burden, 12 F.3d 190 (11th Cir. 1994).

[26]. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

[27]. Monell, at 691-695; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir. 1985). Isolated unconstitutional incidents, without more, cannot bind a municipality. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).

[28]. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Gold v. City of Miami, 1998 WL 54803 (11th Cir. 1998); Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488 (11th. Cir. 1997). However, where the employee’s proper course of action “is obvious to all without training or supervision, then the failure to train or supervise is generally not ‘so likely’ to produce a wrong decision as to support an inference of deliberate indifference by city policymakers to the need to train or supervise.” Sewell, 117 F.3d at 490.

[29]. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). Who is a “final policymaker” is decided by reference to state law. Pembaur, at 483; McMillan v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997).

[30]. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). However, merely going along with the discretionary decisions made by subordinates is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy. Id.

[31]. Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836 (11th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990); Zatler v. Wainewright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986).

[32]. Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). There is, however, a heightened pleading standard for individual capacity claims. See note 83 infra, and accompanying text.

[33]. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). Section 1983 does not provide for the vindication of rights secured by state law. Id. at 145-146; Almand v. DeKalb County, 103 F.3d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1997).

[34]. U.S.Const. amend. XIV, Â§1. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause is a limitation on state power, while the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause limits federal power. Halinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 319 (1892).

[35]. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).

[36]. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).

[37]. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); See also, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976).

[38]. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 576.

[39]. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).

[40]. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542.

[41]. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-544 (1981).

[42]. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

[43]. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)(“[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the due process clause of the 14th amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available. For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state’s action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy.”). The Court later held that negligence does not constitute a “deprivation.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). See also, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990).

[44]. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132.

[45]. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Santamorena v. Georgia Military College, 147 F.3d 1337, 1339-1340 (11th Cir. 1998). As with all actions predicated upon a violation of the United States Constitution, in order to state a claim for a deprivation of due process, “state action” must be present. The eleventh circuit has recognized three primary tests to determine whether the actions of a private entity constitute state action: (1) the public function test; (2) the state compulsion test; and (3) the nexus/joint action test. National Broad Co. v. Communications Workers of Am., 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1988).

[46]. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992); Rymer v. Douglas County, 764 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1985).

[47]. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125(“As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.”). See also, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)(high speed police chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability for violation of substantive due process); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-272 (plaintiff could not make out substantive due process claim for alleged prosecution without probable cause because Fourth Amendment is more appropriately considered); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)(claims of force arrest by police officer during arrest or detention cannot state a substantive due process claim–it is more appropriately analyzed under Fourth Amendment); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994)(in non-legislative cases, only procedural due process claims are available to pretextually terminated employees).

[48]. See note 46, supra, and accompanying text.

[49]. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994).

[50]. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy public trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), apply to the states.

[51]. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).

[52]. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).

[53]. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 101, 106 (1989) (“Section 1983 speaks in terms of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities,’ not violations of federal law.”).

[54]. Id.

[55]. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981).

[56]. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1987)). See also, Maynard v. Williams, 72 F.3d 848, 851 (11th Cir. 1996).

[57]. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990). Of course, a defendant in state court may remove to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

[58]. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961)(exhaustion of judicial remedies is not a prerequisite); Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982)(exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite). But see, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)(a federal plaintiff is barred from seeking declaratory or injunctive relief relating to ongoing state criminal judicial proceedings); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994)(plaintiff must prove that a conviction or sentence has been reversed prior to recovering damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment); 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1997e (a prisoner’s civil rights lawsuit may be delayed up to 180 days to require the prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies).

[59]. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124 (1990).

[60]. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).

[61]. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-267 (1978).

[62]. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981). A municipality may, however, be jointly and severally liable. Finch v. City of Vernon, 877 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1989).

[63]. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

[64]. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). But as discussed above, because states are not “persons” under the statute, they cannot be sued in either state or federal court. See note 6, supra, and accompanying text.

[65]. Owen v. City of Independence, MO, 445 U.S. 621 (1980); Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 699-700 (1978).

[66]. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); Hamm v. Powell, 874 F.2d 766, 770 (11th Cir. 1989).

[67]. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).

[68]. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See also, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University Board of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1994)(en banc).

[69]. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817; Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149.

[70]. Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149; Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1406 (11th Cir. 1998)(the plaintiff must point to case law which predates the official’s alleged improper conduct, involves materially similar facts, and truly compels the conclusion that the plaintiff had a right under federal law).

[71]. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987); Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

[72]. “One of the purposes of immunity, absolute or qualified, is to spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out lawsuit.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). See also, Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir. 1991).

[73]. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991); GJR Investments Inc. v. Escambia County, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998). Courts should not assume that the plaintiff states a constitutional claim simply to get to the qualified immunity issue. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232.

[74]. Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 826-27 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997)(en banc). “Public officials are not obligated to be creative or imaginative in drawing analogies from previously decided cases.” Id. at 827.

[75]. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.

[76]. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991); Stone v. Peacock, 968 F.2d 1163, 1166 (11th Cir. 1992)(if there are disputed factual issues regarding qualified immunity that a jury should resolve, special interrogatories would be appropriate).

[77]. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991). A defendant official may assert the qualified immunity defense in 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, as an affirmative defense in a 12(c) request for judgment on the pleadings, and on a Rule 56(e) summary judgment motion. Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 1991).

[78]. A defendant in state court does not necessarily have the right to an interlocutory appeal. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997). But see, Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(viii).

[79]. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985). However, a defendant may not appeal the denial of a summary judgment motion on the issue of qualified immunity if the denial was based solely upon the existence of disputed factual issues, as opposed to a finding that the law was not clearly established, or that the defendant did not act objectively reasonably. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995).

[80]. Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997)(“[I]f [qualified immunity] is found applicable at any stage of the proceedings, it determines the outcome of the litigation by shielding the official from damages liability); Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305-11 (1996). The other claims that remain for trial may consist of a claim against the official in his official capacity. Id.

[81]. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)(“If the defendant does plead the immunity defense, the district court should resolve that threshold question before permitting discovery”); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)(“Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before commencement of discovery.”).

[82]. Summit Medical Associates, P.C. v. James, 1998 WL 125776 (M.D.Ala. 1998)(citing Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 123 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1997))(relating to appeal of Eleventh Amendment immunity).

[83]. GJR Investments, Inc. v. Escambia County, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998).

[84]. See, Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997)(private prison guards are not entitled to qualified immunity); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992)(private individuals who invoked state replevin, garnishment, or attachment statutes were not entitled to qualified immunity). However, the Supreme Court did not “foreclose the possibility that private defendants . . . could be entitled to an affirmative defense based upon good faith and/or probable cause or that Â§ 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens.” Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169.

[85]. See, McDuffie v. Hooper, 982 F.Supp. 817 (M.D. Ala. 1997)(private corporate health care providers who contract with government agencies are not entitled to qualified immunity); Hartman v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 960 F.Supp 1577, 1582 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Smith v. United States, 850 F.Supp 984, 986 (M.D. Fla. 1994). But see, Blumel v. Mylander, 954 F.Supp 1547, 1560 (M.D. Fla. 1997).

[86]. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). However, individual legislative immunity does not apply where the decision is an application of policy to a specific party. In that instance, the act is said to be administrative as opposed to legislative. Crymes v. DeKalb County, 923 F.2d 1482, 1486 (11th Cir. 1991).

[87]. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was amended in 1996 to provide judicial officers with immunity from injunctive relief. This amendment partially overruled Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), which provided that judges were immune from suits for damages, but not injunctive relief.

[88]. Prosecutors are entitled to immunity for activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” but a prosecutor engaged in investigative or administrative activities is only entitled to a good faith defense. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). See also, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997).

[89]. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980).

[90]. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). But accrual of the statute of limitations is governed by federal law, while tolling of the statute of limitations is governed by state law. Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987). See also, Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989).

[91]. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

[92]. One who recovers nominal damages is not a prevailing party. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992). The Court reasoned that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained. Id. at 114 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)). Also, see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), for a discussion of the interplay between 42 U.S.C. Â§ 1988 and the offer of judgment provision contained in Fed.R.Civ.P 68.

[93]. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).

Thanks,

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Pennsylvania Civil Rights Law Network Files Against State Supreme Court

Andy Ostrowski and PCRLN file federal action based upon violations by courts and authorities in Attorney Don Bailey disciplinary proceedings.

A federal civil rights lawsuit was filed today by Andy Ostrowski and the Pennsylvania Civil Rights Law Network raising claims for violations of, and interference with, their rights under the United States Constitution. See PRCLN website.

Continue reading Pennsylvania Civil Rights Law Network Files Against State Supreme Court

42 U.S.C. 1983 allows You to sue for Violation of Your Rights

I came across this information online while doing some research.

There is a lot of excellent information about 42 U.S.C. 1983.

I copied it from http://www.constitution.org/brief/forsythe_42-1983.htm

Continue reading 42 U.S.C. 1983 allows You to sue for Violation of Your Rights