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As I have said in other articles, our Constitutional rights have become a myth. 

When it comes to federal judges in Atlanta, Georgia, you have no rights.  They have them all.

Consider this motion seeking relief from violation of my Constitutional rights.  This was filed September 28, 2009.

Review this, and then go to the bottom of the page to see what happened.

United States District Court — Northern District of Georgia — Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-0714-ODE

MAID OF THE MIST CORPORATION and MAID OF THE MIST STEAMBOAT COMPANY, LTD., Plaintiffs v. ALCATRAZ MEDIA, LLC, ALCATRAZ MEDIA, INC. and  WILLIAM M. WINDSOR, Defendants.

EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Comes Now Defendant William M. Windsor (“Windsor”), and files this EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (“Motion for Relief”).  Windsor shows the Court as follows:

1.               Windso’s Constitutional rights have been violated and abused by this Court.  Relief is desperately needed.  [Dec #83 ¶11.]

2.               Due process of law is one of the most deeply rooted principles in American jurisprudence, a legal concept that ensures the government will respect all of a person’s legal rights instead of just some or most of those legal rights when the government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Due process places limitations on laws and legal proceedings in order to guarantee fundamental fairness, justice, and liberty.  [Dec #83 ¶12.]

3. In this civil action, the government has not respected Windsor’s legal rights.  The government has all but ignored Windsor’s rights.  This is addressed in detail below, but page limits do not permit full and complete explanation of all that this Court has done.  A hearing is needed. [Dec #83 ¶13.]

4.               The Constitution states only one command twice. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments say that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”  The central promise is that all levels of government must operate within the law and provide fair procedures. [Dec #83 ¶14.]

5. In this civil action, Windsor has been deprived of most rights except the right to pay money and make filings with the District Court and the 11th Circuit.  Windsor has incurred over a million dollars in legal fees and court costs and has never been granted a hearing.  This Court violated the law regarding preliminary injunctions and summary judgments, ignored O.C.G.A. 43-4B, ignored anti-trust laws, ignored the Plaintiffs’ perjury and subornation of perjury of Plaintiffs’ attorneys, and much more. [Dec #83 ¶15.]

6.               Due process requires that the government respect all of the legal rights that are owed to a person according to the law.  Due process holds the government subservient to the law of the land, protecting individual persons from the state.  In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson set forth the rationale for the establishment of government in a society: to secure the fundamental, inherent, and preexisting rights of the people.  [Dec #83 ¶16.]

7.               In this civil action, this Court has shown absolutely no respect for Windsor’s legal rights.  This Court has ignored the law and the facts.  Windsor has been denied the most fundamental right to not have his legal rights stolen by a dishonest judge. [Dec #83 ¶17.]

8.               Given the enormous value placed on people’s lives and liberty and given recognition of the enormous power of the government, our Founding Fathers wanted to ensure that as few innocent people as possible punished, even if that meant lots of guilty people went unpunished.  [Dec #83 ¶18.]

9.               In this civil action, Judge Evans allowed the guilty Plaintiffs to prevail, and the innocent Defendants were punished to the tune of a million dollars and an injunction.   Windsor has absolutely undeniable proof, but Judge Evans has ignored it, has pretended it doesn’t exist, and has not even given Windsor a hearing.  Judge Evans’ actions and inactions are a disgrace to the judicial system.  Windsor believes Judge Evans has done this to cover up her criminal acts. [Dec #83 ¶19.]

10.            Procedural due process guarantees protection to everyone so that statutes, regulations, and enforcement actions ensure that no one is deprived of “life, liberty, or property” without a fair opportunity to affect the judgment or result.  [Dec #83 ¶20.]

11.             In this civil action, this Court has ignored the law and the rules.  Judge Evans completely ignored the law and the regulations that govern preliminary injunctions.  Judge Evans completely ignored the universal principles that govern summary judgments.  Judge Evans hasn’t taken a single action in this case since May 20, 2009.  That was 161 days ago.  Motions that are open include Docket #’s 387, 393, 395, 396, 398, 400, 402, 404, 406, 408, 410, 412, 414, 456, 458, 466, 468, 470, 472, 474, 486, 488, 490, 493, 511, 513, 515, 528, and 547.  Nine motions were submitted to Judge Evans by the clerk on June 23, 2009; six were submitted on August 4, 2009; six were submitted on August 21, 2009; and five were submitted on September 8, 2009, but Judge Evans has failed to take any action.   This is a complete and total failure of Judge Evans to do the most basic things required of a judge. [Dec #83 ¶21.]

12.            At a basic level, procedural due process is essentially based on the concept of “fundamental fairness.”  In 1934, the United States Supreme Court held that due process is violated “if a practice or rule offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).)  As construed by the courts, it includes an individual’s right to be adequately notified of charges or proceedings, the opportunity to be heard at these proceedings, and that the person or panel making the final decision over the proceedings be impartial in regards to the matter before them. (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).)  [Dec #83 ¶22.]

13.           In this civil action, Windsor has been denied the right to be heard, and the judge has been totally biased against the Defendants.  There was only one preliminary injunction hearing, and the Defendants presented only enough evidence to defeat the arguments presented by the Plaintiffs.  Windsor has been denied hearings repeatedly, and now this Court doesn’t even pretend to review motions.  There has been no fundamental fairness. [Dec #83 ¶23.]

14.            Courts have viewed the Due Process Clause, and sometimes other clauses of the Constitution, as embracing those fundamental rights that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”  (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).)  [Dec #83 ¶24.]

15.             In this civil action, the fundamental right to have the Court accept Windsor’s sworn affidavits as true has been violated.  Windsor’s sworn affidavits under penalty of perjury before a notary have been ignored.  This is made even worse because Windsor’s affidavits have not been controverted in any manner. [Dec #83 ¶25.]

16.            If due process is to be secured, the laws must operate alike upon all and not subject the individual to the arbitrary exercise of governmental power unrestrained by established principles of private rights and distributive justice. (Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).)  [Dec #83 ¶26.]

17. In this civil action, Judge Evans and the Eleventh Circuit have subjected Windsor to arbitrary actions unrestrained by the concepts of rights and justice.  The Plaintiffs were given partial treatment.  Denying the Defendants access to important records, evidence, and witnesses, as Judge Evans did, is a violation of Equal Protection. [Dec #83 ¶27.]

18.            Judges are required to be impartial.  [Dec #83 ¶28.]

Just as in criminal and quasi-criminal cases, (Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)), an impartial decision maker” is an ”essential” right in civil proceedings as well.  (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).)

19.           In this civil action, Judge Evans has demonstrated pervasive bias against the Defendants.  Judge Evans hasn’t shown an ounce of impartiality.  She has never ruled in favor of the Defendants on any contested motion out of 40+ motions.  The record shows that Judge Evans was against the Defendants from the minute she became involved.  Judge Evans established a fixed view about substantive pending trial matters.  Judge Evans issued a Temporary Restraining Order and required a bond that was less than 1.5% of the amount underestimated by the Defendants.  The bond was $5,000, and the loss by the Defendants has been approximately $1,000,000.  This demonstrates extrajudicial bias.  Judge Evans spoke at the Preliminary Injunction with a clearly fixed view about substantive pending trial matters, so this must raise concerns about the “appearance of impropriety,” a standard that must be safeguarded.  Judge Evans indicated to Windsor that she maintained a position throughout this proceeding that the Defendants were wrong and that their case did not matter.  Judge Evans called it a “simple case” in complete disregard for the facts, the law, and the counterclaim of Alcatraz.  Judge Evans treated the Defendants in a hostile manner. Judge Evans ignored Windsor’s claims of over 400 counts of perjury, Rule 11 violations, and subornation of perjury.  Judge Evans issued orders and the judgment based upon perjured testimony.  There can be little proof of extrajudicial bias that can be any stronger than to demonstrate that Judge Evans welcomed the opportunity to have this civil action perverted by perjury.  Maid has not attempted to dispute the perjury with a single solitary affidavit.   This is because Maid cannot dispute the facts. This pervasive bias continues as was shown on May 22, 2009 in Evans Docket #390 — an order from Judge Evans wherein she falsely claims “the issues of law and fact in this case ultimately were not difficult.”  Everything that Judge Evans has done has shown bias, and her failure to act on anything in this case for close to six months certainly is an exclamation point on the bias! [Dec #83 ¶29.]

20.            Judges are required to be neutral.  [Dec #83 ¶30.]

The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. . . . At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of fairness . . . by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.”  (Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982).)

21.            In this civil action, there was no neutrality.  Judge Evans and the 11th Circuit have deprived Windsor of his interests and rights. [Dec #83 ¶31.]

22.            The rights of confrontation and cross-examination are basic. [Dec #83 ¶32.]

Where the ”evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealously,” the individual’s right to show that it is untrue depends on the rights of confrontation and cross-examination. ”This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, . . . but also in all types of cases where administrative . . . actions were under scrutiny.”  (Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 -97 (1959).)

23.            In this civil action, Windsor has reported massive perjury, yet he has been denied the rights to examine the perjurors. The right to present evidence, including the right to call witnesses is a vital right of due process. If the liars show up for a hearing, Windsor will win.  The judge will see within 10 minutes that this is a case that must be fixed. [Dec #83 ¶33.]

24.            Due process of law is violated when the government vindictively attempts to penalize a person for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.  [United States v. Conkins, 9 F.3d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1993).]  [Dec #83 ¶34.]

25. In this civil action, the government has vindictively penalized Windsor.  It seems to Windsor that the Northern District of Georgia and the 11th Circuit are corrupt.  These are strong words, but Windsor believes he can present information that a reasonable person will find to be evidence of corruption. [Dec #83 ¶35.]

26.            In his well-regarded article, “Some Kind of Hearing,” Judge Henry Friendly says that an important right of due process is “a decision based exclusively on the evidence presented.”  [Dec #83 ¶36.]

27.            In this civil action, the decisions have not been based upon the evidence presented.  Judge Evans routinely ignored the facts and the law and even invented her own facts.  Judge Evans manufactured false facts upon which she based orders.  The record proves this. [Dec #83 ¶37.]

28.            Due process is “an established course for judicial proceedings or other governmental activities designed to safeguard the legal rights of the individual.”  A commitment to legality is at the heart of all advanced legal systems.  The due process clause promises that before depriving a citizen of life, liberty, or property, government must follow fair procedures. It is not always enough for the government just to act in accordance with whatever law there may happen to be. Citizens are also entitled to have the government offer fair procedures, whether or not those procedures have been provided for in the law on the basis of which it is acting. Action denying the process that is “due” is unconstitutional.  [Dec #83 ¶38.]

29. In this civil action, Judge Evans and the 11th Circuit have denied the process that is due.  The government’s actions are unconstitutional. [Dec #83 ¶39.]

30.            The rights at issue are fundamental rights, and the government is prohibited from infringing that right unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. The concept of a “compelling interest” has never been well defined, but generally refers to something necessary or crucial, as opposed to something merely preferred.  [Dec #83 ¶40.]

31.            In this civil action, Judge Evans has no supportable reason for infringing on Windsor’s fundamental rights. The Defendants were denied the most basic discovery — never even given the names and contact information for employee witnesses.  Judge Evans denied the ability of the Defendants to take deposition testimony of any of the people directly involved with customers or any customers.  Judge Evans denied the Defendants the time needed to obtain the depositions of Canadian employees of Maid who were important to Defendants’ case.   Judge Evans repeatedly denied discovery requests that were essential to Defendants’ defense and in support of Defendants’case.  Discovery Abuse is detailed in Exhibit 16 to the Second Declaration of William M. Windsor (“Dec #2″) [Evans Docket #361], incorporated herein as if attached hereto.  Judge Evans denied Windsor, a pro se party, the ability to conduct a 30(b)(6) examination of Maid Corporation.  [Evans Docket # 174, P59: 18-21.] [Dec #83 ¶41.]

32.            In 1934, the United States Supreme Court held that due process is violated “if a practice or rule offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”  (Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).)  [Dec #83 ¶42.]

33.            In this civil action, the practices of Judge Evans have been totally offensive. [Dec #83 ¶43.]

34.            You have the right to subpoena witnesses and any documents or other evidence that may support your position or contradict evidence presented against you.  [Dec #83 ¶44.]

35. In this civil action, Judge Evans denied Windsor the ability to subpoena witnesses and obtain documents. [Dec #83 ¶45.]

36.            You have the right to protections expressly created in statute and case law precedent.  [Dec #83 ¶46.]

37. In this civil action, statutes have been violated and overwhelming case law has been ignored. [Dec #83 ¶47.]

38.            You have the right to equal protection of the law regardless of race, creed, color, religion, ethnic origin, age, handicaps, or sex.  [Dec #83 ¶48.]

39. In this civil action, Windsor is handicapped and a minority, and he has not received equal protection as a pro se party. [Dec #83 ¶49.]

40.            You have the right to a remedy, by recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs that you may receive in your person, property, or character.  [Dec #83 ¶50.]

41.            In this civil action, Windsor has been denied recourse.  Windsor spent a year assembling the proof so this Court would reopen the case.  The Court improperly denied the recourse. [Dec #83 ¶51.]

42.            You have the right to justice, without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without undue delay; in conformance with the laws.  [Dec #83 ¶52.]

43. In this civil action, this Court has denied justice, has not provided prompt response to motions, and has not conformed with the laws. [Dec #83 ¶53.]

44.            There is supposed to be a truth finding process:  [Dec #83 ¶54.]

Due process tolerates variances in form “appropriate to the nature of the case” —  (Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).) ”[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of cases.” (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).)  The rules ”minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations” by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a State proposes to deprive them of protected interests. (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).) At times, the Court has also stressed the dignitary importance of procedural rights, the worth of being able to defend one’s interests even if one cannot change the result.  (Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 -67 (1978); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). )

45. In this civil action, there was an error in the truth-finding process.  Windsor doesn’t ask much.  He has prepared all the proof, and it is filed with the Court.  All he has asked from the beginning is an evidentiary hearing, and he has promised that the result will be that the orders and judgment in this civil action will be set aside.  Judge Evans and the Eleventh Circuit have totally ignored Windsor. [Dec #83 ¶55.]

46.            The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of trial by jury, which protects the right of the accused to be judged by ordinary people in the community rather than by the judge presiding over the case.  [Dec #83 ¶56.]

47. In this civil action, the Defendants were denied a trial by jury.  The judge presided over the case and made massive mistakes that can be proven in a hearing.  This Court has held only one evidentiary hearing in four years.  This Court has ignored and/or denied repeated requests for hearings.  There are urgent needs for an evidentiary hearing. [Dec #83 ¶57.]

48.            The only evidentiary hearing held in this case was a Preliminary Injunction Hearing on April 11, 2006.  This was before any depositions had been taken, and only a tiny document production had been provided by Maid.  Christopher Glynn of Maid had already lied a hundred times, but the Defendants had not had an opportunity to gather evidence to prove those lies. [Dec #83 ¶58.]

49.            The Defendants were denied due process that led to a summary judgment.  Windsor has now filed all of the proof needed to establish that an honest judge should reopen the case, Judge Evans obviously hasn’t read the evidence, and she has refused to schedule a hearing or a conference.  If Judge Evans continues to deny a hearing, it will deny Windsor the opportunity that he must be given to regain his property.  Failure to hold a hearing will be an incredible violation of Windsor’s Constitutional rights.  It is an elementary right.  It is fair play.  The judge is supposed to respect the elementary rights of litigants.  [Dec #83 ¶59.]

50.            The Supreme Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property [418 U.S. 539, 558]   interests.  (Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring):  [Dec #83 ¶60.]

“Fairness of procedure is “due process in the primary sense.” Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681. “It is ingrained in our national traditions and is designed to maintain them.  In a variety of situations the Court has enforced this requirement by checking attempts of executives, legislatures, and lower courts to disregard the deep-rooted demands of fair play enshrined in the Constitution.” [Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162]   One of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard . . . .” The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100 -101. “[B]y ‘due process’ is meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case, and just to the parties to be affected.  It must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by the law; it must be adapted to the end to be attained; and wherever it is necessary for the protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought.”  (Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701, 708.)  â€œBefore its property can be taken under the edict of an administrative officer the appellant is entitled to a fair hearing upon the fundamental facts.”  (Southern R. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 199.) “Whether acting through its judiciary or through its legislature, a State may not deprive a person of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the State has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to him some real opportunity to protect it.”  (Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, supra, 281 U.S. at 682.)

“The requirement of ‘due process’ is not a fair-weather or timid assurance. It must be respected in periods of calm and in times of trouble; it protects aliens as well as citizens. But “due process,” unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization, “due process” cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the individual and government, “due process” is compounded of history, [Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163]   reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.

“This Court is not alone in recognizing that the right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society. Regard for this principle has guided Congress and the Executive. Congress has often entrusted, as it may, protection of interests which it has created to administrative agencies rather than to the courts. But rarely has it authorized such agencies to act without those essential safeguards for fair judgment which in the course of centuries have come to be associated with due process.  (See Switchmen’s Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297; Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 576 , 577; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Labor Board, 261 U.S. 72 . 15 And when Congress [Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath 341 U.S. 123, 169]   has given an administrative agency discretion to determine its own procedure, the agency has rarely chosen to dispose of the rights of individuals without a hearing, however informal. [Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath 341 U.S. 123, 170]

“The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.

An opportunity to be heard may not seem vital when an issue relates only to technical questions susceptible [Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171]   of demonstrable proof on which evidence is not likely to be overlooked and argument on the meaning and worth of conflicting and cloudy data not apt to be helpful. But in other situations an admonition of Mr. Justice Holmes becomes relevant. “One has to remember that when one’s interest is keenly excited evidence gathers from all sides around the magnetic point . . . .” (Mr. Justice Holmes made this remark in a letter to Mr. Arthur Garfield Hays in 1928.) It should be particularly heeded at times of agitation and anxiety, when fear and suspicion impregnate the air we breathe. Compare Brown, The French Revolution in English History. “The plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free men, because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the role of informer undetected and uncorrected.”  (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (dissenting).)  Appearances in the dark are apt to look different in the light of day.

“Man being what he is cannot safely be trusted with complete immunity from outward responsibility in depriving others of their rights. At least such is the conviction underlying our Bill of Rights. That a conclusion satisfies one’s private conscience does not attest its reliability. The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode by which it was reached. Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss [Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172]   notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done. (“In a government like ours, entirely popular, care should be taken in every part of the system, not only to do right, but to satisfy the community that right is done.”  (The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster, 163.)” [emphasis added]

“Due process forbids condemnation without a hearing.”  (Pettit v. Penn, LaApp., 180 So.2d 66, 69.)  The notice of hearing and the opportunity to be heard ”must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”  (Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).)  ”The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions.  The purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual.  Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment. . . .”  (Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 -81 (1972).)  “While written presentations may be acceptable in some situations, in others the issue of veracity may necessitate oral presentation or oral examination of witnesses, or the petitioner may not have the ability to present his case in writing.”  (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 -67 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 -45 (1976). See also FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 275 -77 (1949).)  [Dec #83 ¶10.]

51.            In this civil action, this Court has arbitrarily ignored numerous requests for an evidentiary hearing.  The opportunity to be heard is the most basic of rights, and this Court has denied that right.  This Court has violated Windsor’s First Amendment rights. [Dec #83 ¶61.]

52.            The term due process refers to the requirement that the actions of government be conducted according to the rule of law.  No government can be above the law.  Both the lessons of history and the natural rights philosophy declare that each person possesses rights to life, liberty, and property.  Government cannot interfere with these rights except according to established procedures of law.  The principle of due process of law is one of the most important protections against arbitrary rule.  The Fifth Amendment prevents the federal government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.  The Fifth Amendment acts as a limitation upon the exercise of judicial power — judges may not sit as adjudicators in cases in which they have an interest.  [Dec #83 ¶62.]

53.            In this civil action, Windsor has filed a professional misconduct complaint against Judge Evans, and he has filed a lawsuit against Judge Evans.  This means Judge Evans has more than an interest in this matter, and she is violating the Fifth Amendment by remaining involved. [Dec #83 ¶63.]

54.            An inherent right is the honesty of the judge.  [Dec #83 ¶64.]

55.            In this civil action, Judge Evans has committed perjury.  Judge Evans made over 200 statements in the Preliminary Injunction Order and Summary Judgment Order that were false or that Windsor believes to be false.  Proof of most of the false statements in the orders has been documented in Evans Docket #362 and 377 with citations to Maid’s witnesses proving that many statements are false.  These were material false statements made under the Judge’s oath of office in a federal proceeding.  Judge Evans knew statements that she made were false because she claimed statements were evidence before the Court, and that was clearly not true.  Furthermore, Judge Evans was on notice that the Summary Judgment Order statements were false because Windsor informed her at a hearing on February 2, 2007.  [Evans Docket #174, P 23: 24-25, P 24: 1-7, P 34: 4-7, P 44: 6-8.] [Dec #83 ¶65.]

56.            Inherent in the expectation of due process is that the judge will abide by the rules.  [Dec #83 ¶66.]

57. In this civil action, Judge Evans has violated many canons of the Code of Judicial Procedure as well as rules in the State Bar of Georgia Code of Professional Conduct.  Failing to report the dishonesty of Plaintiffs’ attorneys is a clear violation of the ministerial duties of Judge Evans pursuant to Canon 3B(3) of the Judicial Code of Conduct that states: “A judge should initiate appropriate action when the judge becomes aware of reliable evidence indicating the likelihood of unprofessional conduct by a judge or lawyer.”  Detailed background facts regarding the professional misconduct of Judge Evans are provided in Dec #23 — Evans Docket #406; this details what Judge Evans did throughout this case. Other violations are detailed in Dec #25 (Evans Docket #462).  Docket 406 and 462 are referenced herein and made a part hereof as if attached hereto. All of this should cause Judge Evans to be found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.  All of this should cause this Court to set aside the orders and judgments. [Dec #83 ¶67.]

58.            Inherent in due process is the expectation that the judge will not violate criminal statutes.  [Dec #83 ¶68.]

59.            In this civil action, Judge Evans has committed perjury and obstruction of justice. Judge Evans withheld material evidence that should have been provided to the Defendants.  Judge Evans received two contracts for an in camera inspection in February 2007.  Judge Evans did not respond to the Defendants’ Motion to Compel these contracts until well after discovery had closed.  Judge Evans claimed the contracts were not relevant to the case, but that was false.  Maid claimed these documents were “irrelevant, immaterial, ill-defined, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” but that was false.  The Defendants have now obtained the contracts through a FOI request, so Windsor knows that the contracts contained extremely important information.  These documents are referenced in Evans Docket #168, and the production requirement is noted in Evans Docket # 174 – Hearing of February 2, 2007, P 61-62.  The importance of these documents is addressed in the First Declaration of William M. Windsor (Dec #1, ¶¶ 15-32 and Exhibits 1 and 2 thereto — Docket #361.) Dockets 168, 174, and 361 are referenced and incorporated herein as if attached hereto. [Dec #83 ¶69.]

60.            This Court has violated Windsor’s Fourth Amendment rights.  [Dec #83 ¶70.]

The Fourth Amendment is a classic repository of constitutional rights. It serves as a bulwark, protecting individual liberty from arbitrary invasions by state actors. See Wolf v. People of State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). To that end, the proscriptions found in the Fourth Amendment impose a benchmark of reasonableness upon the exercise of governmental discretion.  (Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed. 2d 660 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1820, 56 L.Ed. 2d 305 (1978).)

61.            In this civil action, the government has been totally unreasonable.  Judge Evans has violated the Fourth Amendment. [Dec #83 ¶71.]

62.            Judgments and orders rendered in violation of due process are void. [Dec #83 ¶72.]

“A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void.”  (World Wide Volkswagen v Woodsen, 444 US 286, 291 (1980); National Bank v Wiley, 195 US 257 (1904); Pennoyer v Neff, 95 US 714 (1878).)

63.            In this civil action, the summary judgment and the final judgment should be voided.  Clearly the one and only order from Judge Evans in 2009 must be considered void as the violations of due process are horrendous. [Dec #83 ¶73.]

64.            Judge Evans has repeatedly violated the Constitutional rights of Windsor.  Exhibit 1 to Exhibit A hereto is a list.  This Court must prove that each listed violation is not a violation of Constitutional rights.  If this Court cannot do so, Windsor’s rights have been violated and the orders and judgments are void.  [Dec #83 ¶74.]

65.            The entire dockets in Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-0714-ODE, No.1:09-CV-02027-WSD, and 1:09-CV-01543-WSD are referenced and incorporated herein as if attached hereto.  The Eighty-Third Declaration of William M. Windsor (“Dec #83″) is attached hereto as Exhibit A.  This Court is asked to read Exhibit A because it includes a lot of information that is not included in this Motion.  [Dec #83 ¶75.]

66.            To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation “of the most basic sort.” (Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363.) The Defendants were wrongly punished for exercising a protected statutory right due to O.C.G.A. 43-4B, Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Robinson-Patman Act.

WHEREFORE, having emphasized why a hearing needs to be held, Defendant Windsor respectfully requests as follows:

(1)    that the presiding judge of this administrative judicial district assign another judge to this case and/or refer this Motion to the presiding judge of this administrative district for a hearing;

(2)    that the Court grant the Motion for Relief under the Constitution and its Amendments and/or the Court’s Inherent Powers and/or under FRCP Rule 60(b)(4);

(3)    that the Court grant an evidentiary hearing to consider if the orders and judgment should be set aside;

(4)    that the Court strike all orders and judgments in this case;  and

(5)    that the Court grant such other and further relief to Windsor as justice requires in association with this Motion.

Respectfully submitted, this 28th day of September 2009.

William M. Windsor

 

And here was Judge Orinda D. Evans’ ruling on December 22, 2009:

“Windsor has also filed a motion to vacate the orders and judgment in this case pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) [Doc . 567] and a motion to reopen the case and grant relief from alleged violations of his constitutional rights, based on Rule 60(b)(4) [Doc . 571].  The Court previously denied Windsor’s motion to reopen the case under Rule 60 (b) and will not revisit that ruling . The case remains closed, and Windsor’s requested relief is unavailable.  Those motions for relief dependent on reopening the case pursuant to Rule 60(b) [Doc . 567 & 571] are DISMISSED AS MOOT.”

So, Judge Evans ruled that my Constitutional rights were a,moot issue.  Boy was she right, but WRONG!

 

So, the deciison was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

My appeal was dismissed, and my Constitutional rights were not even addressed!

The panel issued an opinion that contains significantly false information that the panel knew or should have known to be false.  The July 23, 2010 Order contains 20 sentences, and only sentences 16 to 19 address one of my 20 points of error.  Those sentences are false.  I have never filed anything unsubstantiated; has never filed duplicative pleadings; has not filed repetitive pleadings; has never made unfounded accusations; and the fact that a case was “closed” has no importance in actions to reopen the case and seek justice.