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Corrupt 90-Year-Old Federal Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch Commits Criminal Acts Against William M. Windsor

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This is corrupt 90-year-old Federal Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch.  She has joined the party in committing criminal acts against William M. Windsor.

I wonder how many people she has screwed in her excessively-long career as a judge?

In an October 31, 2011 Order denying an appeal of William M. Windsor, Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch took positions just exactly opposite the way she had ruled previously (and Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedents required) on nine points of error….

Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch is a crook, a 90-year-old crook masquerading as a federal judge.  That’s my opinion.

It’s interesting to note that Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch was nominated by President Jimmy Carter at the same time as the original corrupt federal Judge Orinda D. Evans.  They are the two longest-serving federal judges in Atlanta, Georgia.  My appeal was against Judge Orinda D. Evans.  I guess they pulled Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch out of mothballs to render this decision for her bosom buddy, Judge Orinda D. Evans.

I have just filed my Petition for Hearing En Banc, and I expect to see the other corrupt federal judges at the Eleventh Circuit try to claim that their combined 152 case decisions in support of my points of error don’t really count. I expect to get the “Kings-X Order” in return.  A one sentence denial, which means, “Kings-X, we take back whatever we’ve ruled before because the rules are different with someone who is about to get us indicted and impeached.”

Background

I was sued on August 29, 2005.  The entire Maid of the Mist Lawsuit was completely made up.  I never did anything that Maid of the Mist claimed.  They admitted this in three depositions.  Judge Orinda D. Evans ignored the undeniable truth and ruled for Maid of the Mist.  Even though she did not rule that I had violated the lone cause of action, she ordered me to pay close to $500,000 in legal fees of Maid of the Mist (a ruling that has no legal basis whatsoever).  I paid.  I did not give Maid of the Mist a release on anything, and in April 2009, I began action to try to get the case reopened due to fraud upon the court. 

Judge Orinda D. Evans has lied hundreds of times in the court orders in Civil Action 1:06-CV-0714-ODE.  I believe she was paid off, though I do not have proof of that.

After she ignored every filing in the case for 213 days, Judge Orinda D. Evans issued an order denying every motion filed by either side except one.  That one was to enjoin me from some types of filing.  Maid of the Mist requested attorney’s fees in their motions and responses to my motions, and Judge Orinda D. Evans denied every request for attorneys’ fees.  I immediately filed my Notice of Appeal.

Jurisdiction for the case was supposed to transfer to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, but Maid of the Mist filed a motion for sanctions for attorneys’ fees in January and later filed a motion for contempt because I filed the appeal and an action to set aside the order pursuant to FRCP Rule 60 (neither of which was contempt!)  Rather than advise Maid of the Mist that the case was on appeal, Judge Orinda D. Evans let both matters go forward (totally illegal).  Judge orinda D. Evans awarded another $250,000 or so in legal fees against me, and she found me in contempt and made me pay more money.  I cashed out my 401(k) retirement account and paid about $300,000 into the Registry of the Court.  (I was still under the mistaken impression that the courts were honest at that point.)

This is one of the deadly ways that corrupt judges screw, glue, and tattoo people like me.  They steal all of your money.  There was no factual or legal basis for what Judge Orinda D. Evans did to me.  She did it because she could, and she did it because it was a way to try to stop me from getting her indicted, imprisoned, and impeached.  I believe she also did it because she had been paid to do it….

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Judge J.L. Edmondson Judge Charles R. Wilson Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch

Now, almost two years later, the Eleventh Circuit Panel of Judge J. L. Edmondson, Judge Charles R. Wilson, and Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch denied my appeals (10-11758) claiming there was no proof of abuse of discretion by Judge Orinda D. Evans. 

Judge J. L. Edmondson, Judge Charles R. Wilson, and Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch committed perjury and obstruction of justice in their Order dated October 31, 2011 because they lied about what the record of the court provided, and they lied about the statutes and case law that mandated that the orders of Judge Orinda D. Evans be vacated.

My appeals were slam dunk winners IF the Eleventh Circuit had any judges who weren’t corrupt.  They don’t.

On November 21, 2011, I filed a Petition for Hearing En Banc.  This is one of the two forms of motions for reconsideration in the federal appellate courts.  Theoretically, this will be considered by every member of the Eleventh Circuit — approximately 17 judges, including the senior judges. 

In preparing the Petition for Hearing En Banc, I focused on precedents in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit as the primary criteria for an en banc reversal is that the decision of the Panel conflcits with precedents of the Circuit and the United States Supreme Court.  I wanted to flood my Petition with proof that the judges of the Eleventh Circuit have previously recognized the law on the issues in my appeal.  I succeeded.  I managed to cram in 152 case law citations from the 17 active or senior Eleventh Circuit judges that prove my errors!  30 of those case law citations are from the three Panel judges, Judge J.L. Edmondson, Judge Charles R. Wilson, and Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch.  So, the Panel had the audacity to dismiss my appeal when the three of them had rendered decisions previously that established precednts for the validity of my points of error.

For those new to reading about my cases with the courts in Georgia, this is simply what these corrupt judges do, at least to me.  I am always right about the law that I painstakingly research, but they rule against me regardless.  I am Judicial Enemy #1 in Georgia, and the judges here will say and do anything to keep me from exposing them as criminals.

Here is my Petition.  The rules only allow 15 pages, and the Petition is for the purpose of having all of the judges decide if they want to allow you to brief the points:

PETITION FOR HEARING EN BANC

STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO MERIT EN BANC CONSIDERATION

The Panel issued an order that conflicts with binding precedents of this Circuit and the Supreme Court on many key issues. The Panel ignored the facts.

STATEMENT OF COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS & ESSENTIAL FACTS

The underlying action began on 8-29-05.  William M. Windsor is a defendant; there was no legal basis whatsoever to sue him, and he was unable to file a counterclaim.

The “Final Order and Judgment” was entered 12-9-08.

In 2009, William M. Windsor began efforts to reopen the case.  After 213 days of ignoring everything, Judge Orinda D. Evans issued an order on 12-22-09 on all pending motions.  Judge Orinda D. Evans denied Plaintiffs’ (Maid of the Mist) requests for attorneys’ fees.

On 12-31-09, William M. Windsor filed a Notice of Appeal of all pending post-judgment issues.

On 1-6-10, Plaintiffs Maid of the Mist filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees. [Docket 728-1Docket 728-2Docket 728-3Docket 728-4Docket 728-5.]

The Appealed Orders were entered 4-9-10 and 4-26-10

Notices of Appeal were filed on 4-15-10, 4-27-10, 5-5-10, and 5-25-10.

On 10-25-10, William M. Windsor filed a Motion for Intercircuit Assignment.

In November 2010, William M. Windsor filed motions to disqualify Panel Judge J.L. Edmondson and Panel Judge Charles R. Wilson as well as other individual judges of the Eleventh Circuit. No orders were ever issued on these motions.

On 6-20-11 and 6-23-11, William M. Windsor filed Verified Complaints pursuant to Georgia RICO in Fulton County Superior Court (Nos. 2011CV202263 and 2011CV202457).

On 7-22-11 and 7-15-11, U.S. Attorneys filed illegal notices of removal to remove the cases to federal court where they became civil actions 1:11-CV-02027-TWT (“2011-02027”) and 1:11-CV-02326-TWT (“02326”).  All judges of the Eleventh Circuit are Defendants in these cases.

On 9-12-11, William M. Windsor filed a TIME-SENSITIVE MOTION FOR CERTIFICATE OF NECESSITY (“MCN”).

On 10-28-11, an Order was filed refusing to consider the MCN — actually voided the file-stamped motion and returned it to William M. Windsor.

On 10-31-11, the Panel issued the ORDER DENYING APPEAL (“ODA”).

On 11-18-11, William M. Windsor filed a Petition for En Banc Consideration of the OCTOBER 28, 2011 ORDER.

On 11-21-11, William M. Windsor filed this Petition for Hearing En Banc.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

The Panel decision conflicts with decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, and consideration by the full court is therefore necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions, and there are matters of exceptional importance that require an en banc determination.  Not a single one the 90 errors identified by William M. Windsor was discussed, nor were any of the 397 cases and statutes cited by William M. Windsor.  MANY opinions of Panel members prove William M. Windsor’s positions, and some of these are cited below.

1.  The Panel “voided” a filed motion without legal authority, and the Panel and the Clerk of the Court have committed felonies. The Panel instructed the Clerk to remove the filed MCN documents from the court record. Criminal statutes prohibit this — 18 U.S.C. § 2071. The ODA must be vacated.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Ray v. United States, 57 S. Ct. 700, 301 U.S. 158 (U.S. 04/26/1937); United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76, 36 S.Ct. 508, 60 L.Ed. 897 (1916); Wetmore v. Karrick, 27 S. Ct. 434, 205 U.S. 141 (U.S. 03/11/1907); Gravel v. United States, 92 S. Ct. 2614, 408 U.S. 606 (U.S. 06/29/1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965); Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1864); Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S. Ct. 780, 786, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971); Mullane v. Central Hanover, 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995) (Before Black); U.S. v. Flint, 178 Fed.Appx. 964 (11th Cir. 05/01/2006).

2.  There was never a decision entered on the October 25, 2010 motion.  FRAP Rule 27 grants parties the right to file motions, responses, and replies and provides that a “motion will be decided….”  This is statutory law.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Rule 27; U.S. v. Levy, No. 01-17133 (11th Cir. 12/03/2004) (Before Anderson, Hull, Pryor).  There must be many more.

3.  The binding precedents of U.S. v. Will, 28 U.S.C. 292, due process, and recusal require that the MCN be considered and granted.  The Chief Judge must issue a Certificate of Necessity to seek a new panel for the appeal.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Jefferson County v. Acker, 92 F.3d 1561 (11th Cir. 1996) (Before Panel Judge Edmondson); U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 212-13, 66 L. Ed. 2d 392, 101 S. Ct. 471 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 291, 28 U.S.C. § 292, and 28 U.S.C. § 294; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Liteky v U.S., 510 US 540 (1994); Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242, (1980); Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 483 n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976).

4.  The Panel used the wrong standard of review.  The precedents of the Supreme Court and the 11th Circuit provide that clear error was appropriate — errors in this case are so fundamental that, absent the errors, an unbiased judge would have reached a different result.  The District Court (“DC”), Judge Orinda D. Evans, did not even make it clear which statute(s) she relied upon in issuing the orders.  The Panel should have conducted a de novo review under both its review and supervisory powers.  Even if abuse of discretion, Judge Orinda D. Evans did not apply the proper legal standard, follow proper procedures in making the determination, and based an award upon clearly erroneous findings of fact. (Cordoba, 419 F.3d at 1180.)

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 732–736 (1993); Long v. Florida, 805 F.2d 1542, 1550 (11th Cir.1986) (Before Fay); In re Red Carpet Corp., 902 F.2d 883, 890 (11th Cir. 1990) (Before Fay).

5.  Judge Orinda D. Evans did not have jurisdiction to consider the motions filed by the Plaintiffs (Maid of the Mist) after all issues were on appeal.  ALL case law of the Supreme Court and the 11th Circuit says that jurisdiction was with the 11th Circuit.  Only six post-judgment motions may stay a party’s notice of appeal, and Plaintiffs’ (Maid of the Mist) motion was not one of the six. [Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) (4) (A) (i) to (vi).]

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); Shivers v. Hill, 205 Fed.Appx. 788 (11th Cir. 11/14/2006) (Before Tjoflat, Anderson, Birch); Thompson v. Relationserve Media, 610 F.3d 628 (11th Cir. 06/30/2010) (Before Tjoflat, Black, DC Judge Evans); Stevens v. Wachovia Bank, No. 09-12816 (11th Cir. 03/09/2010) (Before Panel Judge Wilson, Tjoflat, Barkett); Mahone v. Ray, 326 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 04/02/2003) (Before Panel Judge Wilson, Carnes, Marcus); Weaver v. Florida Power, 172 F.3d 771, 9 A.D. Cases 363 (11th Cir. 04/13/1999) (Before Tjoflat, Dubina); U.S. v. Tovar-Rico, 61 F.3d 1529 (11th Cir. 08/28/1995) (Before Panel Judge Edmondson and Barkett). 

 6.  The motion for attorneys’ fees was filed too lateThe motion for “sanctions” filed by Maid of the Mist was not made prior to judicial rejection of the offending motion(s).  The Panel’s decision conflicts with decisions in this very case by Judge Orinda D. Evans and 11th Circuit that such motions for sanctions are not allowed.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Peer v. Lewis, No. 09-10882 (11th Cir.2010) (Before Pryor, Fay); In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir.2008) (Before Dubina, Black, Pryor); Maid of the Mist v. Alcatraz, 1:06-CV-0714-ODE, Doc.390 – May 22, 2009 Order, P.16 and Order in Appeal No.09-13086-DD (Before Hull, Marcus, Pryor).

7.  Attorney’s fees are barred by collateral estoppel, issue preclusion, the consent final order and judgment, and the order of December 22, 2009.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Bobby v. Bies, 129 S.Ct. 2145 (U.S.2009); Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 553 U.S. 880, (U.S.2008); Gjellum v. City, 829 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir.1987) (Before Panel Judges Kravitch and Edmondson); Abele v. Tolbert, No. 07-10302 (11th Cir.2007) (Before Tjoflat, Hull, Pryor.)

8.  William M. Windsor’s Constitutional rights to due process were violated.  The violations by Judge Orinda D. Evans are immense.  Despite many requests for hearings and conferences, there was absolutely no communication from Judge Orinda D. Evans at any time to indicate that sanctions might be given any consideration whatsoever as the law demands.  There has apparently never been a case in history like this that restricted one party from filing while allowing the opposite party to file anything.  This is a matter of exceptional importance that requires an en banc determination.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir.1986) (Before Panel Judges Kravitch and Edmondson, Tjoflat, Hill, Fay, Anderson); Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1133-34 (11th Cir.2001) (Before Tjoflat, Birch, Dubina); U.S. v. Powerstein, 185 Fed.Appx. 811 (11th Cir.2006); Shell v. HUD, No. 09-12811 (11th Cir.2009) (Before Carnes, Marcus, Fay); Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390, 391 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam); Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir.1993) (Before Panel Judge Kravitch, Birch and Carnes); U.S. v. Flint, 178 Fed.Appx. 964 (11th Cir.2006); Riccard v. Prudential, 307 F.3d 1277, 1295 n.15 (11th Cir.2002) (Before Panel Judge Edmondson, Carnes); Klay v. United Health., No. 02-1664) (11th Cir.2004) (Before Tjoflat); and Cofield v. Alabama Pub Serv, 936 F.2d 512 at 518 (11th Cir.1991); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950).

9.  Judge Orinda D. Evans was obligated to weigh evidence to evaluate whether William M. Windsor took any actions in bad faith, but Judge Orinda D. Evans denied William M. Windsor the ability to present evidence at the hearing.  The hearings were a due process outrage.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Thomas v. Tenneco, 293 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 06/13/2002) (Before Birch and Dubina); U.S. v. Frazier, No. 01-14680 (11th Cir. 10/15/2004) (Before Panel Judges Edmondson and Wilson, Tjoflat, Anderson, Birch, Dubina, Black, Carnes, Barkett, Hull, Marcus); Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 49-50 (1991); Roadway Express v. Piper, 100 S. Ct. 2455, (U.S. 06/23/1980).

10.  The hearing on April 8, 2010 did not comply with due process at all, and Judge orinda D. Evans violated her own order of March 9, 2010.  

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 457 F.3d 1180 at 1193 (11th Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Frazier, No. 01-14680 (11th Cir. 10/15/2004) (Before Panel Judges Edmondson and Wilson, Tjoflat, Anderson, Birch, Dubina, Black, Carnes, Barkett, Hull, Marcus); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64 (1932); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507-08 (1948); Snyder v. Mass,, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 54 S.Ct. 330, 336 (1934); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277, 278.

11.  Judge Orinda D. Evans improperly limited the presentation of evidence at the April 8, 2010 Hearing In the Order that set the Hearing, Judge Orinda D. Evans stated that William M. Windsor would be allowed to present testimony as to whether attorneys’ fees should be awarded.  At the Hearing, Judge Orinda D. Evans said the testimony would be restricted to the reasonableness of the fees.  Judge Orinda D. Evans denied William M. Windsor the ability to address the essential issue.  Judge Orinda D. Evans even denied William M. Windsor the ability to ask questions about the reasonableness of fees.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394.

12.  The DC did not permit William M. Windsor to call witnessesJudge orinda D. Evans denied subpoenas, and William M. Windsor was denied the ability to cross-examine or put documents into evidence.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Adkins v. Christie, No. 06-13057 (11th Cir.2007) (Before Panel Judges Edmondson and Wilson, Birch); U.S. v. Frazier, No. 01-14680 (11th Cir. 10/15/2004) (Before Panel Judges Edmondson and Wilson, Tjoflat, Anderson, Birch, Dubina, Black, Carnes, Barkett, Hull, Marcus); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).

13.  Judge Orinda D. Evans did not consider the law at all in the April 8, 2010 hearing or in the April 9, 2010 order.  The only case cited by Judge orinda D. EvansC in the entire April 9, 2010 Order does not support the April 9, 2010 Order.  It dealt with mandatory attorney fee awards under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: The universal requirement that there must be a legal basis for decisions.

14.  William M. Windsor was given no warning whatsoever that sanctions or attorneys’ fees might be consideredWarnings are required.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1133-34 (11th Cir.2001) (Before Tjoflat, Birch, Dubina); Kelly v. Old Dominion Freight Line, 376 Fed.Appx. 909 (11th Cir. 04/27/2010) (Before Black, Pryor, Fay).

15.  Sanctions were awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1927, but the statute does not apply to pro se parties who are not attorneys.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1133-34 (11th Cir.2001) (Before Tjoflat, Birch, Dubina); Roadway Express v. Piper, 100 S. Ct. 2455, (U.S. 06/23/1980); Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32, 47, (1991).

16.  13-6-11 is not applicable in this action for a number of reasons.  The Plaintiffs (Maid of the Mist) and Judge Orinda D. Evans falsely claimed that Judge Evans could award attorney’s fees pursuant to applies ONLY to recovery of attorneys’ fees for the Plaintiffs’ claims.  William M. Windsor is a defendant.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Chong v. Reebaa Construction, Inc., 2008-GA-A0717.002; Monterrey Mexican Restaurant of Wise, Inc. v. Leon, 282 Ga. App. 439, 638 S.E.2d 879 (2006); Trader’s Ins. Co. v. Mann, 118 Ga. 381, 45 S.E. 426 (1903); Brown v. Baker, 197 Ga. App. 466, 398 S.E.2d 797 (1990); Lineberger v. Williams, 195 Ga.App. 186, 188-189 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).)

17.  There is no evidence of bad faith.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Patel v. McCall, 200 Fed.Appx. 841 (11th Cir. 09/06/2006); Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 08/14/2001) (Before Tjoflat, Dubina, and Birch); Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, (1980); Amlong & Amlong v. Denny’s, No. 04-14499 (11th Cir. 07/31/2006) (Before Hull, Marcus, Hill); Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir.1998) (Before Panel Judge Edmondson, Tjoflat, Carnes); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50, 111 S.Ct. at 2132.

18.  Plaintiffs (Maid of the Mist) did not satisfy the standard for Judge orinda D. Evans to invoke “inherent powers.”

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: In re Sunshine, 456 F.3d 1291 at 1304-1305 (11th Cir.2006) (Before Tjoflat and Barkett); Martin v. Automobile Lamborghini, 307 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir.2002) (Before Panel Judges Edmondson & Kravitch,Barkett).

19.  Judge Orinda D. Evans and the Panel could not make “findings of fact” favoring the Plaintiffs (Maid of the Mist) as the only evidence in the court record was from William M. Windsor.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: EEOC v. Pet, 719 F.2d 383, 384 (11th Cir. 1983); Walker v. NationsBank, 53 F.3d 1548, 1558 (11th Cir.1995) (Before Cox); Johnson v. Florida, 348 F.3d 1334, 1354 (11th Cir.2003) (Before Panel Judges Edmondson and Kravitch, Barkett.

20.  The Sanctions Hearing should have focused on William M. Windsor’s motive, but Judge Orinda D. Evans would not allow that testimony.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Kreager v. Solomon & Flanagan, P.A., 775 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 11/15/1985) (Before Panel Judge Kravitch, Fay); Rothenberg v. Security Management, 736 F.2d 1470, 1472 (11th Cir.1984) (Before Anderson).

21.  William M. Windsor did nothing frivolous as the record of the District Court proved.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Schwartz v. Millon Air, 341 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (11th Cir.2003) (Panel Judge Edmondson, Dubina); Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1241-42.

22.  Plaintiffs (Maid of the Mist) said that what William M. Windsor was thinking was the key issue regarding bad faith, and William M. Windsor testified there was no bad faith.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Jones, 49 F.3d at 694-95; Corp. v. Assoc. Cont., 877 F.2d 938, 943 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1079 (1990) (Before Panel Judge Kravitch, Cox); Souran v. Travelers, 982 F.2d 1497, 1506 (11th Cir.1993) (Before Tjoflat, Cox); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 49, 111 S. Ct. at 2135, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 48; In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995) (Before Cox).

23.  Financial information provided by the Plaintiffs (Maid of the Mist) was insufficient.  The Panel erroneously claims that “Windsor challenges neither Maid of the Mist’s specific time or expense entries nor the specific hourly rates charged.” But he did in the 10-11758-A Brief, pp.57-59. Plaintiffs (Maid of the Mist) did not provide the information necessary to discern the amount of Plaintiffs’ claimed entitlement.  Judge Orinda D. Evans made no specific factual or legal findings.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Reynolds v. Roberts, 207 F.3d 1288, 1302 (11th Cir. 2000) (Before Tjoflat, Dubina); Amlong & Amlong v. Denny’s, No. 04-14499 (11th Cir. 07/31/2006) (Before Hull, Marcus, Hill).

24.  Sanctions against pro se parties are almost non-existent and are inappropriate.  “Sanctions on pro se litigants are appropriate if they were warned that their claims are frivolous and they were aware of ‘ample legal authority holding squarely against them.’”

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Redeker-Barry v. United States, No. 08-16166 (11th Cir. 06/25/2009) (Before Panel Judge Wilson, Carnes, Hull); Spivey v. Zant, 683 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 08/16/1982) (Before Tjoflat and Fay); Pollinger v. Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board, No. 09-12295 (11th Cir.2010) (Before Birch, Carnes, Marcus); Barrett v. United States, No. 09-15159 (11th Cir.2010) (Before Panel Judge Wilson, Barkett, Hull).

25.  Plaintiffs (Maid of the Mist) did not meet the requirements to show “vexatious.”  Maid of the Mist presented no affidavits and no testimony even attempting to show that William M. Windsor took action for an improper purpose, without reasonable cause.  William M. Windsor made it clear that he only sought to bring the Plaintiffs (Maid of the Mist) to justice.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S. Ct. 694, 700, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978).

26.  The Panel failed to address William M. Windsor’s charges that Judge Orinda D. Evans is biased and corruptThis is detailed in 10-11758-A Brief, pp.65-67.

27.  Judge orinda D. Evans did not determine William M. Windsor’s ability to pay, and this must be considered under the court’s inherent power to impose a sanction.   Judge orinda D. Evans made no factual inquiry into whether or not William M. Windsor could pay the sanctions as required by law.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Martin v Automobili Lamborghini, 307 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 09/30/2002) (Before Panel Judge Edmondson, Barkett, and Kravitch); Durrett v. Jenkins, 678 F.2d 911 (11th Cir. 06/14/1982) (Before Tjoflat); Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 08/14/2001) (Before Tjoflat, Dubina, and Birch); Campos v. City of Naples, 202 Fed.Appx. 381 (11th Cir. 10/25/2006) (Before Anderson, Birch, and Hill); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49-50 (1991).

28.  The panel failed to address that there are 126 false statements in the contempt order.  Judge Orinda D. Evans is a pathological liar, and the record proves it.

29.  There is evidence that William M. Windsor was not allowed to present at the Hearings, and the denial was an abuse of due process and William M. Windsor’s Constitutional rights.  15 pages do not permit a listing of the MASSIVE Constitutional violations.
 

30.  There was no contempt; the injunction violates FRCP Rule 65 because it is ambiguous.  Judge Orinda D. Evans admitted the legal requirement that “an ordinary person reading the court’s order should be able to ascertain from the document itself exactly what is proscribed.”  Then she outrageously claims that “claims arising from the same factual predicate or nucleus of operative facts as the instant case” and “would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata” should be comprehensible to an ordinary citizen.  Ridiculous!

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S. Ct. 201, 19 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1967); Pasadena City Board Education et al. v. Spangler et al., 96 S. Ct. 2697, 427 U.S. 424 (U.S. 06/28/1976); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 08/10/2005); United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 03/30/1987); Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 78 F.3d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir.1996) (Before Anderson and Carnes); Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techplosion, 261 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 08/16/2001) (Before Panel Judge Wilson); American Red Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1139, 143 F.3d 1407 (11th Cir. 06/16/1998) (Before Tjoflat); Abbott Laboratories v. Unlimited Beverages, 218 F.3d 1238, 218 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 07/14/2000) (before Panel Judge Edmondson and Barkett).

31.  The December 22, 2009 injunction order is all about res judicata, and res judicata did not apply.  Judge Orinda D. Evans tried to deny that res judicata applied, but the injunction order specifies res judicata:

“Finally, Windsor is ORDERED not to file in any court any new lawsuit which involves claims arising from the same factual predicate or nucleus of operative facts as the instant case.  These claims would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  The filing of such claims would serve no purpose except to harass Plaintiffs, and would probably result in sanctions against Windsor.” (Docket #723, Order dated December 22, 2009, P.19-¶4.)

The April 26, 2010 Contempt Order has nothing to do with issue preclusion.  William M. Windsor’s actions in Washington-DC are not subject to res judicata because res judicata does not apply to an independent action in equity, action pursuant to Rule 60(d), or an action pursuant to the court’s inherent powers, for fraud on the court.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944); Day v. Benton, No. 08-16958 (11th Cir. 09/24/2009) (Before Hull, Marcus, Pryor).

32.  William M. Windsor’s actions with the appellate court and in Washington-DC are not improper because the “nucleus of operative fact” pertains only to facts and causes of action that existed (or could have been claimed) at the time this action was filed on August 29, 2005.  There was no “nucleus of operative fact” issue with William M. Windsor’s appellate actions or the Washington-DC Action.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Sherrod v School Board, 272 Fed. Appx. 828 (11th Cir. 2008) (Before Dubina, Marcus, Pryor); Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir.1992) (Before Kravitch and Edmondson); Pleming v. Universal-Rundle, 142 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 06/08/1998) (Before Birch, Fay); Travelers Indemnity v. Bailey, 129 S.Ct. 2195, 174 L.Ed.2d 99 (U.S. 06/18/2009); Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472 (U.S. 04/28/2010); Nevada v. U.S., 463 U. S. 110, 130 (1983) (quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352 (1877).

33.  The requirements were not met for a finding of contempt.  The Plaintiffs (Maid of the Mist) produced absolutely no evidence that William M. Windsor willfully violated the injunction.  He didn’t.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “willful” as voluntary and intentional.”  The two cases cited by the Panel (McGregor v. Chierico and Jordan v. Wilson) require willful disregard of the authority of the Court as expressed in 2007 in Georgia Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 484 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 04/17/2007), which has precedence over any case cited by the Panel.  The other case cited by the Plaintiffs (Maid of the Mist) was 17 years prior (Howard Johnson v. Khimani). Because the contempt sanction was criminal, willfulness is absolutely required, and there was no such showing.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: U.S. v. Baldwin, 770 F.2d 1550, 1558 (11th Cir. 1985) (Before Panel Judge Kravitch); Riccard v. Prudential Ins., 307 F.3d 1277, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) (Before Panel Judge Edmondson, Carnes); Georgia Power v. NLRB, 484 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 04/17/2007) (Before Marcus and Hill); Fleischmann Distilling v. Maier Brewing, 87 S. Ct. 1404 (U.S. 05/08/1967).

34.  William M. Windsor’s actions in Washington-DC are not subject to res judicata because the parties are not identical and the causes of action are totally different.  The Panel ignored that the injunction order was based on res judicata. (Docket #723, Order dated December 22, 2009, P.19-¶4.)

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001); Sherrod v. School Board of Palm Beach County, No. 07-13747 (11th Cir. 04/07/2008) (Before Dubina, Marcus, Pryor); and many others.

35.  Judge Orinda D. Evans had the inherent power to reopen the case for an investigation of fraud upon the courts, but she told William M. Windsor that she had no such power. That was a lie.

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Hazel-Atlas Glass v. Hartford-Empire, 322 U.S. 238, 64 S. Ct. 997, 88 L. Ed. 1250 (1944); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, No. 93-1121 (U.S. 04/18/1995); Rozier v. Ford, 573 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (5th Cir. 1978); Day v. Benton, No. 08-16958 (11th Cir. 09/24/2009)( Before Hull, Marcus, Pryor); In re Ocon, No. 08-11226 (11th Cir. 02/19/2009) (Before Birch, Hull, Pryor).

36.  False statements were made to the court by Plaintiffs’ (Maid of the Mist) attorney.  The Panel ignored the documented proof.

There has been fraud upon the courts.  Judge Orinda D. Evans has obstructed justice by concealing the documents submitted to the court under seal for an in camera inspection. [Doc. 168.]  The Panel ignored this.

37.  William M. Windsor was not provided the legal protections required in a criminal contempt hearing.  $5,000 of the sanctions that William M. Windsor was forced to pay were paid to the Court rather than to the Plaintiffs (Maid of the Mist).  This made the Contempt Hearing a criminal contempt proceeding, and William M. Windsor was not given the protection or the procedures required.  Eleventh Circuit Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat is the expert on this issue!

PANEL DECISION CONFLICTS: Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 136 Ed. Law Rep. 201 (11th Cir. 07/13/1999) (Before Tjoflat); United States v. Rizzo, 539 F.2d 458 (5th Cir.1976); See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798-99, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 2133, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987).  

38.  The Panel gave no valid legal authority.  The Panel cited only 8 cases:

    1. Cordoba (ORDER, pp.3-4) are irrelevant as to standard of review. (See ¶¶ 4, 14 above.)
    1. Cliff (ORDER, pp.3-4) are irrelevant as to standard of review. (See ¶¶14 above.)
    2. Chambers v. Nasco (ORDER, p.4) supports Windsor’s positions. (See ¶¶6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 above.)
    3. Hutto v. Finney (ORDER, p.4) supports Windsor’s position. (See ¶¶14 above.)
    4. McGregor v. Chierico (ORDER, p.6) supports Windsor’s position. (See ¶¶13 & 15 above.)
    5. Jordan v. Wilson (ORDER, p.6) supports Windsor’s position. (See ¶¶13 & 15 above.)
    6. Doe v. Bush (2001) (ORDER, p.6) is not the precedent on contempt, and Windsor’s contempt hearing was criminal not civil. (See ¶¶ 15 above.) 
    7. Howard Johnson v. Khimani (1990) (ORDER, p.6) is not the precedent on contempt, and Windsor’s contempt hearing was criminal not civil. (See ¶¶ 13, 15 above.)

William M. Windsor cited 397 cases in this appeal.  Please see Page viii in the Petition; each of the case law citations for Eleventh Circuit Judges is indexed for easy reference.

CONCLUSION

39.  The Panel issued the ORDER because they are criminally biased against William M. Windsor.  The entire Eleventh Circuit must vote to hear this matter and reverse the decision.  This Petition must be granted.  Failure to do so will be a criminal act.

Submitted, this 21st day of November 2011.


William M. Windsor


I, William M. Windsor, am not an attorney.  This website expresses my OPINIONS.   The comments of visitors to the website are their opinions and do not therefore reflect my opinions.  This website does not provide legal advice.  I do not give legal advice.  I do not practice law. This website is to expose corruption in government, law enforcement, and the judiciary. Whatever this website says about the law is presented in the context of how I or others perceive the applicability of the law to a set of circumstances if I (or some other author) was in the circumstances under the conditions discussed.  Despite of my concerns about lawyers in general, I suggest that anyone with legal questions consult an attorney for an answer, particularly after reading anything on this website.  The law is a gray area at best. Please read our Legal Notice and Terms.I, William M. Windsor, am not an attorney.  This website expresses my OPINIONS.   The comments of visitors to the website are their opinions and do not therefore reflect my opinions.  This website does not provide legal advice.  I do not give legal advice.  I do not practice law. This website is to expose corruption in government, law enforcement, and the judiciary. Whatever this website says about the law is presented in the context of how I or others perceive the applicability of the law to a set of circumstances if I (or some other author) was in the circumstances under the conditions discussed.  Despite of my concerns about lawyers in general, I suggest that anyone with legal questions consult an attorney for an answer, particularly after reading anything on this website.  The law is a gray area at best. Please read our Legal Notice and Terms.

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