Complaint of Judicial Misconduct by Judge Frank M. Hull by Joseph S. Norman

This Complaint of Judicial Misconduct by Judge Frank M. Hull by Joseph S. Norman is due to the obvious appearance of fraud and/or participation in conduct that is prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts by Judge Frank M. Hull.  The other Court of Appeals judges involved in the case under question were Judge Dubina and Judge Tjoflat. 

COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE FRANK M. HULL
BY JOSEPH S. NORMAN II
as defined by Section 351 (a) title 28 U.S.C.

This complaint is due to the obvious appearance of fraud and/or participation in conduct that is prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts by Judge Frank M. Hull.  The other Court of Appeals judges involved in the case under question were Judge Dubina and Judge Tjoflat.  In writing the opinion Judge Frank M. Hull states:

II STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, construing all allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Lowell v. American Cynamid  Co., 177 F.3d 1228, 1229 ( 11th Cir. 1999); Harper v. Thomas, 988 F2d 101, 103 (11th Cir.1993). A complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts, which would entitle plaintiff to relief. Hall v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 157 F 3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 1998); Terry v. Cook, 866 F2d 373, 375 (11th Cir 1989).

Our review of a summary judgment order is also de novo.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 5TH EDITION

Fraud. “An intentional perversion of truth for the purposes of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right.  A false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.”

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Using the definition of fraud found in Black’s Law Dictionary, Judge Hull perpetrated fraud when the STANDARD OF REVIEW  was presented.  During the judicial evaluation process of my complaint there was zero judicial comment on the evidence and case law that supported the complaint.  The defendant’s did not comment on any case law and evidence nor did they provide any case law to support their defense.  The court did not provide any case law on which they relied in reaching  their conclusions.  The court did contradict circuit case law on the identical issue when it reached conclusions in this case.

Fraudulent representations by Judge Frank M. Hull constitutes bad conduct that is prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS OF THE CASE

The case number is 97-5587-CV-EBD in the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT.  Joseph S. Norman II (Norman) was a named Plaintiff/Appellant in this case. Norman was one of hundreds of airline pilots who brought suit against the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) and certain officials of the union regarding the publication and distribution of a defamatory list of “SCAB” airline pilots that worked for Eastern Airlines during the sympathy strike of 1989. Norman was never more than a pilot trainee during this job dispute yet his name is on the “SCAB” list.  Norman filed an appeal to the 11th Circuit from the Southern District of Florida pro se.

On October 25, 1999 the 11th  Circuit ruled in favor of the Defendants.  Judge Hull wrote the majority opinion and stated regarding all Appellants, apparently, except Norman.

“the Eastern MEC unanimously adopted a formal resolution to “publish a finalized list of strike breaking pilots at the conclusion of the ALPA sympathy strike” and “to bring internal union charges under ALPA’s constitution Against ALPA members who crossed the picket lines.  Individuals were placed on this list of working pilots only upon receipt of two confirmed reports that they had crossed ALPA picket lines, and after being provided with “an opportunity to refute the allegation that they had crossed picket lines to fly for Eastern.”

and

“During the sympathy strike, ALPA had compiled a “scabs” list of pilots who crossed union picket lines to fly for Eastern.”

Norman notes in this complaint the operative word used in both statements by the court majority is fly. The word fly is used to define the work done which qualified a name to be placed on the “SCAB” list.  The word “fly” in any tense (fly, flew, flown) was never applicable to the activity of Norman during the Eastern strike, a fact that was repeatedly made known  to the court.

And the Court states:

“This court reviews de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, construing all allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

In addressing Appellant Norman, Judge Hull writing for the majority states:

“Norman’s contentions lack merit.  The record shows that Norman was hired by Eastern as a DC-9 Captain and received compensation while in training.  One of his job requirements was to participate in the pilot training program. Under these circumstances, Norman was “working” for Eastern in the ordinary sense of the term.  It is this colloquial use of “working” - and not Norman’s legal classification under the Railway Labor Act-that is relevant in determining whether “scab” can be applied to him.  Consequently, ALPA had no additional reason to know that Norman was not a SCAB; his situation is therefore no different from all the other pilots who worked despite the strike.”

Just why a United States Court of Appeals Judge is not obliged to use “legal classification” when representing all evidence is considered de novo warrants independent inquiry.

During the Eastern strike of 1989 the circumstances of Norman were no different than the circumstances of hundreds of other pilot trainees.  The names of the other trainees are not on the “SCAB” list while the name of Norman is.  The 11th Circuit in EASTERN AIRLINES INC. v ALPA et al., 920 F 2d 722, Dec. 20 1990, clearly addressed trainee status in the Eastern strike. The 11th Circuit determined trainees were not “working Eastern pilots” plain and simple. It is interesting to note that the standard of “SCAB” of Judge Hull for the other Plaintiffs in this case required them to fly for Eastern, but the standard Judge Hull established only for Norman was different.  Norman did not have to fly for Eastern during the ALPA strike to be labeled “SCAB”.  In fact, Norman has never flown an airplane for Eastern in his life and was not given the opportunity to refute the allegation he flew during the strike, as the courts believed.  Norman has always been an ALPA member in good standing and was not brought up under union charges Article VIII of strike breaking as were the ALPA members who crossed the picket lines to fly.

Defendants have represented there was daily monitoring of those who flew aircraft during the strike so that any union privileges could immediately be curtailed for those crossing their picket lines to fly.  The privileges were never curtailed for Norman as evidenced by his union membership cards and other documentation, which is in the record, and was continually provided by the Defendants to Norman.  With this daily monitoring ALPA knew Norman was not a SCAB.

Judge Hull incorrectly reasoned “Consequently, ALPA had no additional reason to know that Norman was not a scab”.  Had any of the documentation provided to Norman, by the Defendant’s, been legitimately construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff (Norman) or had Judge Hull legitimately considered 11th Circuit case law on trainees the conclusions reached would have certainly been different.

The majority opinion in this case concluded Norman was a “SCAB” because he received compensation while in pilot training.  The treatment of Norman while in training was no different than other pilot trainees during the Eastern work dispute and the Courts determined in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, et al., 744 F. Supp. 1140, S.D. Fla., 1990 and the 11th Circuit  in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA et al., 920 F 2d 722, Dec. 20, 1990 that trainee pilots who had not completed the airline training program and initial operating experience, had not obtained Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certificate, and had not started flying revenue flights were not “working Eastern pilots”. They had not performed work ordinarily discharged by striking pilots and they were not employees protected by the Railway Labor Act.  By this definition of Judge Edward Davis and the 11th Circuit  Norman never crossed a picket line to do work for Eastern Air Lines.  The other Plaintiffs in the case did cross the picket lines to “work”, i.e. fly.

Compensation has never been an issue in any airline trainee case law – never – the issue always boils down to whether or not the trainee has participated in a revenue flight.  A pilot looses his / her trainee status and becomes a pilot for the carrier on strike the minute a revenue flight begins- a definition well established in industry practice and case law.  That definition is also used by the Defendants and is why Norman was never accused of strike breaking under the union Constitution and Bylaws.  .

Judge Hull needs to explain, how the  represented STANDARD OF REVIEW  was adhered to with the mound of repeatedly presented case law and evidence in the case record.  Judge Hull needs to explain just why  11th Circuit case law was contradicted  to the benefit of the same defendant — the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA).  Judge Hull also needs to comment on the evidence presented by Norman in this case. If the explanations for her actions are not of sufficient quality she should be asked to tender her resignation to preserve citizen confidence in the justice system and the case should be remanded to District Court for proper review.

If  Judge Hull can provide a proper explanation to the issues raised in this complaint I will humbly apologize for any inconvenience and withdraw this complaint.

In the interest of preserving public confidence in the ability of this circuit to review misconduct complaints, I suggest the review be published and made available on line as the JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT has done. See attached.

Respectfully submitted this the 7th day of June, 2004

Joseph S. Norman II, pro se

Santa Anita Dr.

Tallahassee, FL  32309

Phone:  (850) 893-1484

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner

Chairman House Judiciary Committee

2449 Rayburn House Office Bldg.

Washington, D.C.  20515

Justice Stephen G. Breyer

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

One First Street N.E.

Washington, D.C.  20543

Mr. Blaine Merritt

Council to the House Sub Committee of the Courts

B-351A  Rayburn House Office Bldg.

Washington,  D.C. 20515

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