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After being screwed, glued, and tattooed at every turn, William M. Windsor has regrouped and is launching two new judicial assaults.
Tune in to the LawlessAmerica Online TV Show on Sunday, October 16, 2011 at www.shovio.com for all the details.
The Georgia Supreme Court has docketed Windsor’s Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and Windsor has taken the battle to the FEDERAL GRAND JURY….
Georgia Supreme Court
I was really pleased to learn that the Supreme Court of Georgia has docketed my Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as a “discretionary appeal.” Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 5-6-35, this is a matter that the Supreme Court must handle in 30 days or less from the date of filing, October 13, 2011.
The Georgia Supreme Court has been asked to issue a ruling to stay the order of Judge Jerry W. Baxter that has morphed into denying me the right to file anything in my existing cases in the Fulton County Superior Court. Baxter’s actions are as illegal as they get, so we’ll see what the Georgia Supreme Court says. Hope springs eternal. perhaps the outrageous actions of Baxter are so egregious that the Georgia Supreme Court justices will feel compelled to set aside his order. We’ll know on or before November 12, 2011.
Federal Grand Jury
In addition to that action, I have turned my efforts to the Federal Grand Jury here in Atlanta. I have contacted the U.S. Attorney, Sally Quillian Yates, to request to speak to the Federal Grand Jury, and I have warned her and her staff to keep out. Here’s my letter, send Certified Mail Return Receipt and by fax on October 14, 2011:
October 14, 2011
Ms. Sally Quillian Yates
Mr. Chris Huber
U.S. Attorney’s Office
600 Richard B. Russell Fed. Bldg.
75 Spring St, S.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303
Fax: 404-581-6181
Dear Ms. Yates and Mr. Huber:
I will be spending the first, second, third, and fourth Tuesdays of every month at the federal courthouse outside the Grand Jury Room.
I have notified the U.S. Marshal Service, and I am notifying you.
DO NOT DO ANYTHING TO TAMPER WITH THE GRAND JURY. PLEASE ENSURE THAT YOUR ENTIRE STAFF KNOWS TO DO NOTHING TO INTERFERE. PELASE ENSURE THAT EVERY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE IN THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSES KNOWS THAT ANY INTERFERENCE WILL BE JURY TAMPERING AND OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE.
High Court Justice Lewis Powell, in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974), said this: “The institution of the grand jury is deeply rooted in Anglo-American history. [n3] In England, the grand jury [p343] served for centuries both as a body of accusers sworn to discover and present for trial persons suspected of criminal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action. In this country, the Founders thought the grand jury so essential to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth Amendment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only be instituted by “a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.†Cf. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-362 (1956). The grand jury’s historic functions survive to this day. Its responsibilities continue to include both the determination whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-687 (1972).â€
So the grand jury has two purposes, says Justice Powell: deciding whether a crime has been committed and protecting the citizen from the government. In United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 at 47 (1992), Justice Antonin Scalia, delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court:
“[R]ooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history,†Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420, 490 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result), the grand jury is mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but not in the body of the Constitution. It has not been textually assigned, therefore, to any of the branches described in the first three Articles. It “‘is a constitutional fixture in its own right.’†United States v. Chanen, 549 F. 2d 1306, 1312 (CA9) (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U. S. App. D. C. 58, 70, n. 54, 487 F. 2d 700, 712, n. 54 (1973)), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 825 (1977).â€
So, since the grand jury is not part of the three branches of government set forth in the Constitution – Justice Scalia also says the grand jury “is an institution separate from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside.†– it is perfectly reasonable to characterize the grand jury as the “fourth branch of government.â€
In the same place, Justice Scalia says this: “. . . In fact, the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 61 (1906); G. Edwards, The Grand Jury 28-32 (1906). Although the grand jury normally operates, of course, in the courthouse and under judicial auspices, its institutional relationship with the Judicial Branch has traditionally been, so to speak, at arm’s length. Judges’ direct involvement in the functioning of the grand jury has generally been confined to the constitutive one of calling the grand jurors together and administering their oaths of office. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 6(a). [504 U.S. 36, 48]â€
Notice! The only thing the judge should do, says the Supreme Court, is assemble the grand jurors and swear them in. That’s all! Again, the court does not preside over it. The grand jury goes to work “as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people.†The grand jury protects the people. It oversees the government. It does that by investigating the government, by rooting out government corruption.
In Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 163, 15 S.Ct. 586, 587, 39 L.Ed. 657, 658 (1895), the Court expressed the proposition in this way: “But in this country the common practice is for the grand jury to investigate any alleged crime, no matter how or by whom suggested to them….â€
A citizen’s right to ask a federal grand jury for permission to appear before it is now expressly protected by statute. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1504, which prohibits attempts to improperly influence a grand juror by written communication regarding pending matters, also provides that”[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury.
18 U.S.C. 1503’s omnibus clause will be violated by any attempts to interfere.
So, please confirm in writing that there will be no interference.
I would like to meet with the Grand Jury on Tuesday. I will have a Personal and Confidential envelope addressed to each Grand Juror by number.
I will be presenting criminal charges against you, Ms. Yates, among others.
Sincerely,
William M. Windsor
————————————
So, my plan with the Federal Grand Jury is essentially the same as my efforts with the Fulton County Grand Jury. I went with the county first because I felt there was less chance of interference. WRONG AGAIN! The federal laws about interference with a grand jury, and the case law about citizen rights to present to grand jurors are much stronger.
So, I’ll go every day they meet until I am given an audience. Anyone who wants to join me on Tuesdays is very welcome. The Federal Grand Jury meets in the Richard B. Russell Federal Building, 75 Spring Street, Atlanta, GA 30303. (It’s the building with my 8×10 color photo at every entrance.) I believe the Grand Jury Room is on the sixth floor. I should have armed guards with me while I am there; they always assign two U.S. Marshals to me. 
I’ll keep you posted on my progress. Should be another very exciting experience!
Please note that one of the important things about this effort is to be able to establish that the U.S. Attorney has ignored his/her duties and committed criminal acts in the process. You want to exclude the U.S. Attorney or her staff from participation!
Letter to U.S. Attorney – November 30, 2009 — Letter to U.S. Attorney — April 10, 2010 — Letter to U.S. Attorney — November 4, 2010 — Letter to U.S. Attorney — November 10, 2010 — Letter to U.S. Attorney — May 16, 2011 — Letter to U.S. Attorney — June 1, 2011 — Letter to U.S. Attorney — September 14, 2011 — Letter to U.S. Attorney — October 14, 2011
If you have criminal complaints, you may want to consider making a complaint to your U.S. Attorney. When your complaint is ignoired, demand to present evidence to the Federal Grand Jury.
More Federal Grand Jury Case Law Citations
Moreover, in order to perform its protective function, the grand jury must remain detached from and independent of the Executive Branch. Therefore, the grand jury is under no compulsion to follow the orders of the prosecutor. (United States v. Smyth, 104 . upp. 83, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1952). See generally Note, 37 Minn. L. Rev., supra note 145, at 599-600.) (Richard M. Nixon, v. the Honorable John J. Sirica, CDC.0000249, DC Circuit (10/12/73).)
In United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 at 47 (1992), Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court: “the grand jury is not part of the three branches of government set forth in the Constitution†– Justice Scalia also says the grand jury “is an institution separate from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside.
First Circuit (Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Puerto Rico):
The grand jury, classically, is meant to be an independent check on the ability of the government to bring criminal charges against individuals. It “serv[es] as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people,” United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992), “protect[ing] . . . citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions,” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). The grand jury also has another role, as an investigatory and accusatory body. The federal grand jury “has not been textually assigned” to any of the three branches of federal government. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47. The institution is not mentioned in the body of the Constitution, but in the Bill of Rights. Id.; U.S. Const. amend. V. It is thus a “constitutional fixture in its own right”; it is not an arm of the district court. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977)). Indeed, “the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government.” Id. Thus, the grand jury remains functionally and constitutionally “at arm’s length” from the judicial branch. Id.; see also Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 15 (1st Cir. 2000). (In re United States, 441 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 03/24/2006).)
Second Circuit (Connecticut, New York, Vermont):
[I have not found a good case.]
Third Circuit (Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, U.S. Virgin Islands):
As the Supreme Court has noted, the grand jury is “[r]ooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history” and is “a constitutional fixture in its own right.” United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted). It may “inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred.” United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991). Therefore, “[a]s a necessary consequence of its investigatory function, the grand jury paints with a broad brush.” Id. A subpoena is perhaps the most important of the grand jury’s tools of investigation, and its authority to subpoena witnesses “is not only historic, but essential to its task . . . [because] ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence,’ except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege.” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (citations omitted). Courts exercise limited control over the functioning of the grand jury and extend great deference to this historic institution and its broad powers. See Impounded , 241 F.3d at 312. The grand jury “belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people.” Williams, 504 U.S. at 47. As we have acknowledged, the grand jury’s “great powers of investigation and inquisition” allow it to ” ‘compel the production of evidence or testimony of witnesses . . . unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials.’ ” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d at 216 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)). While courts have some authority to limit the grand jury’s power, see Impounded, 241 F.3d at 312-13, the Supreme Court has stated that “[g]iven the grand jury’s operational separateness from its constituting court, it should come as no surprise that we have been reluctant to invoke the judicial supervisory power as a basis for prescribing modes of grand jury procedure.” Williams, 504 U.S. at 49-50. (In re Grand Jury, 286 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 04/05/2002).)
Fourth Circuit (North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland):
The grand jury is a unique institution within the criminal justice system. Belonging to no branch of government, the grand jury is a “constitutional fixture in its own right . . . serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people.” United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Its mission is to “inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred.” United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991). (In re Jury, 478 F.3d 581 (4th Cir. 02/22/2007).)
Fifth Circuit: (Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi):
In general, courts have very little authority over the proceedings of a grand jury. As the Supreme Court has observed, “the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside.” United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1742, 118 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1992). Further, “Judges’ direct involvement in the functioning of the grand jury has generally been confined to the constitutive one of calling the grand jurors together and administering their oaths of office.” Id. (In re Grand Jury Proceedings., 115 F.3d 1240 (5th Cir. 06/26/1997).)
Sixth Circuit (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee):
Although the grand jury was first instituted in England to aid the Crown in the prosecution of criminals, it had over time developed into a safeguard of individual rights. See id. at 5-8. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that the “whole theory of [the grand jury’s] function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people.” United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992). The New York ratifying convention, therefore, suggested that a presentment or indictment “ought to be observed as a necessary preliminary to the trial of all crimes cognizable by the judiciary of the United States.” 1 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 328 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888) (hereinafter Elliot). John Hancock and the Massachusetts convention, meanwhile, stated that it would “remove the fears, and quiet the apprehensions, of many of the good people of this commonwealth” if the Constitution were amended so that, among other things, an indictment would be required for any crime “by which [a person] may incur an infamous punishment, or loss of life.” 1 Elliot 322-23. The amendments that James Madison originally introduced in the House of Representatives would have required a grand jury “in all crimes punishable with loss of life or member,” but the language ultimately passed by Congress broadened the grand jury guarantee to all capital and “otherwise infamous” offenses. See Bernard Schwartz, The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights 233 (1977). (United States v. Colt, No. 96-3577 (7th Cir. 10/02/1997).)
Seventh Circuit (Illinois, Indiana, Wisonsin):
…as a rule courts are not endowed with supervisory authority over the grand jury, which was conceived and remains functionally independent. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47-48 (discussing history of grand jury as “kind of buffer or referee” belonging to no branch of institutional government, and concluding that judicial supervision is “very limited”); see also United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796, 800-801 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257, 267 (7th Cir. 1986) (both acknowledging courts’ limited supervisory powers). Courts are generally not free to delve beneath the four corners of a validly returned indictment; they are generally not free to prescribe rules for the operation of the grand jury beyond those set out by Congress. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (review of facially valid indictments “would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution”); Williams, 504 U.S. at 50 (“any power federal courts may have to fashion, on their own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited one, not remotely comparable to the power they maintain over their own proceedings.”). (United States v. Lamantia, No. 94-2667 (7th. Cir. 07/13/1995).)
Eighth Circuit (Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota):
…the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside,” United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992), (United States v. McDougal, 559 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 03/20/2009).)
Ninth Circuit (Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Northern Mariana Islands):
“[T]he whole theory of [the grand jury’s] function is that it . . . serve[s] as a kind of buffer or referee between the government and the people. . . . to assess whether there is adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge.”); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973) (grand jury’s “mission is to clear the innocent, no less than to bring to trial those who may be guilty”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972) (“[t]he ancient role of the grand jury . . . has the dual function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.” (United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 08/16/2002).)
The grand jury’s ability to fulfill its historical role effectively flows in part from its unusual position in the Constitution’s structure. “The grand jury belongs to no branch of government, but is a ‘constitutional fixture in its own right.’ ” United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184 at 1199 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992)). The Fifth Amendment “presupposes an investigative body acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.” United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Amendment may be violated if the independence of the grand jury in performing its historical function is substantially infringed. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1988). (United States of America v. Elide T. Caruto, No. 09-50309 WQH-1, (9th Cir. 12/08/2010).)
Tenth Circuit (Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming):
[I have not found a good case.]
Eleventh Circuit (Georgia, Florida, Alabama):
The fundamental concept underlying the Fifth Amendment guarantee is that in order for an indictment to be recognized as actually issuing from a grand jury, it must be the product of an investigative deliberation that is independent of both the prosecuting attorney and the court. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 1743, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992) (“Recognizing [the] tradition of independence [of the grand jury], we have said that the Fifth Amendment’s constitutional guarantee presupposes an investigative body acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 18, 93 S.Ct. 764, 773, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (finding that a grand jury “must be free to pursue its investigations unhindered by external influence”); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962) (recognizing “[t]he necessity to society of an independent and informed grand jury”); John Roe, Inc. v. United States (In re: Grand Jury Proceedings), 142 F.3d 1416, 1425 (11th Cir.1998) (explaining that although a grand jury relies on the judiciary when it seeks subpoenas or contempt sanctions, it “performs its investigative and deliberative functions independently”). Without a guarantee of independence, the indictment would not be the genuine issue of a grand jury within the meaning of the Constitution.
It is clear, for example, that if a prosecutor simply drew up an “indictment,” had a grand jury foreperson sign it, and then used it to charge the defendant with a criminal offense, we would dismiss the “indictment” out of hand as violative of the Fifth Amendment. This is because the “indictment” would in no sense be the product of a constitutionally required grand jury proceeding. So, too, would we dismiss an indictment that was issued by a “kangaroo grand jury”-one whose deliberations were so overborne by a prosecutor or judge that the indictment was, in effect, the prosecutor’s or judge’s handiwork, and not the result of a considered judgment by an independently functioning grand jury. See United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.1982) (holding that an indictment may be dismissed “when prosecutorial misconduct amounts to overbearing the will of the grand jury so that the indictment is, in effect, that of the prosecutor rather than the grand jury”); see also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (“the very purpose of the requirement that a man be indicted by a grand jury is to limit his jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge.”). (Stirone relied on and reaffirmed the proscription of Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 10, 13, 7 S.Ct. 781, 786, 787-88, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887), against court amendments to an indictment. Bain held that a judge’s excessive interference in grand jury proceedings violated the Fifth Amendment. Bain, 121 U.S. at 10, 7 S.Ct. at 786. In Bain, the trial judge struck a portion of the indictment as surplusage, thereby (according to the petitioner) making it easier for the government to prove its case. Id. at 5, 7 S.Ct. at 783. The Supreme Court’s subsequent repudiation, in United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 142-43, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 1818, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985), of “the proposition that the striking out of parts of an indictment invalidates the whole of the indictment” does not affect the continuing validity of Bain ‘s generalized proscription against court interference in the grand jury process or Stirone ‘s requirement that the defendant be convicted of the specific offense charged in the indictment. In Miller, the Court held that “[t]he proposition that a defendant cannot be convicted of an offense different from that which was included in the indictment [that] was broadly declared in Bain … has been reaffirmed in a number of subsequent cases.” Id.) (United States v. Sigma International, Inc., 244 F.3d 841 (11th Cir. 03/15/2001).)
The Fifth Amendment requires that an indictment issue from an independent grand jury. Where a grand jury proceeding is so corrupted by the conduct of a prosecutor or judge that it “substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict, or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from … substantial influence,” Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256, 108 S.Ct. at 2374 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), courts should not hesitate to remedy the violation because the indictment is not, in reality, “of a Grand Jury,” U.S. Const. amend. V. (United States v. Sigma International, Inc., 244 F.3d 841 (11th Cir. 03/15/2001).)
The Supreme Court has observed that the grand jury is mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but not in the body of the Constitution. It has not been textually assigned, therefore, to any of the branches described in the first three Articles. It is a constitutional fixture in its own right. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 6, 47, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 1742 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted). (United States v. Barry, 371 Fed.Appx. 3 (11th Cir. 03/24/2010).)
Historically, the grand jury has operated as an autonomous body, independent of the court or prosecutors. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (explaining that constitutional right to grand jury indictment presupposes “group of fellow citizens acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or Judge”); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362, 76 S.Ct. 406, 408, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) (noting that grand jury “acquired an independence in England free from control by the Crown or Judges”). Although the grand jury must rely on the court’s process to summon the attendance of witnesses and to compel the testimony of witnesses who refuse to testify, see United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 1743, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992), the grand jury performs its investigative and deliberative functions independently. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.Ct. 764, 773, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (explaining that grand jury “must be free to pursue its investigations unhindered by external influence or supervision”). As the Supreme Court has stated: Although the grand jury normally operates … in the courthouse and under judicial auspices, its institutional relationship with the Judicial Branch has traditionally been, so to speak, at arm’s length. Judges’ direct involvement in the functioning of the grand jury has generally been confined to the constitutive one of calling the grand jurors together and administering their oaths of office. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47, 112 S.Ct. at 1742; see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 617, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (“No Judge presides to monitor [grand jury] proceedings. It deliberates in secret and may determine alone the course of its inquiry.”); Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1549-50 (11th Cir.1988) (per curiam) (recognizing independence of grand jury and declining to grant injunctive relief to prevent grand jury from returning an indictment tainted by alleged governmental misconduct). (John Roe Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 06/12/1998).)
DC Circuit (District of Columbia):
As the Supreme Court has reminded us on occasion, “the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts.” United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992). The function of that separate institution is to “serv[e] as a kind of buffer or referee between the government and the people.” Id. The function of the grand jury “depends on ‘maintaining the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal courts.'” In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d at 526 (quoting United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958)). The authorities collected in In re Sealed Case recite the broad variety of circumstances in which the courts have upheld this grand jury secrecy, a secrecy that has been the persistent rule for grand jury proceedings for at least four hundred years. See Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 n.9 (1979) (“Since the 17th century, grand jury proceedings have been closed to the public, and records of such proceedings have been kept from the public eye.”). (In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C.Cir. 02/15/2005).)
Indeed, as the Supreme Court has noted, the grand jury is not even a part of the judicial system. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (“[T]he grand jury is an institution separate from the courts.”). The theory “of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people.” Id. That function depends on “maintain[ing] the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal courts.” United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958). As the Court noted, “[s]ince the 17th century, grand jury proceedings have been closed to the public, and records of such proceedings have been kept from the public eye.” Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 218 n.9. (In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 522 (D.C.Cir. 01/04/2000).)
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